It is interesting that at this stage, MI5 seem to feel the need to protect themselves from any charges of their being responsible for Domvile’s detention. Oswald Allen Harker, the head of MI5, wrote to Lord Swinton of the Home Security Executive. He enclosed copies of the letters from Birkett and Pilcher which Swinton ‘ought to see’. He then twice uses the phrase ‘you will remember’. What he wanted Swinton to remember was that it was he who ‘wrote a letter to the Home Secretary recommending that orders be made against Barry and Lady Domvile’. He was also to remember that ‘the case was really put up by the Admiralty’ and that MI5 had only ‘sponsored’ the detention after this. This gives a great insight to how Harker was always keen to distance MI5 from any mistakes.
However, on 30 October 1940, Noakes of MI5 appeared before the committee to ‘assist them with the Domvile case’. The record of this meeting makes it very clear that Noakes, and MI5, were going to control how it went. Birkett outlined the Domvile situation and the committee’s view of little or no evidence against him. On the allegation that the Link was under German influence and control, Birkett tried to discover what evidence existed, Noakes took charge.
‘Before I deal with that, I wonder if you would allow me, I do not wish to get at loggerheads with you and I do not want to state the case too high, and I wonder if you would allow me to make one or two general remarks about what I think is the way to approach this case.’
Birkett was now being led and settled in to Noakes’ ‘approach’. This approach began with the ignoring of the request for evidence and the MI5 agent agreeing that the Link was started with ‘the highest motives’, but ‘Barry Domvile is a conceited man’, he has been described as ‘going off’. Furthermore ‘Barry Domvile sometimes takes too much to drink’. Having denigrated Domvile’s character, the committee, Noakes suggested, should hold anything Domvile said in evidence must be seen in that light. He helpfully added that the way he had put his remarks ‘weighed very much in his [Domvile’s] favour’. Birkett thought it ‘most helpful’.
Noakes pointed the committee to consider the British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe, the pro-German group Domvile had denied having any thing to do with. The committee were asked by Noakes if they knew Luttman-Johnson. They replied that they had and that they knew him to be very pro-German. They also indicated that he was a totally unreliable man. Noakes was obviously pleased to hear the committee’s view of Luttman-Johnson as pro-German and indicated that if that was ‘the impression in the minds of the committee’, he would say no more about who he was. He then proceeded to go through the letters between Luttman-Johnson and Domvile that were referred to above. From these letters, Noakes concluded that Domvile’s assertion that he had nothing to do with Christian Settlement was questionable. Had he not been invited to and attended the first meeting of the group when it was established? Were not Gordon-Canning, C E Carroll and other pro-Germans there? Had not Domvile written to Luttman-Johnson stating ‘the meeting was a complete success’? Had he not written also that ‘The British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe has started’? Noakes thought this was persuasive stuff but Birkett had some doubts. He raised the question of the Duke of Bedford, the Marquis of Tavistock and other prominent figures who had similar views to Domvile. He also noted that Lloyd George himself wanted a negotiated peace with Germany in 1939, in just the same way as Domvile and Christian Settlement. Noakes’ response was that the committee had to test the credibility of what Domvile said. Sir Arthur Hazlerigg noted that Domvile ‘had rather slipped off the point’ when questioned about this matter. Birkett went through Domvile’s statement where he confirmed attending the founding meeting but still insisted he had nothing to do with it. Noakes turned to another letter Domvile had written to Luttman-Johnson referred to above, that warned him to be aware of any security agents and the government being ‘frightened’. Domvile had also written about Information and Policy, the pro-German paper, and that it ‘would have all the details’.
Noakes placed before the committee their options as to Domvile, whilst sowing a seed of doubt. Was he less than candid about his involvement in Christian Settlement and thus raising suspicions as to his real role? Was he really ‘the bluff old Admiral who always speaks the truth’?
‘We did like him’, Birkett responded.
Noakes agreed. ‘Yes. In many ways he is obviously a taking personality’
Turning again to Domvile and Christian Settlement, Noakes referred to the letter written by him to Carroll in which Domvile had stated, he was ‘always ready to help unofficially. It does them no good if I join because the press call it a disguised Link’.
The discussion continued with Noakes making it clear that the committee had to make up its mind as to Domvile and his pro-German views. However, he steered them to consider the likelihood of the Admiral being ignorant of the pro-German activities at the Link meetings as highly suspect. Furthermore, he went on to stress the very firm connections between the Anglo-German Review and the Link. Domvile, he stressed, had written for every issue of that paper, which in turn was edited by the very pro-German Carroll. It was also the case that the Review always praised Germany and never once had anything good to say about Britain. Noakes produced copies of the Review for the committee to bring home his points.
Birkett noted that in his interviews with Oswald Mosley, he discovered the same thing, with Mosley also praising Hitler but never Britain. There appears to have been agreement with this general point and Noakes reinforced the idea that Link meetings were places that pro-German sympathies were aired. He again brought the pressure on the committee:
‘The matter is whether one can believe that Sir Barry Domvile – and it is a matter entirely for your judgment of Sir Barry Domvile – whether you think Sir Barry Domvile can have been ignorant of everything that went on.’
Birkett’s response appears to show him being agitated and he pushed Noakes as to how the committee could press Domvile if there was no evidence that he had knowledge of the pro-German activities. Noakes again stated that there was evidence that various speakers had given support to German views at Link meetings but no one had given the British views. There had also been commendations of German public works but again no commendation of those in Britain. Noakes spoke of an agent being present at the meetings, but Birkett argued that this was of no use unless they knew who the agent was and their reliability. Noakes side-stepped this and again reiterated that it was a matter for the committee’s judgment as to the Admiral being truthful.
There then followed a review of Germans who had spoken at Link meetings. One in particular had spoken in support of the German concentration camps and this led to an uproar among the audience. There was also a British General Fuller, who had written a book on Fascism and its defence. Domvile’s diary shows that he met with General Fuller and his wife as early as the 1930s for dinner on many occasions. In his entry of 3 May 1934, Domvile writes that Fuller is ‘working with Mosley’. When the committee wanted to discuss this general, Noakes advised them that ‘it is not yet within your purview’. The general had been linked to the Anglo-German Review and this led Birkett to state that you could not separate this pro-German paper from the Link when considering the case of Sir Barry Domvile. Noakes had led the committee to the conclusion he had wanted.
Having dealt with what was spoken at Link meetings, the committee turned to written propaganda that was distributed at them. This material was pro-German and anti-Semitic. The committee considered if this was a case of someone having visited Germany and signed a visitor’s book and was subsequently sent some of these pamphlets? Noakes made it clear that it was a bulk dispatch and that the Post Office had intercepted a large quantity of material. In fact, Noakes pointed out, the Vice-Chairman of the Link’s London branch had written to Ribbentrop’s office asking for regular monthly literature. Noakes underlined his point by making it clear that this was what was happening at the Link, even if Domvile claimed he knew nothing about it. Birkett
again tried to offer an explanation that it could be seen as the Link wanting to get the official German line. However, Noakes wanted to move on and steered the committee to the ‘important matter’ of finance. To which Birkett agreed that they should, bearing in mind the Home Secretary’s statement in Parliament that the Link had received money from Germany.
Satisfied he had confirmed the close association of the Link with the Anglo-German Review, Noakes pointed to Carroll, its editor, having written frequently to the Ribbentrop’s bureau for money, ostensibly for advertising. Birkett intervened to state that the paper carried a lot of ‘respectable’ advertising, some even for British companies. He insisted that there was a difference between legitimate advertising and receiving money ‘to support the Link or Review’.
‘Have you any letters?’ Birkett asked.
Noakes answered, ‘As I said we have so many volumes of …….’
Birkett’s irritation seemed to boil over as he interrupted Noakes. ‘Do not burden us with things that are not relevant. We should regard that point as of great importance because of our knowledge.’
There then followed an exchange about what letters would be relevant and just how many people received the Anglo-German Review, which was about 5,000.
As Carroll was the main topic of the letters, the committee felt that it would be right to hear Carroll’s case before making a decision on Domvile. Noakes agreed that might be a good course and went on to outline the case against Carroll. He had written to the Germans as to the best way to use the Review and advertising to influence editorial opinion in Britain.
Here the committee took a break and upon resumption Birkett began to speak, to be immediately interrupted by Noakes.
‘Whatever may have been the original idea of Barry Domvile and those who founded the Link in the first instance, it is clear that the Link was, in fact used as an instrument of Nazi propaganda in England.
Its official organ was the Anglo-German Review which may best be described as the orthodox exponent of everything Nazi. It is difficult to find throughout its pages any words of criticism of anything Nazi or any praise of anything British, when the latter was not completely in accord with the Nazi model.’
Noakes then went through the activities of Carroll and his contacts with German officials. He outlined the letters from Carroll that clearly had the object of getting the Germans to support the Review financially. He quoted Karl Marhau of the German Chamber of Commerce, ‘expressing the greatest satisfaction at the way the paper was being run, and he said that it was the first paper brought out by an Englishman which published the truth “in our sense”.’ He also reminded the committee that Domvile had stated he gave £5 per week for the upkeep of the Review and ‘did they remember that?’ Having obtained the committee’s acceptance of that fact, Noakes outlined Carroll’s letters to the Germans where he had stated that the Review was not financially sound and needed the Germans to assist financially. He had written that their lack of support would ‘jeopardise the existence of both the Review and the Link’. It was after this that £200 had ‘come over’. This, Noakes insisted, was the evidence that supported the Home Secretary’s claims that the Link had indeed received money from Germany.
A long discussion ensued around the letters that had passed between Domvile and the Home secretary and the Admiralty and Domvile. It was clear that the Admiralty had concerns about Domvile and after the Home Secretary’s statement, had warned him to be careful in his actions. The committee and Noakes pondered why Domvile did not make enquiries of his secretary, Carroll, as to the claims of money from Germany. They also considered the variance in Domvile’s statement on the £5 monthly payment to the Review and a statement of Carroll that the Review made a £5 payment to the Link. There were grounds for further enquiries of Carroll and Domvile.
The conversation then turned to Domvile and his connections to prominent Germans such as Hitler and Goering. Noakes spoke of general reports ‘which I do not wish to bring out’. There followed a discussion as to which Nazis Domvile had met. These included Hitler, Hess, Himmler and other minor figures. As to the depth of relationship Domvile had with each of them Noakes posed the idea that one could not fully know but that there were obvious closer relationships with a prominent Nazi Dr Hetzler. Domvile also lived ‘within a stone’s throw’ of a German journalist, Rosel, who had been expelled from Britain. Noakes stated that Domvile ‘knew him extremely well’. Noakes again raised the question as to whether this was another case of Domvile being deceived. On that point Noakes suggested that Domvile would have to be examined very carefully.
Then there was also the links Domvile had with other Fascists such as Mosley and Ramsay. The diary of Lady Domvile was then focussed on. In it there was a record of meetings with the BUF and Mosley along with meetings of Information and Policy. There was clear evidence that Domvile knew Mosley very well. In terms of Domvile and Captain Ramsay, Noakes pointed out that a letter from Ramsay’s son to a prospective member of the Right Club on 20 July 1939 which stated:
‘The chief aim of the Club is to co-ordinate the activities of all the patriotic bodies which are striving to free this country from the Jewish domination of in the financial, political, philosophical and cultural spheres. The parties in question are such as the following: The B.U. [BUF], The Nordic League, The National Socialist League, the Link, Liberty restoration League and a few others.’
Noakes indicated that the letter only becomes important when it is considered that Captain Ramsay used a meeting of the central branch of the Link on 16 June 1939 to launch the Right Club. The problem the committee faced was then outlined by Birkett to Noakes. Domvile had admitted knowing Ramsay for some time before the war. He had also acknowledged meetings where he met him. Domvile had called the meetings with Ramsay and Mosley as ‘tea parties’ and for no political purposes. Domvile had also denied knowing about the Right Club until he arrived in Brixton. Is it possible, he asked, that Domvile was deceived and did know nothing about the Link meeting being used to launch the Right Club? Noakes was noncommittal and again made clear that was for the committee to decide. Then there was the question of other associations Domvile had with Fascists, Olive Baker for example. Domvile had exchanged letters with her which suggested he was promoting the pro-German propaganda station, New British Broadcasting. There was also the matter of Domvile’s statements at the Star and Garter home where he had declared ‘Hitler is going to win the war’. This was on the testimony of Colonel Gowlland who had given a signed statement of the event. An agent of the Security Service had been present at conversations where Domvile had stated he ‘advised Oswald Mosley in everything’.
The committee turned again to The Case for Germany and reviewed what had already been discussed before. Laurie had not been detained and neither had a number of leading figures in the Fascist movement whilst smaller fish had been put into Brixton. This led to both the committee and Noakes agreeing there was much confusion over who should be in or out of detention.
The final topic for discussion was Domvile’s son who had been held at Ham Common (Latchmere House). This was a former Lunatic Asylum that had been taken over by the Security Service. The committee expressed surprise at their not knowing about it until brought up at another hearing. The committee described the conditions of military guards and reports of prolonged interrogations with suggesting of inhumane treatment. Noakes was bland in his response saying if they were true reports, someone should be held to account.
The hearing with Noakes ended and the committee were left with Noakes’ evidence and a large number of items that showed Domvile’s views and statements that seemed to suggest he indeed had a case to answer. However, the committee still felt that they needed to recall Domvile to explore the issues raised by Noakes. They were aware the Security files were littered with letters, statements and claims by agents and witnesses along with the complication of other detainees such as Carroll and Mosley which involved Domvile and his activities. One gets the impr
ession that the Security Service had a great deal of material that was open to interpretation, much of which Domvile could not remember or suggested an innocent explanation. It was clear, though, that MI5 wanted Domvile’s detention to continue.
Chapter 12
Domvile Re-examined
On 5 November 1940 Domvile was called back to the appeals committee to answer the points raised by Noakes. The committee first turned to the book, The Case for Germany. Birkett read out the dedication at the front of the book:
Hitler's Munich Man Page 12