Envoys were sent to Ariovistus asking him to meet with Caesar at some point midway between them. The king declined, saying that Caesar must come to him if he wanted to talk, and also asking why the Roman felt he needed to intervene in this part of Gaul. In response Caesar sent a new message, reminding the king of the obligation he ought to feel because during his own consulship the Roman people had acknowledged him as `king and friend'. This time the demands were clearly expressed. Ariovistus was not to bring any more Germans across the Rhine to settle in Gaul. Secondly, he must restore the hostages to the Aedui and refrain in future from raiding or threatening them. Compliance would ensure continued good relations with Rome, but refusal would force Caesar to take firm steps to safeguard the Aedui and other allies of the Republic. Ariovistus' reply showed a similar unwillingness to compromise. He was a conqueror and, just like the Romans, saw no reason to be dictated to by others in his treatment of the conquered. The Romans were free to run their provinces as they wished and he claimed the same right in the lands he and his warriors had taken. He had beaten the Aedui, and their hostages had nothing to fear from him as long as the tribe delivered their annual tribute to him. He and his warriors had never been defeated since they came to Gaul and feared no enemy. Having established Ariovistus' overweening pride to his audience, Caesar claims that within an hour of receiving this message, envoys came from the Aedui reporting that their lands had been raided by the Germans. In addition, the Treveri from further north sent word that huge numbers of Seubi - the Germanic people to which Ariovistus and his men belonged - were at the Rhine and trying to cross into Gaul. There were supposed to be one hundred clans making this attempt, a migration that would have dwarfed that of the Helvetii.26
Caesar decided to act, but this time made sure that his grain supply was secure before he began to move. He drove the army on at a quick pace, for they were no longer following the sluggish Helvetii, and after three days received a message informing him that Ariovistus and the German army were advancing on Vesontio (modern Besancon), the main town of the Sequani. Clearly by this time the tribe had broken with its former ally. As the tribal centre it was an important place, sited in a naturally strong position and with large food stores that would be very useful for any army. Not willing for this to fall into enemy hands Caesar drove his men on, forcemarching both day and night with only brief rests until he reached the town, into which he put a garrison. With the race won, he gave the troops several days of rest to recover from their exertions, and also to allow his supplies to catch up. Discontent has always tended to flourish more when armies have time on their hands, rather than when they are busy. Rumours were rife in the town and:
a panic spread after conversations with the Gauls and the traders, who said that the Germans were a race of huge stature, incredible courage and skill with weapons - they claimed that often when they met them they had not been able to sustain even their glance and keen expressions. Then very suddenly a great panic seized the entire army, dismaying the minds and spirits of all ranks. The thing started with the military tribunes and prefects, and the rest of the men lacking military experience who had followed Caesar from the City in an effort to win his friendship: some put forward some excuse obliging them to depart, others asked permission to leave, and a few were shamed into staying ... they were unable to conceal their depression, or at times hide their tears; they cowered in their tents to bemoan their fates, or gathered with friends to lament the common danger. Throughout the entire camp men started drawing up their wills. With these voices of despair, even men with long experience of campaigning, soldiers, centurions, and cavalry officers were affected.27
Some men claimed that they were more worried about the difficult terrain through which the army would have to pass in the next stage of the advance. Others said that they were nervous about the grain supply - a plausible enough concern in the light of the recent operations against the Helvetii. A few officers even declared that there would be an open mutiny and that the soldiers would not obey Caesar's order to advance. The episode provides another indication that the fanatical loyalty which Caesar's officers and soldiers displayed in later campaigns, especially during the Civil War, did not spring up instantly on Caesar's arrival in Gaul, but took time to grow It is interesting that Caesar portrayed the tribunes and other officers as the source of the discontent, for these men were usually equestrians and often the sons of senators. This reinforces the view that these classes were not the sole, nor even necessarily the main target audience for the Commentaries. Dio claims that some of these men complained that the war against Ariovistus had not been authorised by the Senate, so that they were risking their lives purely because of Caesar's personal ambition.21
The proconsul summoned a consilium (a council or briefing). All of the centurions - some 360 men if all of these posts were filled in the six legions - were instructed to attend, along presumably with the other senior officers. It was time for Caesar the orator to use reason and charm his army as he had often in the past worked a crowd in the Forum. He began sternly, as befitted a general given imperium by the Senate and People of Rome, and told them off for daring to question the plans of their legally appointed commander. After giving them this shock and reminder of discipline, Caesar switched to argument. Their nervousness might well prove unnecessary, since there was every chance that Ariovistus would remember his obligation to Caesar because of his recognition by Rome in the previous year and see reason. Even if fighting became necessary, Roman legions had met and defeated German warriors in the past, when Marius smashed the Cimbri and Teutones, and more recently when there were many Germans amongst the slave army of Spartacus. Ariovistus had beaten the Aedui and other Gauls by outwitting and surprising them, not in a fair fight. Such crude stratagems would not work against a Roman army. Those who openly worried about the grain supply insulted him by doubting his care and competence, while ignoring the convoys already coming from allied tribes and the ripe harvest now visible in the fields. He was not worried by the claim that his soldiers would refuse an order to advance:
... at any time when an army has not listened to its commander, either fortune has failed them or bad mistake been discovered . . .. My own integrity has been shown in my life, and my good luck in the war against the Helvetii. Therefore I intend to carry out what I had planned to postpone till a later date, and to break camp in the fourth watch of this coming night, so that I may see once and for all if duty and honour prevails in your hearts over fear. Anyway, even if no one else follows, I shall set out with just the Tenth Legion, for I have no doubt of its loyalty, and it will act as if it were my own guard.
Caesar had favoured this legion, and had the greatest confidence in its courage.29
The whole speech was a challenge to the centurions' pride in themselves and their units. Caesar's tone displayed disappointment in them, since only cowardice and lack of faith in his leadership could explain their threatened refusal to obey orders. The Tenth was flattered, and its tribunes immediately reported the legion's readiness to obey Caesar's every order and prove that his trust was not misplaced. The other units were each determined not to be outshone by any other legion, and their centurions asked the tribunes and senior officers to assure Caesar that there had never been any real question of disobedience.30
As he had promised, Caesar marched the army out of camp before dawn of the next day. He did change his plans in one way, which may suggest that he had seen some justification in a little of the criticism. Rather than continue as he had originally planned, through the hills, he sought advice from Diviciacus and took the column through open country. This meant a detour of 50 miles, but prevented a fresh outbreak of croaking amongst his officers. After a week, his scouts reported that the German army was only 24 miles away. Envoys soon arrived from Ariovistus, saying that he was now willing to have the face-to-face meeting that he had previously declined. In the Commentaries Caesar claims that he still hoped for a peaceful resolution of the problem, and this may n
ot simply have been intended to emphasise his reasonableness to his audience. Many Roman commanders, Sulla included, had celebrated the occasions when, surrounded by the full pomp and ceremony of a Roman magistrate and surrounded by the serried ranks of the legions, they had confronted a foreign king and dictated terms to him. There was almost as much glory in such a deed as there was in defeating the enemy in battle, although the potential profits were less, with no prospect of plunder or slaves.31
Five days later the meeting took place on the neutral ground of a plain roughly equal in distance between the two camps. Only one large mound interrupted the flat land. The details of how this would take place had been hammered out in long negotiations during the preceding days. Ariovistus insisted that each of them should only have horsemen in his entourage. Not fully trusting his allied horsemen, Caesar borrowed their mounts and gave them to legionaries from the Tenth so that these provided his escort. Once again delighted to be singled out from the entire army, the soldiers joked that the proconsul was making them knights (equites), punning on the ancient role of the wealthy equestrian order. The two parties stopped 200 paces apart. In accordance with Ariovistus' wishes, each leader then rode forward with only ten men as escort. The language used was Gallic, which Ariovistus had learned during his time west of the Rhine. Caesar presumably used one of his usual interpreters. He began by reminding Ariovistus of the favour done to him by the Republic and the obligations that this implied. The Aedui were very long-standing allies of Rome, and the German's treatment of them was unacceptable and must stop. Caesar's demands were the same as before. No more Germans must be allowed across the Rhine into Gaul and the Aedui must have their hostages returned. Ariovistus' attitude had not changed. What he had won, he had won through right of conquest. Why was Caesar interfering in a place where no Roman army had ever ventured before? This was his `province', just as Transalpine Gaul was Caesar's, and neither of them should interfere in the other man's territory. The German wondered whether `despite Caesar's pretence of friendship, he had brought the army into Gaul to destroy him'. Until the Romans withdrew, Ariovistus would treat them as enemies. In the Commentaries he makes the barbed comment that if he killed Caesar, the news would be welcomed by `many of the principal men and nobles' back in Rome. This may well have been true, but none of his opponents would have liked to be depicted as men so lacking in patriotism that they would be pleased by the defeat of a Roman army as long as it meant Caesar's death. Having made the threat, Ariovistus then offered to support Caesar in every future operation if he withdrew now. 32
Caesar responded with more justification of the Roman position, but the parley broke up when some of the German warriors began throwing javelins or slinging stones at the mounted legionaries. He decided against fighting, since he did not wish to give the impression that the Romans had broken faith. After two days, Ariovistus sent word asking for another meeting, or alternatively for the Romans to send envoys to his camp. Reluctant to risk any of his senior officers on this mission, Caesar again showed his trust in Valerius Procillus by selecting him for the task. With him went Caius Mettius, a merchant who in the past had visited Ariovistus and received his hospitality. This time the welcome was less warm and both envoys were denounced as spies and thrown into chains by the Germans.33
Ariovistus had evidently decided on a military solution to the dispute. Yet he was an experienced war-leader who had welded his warriors into a more cohesive force than most tribal armies and he still acted cautiously. On the same day as he arrested the Roman envoys, he advanced to camp on high ground 6 miles from the Roman position. Probably remaining on high ground, he led his army out again on the following morning and marched past Caesar's camp to establish a new base 2 miles behind the Romans. This cut Caesar off from his supply lines to the allied tribes. For five days the proconsul ordered his army out of camp and formed a battle line. The Germans refused to come down and Caesar clearly felt it unwise to risk a direct attack on Ariovistus' camp, which suggests that it was in a strong position. There were skirmishes on these days, mostly between the cavalry, but no full-scale fighting developed. Ariovistus' horsemen worked closely with picked light infantry - who in later centuries were known to the Germans as the `hundred' (centeni) - capable over short distances of keeping pace with the horses by grabbing onto their manes. The warriors on foot acted as a solid support, behind which the cavalry could retreat if worsted, and rest and re-form before advancing again. The tactics and the quality of the Germanic warriors usually gave them the edge over Gaulish cavalry.34
Caesar could not afford to remain where he was, for he was achieving nothing and each day his army consumed a significant part of the supplies he had with him. A direct attack was too risky, so instead he decided to reopen his supply lines. The army formed into three columns, each of which could be readily converted into a fighting line to make up the normal triplex acies. The baggage train and presumably some guards remained in the main camp, for Caesar only intended to create an outpost beyond the German position. The Romans marched past the German camp to a spot just under 1,000 yards away from it. Once there the legions faced towards the enemy. The German cavalry along with 16,000 infantry came out to oppose them. This was only a part of Ariovistus' foot, but it is unlikely that he was able to get more of them armed and ready for battle quickly enough to intervene. Caesar ordered the cohorts in the third line to begin laying out and constructing a new camp to accommodate two legions, while the first and second lines met any German attack. These probably took the form more of probes and feints rather than an all-out assault. If most of the six legions took part in this manoeuvre then two-thirds of their strength plus the cavalry and light troops would at the very least have matched the German numbers. After several hours of this, the camp defences were ready. Two legions were installed, while the rest of the army marched back in the same order to the main camp. The smaller fort would now make it easier to protect supply convoys coming from the allied tribes. The pressure on Caesar for a quick victory or an ignominious retreat was removed, and he could afford to wait for the moment and situation of his choice before engaging the enemy army35
On the next day Caesar ordered the legions out of both camps to form up in the standard triplex acies facing the enemy. It was a gesture of confidence, intended to encourage his own men and impress the enemy, and he says that this was his normal practice during these days. Ariovistus declined the offer of battle and at noon the Roman commander sent his men hack. Later in the afternoon the Germans did become aggressive, sending out troops to attack the smaller camp, but the troops there were able to repulse the onslaught. That evening Caesar personally questioned some of the prisoners who had been taken. These men claimed that Ariovistus was reluctant to risk a full-scale battle because the women who acted as diviners for the German army had declared that he would only win a victory if he waited until the full moon. Ceremonies and sacrifices were normal in most armies before battles, but Caesar, the Pontifex Maximus, makes no mention throughout the Commentaries of the rituals that were a very important aspect of the legions' routine. In this case, he decided to exploit the superstition of the enemy. On the next day he stripped the camps of all but the barest minimum of guards and formed the rest of the army into a triplex acies, with the cavalry probably on the wings. He then led the army straight up the slope against the Germans, going far closer to their camp than he had ever done on the previous days. This challenge was too bold to ignore without humiliation, and the risk that his warriors would become daunted by the enemy. Ariovistus led out his men, who formed in units according to their clans and tribes - mention is made of seven distinct contingents. Behind the line were the warriors' wives, perched on wagons and cheering on their men folk, begging them to protect them from slavery at the hands of the enemy.36
Battle against Ariovistus
In this battle all six legions took their place in the battle line, so that Caesar clearly felt that the Eleventh and Twelfth now had sufficient experience of campaigni
ng to cope with the stress of battle. Probably they were both sandwiched between more experienced units and it is very likely that a veteran legion was stationed on each flank. Caesar's five legates and his quaestor were each given command of a legion `so that every man should have a witness of his courage'. He stationed himself on the right flank, where he thought the enemy line was weakest and most likely to be broken. The battle began suddenly, both sides charging into contact without the normal exchange of missiles. Caesar managed to break through the enemy left, but was too closely involved to keep much control of the other sectors of the battle. The German right began to drive back the Roman left, and it was only the prompt action of the young Publius Crassus, who as commander of the cavalry `could move around more easily than the officers in the main line', which saved the day. Crassus ordered up the cohorts of the third line and they restored the situation. Soon afterwards the breakthrough on the far wing spread panic throughout the entire German army, which collapsed into flight. Caesar himself led his cavalry at the head of a pursuit that was both determined and utterly ruthless. One later source that probably refers to this battle claims that he deliberately gave an escape route to a group of Germans who were desperately resisting so that he could slaughter them more easily in flight. Ariovistus himself escaped, and from then on disappears from history. Two of his wives - one the sister of a Norican king - and one of his daughters were less fortunate and were killed amidst the general massacre. Another daughter was captured. Even some of those fugitives who escaped across the Rhine were then attacked by other tribes. The Seubi, who were supposed to have been waiting to join their kinsmen in Gaul, returned to their own homes. Much to Caesar's delight, the troops he was actually with came across Valerius Procillus and were able to rescue him from his captors. The proconsul claimed that the reunion gave him `as much pleasure as the victory itself'. The emotion was surely genuine, though of course it also helped to confirm Caesar's reputation for loyalty to his friends. Procillus was doubtless even more relived, for he told them that the Germans had three times asked the diviners whether he should be burnt to death, but that thrice he had been saved by the lot. The other captured envoy, the trader Mettius, was also released unharmed .17
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