by Matthew Hall
Johnston’s remarks were prophetic in more than one sense. Early on 25 September, Herford was taken to Schloss Haetloo (Queen Wilhelmina’s Castle), a large German military hospital near the town of Apeldoorn in the Netherlands, where he was introduced to Colonel Sangerling. They met in the luxurious private apartments of the palace where they had coffee from some delicate china blue and gold cups.
Sangerling had a kindly demeanour and seemed to be treating Herford not as a prisoner but as one medical man to another. He carefully explained that the German hospitals in the Apeldoorn area had become overwhelmed with over 2,000 of their own wounded, and that he had just heard that over 1,500 British casualties were being evacuated from the battle area. In the normal course of events the Germans would have undertaken to treat them, but they had completely exhausted their facilities. He expressed the fear that the wounded would simply have to be evacuated in cattle trucks; there was no alternative.
Herford repeated his request for passage for medical stores or evacuation over the river. As the Germans were obviously intent on carrying out their obligation to treat the British wounded it seemed foolish for them not to accept an offer which would be of logistical assistance. Sangerling seemed interested in the proposition and went away to make some phone calls.
By an ironic coincidence, at about the same time Herford was having this discussion with Sangerling, arrangements were being made for all survivors of the 1st Airborne Division to pass through 163 Field Ambulance following their retreat across the Rhine. Under unceasing bombardment the order had finally been given to evacuate. Many were shot trying to swim to safety across the river; many were captured. In total 1,400 Airborne troops were killed. Of the original force of 10,000 only 2,400 returned. The 163 Field Ambulance provided hot drinks and blankets for all returning Airborne personnel and treated the casualties promptly, providing shelter with the tarpaulins Major Herford had ‘collected’ and made into tents.
It soon became clear that Colonel Sangerling was not in a position to allow Herford to return, but he tried to find a way in which he could be used to help the stream of injured British paratroopers who were being brought into Apeldoorn. Sangerling began by taking Herford to view the Wilhelm III barracks in Apeldoorn which he said he might make a post for 500 walking wounded. He was expecting many stretcher cases as well, but simply did not have the resources to provide for them.
Next Sangerling took Herford on a tour of the hospitals in the area to make clear to him the parlous nature of their situation. At one point Herford was left alone with Sangerling’s driver, who came out with the strange comment that in the five years he had been working for the colonel he had never been punished. Herford concluded that German officers were usually expected to mete out penalties to their staff!
During the tour of the hospitals Herford had the opportunity to talk to many of the British wounded, including a young doctor from the Airborne, Captain Theo Redman of 133 Field Ambulance, who had been wounded in the arm and captured on landing. He had thereafter worked with a German surgical team treating British and German casualties alike without distinction. He told Herford that a large number of Airborne medical staff had been captured, including two whole field ambulance and surgical teams who were now working at the St Elizabeth Hospital in Arnhem.
Herford quickly concluded that the Wilhelm III barracks could be used as a hospital for the British wounded. He pointed out to Sangerling that the Allies were amassing in great numbers just over the Rhine and that it would only be a short while before Apeldoorn fell into enemy hands. It would therefore be better for the Germans to evacuate their casualties before the town was overrun and leave the Allied casualties to be collected by their own side. He even went so far as to suggest that he might be able to get petrol and supplies transported over the Rhine to help with the evacuation of German casualties.
Sangerling was not impressed with the idea of accepting help from the Allies, but was anxious to explore all the possibilities. Herford again pressed his request to form a hospital at the barracks and finally Sangerling gave in. However, he sought a personal assurance that the building would be used for no other purpose, saying, ‘A hospital must be a hospital and nothing more.’ Herford collected Theo Redman and a few orderlies and proceeded to the barracks. By the afternoon casualties, mostly walking wounded, were pouring in. At that stage they had virtually no medical supplies, and Herford complained bitterly to Colonel Sangerling that arrangements should be made for some of the supplies captured from the Airborne to be made available. Sangerling himself didn’t have authority to grant the request, but agreed to drive Herford to Arnhem to speak to General Bittrich.
Sangerling and Herford travelled in a German staff car along the Arnhem road past streams of displaced Dutch, many of whom had been rendered homeless by ‘friendly fire’. There were a number of RAF and USAF strafing planes in the area which could not help but injure some of the civilian population. It was a sad fact that when Dutch surgical teams from Amsterdam arrived in the area two days later their initial task was operating on members of the civilian population who had been injured fleeing from Arnhem. (Sangerling himself was reported killed in his car during an air attack several months later.)
When they arrived at Arnhem Herford was again blindfolded and taken to General Bittrich’s command post. After a brief discussion (during which bombs from Allied planes landed uncomfortably nearby), Bittrich decided that Herford had heard and seen too much to be considered anything other than a prisoner. He allowed the blindfold to be removed, and with a smile said he was a ‘special prisoner’. Herford objected, perhaps a little too impertinently, that he resented being classified as a prisoner at all. Bittrich replied that he thought he would not want to return in any event, implying that his first duty lay with the injured men of the Airborne. Herford replied that he would be glad to stay as long as he remained useful.
Bittrich turned out to be a reasonable man. He said that Herford could go to St Elizabeth’s Hospital in Arnhem to request for help to be sent to Arnhem. He said he would consider the request for the release of captured supplies a little longer.
With the benefit of this minor concession Herford and Sangerling went to St Elizabeth’s Hospital and arranged for the transfer of supplies, but by the time they arrived back in Apeldoorn over 600 casualties had been brought to the Wilhelm III barracks. Many were walking wounded, but among the stretcher cases there were some who were dying.
By nightfall still no help had come from Arnhem and over 800 casualties had been admitted. There was little more they could do than make them comfortable. Most of the wounded slept the sleep of utter exhaustion, having hardly slept since the beginning of their ill-fated expedition.
In the small hours of the morning a German doctor arrived and said that they were to prepare 500 walking wounded for immediate evacuation to Germany. Herford and Redman were forced to go round the building waking men who had not slept or eaten properly for several days, telling them that they were to be taken into Germany. They gathered without complaint and mustered as if on parade. Herford watched with pride as in the chill dawn they formed up and marched down the road singing. It was an inspiring sight. Soon after, a second order was received, this time to select 40 stretcher cases for removal in cattle trucks. Herford took a chance and refused point blank to move any of the stretcher cases, threatening that there would be hell to pay if he was contradicted. The Germans demurred, but no more was said.
The following morning it was discovered that supplies from Arnhem had in fact been brought by English personnel, but that the English major, Peter Smith, together with two other officers and 20 orderlies, had been brought by the Germans from Arnhem and locked up for the night. None of them could speak German so the mistake was not rectified until they had spent a very uncomfortable night in custody. As the confusion was being sorted out, Sangerling arrived with the news that the Wilhelm III barracks would henceforward be officially recognized as an Airborne Hospital, and that they were
to have full control of the food and supplies which the Germans would provide from their own stores.
The formal recognition of an official British hospital was an enormous breakthrough and completely without precedent in the whole course of the war. In the few weeks in which it existed it was responsible for saving the lives and limbs of many men who otherwise would have had to wait their turn in German military hospitals. It is undoubtedly a fact that although Herford has received no official recognition for this particular achievement, the existence of the Airborne Hospital at Apeldoorn was entirely due to his persuasive efforts with Colonel Sangerling.
For the rest of the day the barracks hospital continued to receive British casualties. Thankfully the next day they were joined by two complete Field Ambulances commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Marrable, CO of 181 Field Ambulance, and Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Alford, CO of 133 Para Field Ambulance. Their arrival meant that Herford was free to spend his time cajoling and scavenging for medical equipment and supplies. The tight-knit Airborne community had also begun to demonstrate its advantages as the officers and men quickly formed efficient working parties based on their existing organizational structures.
The last to arrive was Colonel Graeme Warrack, Assistant Director of Medical Services, 1st Airborne Division. Just before capture he had removed his badges of rank in the hope that he would be less likely to be immediately transferred to Germany to a senior officers’ POW camp if he masqueraded as a private. This strategy worked well for getting him as far as the hospital, but once there he wished to resume his authority and be recognized as an officer by the Germans. Warrack attempted to remonstrate with a German NCO who responded by threatening to march him off into custody for insubordination. He did not, at any time, wear badges of rank. Thanks to Herford’s intervention Warrack managed to establish his position, and, as the Senior Officer present, next morning called a conference of senior staff. Herford briefed them on what they had managed to achieve since the hospital had been established and the strategy they were attempting to adopt, that is, making the wounded comfortable in anticipation of a rapid Allied advance while making all possible attempts to prevent evacuations of British wounded to Germany. Warrack was impressed with what he found and appointed Herford as his second in command. Herford felt this was a singular honour given the closeness of the Airborne to one another, but his abilities as a German speaker were doubtless a significant factor in his appointment.
The major problem they now faced was feeding nearly 2,000 men in the overcrowded barracks. At first the only cooking facility was a horse-drawn field kitchen which was adequate for feeding only 250. Meals were therefore meagre and wretched. Nothing was worse for morale than hunger. The local Dutch offered what they could: blankets, items of medical equipment and food parcels, including a box of smoked salmon. Herford and a fellow surgeon, Major Simon Frazer, were delegated to divide it up between severely wounded men. It was a tortuous task; both Herford and Simon were themselves aching with hunger on their own meagre rations, but resisted the temptation to eat a scrap more than their allotted portion.
Herford again approached the German officers and protested vehemently that they were not being allowed to use the main kitchens, which would have been adequate to cook for all the men. Again the Germans acceded to his request, and with the benefit of Red Cross rations which arrived from Canada they were able to eat more comfortably.
Talk soon began among the officers of escape. Herford was approached by a Captain Coke who told him that he and several others had established contact with the Dutch underground and that everything was arranged for four of them to make their escape that night. Coke himself had a wounded thigh and had sent a message to the Dutch requesting them to make a signal with a flashlight if they felt unable to risk him coming with them with the burden of his injury. Four days later Colonel Sangerling told Herford that several British prisoners had escaped. He found it rather ironical, for if the British really were coming so quickly it seemed ludicrous to risk being killed escaping over enemy territory.
It transpired that the escapees Sangerling had referred to were another party, but several days later Coke did escape with several others. Following this escape, however, the Germans decided the hospital presented a risk to security and began to adopt a policy of evacuating as many British casualties to Germany as they could.
When the evacuations commenced Herford again risked incurring the wrath of German officers by demanding the wounded were provided with the best possible facilities, objecting absolutely to any suggestion that they should be transported in cattle trucks. The results were quite astonishing, and even prompted Colonel Warrack to describe it as ‘pure Alice in Wonderland’. On one occasion the Germans provided a specially appointed ambulance train with medical staff and nurses – conditions which exceeded those the German wounded could expect!
The German strategy now seemed rather self-contradictory. While taking Herford to visit several Dutch hospitals in the area to investigate the provision of further medical supplies, Sangerling expressed his concerns for the German casualties. As more and more German towns were being destroyed by Allied air raids the hospitals available to treat them became fewer and fewer. The situation had become so critical that German medical units were deliberately leaving their more serious casualties to be treated by the advancing Allies. This should have added strength to Herford’s arm in arguing that the best option was for the British to be allowed to remain in Apeldoorn, but administrative decisions taken above Sangerling’s head dictated otherwise. The Germans were perhaps gambling on the Allies not bombing hospitals inside Germany where British POWs were known to be patients.
On the morning of 30 September two German surgeons arrived at the Airborne Hospital and made a cursory inspection of the wards before pronouncing that nearly everyone there was ‘transportable’. Herford took grave objection and argued that besides the fact that they would be better off evacuating their own wounded, the journey was far too arduous and the nights far too cold for many of the men to be moved in safety. When that failed to impress the stony-faced German doctors he threatened to make an official complaint through the Red Cross.
The protests cut no ice. Later in the afternoon Sangerling arrived with the order that 300 lightly wounded were to be evacuated in a ‘truck train’ (goods wagons). Herford said that no casualties would be prepared for evacuation unless assurances were given that adequate minimum conditions would be provided. The best Sangerling could offer was the posting of a German MO to the hospital who would ensure good supplies to the remaining casualties and deal with requests.
Over the next two days Herford had the unfortunate task of seeing more than 500 men off in German trains. He managed to secure the important concession that the wagons were to have a red cross painted on the roof to discourage strafing, but was horrified when on arriving at the station he saw a massive anti-aircraft gun being used right next to the train, inviting attention from Allied bombers. He complained loudly to Sangerling, who apologized and promised that there would be no more firing while trains were in the station.
Herford drew some comfort from the fact that at last the Germans seemed to be on the defensive. As he travelled through the town to and from the station the Dutch openly gave the ‘V’ sign, much to the annoyance of the German guards. Discipline was also beginning to break down among the German troops. On one occasion Herford saw that they were confiscating all the bicycles in the town – now the most valuable loot they could lay their hands on.
The hospital had been arranged startlingly quickly, the administrative side being run by Lieutenant Colonel Marrable and the medical wing by Lieutenant Colonel Alford, under whom were highly efficient teams of doctors and orderlies. An inspection was carried out by senior German officers including General Mayer and General Haubenreiser, Director of Medical Services Western Area, who were impressed by what they saw, though reluctant to admit it. However, no sooner had the efficient hospital been set up than the Germa
ns began to run it down by steadily carrying out more and more evacuations which, despite protests from Herford, he simply was unable to prevent.
CHAPTER 10
ESCAPE FROM APELDOORN
Herford had been a POW for two months but to him it seemed like years. Having enjoyed unimaginable success and co-operation from the Germans, he now noticed a sudden and hostile shift in their attitude. Their annoyance had some justification: Graham Warrack was encouraging escapees and there was relatively little fencing to prevent it.
This change was obvious; for example, on the night of 8 October a Dutch doctor was coming to the Airborne Hospital bringing 800 books for the men. En route he was arrested and the books confiscated by the SS. Herford made complaints but this time they were ignored. The following day a previously co-operative German guard made offensive remarks to a British orderly. When challenged by Herford he made no apology and merely threatened him with arrest. That evening 600 German troops arrived to occupy part of the barracks which had been evacuated.
The complete shift in attitude was made clear the next day when Sangerling’s second in command, Major Krammer, arrived and said that British personnel would only be allowed to travel to other Dutch hospitals with an escort. Previously Theo Redman and Herford had enjoyed free association with the Dutch and had driven unaccompanied in ambulances. The Gestapo had taken objection to this.
The guards at the hospital trebled in number and tightened their grip. No one was allowed to speak to the Dutch in the absence of a German interpreter. Signs increased that it would not be long before the hospital would be closed down entirely and those remaining sent to Germany. The St Elizabeth Hospital suffered that fate and the British medical personnel and a chaplain, Dan McGowan, were relayed to Apeldoorn.