Juno Beach

by Mark Zuehlke

  Corporal Richard Bryant, Casey’s driver, was struggling to forget the grim image of several Canadian corpses lying on the edge of the beach with their clothes blown right off by the force of an explosion that must have resulted from one of the men triggering an antitank mine. Bryant kept thinking: “If I don’t forget this, I’m not going to get through.”8

  Soon the tanks closed up on a German trench system and Casey tried to flush any Germans that might be in it by throwing grenades from his position in the top of the turret. When that failed to have any noticeable effect, Casey told Bryant to drive closer so he could be sure to put the grenades right into the trench. “Sir, you’re going to get your head blown off if you’re not careful,” the driver warned.

  But Casey was insistent and also frustrated by the lack of effect the grenades were yielding. To increase the power of the explosions in the trench, the lieutenant started wrapping a grenade and anti-personnel mine together and throwing one of these charges after another into the trench. Suddenly, a burst of machine-gun fire ripped out of the German position and wounded Casey horribly in the head. Bryant spun the tank around and raced towards Bény-surMer and the Regimental Aid Post there while other men in the crew tried to treat Casey’s wound. Although the twenty-nine-year-old officer was soon evacuated off Juno Beach to a hospital in England, he succumbed to his wounds on June 18.9

  When Casey was wounded, Sergeant Beardsley assumed command of the troop and continued the search for the enemy mortar position, but stumbled instead upon a well-hidden battery of four 122-millimetre howitzers protected by several machine guns and light antitank guns. Despite being decidedly outgunned, the sergeant succeeded in silencing the German position with a rapid succession of well-placed 75-millimetre gun rounds. Murray, meanwhile, had tracked the mortar to a position in a dugout in front of the Moulineaux church and destroyed it with several high-explosive shells. The two tanks then rejoined the rest of ‘A’ Squadron, which was advancing towards Colomby-sur-Thaon.10

  The opposition the North Novas and Sherbrookes had encountered prompted 8 CIB Brigadier Ken Blackader to worry that the higher ground overlooking the road from the right might harbour German forces gathering for a counterattack against the long, dangerously extended column. With the column completely exposed by a gap that existed between the two brigades on the east and 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Blackader had no way of knowing what German forces might be lurking in that direction. He therefore ordered Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Morton to detach ‘B’ Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse from its position in front of the Queen’s Own Rifles and have it sortie out through this country in an arc. Morton instructed Major Jack Meindl to take ‘B’ Squadron out on a wide loop from Bény-sur-Mer to Fontaine-Henry and then back to Colomby-sur-Thaon. Meindl was cautioned to not get involved in any major fight but to ensure that no German force in this area got past him to attack the main column.11

  The major’s headquarters section was trailing along in company with No. 5 Troop at the very tail of ‘B’ Squadron, the Shermans grinding up the road just south of Bény-sur-Mer behind the marching ranks of the Queen’s Own Rifles, when this order came. On either side, thick hedgerows presented a barrier too thick for the tanks to easily break through to embark on their new assignment, so No. 1 Troop under Lieutenant J.P. Milner could only bump along behind the infantry while looking for a suitable exit point. From a position much farther back in the column, Morton saw ‘B’ Squadron still rolling up the road despite the fact that Meindl had indicated that he understood the urgency of the task given him. Exasperated, Morton demanded to know what was causing the holdup. Stuck near the rear of the tank column, Meindl was powerless to personally lead the squadron off on its mission. Responsibility for finding an exit from the road lay completely with the lead tank, so the major demanded that Lieutenant Milner get his troop heading in the right direction. With each passing minute and no thinning of the hedgerow, Milner’s headset was buzzing ever more loudly with exhortations to get the job done. Finally, a desperate Milner got on the radio to Sergeant John Shineton, whose tank was at the head of No. 1 Troop. “For God’s sake, do something,” he snapped.

  Looking about frantically, the sergeant decided there was nothing for it but to just try bursting through the hedge and hoping his Sherman didn’t get hung up or lose a track in the effort. With much crashing and clawing of tracks, the thirty-five-ton monster lunged through the heavy foliage and rumbled out into an open field, followed by the rest of the squadron in single file. The sudden appearance of the tanks caught several pockets of Germans dug in behind the hedgerow preparing to ambush the advancing Canadians. Before the Germans could react, Shineton and the other crew commanders in the leading ‘B’ Squadron tanks ripped into them with machine-gun fire, causing a general panic.12

  When all the tanks were spread out in formation in the field, the Fort Garry regimental historian later wrote, “Meindl pushed on joyously, as so far he had only been able to shoot up some German infantry and antitank guns near Bernières.”13 It was the hard-charging gallop so dreamed of by tankers but seldom called for and rarely possible in the uneven European countryside. The primary tank role was to chug along at the pace of the infantry they were supposed to support. Now, if only briefly, ‘B’ Squadron was foraying out as horse cavalry had done for centuries to protect the flank of the main body, perhaps even to crash into the enemy from behind, leaving havoc and destruction in its wake.

  The squadron was bound for Hill 70, a position that overlooked many small crossroads and the villages of Colomby-sur-Thaon and Anguerny. From here, the tankers would be able to lob shells down from the right to cover the main column’s advance. Resistance en route was scant, only a few snipers that the tankers took out if it was possible to do so without slowing down. Barrelling along at full speed, ‘B’ Squadron roared up onto the summit of Hill 70 to see the Canadian column only just making its way out of Basly.

  As No. 5 Troop and Meindl’s headquarters section came up to join the rest of the squadron on the hill, several German high-explosive artillery rounds slammed down on the hill. By mischance, one round dropped directly through a hatch on Lieutenant Norman Brown’s tank. The ensuing explosion instantly killed the No. 5 Troop leader and his entire crew. Shrapnel from another shell seriously wounded Meindl in the head. When the smoke cleared, Meindl insisted on walking back to the Canadian lines rather than put stretcher-bearers at risk by having them make the cross-country trek to evacuate him. Bleeding badly, the major made his way back safely. The severity of his wound, the regimental historian wrote, meant that “early in our first battle we lost the services of a brave and outstanding commander.”14

  The squadron’s second-in-command, Captain Jim Hall, took over and was just beginning to consider the next course of action when Captain Robert Grant’s Sherman arrived. Grant was the squadron rear-link officer, whose main task was to maintain radio contact with regimental headquarters. Hall and Grant jumped out of their tanks to confer. “What the heck do we do now?” Hall asked as Grant walked up. Neither man had any idea, for no orders were coming from Lieutenant Colonel Morton’s HQ.15

  In the distance, the hangars and runway of Carpiquet airfield were clearly visible. No enemy forces were apparent between Hill 70 and the airport, and the tankers were tempted to renew the charge straight through to that final objective. Suddenly, to the south, a large cluster of German vehicles came roaring out of Villons les Buissons and made towards the main road running from there directly to Caen. The two officers jumped back into their tanks, as every Sherman in the squadron drew a bead on the fleeing column of half-tracks, trucks, and cars. Grant wrote later, “This was really our first experience firing at these things. It was just like a shooting gallery. They were going across in front of us. It was a great initiation.”16

  Shineton “had a field day setting them on fire,” but eventually ammunition started running low and, having re-established radio contact with the regimental HQ, the squadron was ordered to “hold ba
ck on engaging any more targets unless it was absolutely necessary.”17 It was to hold in place to anchor 8 CIB’s right flank. ‘B’ Squadron’s exhilarating charge was done.

  MEANWHILE, IN AN EFFORT to hasten the main advance upon Basly, Major Sévigny of ‘C’ Company had requested permission from Chaudière commander Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mathieu to form a rapid attack force to seize the hamlet of la Mare and an intersection just beyond. The road the column had been travelling split at this intersection, with one fork running to Colomby-sur-Thaon and the other to Anguerny. The Queen’s Own Rifles were to break off for Anguerny at this intersection, while the Chaudières pushed on to capture Colomby. Sévigny hoped to accelerate the column’s ponderous pace by striking out ahead with a fully motorized unit comprised of Lieutenant W. Foy’s No. 14 Platoon mounted on a troop of Fort Garry Horse’s ‘A’ Squadron and the Chaudières’ Bren carrier platoon, commanded by Captain Michel Gauvin. Mathieu thought the idea had a good chance of success and radioed 8 CIB commander Brigadier Ken Blackader for permission to cobble together the small force. Desperate to attain his brigade’s final objectives despite all the delays, Blackader quickly approved.

  Sévigny and Foy’s men mounted the tanks and the force set off with Gauvin’s Bren carriers following close behind the Shermans. Instead of rooting out the few German snipers they encountered, Sévigny ordered them bypassed and the force rushed straight through to La Mare. They found the village undefended except for an anti-aircraft gun detachment of twenty soldiers who immediately surrendered. Sévigny radioed back to Mathieu that he was in possession of the hamlet, had captured four vehicles along with the AA gunners, and was en route to the intersection. He soon reported this objective firmly in his hands and said he was ready to proceed to Colomby as soon as the rest of the battalion came up to provide a base of support. For this action and those that had preceded it through the long march, Sévigny was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, while Gauvin and Foy won Military Crosses.18

  At the intersection, the Fort Garry’s ‘A’ Squadron took the left fork, striking out ahead of the Queen’s Own Rifles towards Anguerny, while Sévigny’s ‘C’ Company led the Chaudières on to Colomby-sur-Thaon. The two villages were barely a half-mile apart and slightly less than that from the intersection. Sévigny closed quickly on Colomby with the hope of carrying off the same kind of fast attack that had led to La Mare falling so easily, but found the village surrounded by a thick stone wall that he could not breach in the face of determined German resistance. Once again, his men were so close to the wall that it was impossible to call for artillery without risking friendly fire casualties. The major put out an urgent request for tanks, only to learn that ‘A’ Squadron had pushed off ahead of the Queen’s Own and was heading independently for Anguerny. No other tanks were available.

  A protracted firefight ensued, with several failed attacks during which Lieutenant L.E. Dupont was wounded, before the company managed to rout the German defenders and the Chaudières moved into the town. With his men establishing a perimeter defence around Colomby, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Mathieu was able to report to Brigadier Blackader that the way was now open for 9 CIB to pass through and head for its objectives.19

  Meanwhile, the Fort Garry’s ‘A’ Squadron had arrived at Anguerny and its commander reported his tanks “were prowling about mopping up enemy resistance [but] wished infantry as soon as possible.” The prowling took some of the squadron as far as the outer edges of Anisy, but lacking infantry support the tankers were hesitant to attempt to hold any ground and instead kept roaming between the two villages.20

  ‘C’ Company was leading the advance of the Queen’s Own and faced the same problems that Chaudières had encountered during the earlier phase and the march on Colomby—constant sniper harassment and stubborn machine-gun blocking positions that proved tough to eliminate. The company was also subjected to almost constant mortar and artillery fire. Throughout the advance, Rifleman Orville Cook had noticed that each village had at least one tall religious statue in a square and every time “you got close to one of these you were going to get shelled or mortared.”21 The Germans had pre-registered their guns to range in on the statues.

  Farther back in the advance, ‘A’ Company’s Company Sergeant Major Charlie Martin had come to the conclusion that the advance inland was “worse than the beach itself.” Because the ground rose gradually the farther inland they went, the Germans enjoyed the advantage of having a clear view of the advance at all times. When a German machine gun opened up, the nearest platoon took to “the fields, picking out draws, sloughs and low ground when we could. We needed to locate the enemy’s machine-gun fire in order to pinpoint our own fire and this was done in erratic bursts of running and flop-ping, stops and starts.” It was exhausting and exceedingly dangerous work. All the companies were taking casualties during the march to Anguerny and it pained Martin to see ‘A’ Company, so hard hit on the beach, lose even more men as the long afternoon dragged on.22

  Finally, at 1730 hours, the Queen’s Own entered Anguerny, a small village of about 240 people living in 90 houses. Shortly thereafter, a jeep carrying two Queen’s Own soldiers drove into Roger Chevalier’s small farmyard and stopped outside his house. The family went out to greet them and one of the Canadians offered Chevalier’s two-year-old daughter an orange, which she began happily tossing around in the mistaken belief that it was some kind of ball. Since the occupation, nobody had seen any kind of fruit other than those that grew locally. One of the Canadians spoke a little French and began questioning Chevalier about what defences the Germans might have on top of a hill that overlooked the farm. He told them that the hill had a water reservoir on it and the Germans had some kind of gun dug in on the summit.

  The farmer was having a hard time concentrating on the Canadian soldier’s French because of a grisly sight on the road running in front of his farm. In the approach to Anguerny, a German sniper had killed a Canadian soldier and the body still lay in the middle of the road. He watched in growing horror as a line of Fort Garry tanks leaving Anguerny ground one after another over the corpse, the tracks scattering the man’s “guts all over the road.” It was the cruellest thing he had ever seen, but when Chevalier pointed out to the soldiers what was happening they shrugged as if such matters were routine.23

  While most of the Queen’s Own Rifles began taking up defensive positions in Anguerny, Lieutenant Colonel Jock Spragge sent Major Neil Gordon’s ‘D’ Company on to secure Anisy. After a “sharp brush” with a small force of Germans that attempted a stand in the little village, Gordon reported it cleared. He had seen no sign of the Fort Garry Horse tanks that were supposed to have been in the vicinity.24 Spragge set ‘A’ Company up in the eastern part of Anguerny with ‘B’ Company holding the westerly side, which was further protected by the presence of the Chaudières in Colomby-sur-Thaon. ‘C’ Company was given the task of conducting roving patrols between Anguerny and Anisy to tie ‘D’ Company into the battalion’s defensive layout.25

  Most of the Queen’s Own had no sense that the tankers had beaten them to Anguerny or Anisy. This was possibly because, within minutes of the infantry’s arrival, the Fort Garry Horse had received orders from 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade to return to Bény-sur-Mer in order to regroup and replenish fuel and ammunition stocks so that it would be immediately operational come the morning. As a result, by 2000 hours ‘A’ and ‘B’ squadrons along with the regimental headquarters were rumbling back along the road towards the rear. Only ‘C’ Squadron, after much pressure by North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment’s Lieutenant Colonel Donald Buell, was instructed to overnight with the infantry at Tailleville because of the strong likelihood of a counterattack from the German strongpoint at Douvres-la Délivrande.26

  With the tankers already departing from the area, Spragge faced a difficult time summoning tank support for the one remaining piece of real estate he was determined to acquire before night fell. This was Hill 80, a small height of ground to the east of
Anguerny near Roger Chevalier’s farm, believed to be a key German observation point that enjoyed an excellent view of Juno Beach. Spragge ordered Captain Stanley Biggs, commander of the Bren carrier platoon, to gather a small force and take the hill after it was heavily shelled by two Fort Garry Horse tanks. Once atop the summit, Biggs was to transform it into a Canadian observation post by keeping an eagle eye open for the presence of German artillery batteries or the approach of counterattacking forces.27 That no serious counterattack had yet materialized was a source of increasing puzzlement to Spragge and every other commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, which had by now expected to be fending off elements of the heavily mechanized 21st Panzer Division and even the 12th SS Panzer (Hitlerjugend) Divison.

  Biggs took just nine men with him to carry out the attack. As the Queen’s Own had closed on Anguerny, they had come under fire from the hill, so the captain knew he was going to have to fight for its possession. But he was counting on the tank fire to force the Germans to cower in their trenches long enough for his men to get on top of the hill in a flat-out charge that would be better executed by a small group than a full platoon. His men also had the advantage of being heavily armed, with one soldier carrying a PIAT, another a two-inch mortar, and the rest Bren guns. For his part, Biggs had a Sten gun and two grenades. His batman, Rifleman “Red” McBride, was lugging a wireless that would be used to alert Spragge to any artillery targets or approaching German forces that Biggs spotted after the hill was taken. Rifleman Orville Cook was among the men dragooned by Biggs for the task.