The report of the interview of the FBI agent who was sent to question Alia's parents in Durango was presented to the task force. It was obvious that her parents knew nothing of their daughter's plans and even less of their son-in-law's actions.
A search of the Jabers' house, as expected, did not provide any clues with regard to their whereabouts. A court order was issued that allowed the investigators to get a list of all the calls made from their home phone and their mobile phones but no useful information was obtained from these lists. A similar permit to get their bank records and credit card transactions showed that the maximum amount of cash withdrawal from their account was carried out on June 14th from the ATM machine located at the employees' union of the Lab. The New Mexico department of motor vehicles provided the details of Nagib's car – it was a latest model black Toyota with a four-wheel drive. Alia's car, an old green Ford, was found in one of the Lab's parking lots.
Meanwhile reported sightings of the culprits started flowing in to the task force temporary office. They were supposedly seen in Colorado, Texas, Utah and Las Cruces, New Mexico. This last location appeared to be credible as they knew that Nagib had attended school there and received his doctorate from NMSU. But this lead, like all the others, turned out to be a case of mistaken identity. The only report that seemed to be substantive was from a traffic police officer in Kingman, Arizona. The officer said that around midnight of the 14th he had spotted a car that exceeded the speed limit and stopped it for examination. The driver was a woman who had a foreign name, probably something that sounded Arabic, but he was not sure if it was Alia Jaber. However, he said that his recollection of the couple exactly fit the photos posted on the APB. When asked what he had done after stopping the car he said that as their papers were in order, and they were not intoxicated, he let them go with an informal warning. He also recalled that they gave him a story about an uncle who was hospitalized in LA in critical condition after being involved in a hit-and-run accident, but added that he did not believe this story he had heard so many times from speeding drivers. He neglected to mention the cash "fine" he had received as he knew that this would be considered as a bribe and lead to his dismissal from the force, if not to a severe punishment. Penny wondered aloud if Los Angeles was indeed their true destination or just the first excuse that came to mind when they were stopped by the police. She said that her intuition was that the destination escaped their subconscious and called for an enhanced effort to locate them in the large LA area.
She directed the junior FBI representative of the task force to call the LA branch of the FBI and have them search for the Jaber couple and for the black Toyota they had driven in. The junior agent called ahead and said he would be arriving that evening and expected full cooperation of all the police departments in the LA metropolitan area. He said that they should focus on used cars dealerships as he assumed that the couple would need to get rid of the Toyota and get a cheaper used car and some cash.
The border crossings did not keep records of US citizens going into Mexico or returning to the US and usually just glanced at the car's registration and asked the occupants if they were US citizens. In some cases, when the driver or passengers looked suspicious they also requested to see some proof of citizenship, but on the whole the traffic flowed freely. The FBI saw no point in asking the Mexicans for information as their cooperation was less than enthusiastic. At the suggestion of the representative of the Department of Homeland Security, Patrick Batterson, prize money was promised to whoever would provide information on the two fugitives. The reward for information on Nagib was $100,000 and on Alia $50,000. Posters with their photos and promised rewards were distributed to all border crossings but, as feared by the experienced FBI people, the number of false sightings grew exponentially compared to the reports after the APB was published. This once again demonstrated that greed was the strongest incentive for getting the public's cooperation. These reports were now a nuisance because every law-enforcement agent knew what would happen if it turned out that a true lead was not pursued, or more specifically if the media found that out after damage was done. As far as Penny was concerned the manpower dedicated to sift through all these reports and follow up on those that appeared to be serious could be put to better use in the field, but like any other committee the politics involved meant that she had to acquiesce with the DHS. She began to regard Mr. Batterson in the same light as she considered the Colonel – a bureaucrat with no imagination whose potential for causing harm should be curtailed.
June 18th, Washington, DC, the Second Task Force
The mission of the second task force was to study the motives of Nagib and Alia Jaber and to try and predict their target. The members included Dr. Eugene Powers from the NNSA who had been appointed as its chairman, Brian Blade from the CIA who was addressed by everybody by his nickname BB and representatives from the DHS, FBI, NSA, State Department and the Pentagon. Eugene, who had interviewed Nagib in person just a couple of weeks earlier, recounted his impression of Nagib. He said that Nagib was very intelligent and managed to deliver his answers quickly and with what appeared to be complete frankness. He relayed the impression Nagib had made on Colonel Groovey and mentioned his own reservations about the smoothness of Nagib's response to all queries as if he had rehearsed them. He also mentioned the fact that he had conveyed his uneasy feeling to his colleague, David Avivi, from the Israeli Mossad. He assured the skeptical members of the group that David could be trusted and related their mutual involvement in the case that became known as the Dreadful Alchemist. Eugene also said that they would need the cooperation of the Israelis to carry out a thorough background investigation of Nagib that would be vital in understanding his motivation. BB was especially dubious because the CIA had come to expect the Israelis to cooperate fully only if it were in their own interests and he wondered aloud if any foreign countries were involved in this case. The DHS representative added that they should focus on dangers to US citizens and property and not worry about what happens in the remote Middle East where tribal wars between Jews and Arabs and between Muslims of different sects were constantly raging. The NSA delegate said that they had checked Nagib's international e-mail messages and phone calls (officially they were only allowed to monitor the international communications or those involving a foreign national) and found nothing at all since he had joined Los Alamos National Laboratory. He did mention that Alia had some relatives in Palestine but had not maintained any contacts with them after her visit several years earlier. The Pentagon representative said that he had reviewed Nagib's work as a contractor in the Albuquerque air force base, before joining the Lab, and got the impression that he had been a hard working, highly motivated employee with good professional skills. The State Department delegate simply nodded and said that he had "no comment". Eugene said that they would work on getting information from the Israelis through official channels and summon the Israeli military attaché to their next meeting, but decided to share his concerns with David without informing the committee.
The task force members discussed their next steps for quite a long time until a consensus about the priorities was reached. They agreed that the designs of nuclear weapons in themselves were useless unless fissile materials could be obtained. They also postulated that all nuclear materials in the US were well guarded and therefore the designs themselves did not pose an immediate threat to the security of the United States. The CIA representative, BB, raised the point that these designs would be worth a fortune to terrorist organizations that could get hold of fissile materials or to state entities that did have the necessary materials but could only produce the most primitive atomic weapons. He continued to name the three states that suited this profile: Iran, Pakistan and North Korea. He added that a fanatic Muslim would rule out North Korea, but that they had no evidence that Nagib was a devout Muslim and even had ample evidence to the contrary - he liked to consume alcohol and had never refrained from eating pork products. The senior officer from the Pentag
on said that military intelligence believed that Pakistan had already produced an arsenal of nuclear weapons that included multiple Megaton hydrogen bombs. Iran was therefore the most likely state that would be willing to purchase the stolen designs. Iran had a diplomatic delegation at the United Nations in New York and several of its members used their diplomatic immunity to carry out subversive operations like industrial espionage, purchase sensitive items and export them illegally with the help of fake export licenses and front companies. They also actively encouraged people to convert to Shiite Islam and turn them into "sleeping agents" that could be called upon to carry out seditious acts. Eugene said that the NNSA was also concerned that Iran would try to obtain detailed designs of advanced nuclear weapons despite its commitment iterated in the nuclear deal that was signed in 2015 not to pursue a military nuclear program. The State Department representative nodded and again said that he had "no comment".
When Eugene asked if anyone had practical suggestions the members of the task force unanimously agreed that there were only two operational items: find out more about Nagib and Alia in order to understand where they were heading and increase the surveillance on all Iranian diplomats that were involved in illegal activities on US soil. Eugene's determination to contact David and the Israelis grew stronger and he started thinking of covertly inviting David to the US to unofficially advise him unbeknownst to the committee.
Chapter 6
June 18th, Pasadena, California
Nagib and Alia discussed their options. Unknowingly their conclusions were quite similar to the discussions that took place at the meeting of the second task force. Nagib said that the information they had on the memory stick was worthless unless they could find a suitable partner who will help them take revenge on Israel or its strongest supporter – the United States of America. Alia repeated her objection to do anything that would harm the USA as it was a haven for her parents. They were in agreement that the most likely buyers of the advanced designs were Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, but did not rule out powerful organizations like the Islamic State that may be able to get hold of the fissile materials. Nagib had read the scientific literature and knew that with the proper facilities a nuclear device could be constructed even with materials extracted from irradiated nuclear fuel. After some deliberation on the pros and cons of each of these options they decided to focus on Iran and the Islamic State as these two entities were considered as dire enemies of the Jewish state of Israel. Alia said that they should not rule out Pakistan because it had a strong incentive to improve its nuclear arsenal as a means of retaliation to its much bigger neighbor, India. She added that she had read somewhere that there were strong anti-American feelings in that country, and there were rumors that even inside the government there was a powerful anti-American faction. Nagib said he knew nothing about this but they should not rule out this possibility.
The simplest way to make contact would be to go to one of the many mosques or Islamic Community Centers, ICCs for short, in the Los Angeles area, but as Alia was a Christian and Nagib had drifted far away from his original religion and now saw himself as an atheist, this approach could be dangerous. Furthermore, like every American, and certainly every Muslim in America, they knew that after 9/11 these places were normally under surveillance by the DHS and FBI. They also realized that the religious institutions were riddled with informers and planted agents so they decided to stay away from anything that was identified as a conspicuous Islamic center. There was a large community of former Iranians in Los Angeles but some, especially those that arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were sympathizers of the Shah, some were fully Americanized and some were even Jewish, so finding the right contact would not be easy and could even be dangerous. Alia suggested that they travel to New York and try to contact official members of the Iranian UN delegation but Nagib said that those would probably be under close surveillance. Then they considered crossing into Mexico on the way to Cuba or Venezuela where it would be easier to find Iranian representatives and where the US law enforcement agencies could not operate freely, if at all. They ruled out this option as they believed that the border crossing would be too risky because they were sure that extra precautions would be taken to block this route.
That evening, while watching the news on TV in their motel room they were glad to see that there was no mention of their action and their photos were not shown. During a commercial break a short advertisement promoting tourism to Turkey was shown. Alia excitedly told Nagib that this would be the ideal place to make contact with Iranians and with Islamic State operatives. In addition, many Americans travelled to Turkey so they would not stand out there. The problem then was getting out of the US without being apprehended. They knew that it would be impossible to get an airline ticket and board a plane in an American airport because their description and passport information would be flagged. They did not have the contacts or the cash needed to purchase forged passports, so they figured out that their most promising route would be to cross into Canada and try to make their way to Turkey, indirectly, from there.
June 19th, Washington, DC
David Avivi passed through the passport control at Dulles International Airport, collected his luggage and handed his customs form to the officer and was waved through without any delay or even a second glance. He had been briefed by Dr. Eugene Powers that his presence in Washington was informal and that he should contact him on his private cellphone after settling down in his hotel. The Israeli embassy was informed that David would be in Washington on semi-official business: on the Israeli side he was sent on a mission by Haim Shimony, the Head of Mossad, but as far the US intelligence community was concerned he was there as a private individual. If his presence would be exposed an embarrassing scandal could develop so very few people at the embassy were aware of his visit. David went to the car rental desk and was told that his reservation was upgraded from his nondescript compact car to a red four-wheel drive Jeep Wrangler. To the surprise of the agent at the car rental desk David said that he preferred an intermediate size car and was told that a Chevrolet Cruze would be ready for him in 10 minutes. He took the Washington Dulles Access Road to I-495, headed north and then switched to the I-270 getting off the highway at the Montrose Avenue exit and made his way to the Hilton hotel in Rockville. He preferred this location, far away from the center of Washington, DC, yet readily accessible by the Twinbrook Metro station. This would be an ideal place for meeting with Eugene without drawing unwanted attention. He called Eugene, who was just leaving his office, and they arranged to have dinner in a small Mexican restaurant that was a short walking distance from David's hotel.
On the phone, Eugene did not tell David exactly what documents were downloaded by Nagib, only hinting that they were pertinent to nuclear weapons. David said that the disappearance of the ex-Palestinian scientist with highly classified documents was considered to have possible implications on the security of Israel and Mossad took this situation very seriously. Before leaving Israel David had been briefed by "the Fish" and was given a thick file that the ISA had gathered. It included information on Dr. Nagib Jaber, his family, his childhood friends and particularly on his brother's criminal and terrorist activities. The file noted that the two brothers had been very close although their interests in life differed radically – Nagib had been the studious, rational cool headed type while Yassir was hot-headed and dropped out of school early and then became deeply involved with the Palestinian cause. The ISA had also constructed a thorough record on Alia's relatives and had a report of her visit to her grandparents. David had all the data on his laptop and it was in encoded format so that no unauthorized person could access it.
When David arrived at the restaurant Eugene was already seated at the bar and sipping an ice cold Corona beer in a chilled frosty glass. David sat down beside him and ordered the same. The cool beer was especially welcome considering that outside it was one of the 90/90 days (90 percent humidity and 90 degrees Fahrenheit) Washingt
on was noted for. While seated at the bar they chatted about the weather, family affairs, the flight and the tourist attractions but once they were seated at their corner table and ordered their dinner they got down to business. Eugene told David about the disappearance of Nagib and Alia and said that they had probably copied secret files that contained highly classified information. David tried to find out what kind of information but Eugene refused to elaborate and said that it was very sensitive and could affect not only the US national security but also destabilize the world. David could put two and two together and reckoned that the files may include technical details of modern nuclear weapons, but kept this thought to himself. Eugene then told David about the task force and its two main objectives – discovering the motivation and possible targets - and frankly related his idea to involve the Israeli intelligence agencies and the objections of the other committee members. He explained that it was his own initiative to invite David as his own private consultant and therefore discretion was called for. David said that his participation was approved by the Head of Mossad in person but he was directed to keep a low profile and refrain from doing anything that would deleteriously affect the delicate US-Israeli relations. So by the time they finished their dinner the ground rules for cooperation were set, and now came the time for serious discussions.
They left the restaurant and took a stroll through the quiet neighborhood speaking in low voices. They passed Congressional Plaza and reached a sports pub and bar. They found a quiet table, far away from the TV screens that were showing some reruns of college football games and ordered another beer. There was no one seated near them and they felt that they could talk more freely. David summarized the information collected by the ISA. Nagib had left Palestine over a decade earlier when he was in his early twenties, and had never returned there. He had never been in trouble with the Israeli or Palestinian authorities but his brother, Yassir, was a notorious terrorist in the eyes of the Israelis or a revered martyr in the Palestinian view. The two brothers admired each other's lifestyle and achievements – Yassir regarded Nagib's scientific career with great pride and Nagib respected Yassir's total dedication to Palestine. David said that Nagib did not follow in his brother's footsteps and was not involved with any terrorist organization even after his parents' home was demolished by the Israelis. The ISA noted that this was exceptional because Arab youths that went through similar experiences usually were short tempered and sought revenge. The psychologist employed by the ISA emphasized that this type of behavior, lack of reaction, would be frowned upon in Palestine and Nagib would be considered as not man enough had he not lived abroad. The psychologist added that in Arab culture "revenge should be served cold", namely the longer a person waited to avenge an offence the better. He said that it could not be ruled out that Nagib had waited for the proper circumstances to exact his reprisal and seized it when presented with the opportunity. David said that when he asked the psychologist what form the retribution could take the answer was that the longer the open sore festered the more venomous it became. The ISA did not have much data on Alia's family and only said that her parents, like many other Christians who felt unsafe under the Palestinian Authority's rule and immigrated to a place where they hoped their children would have a better future. Many took up residence in South America, especially in Chile and Peru, and others moved to the United States or European countries like Germany or Scandinavia, usually joining family members that had preceded them. There was record of Alia's visit to Israel and Palestine a few years earlier but her grandparents were no longer alive and her remaining uncles and cousins refused to cooperate. Eugene thanked David for the update and said that it may be the key to understanding Nagib's behavior that was supposedly out of character. He noted that none of his friends or colleagues had ever heard him say anything against Israel or criticize the support it received from the US. They recalled that Nagib's doctoral advisor, Professor Jack Chen, was a former Israeli that had helped Nagib with his career and was the guest of honor at his wedding with Alia. So it was unclear what Nagib had in mind and what he really thought about Israel.
The Dreadful Renegade: A Thrilling Espionage Novel (Techno thriller, Mystery & Suspense) Page 7