Hitler's Munich Man

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Hitler's Munich Man Page 10

by Martin Connolly


  ‘In the following period [after 1934] a unified, detailed scenario for visits [by foreigners] was worked out and routinely adhered to. Visitors were shown a sort of theatre of the absurd, which many of them saw through, but not all, apparently.’

  When the British Legion visited, the prisoners were hidden away in an inaccessible part of the camp and German guards played the role of prisoners. Domvile was either naïve or deliberately obtuse and either saw what he wanted to see or really was deceived by his hosts. Whatever the case, he returned from Germany convinced that if war were to break out, Britain would be confronted ‘by the formidable combination of Germany, Italy and Japan’. In this he was anxious to encourage a relationship with Germany, believing that Britain should concentrate on the Empire and leave Europe to its own devices. He argued strongly that if Britain entered into conflict with Germany, it could not in turn deal with an aggressive Japan. Britain had failed to deal with a weak Germany and now it was strong the situation was more difficult. He therefore felt that politicians who ‘got involved with Europe were stupid’. They should, he argued, establish a firm alliance with Germany and leave Eastern Europe to be sorted out between Russia and Germany. Any other approach was part of the Judmas conspiracy. The Admiral concluded, ‘I could only try and point out to my countrymen the strategic danger they were running so needlessly, by pursuit of a faulty foreign policy.’

  One way Domvile went about pointing out ‘the strategic danger’ was to tour the country with a series of lectures. One such lecture was at Chatham House in 1938, where he lectured the great and the good of the military world, on his belief that Germany was ‘the most important country to be at peace with’. He argued that, ‘… they [the government] had completely thrown overboard the sound principles upon which our Empire had been built up and successfully defended.’

  He also railed against the sacrificing of the Anglo Japanese alliance. Again it was all down to the underlying influence of Judmas. From such lectures he came away with the idea of an organisation that would actively promote the German-British relationship. He spurned the AGF which was in existence (because it was ‘patronised by Judmas) and established the Link as we have noted above. He appeared to welcome ‘Hitler’s New Order’, and lambasted his opponents who opposed it. Particularly ‘the Jews and official Labour’. He claimed his work was an uphill struggle because of ‘the constant output of vituperation and falsehood’ appearing in the national press. He argued that their representation of Germany was nothing like the truth and in 1938 he welcomed the Munich Agreement as a setback for ‘warmongers’. He truly believed that appeasement of Hitler was the way forward and that any guarantees to Poland were ‘a dud cheque’ that could never be honoured. Poland, he argued was in ‘possession of stolen land’ [from Germany] and they should accept the reasonable demands being made on them by Germany. His efforts to persuade his fellow countrymen to accept similar views to his own through the Link, was met with ‘Jews attacking us from every possible angle’. He battled against this because he believed that Anglo-German friendship was the key to peace in the world. In all of this Domvile did really see himself as the crusading knight, fighting for the old ideas of Empire. He was desperate to preserve this old order of the superior British Whiteman, who knew what was best for the rest of the world.

  The outbreak of the war put an end to the Link and was a great disappointment to Domvile. He felt that, ‘The intense enthusiasm of the German people for the Nazi regime, and the hopes thereby engendered in German bosoms of achieving their rightful position in the world were given little credence in this country.’

  He dismissed the reports of ‘the naturally biased refugees [Jews] from the Reich’ that was informing public opinion. Domvile appears to have had a confusing mind set on Jews. On one hand he claimed not to blame all Jews yet writes, ‘I do not blame the Jews, except so far as their aims are inhuman.’ The Security Service notes indicate a similar view, seeing the Admiral as confused and a ‘bit of a fool’. He also suggested Russia was a front for Jewish influence, which flies in the face of history, with the number of pogroms that were carried out even up to 1906. He also asserted that every revolution involving national movements was also the work of Jews and Masons. Domvile saw Hitler as challenging Judmas and was grieved that Britain should go to war with him. He compared himself to Herbert Morrison who had been opposed to the Great War but who, unlike him, had not been sent to jail. He did not disguise his contempt for Morrison who now was a supporter of war against Germany. An amusing insight into the Admiral’s mind comes when we compare his many references of admiration for Hitler and his attitude to Jews and his thoughts about his jailers, when he refers to them as ‘little Hitlers’.

  Domvile continually challenged Churchill’s policy towards Germany, making his views clear when writing, ‘Was it sound policy to set alight the British Empire House, in order to have the satisfaction of roasting the German pig? Was the little bill in blood and treasure justified?’ He believed the politicians had no mandate to go to war with Germany. He once more saw the influence of Judmas:

  ‘The present war was brought about by Hitler’s challenge to Judmas; he was the first man since Napoleon, with the courage to tackle it openly. His new economic and financial plans for Europe struck at the very roots of Judmas policy.’

  Writing of Judmas as a ‘canker eating out the heart of England’, he spoke of the next war and though he expected not to be here for it, he wanted to make a start on ‘a clean new England’ before he went. This had echoes of Hitler’s desire to have a clean new Germany through the Nuremberg Laws and the cleaning of the German blood line. Indeed, the Admiral wrote:

  ‘This [immigration] had led in course of time to a generous admixture of various stocks in our national blood, and has presented on particular difficulties, except in the case of the Jews, who are a category by themselves.’

  He discussed the idea of sending the Jews to their own homeland, and recommended that should be Eastern Siberia. He also objected to Jews being able to change their names to English names, seeing it as a means for the secret infiltration of Judmas. He was fully aware of the attacks on Jews in Europe by Hitler and distanced himself from any suggestions that he would advocate any similar actions. His course was one of political and civil means to prevent the Empire being destroyed by the Judmas influence.

  From this we can see that Domvile held a deep anti-Jewish/Masonic attitude that he felt was ruining the world. His passion for the Empire led him to believe that Europe was not strategically important to Britain and that it should be left to Russia and Germany to deal with. He had no regard for Churchill who succeeded Chamberlain and argued that his own activities were geared to a peace with Germany and a reinforcement of the Empire. It was this activity however that led to the alarm of the Security Service and Domvile would be given the chance to explain himself to the Advisory Committee.

  Chapter 10

  The First Appearance before the Committee

  It was at the Berystede Hotel in Ascot on Tuesday, 22 October 1940 that the Advisory Committee convened as Court One. The members of the committee were Norman Birkett KC as Chairman, with the Right Honourable Sir George Clerk GCMB, CB, Professor W E Collinson MA, PhD and Sir Arthur Hazlerigg Bt. as his fellow committee members. G.P. Churchill CBE acted as secretary. Birkett was a liberal lawyer and a former member of parliament. He had an exceptional reputation for fairness and was ideal for his role on the committee, which was unpaid as were all members. Clerk was a former diplomat and ambassador to Paris and well connected to the Foreign Office. Collinson was an ideal man to examine Domvile. He was with Naval Intelligence during the Great War and was fluent in German. Hazlerigg was simply an old Etonian who had become involved in public service. He was a Staff Officer in the Great War and that appears to have been his only qualification to serve on the committee. The secretary, Churchill, was a former diplomat and his role was purely to record the activities of the committee and maintain correspondence. One
notable point here is that Domvile has a dairy entry for 30 May 1935 that records Birkett meeting and congratulating him after one of his lectures. Yet during the hearing, despite the mention of a court case in which Birkett acted, there is no mention of this other meeting of the two.

  The hearing began with Birkett asking Domvile about the application for habeas corpus and whether he wished to postpone the hearing until it was dealt with. The Admiral clarified that he was postponing the application until the committee had reviewed his appeal. The session then proceeded, with the committee confirming the Admiral’s details as to birth and naval history. He was then asked to what he was devoting his attention since his retirement from the service. To this he replied that he was enjoying himself and the work in connection with friendship with Germany. The committee then turned to the founding of the Link. Domvile explained that he had been to Germany first in 1935. He had been invited by a friend called de Sager. The committee were interested in why Domvile had become interested in friendship with Germany and to this he replied that it was ‘a long story’. The long story began with Domvile explaining his views on the position of Germany, Italy and Japan as possible enemies. Since the Great War he feared that British policy was not going in the right direction in terms of strategy to deal with this. He therefore saw friendship with Germany as ‘the key’ to redi-recting this strategy. To this end, he told the committee, he had founded the Link and became its chairman. When asked if there had been any communications with Germany before the Link was established, Domvile said ‘no’. Yet he had just confirmed he had visited German in 1935, two years before it was founded. The Admiral explained that the Link was brought into being so that ‘all classes’ of people could be involved and understand the German view. He also wanted to see them being able to travel to Germany through exchange trips with Germans. When Birkett asked Domvile if the Link’s ‘real purpose was to disseminate German propaganda in this country’, he reacted with a strong ‘that is absolutely untrue’. However, he went on to state that the object of the Link ‘was to disseminate a better knowledge of Germany in this country. If that means German propaganda, then I suppose you would call it true’. The Admiral was then asked if the Home Secretary had banned the Link to which Domvile retorted sharply that he had not. He alone had taken the decision to end it on the outbreak of war. Birkett queried whether the Link was a banned or illegal organisation to be told by Domvile that it was not. The Admiral then confirmed that he had spoken at Link meetings over the whole country and that these meetings were always public. Sometimes the local press reported them and sometimes they were ignored. Pressed as to whether any of the meetings were ‘private’, the Admiral was emphatic that they were all public because they wanted the publicity.

  The questioning then turned to Domvile’s visits to Germany. He confirmed that he had visited Germany twice after the Link was founded. Asked about meeting Hitler, he said he had met him and shook his hand. He acknowledged that he knew Himmler and had met him previously. As to Goebbels he said had only met him and shook hands with him, however, Domvile’s diaries suggest this was not true. Unlike Hitler, Domvile had shared the ‘Royal Box’ with Goebbels and had been in correspondence with him. He had also met and shook hands with Rudolf Hess but had not met Goering. He had seen the Nazi Julius Streicher but did not meet him. This had all happened at the Nazi Party rallies at Nuremberg. Domvile said he had not had any conversations with the German leaders as they spoke no English and he spoke no German. A question has to be raised here regarding Domvile and the German language. In 1936 when he visited Germany, his diary shows that he visited a number of rallies at which Hitler spoke. On all occasions he appears to understand what Hitler is saying. In one entry he writes, ‘It’s [Hitler’s speech] about the colonies. I wish they had left him alone that will make trouble’. On another speech he writes, ‘Hitler spoke very well from the Tribune. His words clear- A most impressive spectacle’. As we will note later on he also makes a diary entry where he says he ‘listened to Hitler’ on the radio at home in Roehampton. We also know he was good with languages, having won the distinguished prize for French, whilst in the navy. It can only be concluded that Domvile could get by in German and his contacts with German leaders more than he has admitted at the hearings.

  Birkett suggested that a number of British people attended these events to which Domvile agreed. He named Lord and Lady Mowbray, Lady Snowden and Lord Allen of Hurtwood. Domvile was pressed further as to any consultations or any German influence on the Link. He was adamant that Germany had none and furthermore, he argued, that they were not particularly keen on it at first. The Admiral confirmed he did not know all the members of the Link as they were scattered over the country. When asked if any of them were anti-British or pro-German, he replied, ‘I hope not’.

  This line of questioning was continued and the question was asked as to the Admiral’s knowledge of any anti-British or pro-Nazi activities at the Link meetings. He then admitted that he had been aware of such activities and he had received some complaints from members about it. He had written back to them with his view that people were invited because of their knowledge of Germany and he could not be responsible for the content of the meetings. The committee were obviously unhappy with this and asked Domvile if he had expressly made clear that he did not approve of the pro-Nazi activity. He appeared reluctant at first to confirm this but eventually he stated that he had actively made his disapproval clear. There is no evidence in any document that this ever happened. When Birkett put to Domvile that one of the reasons for his internment was that the Link was ‘believed to be subject to German influence and subject to German control’, he reacted angrily. He ‘strongly resented’ the statement because it caused prejudice and maintained that the use of ‘believed’ was wrong as the Link was either subject to German influence or it was not and it was not, according to Domvile. Birkett pointed out that the authorities had to use ‘believed’ because if the Link was subject to German influence, that fact would be kept secret from the public and the authorities.

  Domvile’s response was that the first time any such allegations were made was by the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, in the House of Commons. It was then that Hoare accused the Link of receiving money from Germany and spreading propaganda. Domvile again strongly denied this. He gave the impression of being ignorant of the activities of Carroll who had been receiving money from Germany for ‘advertising’. Again there is evidence in his diaries, as we will see, that this may not be true. Birkett again referred to what the Government believed about the Link:

  ‘The ostensible object of the organisation [the Link] was a disguise to

  cover the real purpose of the organisation, viz. the dissemination in

  Britain of German propaganda.’

  Replying, Domvile said he would ‘hardly call it propaganda’, what the Link did. He reiterated that the Link wanted to ‘disseminate in Britain a knowledge of Germany’, to encourage people to write letters and to arrange exchange visits between British and German families. Birkett continued his questions asking if Domvile and the Link supported German aspirations to take back the Colonies [given away under Versailles]. Here Domvile was not clear and evaded the question. He stated that the Link ‘was not political’ but admitted that speakers at meetings did address political issues. He had no doubt that speakers at meetings did support Germany wishing to regain the Colonies, but he again insisted that the Link was non-political. He was then asked about the letter written by Karlowa cited above and if he was aware he had written it. Because of the date (15 December) Domvile assumed it was a Christmas party and dance. Domvile could not remember inviting him, insisting he did not like him. Yet he records in his diaries various meetings being arranged with him, without any comments on liking or disliking him. He does make many comments on others of a negative nature.

  Domvile was then questioned again about his trips to Germany and his meetings with Hitler and the Nazi leaders. He was asked about the letter f
rom Walter de Sager, a half Swiss, half German closely connected to the German government. In it, the committee reminded Domvile, he was invited on 26 July 1935 ‘to meet some of the prominent naval people’ and to go on a ‘chamois [wild goat] expedition with Himmler’. Domvile confirmed he had gone to Himmler’s house and then to the concentration camp at Dachau before going chamois shooting. He had then visited his wife’s relatives in Munich.

  What Domvile did not mention was that he was on Himmler’s New Year card list. (His 1938 diary records that fact). Questioned as to the committee’s understanding that Domvile had ‘many German friends’, he replied that de Sager’s approach to him was through Lady Roydes, the widow of a former Rear Admiral, Sir Charles Roydes and not a German ‘friend’. This is not quite the true picture. Indeed, Lady Mary Roydes did introduce de Sager to Domvile, but it was to ask him to visit Domvile at home in Roehampton. It was at this very first face to face meeting on 1 July 1935 that de Sager had invited Domvile to ‘meet Hitler and other important Germans’. Furthermore, Domvile knew exactly who he was. His diary records ‘Walter de Sager – Swiss, but a German propagandist’. On 9 July 1935 Domvile met the German ambassador for dinner and discussed the invitation. The German ambassador ‘gave the OK to de Sager’ and encouraged Domvile to go to Germany. Domvile again meets up with the German ambassador on 13 July 1935 and hears from de Sager ‘suggesting most attractive trip in August’. The formal invitation would follow. This is a pointer to the Germans being keen to get Domvile on board for propagandist purposes as the ‘war mumblings’ had been started as early as 1934, also noted in Domvile’s diary. Furthermore, Domvile continues to meet up with de Sager after his visit to Germany and his diary shows that he met him and his wife on 17 February 1936 for dinner in England after they had been ‘scared out of Germany’. A few days later he takes him to meet Nesta Webster ‘an interesting woman’ who Domvile writes, ‘lays down the law too much’ and ‘we discussed Germany, Jews and other things’. Webster was a member of the BUF and the Link. She was a great believer in conspiracy theories. In 1919, she had published The French Revolution: a Study in Democracy. She claimed in that book that the Jews had prepared and carried out the French Revolution as well as being behind a world takeover plan. The committee were unaware of these facts and Domvile did not enlighten them any further.

 

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