The choice of which side to join does not seem to have required much thought for the overwhelming majority of Caesar's troops, but for most Romans it was very difficult. Only a small number of people were deeply committed by the time hostilities opened. Even some of those who might have appeared fervent partisans now took a step back. One was Caius Claudius Marcellus, who as consul in 50 Bc had presented the sword to Pompey and called on him to defend the Republic. Now that civil war had come, he chose to remain neutral, perhaps thinking of his marriage to Caesar's niece. Calpurnius Piso could not be expected to side against his son-in-law, but did not play an active part in the war, especially in the early months. Family ties and longstanding bonds of friendship played a major role in determining allegiance for many men, but in the small world of the Roman elite many men had links with the leaders on both sides and faced a very difficult decision. Most did not feel a strong commitment to either side, but memories of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians suggested that refusing to take part would not guarantee a man's safety. Brutus, Servilia's son, had studiously avoided ever speaking to Pompey, as he had executed Brutus's father in 78 Bc during Lepidus' rebellion. Now he decided that his mother's long-time lover was in the wrong and declared himself willing to serve under the command of his father's killer. In part this was a matter of principle, but with his family connections there can have been little real doubt about his decision. He had been raised in Cato's house and shared his uncle's love of philosophy, while his wife was one of Appius Claudius' daughters.4
There was one major defection from Caesar's army when Labienus left him in the middle of January. His senior legate had served with him in Gaul from the very beginning and had proved himself to be by far the most gifted of his senior officers. Compared to the other legates, Labienus was granted a more prominent place in the Commentaries. Scholars have put forward the conjecture that Labienus held the praetorship before coming to Gaul, perhaps in 60 BC, but there is absolutely no evidence for this. If this is correct, then he would have been at least fifty years old by the time of the Civil War and thus had been eligible for the consulship for a considerable time. On Caesar's behalf he had effectively postponed his own career for the duration of the campaigns in Gaul. As a legate he won some glory, although the lion's share of this went always to the proconsul. Several of his independent operations, especially those against the rebellious tribes in 54-53 and 52 BC, would certainly have won him a triumph had Labienus been a provincial governor himself, instead of a subordinate. He had also become very rich during these campaigns, for Caesar was far more generous with money than he was with glory. Cicero bemoaned the new-found wealth of Labienus. He may also have attracted the scorn of Catullus, if the theory is true that he was the Mentula - dick or dickhead - attacked in his poems. It is more than possible that Caesar intended further reward and hoped to have Labienus as his consular colleague in 48 BC. There seem to have been rumours about the senior legate's loyalties as early as the summer of 50 BC, but Caesar had chosen to show his confidence in his subordinate by sending him to Cisalpine Gaul, near to Italy and therefore also nearer to hostile influences. In the event the gesture failed and Labienus went to join Caesar's enemies. He may in fact have simply returned to an earlier loyalty, since he came from Picenum, a region dominated by Pompey's family. Past service with Pompey has been conjectured, as well as support in his career. All of this is plausible enough, but personal dissatisfaction may have been just as important. Successful generals have throughout history tended to display supreme self-confidence, often combined with a readiness to denigrate the skill of others, and jealousy of other men's fame - Napoleon's marshals and the Allied senior commanders in the Second World War spring to mind, but many examples could be found. Labienus had given a large chunk of his best years to Caesar and seems to have felt that this had not been sufficiently recognised. On several occasions during the campaigns he may well have felt that it was his ability and deeds, and not Caesar's, which had won the day. Our sources give the impression that he had an abrasive character and was by no means a likeable man. Resentment at having always to come second to another man, and the conviction that his real worth had not been recognised, may well have contributed to his decision. He may also have judged that Caesar was likely to lose the war, especially once the proconsul was deprived of his own talent. Hearing that Labienus had defected, Caesar decided on another gesture and gave instructions that all of his baggage should he sent after him.'
The prospect of gain and personal advantage from picking the right side were evidently important for many men faced with the prospect of war. As early as August 50 BC Cicero's correspondent Caelius Rufus had expressed his own cynical view:
You won't forget of course, that in a domestic squabble, carried on constitutionally and without resort to armed conflict, then men ought to espouse the more honourable cause; however, when it's a war and the military camp, espouse the stronger, and hold the side to be best which is strongest. In all this strife I can see that Pompey will be backed by the Senate and the 'lawyers'- all those with plenty of fear and little hope will join Caesar, whose army is incomparably better.'
True to his word, Caelius joined the side with the better army rather than the one championed by most distinguished men and with the better cause. Not everyone agreed with his judgement on the balance of power. Caesar had ten legions, all veterans of the campaigns in Gaul, along with the equivalent of two more in the twenty-two independent cohorts raised in Transalpine Gaul, and auxiliaries and allies from Gaul and Germany. Losses to battle, accident and disease make it unlikely that any of the legions - especially the ones with longest service - had anything like their paper strength of soldiers. A generous estimate would give Caesar something like 45,000 legionaries at the beginning of 49 BC, but the figure could as easily have been as low as 30,000-35,000. Man for man these soldiers were better than any of the troops available to the enemy. There were the two legions that had been taken from Caesar and were now camped in southern Italy. One of these, the First, had on its formation taken an oath to Pompey, but the other - originally the Fifteenth, now renumbered the Third - had been raised by and for Caesar. Both units had served for three campaigns in Gaul. Pompey swiftly realised that the optimistic reports of their disaffection with their old commander were little more than a fantasy. For the moment at least, he did not feel confident enough to lead these men into battle against their former comrades and general. He did have seven fully formed and trained legions in the Spanish provinces, but these had little or no experience of actual warfare and so lacked the confidence Caesar's men possessed after years of victory. Even more importantly they were far away, unable to play a part in the initial stages of the conflict. In the long term Pompey and his allies could call on far greater resources of manpower, money, animals and equipment than Caesar. A flood of recruits in all parts of Italy was confidently predicted, and with the consuls on their side they had access to the wealth of the State. Overseas, Pompey had clients and connections in Spain, North Africa and throughout the East, all of whom could be called upon to supply soldiers and contribute financially to the cause. It would take time to mobilise all these resources, to raise an army or armies, equip them and provide logistic support, as well as turning raw recruits into soldiers. One of the reasons why Pompey and his allies had adopted such an inflexible line in the months building up to the war was their absolute confidence that they possessed the military might to crush Caesar. On balance this was probably a fair assessment, as long as their opponent gave them time to prepare.
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, JANUARY TO MARCH
The news that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon stunned his opponents. January was a difficult time to keep an army supplied in the field. In spite of earlier rumours, they may well have known that the bulk of his forces were still north of the Alps. It was probably also an indication that, even after passing the senatus consultum ultimum and beginning to mobilise, many of them really did expect him to back down in th
e face of their unity and obvious strength. Perhaps there was an assumption that he would wait for the campaigning season and carefully mass his forces before acting, maybe even remain on the defensive in the hope of continued negotiation. In the days following 7 January the Senate had convened on several occasions outside the boundary of the city, so that Pompey could reassure the senators. His father-in-law Metellus Scipio was given command of Syria, while Domitius Ahenobarbus was to go to Transalpine Gaul as proconsul. Caesar notes in the Commentaries that they did not deign to ratify all these appointments with a vote in the Popular Assembly in the usual way. However, both men did perform the normal ceremonies for a magistrate setting out for a command, and then rushed off to their provinces, as did the propraetors appointed to other commands. One of the latter was given Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar's opponents had openly decided to make use of force against him, but they were not yet ready. Levies were underway, arms and equipment were being gathered, but by no stretch of the imagination could Italy have been described as prepared to meet an invasion. Caesar was not ready either, in the sense that he would surely have liked to have a stronger force at his immediate disposal before acting. He had sent orders to several other formations instructing them to move to join him, but they would not all arrive for some time. His opponents were still unprepared, and waiting would only give them a chance to grow stronger. Never one to delay unless this would bring him clear advantage, Caesar advanced with only the Thirteenth.7
Ariminum, already infiltrated by his men, did not resist him. For a while he remained there but sent Antony with five cohorts to occupy Arretium (modern Arrezo), despatching three more to Pisaurum, Fanum (modern Fano) and Ancona respectively. There was no fighting. News of the crossing of the Rubicon seems to have reached Rome on about 17 January. Pompey and his leading allies promptly left the city, for Pompey quickly realised that at present he simply did not have the forces to stop Caesar. This meant that Rome had been abandoned by all senior magistrates and so the public life of the Republic for the moment ceased to be conducted in the proper way. Many uncommitted senators went with them, remembering the bloody entries into Rome made by Marius and Sulla. Others simply left Rome and went to their country houses, planning to keep a low profile. Around this time a number of unofficial envoys came to Caesar at Ariminum. One was Lucius Julius Caesar, son of the former consul who had served as his legate for a number of years. He brought a message from Pompey, assuring Caesar that his actions were not motivated by personal hostility, but were dictated by his duty to the Republic. His old ally urged Caesar to lay down his command voluntarily and prevent civil war. A similar request was brought by the praetor Lucius Roscius. Caesar replied by stating that all he wished was to exercise the rights legally granted to him by the Roman people. His enemies had been raising troops for some time. If they wanted peace then Pompey should go to his province, then both of them could lay down their commands and disband their armies - along with all the other troops in Italy - at the same time. Not for the last time he also asked Pompey to come and meet him in person. By 23 January Lucius Caesar the Younger reached Pompey, who was now at Teanum in Apulia. According to Cicero writing two days later, Caesar's:
The Italian campaign 49 BC
terms were accepted with the proviso that he must at once withdraw all his garrisons from the towns which he had occupied outside his province. Once that was done, they replied that we should return to the city and settle the matter in the Senate. I hope at present that it will be possible for us to have peace. For one leader regrets his rash folly and the other his lack of forces.'
Letters were sent to Caesar informing him of the offer - as he himself put it, that he should `go back to Gaul, abandon Ariminum and disband his forces'. To him this was an `unfair deal'. No date was given for Pompey's departure to his provinces or his laying the command down and giving up his armies. It was obvious that he was effectively being asked to give up the military advantage he had gained by his sudden invasion. His opponents wanted him to withdraw and then trust to their giving his demands a sympathetic hearing in future meetings of the Senate. There was no reason for Caesar to believe that things would go better for him than they had in the debates of the last eighteen months. Pompey and his allies did not trust Caesar enough to stop raising troops in expectation that he would accept their terms. In return Caeser did not trust them sufficiently to take the first step towards peace and go back to his province. Caesar does seem to have been especially frustrated by Pompey's reluctance to agree to a face-to-face conference. In the past the two men had got on well and he seems to have been confident that he could reach a genuine agreement with his former son-in-law Pompey may have been unsure about whether or not he could resist Caesar's persuasiveness. For a man with a morbid fear of assassination and memories of an earlier and very brutal civil war, it is possible that he was reluctant to risk such a meeting. Yet in the end it was probably more a question of his relationship with Cato and his other new allies. Their alliance was recent, his friendship with Caesar older and of longer duration. Whatever he felt himself, Pompey knew that these men simply would not believe in his good faith and constancy if he privately met Caesar. Cato had already urged the Senate to appoint Pompey as supreme commander until the crisis was over and the rebellious proconsul defeated. This was rejected by the consuls and ex-consuls who were too proud to be commanded by anyone else. Jealousy and suspicion between allies was as much a hindrance to a negotiated settlement as mistrust between enemies.'
Caesar resumed his advance. A report reached him that Iguvium was held by a garrison of five cohorts under the command of the propraetor Quintus Minucius Thermus, but that the townsfolk favoured him. The two cohorts with him at Ariminum were added to the one stationed in Pisarum and sent under Curio to the town. Thermus retreated, his raw recruits deserted and went home, and Curio's men were welcomed at Iguvium. Trusting in local goodwill, Caesar pushed on to Auxinum and had soon overrun Picenum, supposedly the heartland of Pompey's family. There was one small skirmish in which a few prisoners were taken, but the general population was displaying no enthusiasm for rising up against Caesar and his men. The cause against Caesar had little popular appeal and his army was not plundering or doing anything else that might have created hostility. A few of the Pompeian soldiers even chose to join him. Many communities also remembered the gifts Caesar had distributed to them from the profits of Gaul - he took particular satisfaction in reporting that even the town of Cingulum, which had been especially favoured by Labienus, now willingly opened its gates to him.10
By this time it was February and Caesar had reunited the detachments of the Thirteenth and been joined by the Twelfth. At Asculum another Pompeian garrison fled before him, and it was not until he reached Corfinium that he encountered any serious opposition. In command there was Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had not yet managed to get anywhere near his province. Together with his subordinates he had managed to muster a force of more than thirty cohorts, but these were entirely raw recruits. Pompey had not wanted Ahenobarbus to defend the town, as he had no doubt of the inevitable outcome when such inexperienced troops came up against Caesar's veterans. He was himself much further south in Apulia with the First and Third legions, as well as a number of recent levies. However, he had no power to issue orders to Ahenobarbus and could do no more than send letters urging him to abandon the town and join him. Domitius Ahenobarbus was not a man to change his mind too readily and wrote replies imploring Pompey to come to him. There were no similar divisions over strategy for Caesar. He closed on Corfinium, driving off some enemy cohorts which attempted to break down the bridge outside the town. Soon afterwards Antony was sent with a quarter of the army to Sulmo in response to an appeal from the town. In another bloodless victory the Pompeian commander was captured, taken to Caesar and promptly allowed to go free. In the meantime the Caesarean army gathered food in preparation for the siege of Corfinium. After three days it received a major boost to its strength when it was joined by the Eighth
Legion and the twenty-two cohorts raised from Transalpine Gaul and trained and equipped as legionaries. The troops were set to building a line of circumvallation strengthened by forts to surround the town.
Before the blockade was complete, Domitius Ahenobarbus received a final letter from Pompey making it clear that he had no intention of marching to relieve Corfinium. Deciding now that the town's prospects were not good, he publicly announced that help was on its way, while privately planning his own escape. However, his increasingly furtive manner soon revealed the truth to his legionaries. A council was organised consisting of the tribunes, along with the centurions - almost two hundred of these if the thirty-three cohorts were at full strength - and representatives of the ordinary soldiers to debate the matter. Some of the troops were Marsi, who had a close tie to their commander through his family's estates in the region. At first they were staunchly loyal, even threatening to use force against the other legionaries, but their mood changed when they became convinced that their leader planned to abscond. Ahenobarbus was placed under arrest by his own men, who immediately sent envoys to surrender themselves and the town to Caesar. This was welcome news, since although he had little doubt of the outcome of the siege it would clearly pin him down for several weeks. Instead the matter had been resolved in only seven days. However, he was reluctant to enter the walls immediately, for night was falling and he did not trust his legionaries not to misbehave once they got into the dark streets of the town. So far his army had not plundered or laid waste the lands they passed through, as they had so often done in the past. Instead he had the troops stand to arms in the lines around Corfinium throughout the night to prevent any fugitives from slipping out. Near dawn one of the senior Pompeians, Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who had been consul in 57 BC, surrendered himself and was soon followed by the remaining senior officers.
Caesar: Life of a Colossus Page 52