The Final Round of Negotiations in Moscow
The final challenge for achieving a test ban treaty was the question of underground tests and the still-vexing issue of inspections. The question was how to verify and enforce a treaty. For nuclear testing in the air, in space, and underwater, remote sensing of a nuclear test was possible. For example, air samples could be collected to test for radioactive fallout. The challenge was verifying a ban on underground tests. Here, the United States scientific community advising Eisenhower and then Kennedy had long insisted that monitoring underground tests required onsite inspections, while the Soviets argued that seismological detectors could pick up underground tests remotely, and distinguish the signals of a nuclear test from those of a naturally occurring earthquake. They strongly opposed onsite inspections, believing them to be pretexts for espionage.
The standoff over onsite inspections had blocked a test ban treaty for years, and almost did so again in late 1962, when a disagreement erupted over each side’s proposals for the number of onsite inspections needed per year. After years of rejecting any onsite inspections, Khrushchev finally agreed to a small number of inspections, three, noting to Kennedy in a letter on December 19 that a United States negotiator had suggested to his Soviet counterpart that the United States would agree to two to four inspections per year.§ Yet after the Politburo assented to three inspections, Khrushchev was informed by Kennedy in a letter of December 28 that “there appears to have been some misunderstanding,” as the U.S. position was and had been a minimum of eight to ten onsite inspections per year, a number that Khrushchev knew his colleagues would reject.
When Khrushchev read JFK’s message that the United States was demanding at least eight inspections rather than the three he believed the United States had agreed to, he exploded. It seemed yet another case of U.S. backtracking.28 He was already far out on a limb vis-à-vis his Politburo colleagues and the Chinese in the wake of the Soviet reversal in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and knew that he could not go back to the Politburo for a number of inspections greater than three.
When Khrushchev met with Norman Cousins at his Black Sea villa in the spring of 1963, the Soviet leader put the case this way:
People in the United States seem to think I am a dictator who can put into practice any policy I wish. Not so. I’ve got to persuade before I can govern. Anyway the Council of Ministers agreed to my urgent recommendation [on three inspections]. Then I notified the United States that I would accept three inspections. Back came the American rejection. They now wanted—not three inspections or even six. They wanted eight. And so once again I was made to look foolish. But I can tell you this: it won’t happen again.29
One way out of the stalemate, proposed as early as 1959 by the United States but rejected by the Soviets at the time, was a partial test ban, covering the atmosphere, the oceans, and space, where monitoring from afar was possible, but excluding underground tests. Kennedy and Macmillan repeated the proposal for the “three-environment treaty” in September 1961. The Soviets rejected the proposal again, dismissing it as a green light for underground testing, which the Soviet leaders believed would favor the United States. Kennedy and his foreign policy advisers also viewed the partial test ban as inferior to a comprehensive test ban, as the United States worried that underground tests would provide aspiring nuclear nations such as China and France with a route to the bomb.30 The U.S. military, however, preferred a partial test ban, as it would allow them to continue with their own underground tests.
Such was the state of play into the summer of 1963. But on July 2, the Soviets acquiesced to a partial test ban, one that would not cover underground tests. Khrushchev put it this way in his speech in East Berlin:
Having carefully weighed the situation, the Soviet Union, moved by a sense of great responsibility for the fate of the peoples … [and] since the Western powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on all nuclear tests, expresses its readiness to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.31
Several factors no doubt contributed to this decision. Most important was the desire on both sides to achieve a concrete result after so many years of floundering, and after the shared shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy’s peace initiative had done much in a short period to soften Khrushchev’s opposition to a partial test ban. The growing rift between the Soviet Union and China added to the impetus for achieving a treaty quickly. Perhaps the partial nuclear test ban would slow China’s path to its own nuclear weapon, an increasingly important objective for the Soviet Union, especially as Khrushchev had come to view the Chinese leadership under Mao as provocative, unstable, and dangerous to world peace.
The bottom line was that neither side could bridge the gap regarding onsite inspections. The Soviet resistance to more inspections was real, not bluff. And Kennedy also faced severe political limits on what he could concede on the issue. He was fully aware that the Senate would have to pass any treaty with a two-thirds vote, and that many hardliners in the military, the scientific community, and Congress were against any agreement at all. A high number of onsite inspections was a sine qua non for the hardliners, just as much as it was a red light for the Soviet side.
A week before the negotiations began, the lead U.S. negotiator, Averell Harriman, received his instructions.32 Try one more time to close the gap on inspections for a comprehensive test ban. If that was not feasible, go for the three-environment agreement. And to the maximum extent possible, unlink the test ban negotiations from other Soviet proposals, such as a non-aggression pact, which would entangle more allies in the negotiations and delay the conclusion of a test ban treaty.
The three-nation negotiations on the test ban treaty got under way in Moscow on July 15.
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was appointed to head the Soviet negotiating team as counterpart to Harriman, signaling the great importance the Soviet leadership attached to the negotiations. Moreover, Khrushchev himself sat through the entire first day. Both sides wanted an agreement, but there was a lot of ground to cover as each side tested the other’s boundaries. The Soviets first proposed that the test ban discussions be combined with a non-aggression pact. As planned, Harriman demurred, explaining that this would complicate and delay the negotiations. After much to-ing and fro-ing, the two sides agreed to a paragraph in the communiqué announcing their mutual interest in exploring a non-aggression pact.
The next challenge was defining the scope of the treaty: partial or comprehensive. Harriman probed whether a comprehensive treaty including an underground testing ban might still be considered, but Khrushchev shut the door firmly on further discussions regarding onsite inspection. The only course ahead was a partial treaty, with a clause in the final agreement stipulating that the agreement was “without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test options.”
Two other modest hurdles remained. The first was agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Khrushchev argued that those, too, should be ruled out, because even ostensibly peaceful uses (such as to mine resources, divert rivers, or carry out other such activities) could be used surreptitiously to gain military information. The United States accepted the point.
The second hurdle was a bit trickier. It concerned the right to withdraw from the treaty, for example in the case of war, or in the event that China or another country carried out its own nuclear tests, thereby pressuring the United States or the Soviet Union to resume testing. A withdrawal clause, Kennedy felt, would be vital to the successful passage of the treaty by the Senate. Khrushchev initially demurred, arguing that the treaty would be devalued by having a built-in aura of impermanence. In the end, after considerable discussion, the two sides agreed on a country’s right to withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” When China detonated its first nuclear
device in October 1964, no important voices in the United States called for a withdrawal from the treaty, a testament to the attitude shift it had sparked.
While leaders on both sides were intent on reaching an agreement, the potential snares and pitfalls were not inconsiderable, especially since many parties on each side of the table would have welcomed a breakdown of the negotiations. Success required focus from the top, and here Kennedy played his role consummately. Harriman was given considerable authority in conducting the negotiations on the ground, combined with Kennedy’s oversight and daily consultation. Harriman sent detailed cables to the State Department every day for consideration by a small White House team, including the president, Rusk, McNamara, and Sorensen. As Glenn Seaborg related, “Harriman, though a veteran of many troubleshooting missions for several presidents, was not prepared at first for the intensity of President Kennedy’s interest in the detail of the negotiations.”33 Two and a half years in office had taught Kennedy the importance of controlling flows of information. Only a few people were shown Harriman’s daily progress reports, and no copies were made or circulated.34 Kennedy also kept in touch with key senators, thereby building the political support that would be needed for Senate ratification.
On July 25, the treaty was completed.35 The three negotiating parties—the United States, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—initialed the treaty that day, with the formal signing ceremony following on August 5. The document is very short, not even three pages. The preamble states two purposes: the “speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament,” and “the discontinuance of test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.” Article I calls on the parties to prohibit all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. Article II allows for amendments. Article III opens the treaty to all states for signature, and declares that the treaty enters into force after its ratification by the three original parties. Article IV declares the option for withdrawal.
When he received the happy news of the treaty’s conclusion at his Hyannis Port compound in Cape Cod, Kennedy was already looking ahead to the next steps with the Soviets. William Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, recalled: “[We] had a relaxed drink or two in the balmy air of a summer’s day. He stated that he felt that this was the most important thing he had accomplished thus far in his Administration—the achievement of a limitation on testing. He did appear elated. It was a result of his personal persistence … He would not give up before one more try because the stakes were so high.”36 Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Harriman’s top aide in the Moscow negotiations, recounted: “I think he felt this was just a start in terms of a relationship with the Soviets … [H]e felt, ‘Now you’ve got this one, let’s get cracking on something else …’ Generally speaking, his approach then was, ‘Let’s not rest now. This is a first step. Let’s get cracking on something else.’ ”37
But first the treaty would face the U.S. public and the Senate in its ultimate test.
* And the Germans were certainly listening—when Kennedy arrived in West Germany, Adenauer greeted him by quoting the passage from the American University speech stating that the United States would not make concessions at the expense of its allies. Vito N. Silvestri, Becoming JFK: A Profile in Communication (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 229.
† Working out of Schoeneberg City Hall, the correspondents in one day went through 4,540 sandwiches, 690 sausages, 987 bottles of beer, 402 packs of cigarettes, and 23 bottles of whiskey. Andreas W. Daum, Kennedy in Berlin (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2008), 28.
‡ Khrushchev seems to have accepted the speech as political theater, though he did note in a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan that the Berlin speech seemed to have been delivered by “quite a different person” than the orator of the American University speech. Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, ed. Benjamin S. Loeb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 230.
§ In his letter of December 19, Khrushchev wrote, “We noted that on this October 30, in conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR V. V. Kuznetsov in New York, your representative Ambassador Dean stated that, in the opinion of the U.S. Government, it would be sufficient to carry on 2–4 on-site inspections each year on the territory of the Soviet Union.” (Khrushchev to Kennedy, December 19, 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996], Document 85).
Chapter 7.
CONFIRMING THE TREATY
JOHN F. KENNEDY WAS aware that negotiating and signing the treaty was just half the battle. The ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate was the other half. The Senate defended its constitutional prerogatives like a hawk. On many occasions the Senate had dashed the best hopes of a president after a major treaty was signed. Kennedy would again draw on his vast powers of oratory and persuasion to seal the deal.
Woodrow Wilson’s failure with the League of Nations offered lessons for every subsequent president, and the lessons were especially relevant for Kennedy. He hailed from the same party as Wilson, and was an heir of Wilsonian idealism, the belief in international institutions and treaties as the basis for international peace. Kennedy was above all intent on avoiding Wilson’s mistakes in dealing with the public and the Senate. He was determined from the start of the peace campaign to ensure that everything agreed upon in negotiations would also be confirmed in the Senate.
Norman Cousins later recalled what Kennedy had said about Wilson when he met with a small group of opinion leaders to strategize about the campaign to win Senate ratification:
Ever since Woodrow Wilson, he said, a President had to be cautious about bringing a treaty to the Senate unless he had a fairly good idea where the votes would come from. To get two-thirds of the Senate behind any issue was a difficult and dubious undertaking; to get it on a controversial treaty was almost in the nature of a miracle. He said that he could name fifteen senators who would probably vote against anything linked to Kennedy’s name—“and not all of them are Republicans.”1
Speaking to the Nation
The campaign for peace was based on winning the public’s support for the treaty, and thereby pushing the Senate into agreement as well. Kennedy therefore began the campaign with a speech to the country and kept the public informed through press conferences, coverage of the Europe trip, and another major televised address on July 26, just one day after the treaty was initialed in Moscow. Beyond that, Kennedy met with national opinion leaders and actively supported the formation of the Citizens’ Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban.2 After serving as a go-between of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the spring, Norman Cousins helped to coordinate the campaign for public support in the summer. Cousins related a meeting with Kennedy:
He reiterated the need for important business support and suggested a dozen names. He said that scientists such as James R. Killian [of MIT] and George Kistiakowsky [of Harvard] would be especially effective if they could be recruited. He felt that religious figures, farmers, educators, and labor leaders all had key roles to play and mentioned a half dozen or more names in each category. Then he went down the list of states in which he felt extra effort was required.3
Kennedy played a very active role in strategizing and marshaling support from a wide cross-section of public figures. Most important, Kennedy spoke publicly, spoke compellingly, and spoke often. He used the presidential bully pulpit exquisitely.
With the treaty agreed upon in Moscow on July 25, Kennedy turned to the nation in a televised address.4 Kennedy had mastered the medium, and used it to place himself directly in the living rooms and kitchens of families across the country. His remarks still radiate a power of intimacy and persuasion half a century later. He looked into the lens of the camera and the eyes of his countrymen.
“Good evening, my fellow citizens,” he began. “I speak to you t
onight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth.” Kennedy reminded his fellow citizens of the “vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest,” of how “[e]ach increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.” He recalled how seemingly endless rounds of meetings on disarmament had “produced only darkness, discord, or disillusion.”
“Yesterday,” he said dramatically, “a shaft of light cut into the darkness.”
Like a new beginning, first there was light. “Negotiations were concluded,” announced Kennedy, “on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.” For the very first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, an agreement had been reached on bringing “the forces of nuclear destruction under international control.”
As Kennedy described the treaty, he once again used the rhetorical tactic of beginning with a series of negatives—what the treaty was not. He would sell the treaty by underselling it. He would make it compelling as a first step on the journey to peace, not as an end point. He would not let the skeptics accuse him of starry-eyed diplomacy or, worse, appeasement. He would instead soberly inform his fellow Americans why it was right and prudent for them, for all Americans, to take this first step.
He also began with a clarification. Many plans, he noted, have been blocked by “those opposed to international inspection,” obliquely referring to the Soviet Union. Onsite inspections are needed, he explained, only for underground tests. “The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police.”
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