A little study of the personnel and developments of the rebellion furnishes convincing evidence as to its true backing. The Liberal Party is strongly supported by the Spanish element of the population, which is almost unanimously pro- German in its sympathies. All over the island, both Germans and Spaniards were arrested for complicity in the uprising. Nor have the clergy escaped. Literally, dozens of bishops were imprisoned in Havana upon the same charges.
It is also a notorious fact that the Mexicans have supported the Liberals, and that the staffs of the Liberal newspapers are almost exclusively composed of Mexican journalists. These newspapers were suppressed at the beginning of the revolution.
But far more significant are the developments in the actual fighting.
Most of the action has taken place in the eastern provinces of Camaguey, Oriente and Santa Clara in which the more fertile fields of sugar cane are situated. The damage to the cane fields has been estimated at 5,000,000 tons and is, from a military standpoint, unnecessary.
Colonel Rigoberto Fernandez, one of the revolutionary leaders, stated that the rebels were plentifully supplied with hand grenades and artillery although the reports prove that they had none. Was this an empty boast or may there be a connection between Fernandez's statement and the capture by the British of three German ships, which were found off the Azores, laden with mines and arms?
I was in Havana in the latter part of March upon a private errand, although the Cuban papers persisted in imputing sinister designs to me. Naturally, the Germans were not inclined to tell all their secrets, but my Mexican acquaintances, all of whom were well informed regarding Cuban affairs, gave me considerable information. Among other Mexicans I met General Joaquin Maas, the former General of the Federal forces under Huerta. The General has since made peace with Carranza and was at this time acting as the latter's go-between in negotiations with Germany. When I last saw Maas it was after the battle of El Paredo. He was about to blow out his brains, but one of his lieutenants elegantly informed him that he was a fool and dissuaded him from suicide. Maas received me with the courtesy due to a former opponent, and was not averse from telling me much about the situation. I also had ample occasion to speak with Spaniards, whose sympathies were decidedly pro-German.
Little by little I was enabled to acquire a rather complete idea not of the issues underlying the Cuban revolution, but of what had brought matters to a head. The answer may be found in one word Germany. German agents notably Dr. Hawe ben Hawas, who took a mysterious botanising expedition throughout that part of Cuba which later became the scene of revolutionary activities, and who has thrice teen arrested as a German spy saw in the political unrest of the country another opportunity to create a diversion in favour of Germany. Cuba at peace was a valuable economic ally of the United States. Cuba in rebellion was a source of annoyance to the country, since it meant intervention, the political value of which was unfavourable to the United States, and a serious loss in sugar, which is one of the most important ingredients in the manufacture of several high explosives.
Hence the burning of millions of tons of sugar cane. Hence the rebel seizure of Santiago de Cuba. Hence the large number of negroes who joined the rebel army, and whose labour is indispensable in the production of sugar.
The ironic part of it all is that Germany had nothing to gain by a change of government in Cuba. Any Cuban Government must have a sympathetic attitude towards the United States. What Germany wanted was a disruption of the orderly life of the country and she wanted it to continue for as long a time as possible.
At the present writing the Cuban rebellion is ended. General Gomez and his army have been captured, President Menocal is firmly seated in power again, and the rebels hold only a few unimportant points. But much damage has been done in the lessening of the sugar supply and the rebellion has also served its purpose as an illustration of Germany's ability to make trouble.
Germany has played a consistent game throughout. She has sought to use all the existing weaknesses of the world for her own purposes all the rivalries, all the fears, all the antipathies, she has utilised as fuel for her own fire. And yet, although she has played the game with the utmost foresight, with a skill that is admirable in spite of its perverse uses, and with an unfailing assurance of success she has come to the fourth year of the Great War with the fact of failure staring her in the face.
But she has not given up. You may be sure that she has not given up.
CHAPTER XII
THE COMPLETE SPY
The last stand of German intrigue Germany's spy system in America. What is coming?
As I write these last few pages three clippings from recent newspapers lie before me on my desk. One of them tells of the new era of good feeling that exists between the Governments of Mexico and the United States, and speaks of the alliance of Latin American Republics against German autocracy.
Another tells how the first contingent of American troops has landed in France after a successful battle with a submarine fleet. And a third speaks of the victorious advance of the troops of Democratic Russia, after the world had begun to believe that Russia had forgotten the War in her new freedom.
I read them over again, and I think that each one of these clippings, if true, writes "failure" once again upon the book of German diplomacy.
I remember a day not so very many months ago, when a man with whom I had some business in for me less tranquil days, came to see me.
"B. E. is in town," he said quietly. "He says he must see you. Can you meet him at the Restaurant to-night?"
Boy-Ed! I was not surprised that he should be in America, for I knew the man's audacity. But what could he want of me? Well, it would do no harm to meet him, I thought, and anyway my curiosity was aroused.
I nodded.
"I'll be there," I said. "At what hour?"
"Six-thirty," my friend replied. "It's only for a minute. He is leaving to-night."
That evening for the first time in two years I saw the man who had done his best to compromise the United States. I did not ask him what his presence meant and, needless to say, he did not inform me.
Our business was of a different character. I had just arranged to write a series of newspaper articles exposing the operations of the Kaiser's secret service, and Boy-Ed tried to induce me to suppress them.
"I cannot do it," I told him.
But the captain showed a remarkable knowledge of my private affairs.
"Under your contract," he said, "the articles cannot be published until you have endorsed them. As you have not yet affixed your signature to them, you can suppress them by merely withholding your endorsement."
This I declined to do, and our conversation ended.
Shortly afterwards Boy-Ed returned to Germany on the U53. He did not attempt to see me again, but three times within the following weeks attempts were made on my life. Later, pressure was brought to bear from sources close to the German Embassy, but they failed to secure the suppression of the articles.
But my curiosity was aroused as to the meaning of Boy-Ed's presence, and I set to work to discover the purpose of it. This was not difficult, for although I have ceased to be a secret agent, I am still in touch with many who formerly gave me information, and I know ways of discovering many things I wish to learn.
Soon I had the full story of Boy-Ed's latest activities in the United States.
He had, I learned, gone first to Mexico in an attempt to pave the way for that last essay at a Mexican-Japanese alliance, which the discovery of the famous Zimmermann note later made public. Whether he had succeeded or no I did not discover at the time. But, what was more important, I did learn that while he was in Mexico Boy-Ed had selected and established several submarine bases for Germany! His plans had also carried him to San Francisco, to which he had gone disguised only by a moustache. There he had identified several men who were needed by the counsel for the defence of the German Consul Bopp, who had been arrested on a charge of conspiring to foment sedition withi
n the United States.
From the Pacific coast Boy-Ed had gone to Kansas City and had bought off a witness who had intended to testify for the United States in the trial of certain German agents. Thence, after a private errand of his own, he had made his way to New York, en route to Newport and Germany.
It may be well here to comment upon one feature of the Zimmermann note which has generally escaped attention. It was through no blunder of the German Government that that document came into the possession of the United States, as I happen to know. I must remind you that diplomatic negotiations are carried through in the following manner. The preliminary negotiations are conducted by men of unofficial standing, and it is not until the attitude of the various Governments involved is thoroughly understood by each of them that final negotiations are drawn up. Now, although no negotiations had taken place between Germany, Japan and Mexico, the form of the Zimmermann note would seem to indicate that there was a thorough understanding between these countries. They were drawn up in this form with a purpose. Germany wished the United States to conclude that Mexico and Japan were hostile to her; Germany had hoped that America would be outwardly silent about the Zimmermann note, but would take some diplomatic action against Mexico and Japan which would inevitably draw these two countries into an anti-American alliance.
Did President Wilson perceive this thoroughly Teutonic plot? I cannot say; but, at any rate, upon February 28 he astounded America by revealing once again Germany's evil intentions towards the United States, and by so doing not only defeated the German Government's particular plan, but effectively cemented public opinion in the United States, bringing it to a unanimous support of the Government in the crisis which was slowly driving towards war.
That marked the last stand of German intrigue as it was conducted before the war. Now there is a new danger a danger whose concrete illustration lies before me in the account of that first engagement between United States warships and German submarines.
The people of the United States, just entered into active participation in the War, are faced with a new peril the betrayal of military and naval secrets to representatives of the German Government working in America. Not only was it known to Germany that American troops had been sent to France, but the very course that the transports were to take had been communicated to Berlin. It is probable that other news of equal value has been or is being sent to Germany at the present time; and the United States is confronted with the possibility of submarine attacks upon its troopships, as well as other dangers which, if not properly grappled with, may result in serious losses and greatly hamper it in its conduct of the War.
What exactly is this spy peril which the United States now faces and which constitutes a far greater, because less easily combated, danger than actual warfare?
How can it be got rid of?
These are the questions which the American people and the American Government are asking themselves and must ask themselves if they are to bear an effective share in the War in which they are engaged.
Because of my former connection with the German Government and my work as a secret agent both in Europe and America, in the former of which I was brought into intimate contact with the workings of the secret service in other countries, I am prepared to give an accurate account of the general structure and workings of the German spy system in the United States as it is to-day.
It is important to remember that the secret diplomatic service, as it was conducted in America before the War, and with which I was connected, is entirely different both in its personnel and methods from the spy system which is in operation to-day. I shall point out presently why this is so and why it must be so.
Before the entry of the United States into the War the principal activities of the German Government's agents were confined to the fomenting of strikes in munitions plants and other war activities, the organising of plots to blow up ships, canals, or bridges anything which would hamper the transportation of supplies to the Allies and the inciting of sedition by stirring up trouble between German-Americans and Americans of other descent. All of these acts were committed in order to prevent the United States from aiding in any way the enemies of Germany; and also, by creating disorder in peace time, to furnish an object lesson of what could be done in time of war.
These things were planned, supervised and executed by Germans and by other enemies of the Allies, under the leadership of men like von Pap en, who were accredited agents of the German Government and who were protected by diplomatic immunity.
Now that War has come an entirely new task is before the German Government and an entirely new set of people are needed to do it. War-time spying is absolutely different from the work which was done before the War, and the two have no connection with each other except as the work done before the War has prepared the way for the work which is being done now.
And whereas the work done before the War was conducted by Germans, the present work, for very obvious reasons, cannot be done by anyone who is a German or who is likely to be suspected of German connections.
I venture to say that not 1 per cent, of the persons who are engaged in spying for the German Government at the present time is either of German birth or descent.
I say this, not because I know how the German secret service is being conducted in the United States, but because I know how it has been conducted in other countries.
Let me explain. It is obvious that such activities as the inciting to strikes and the conspiring which were done in the last three years could be safely conducted by Germans, because the two countries were at peace. The moment that War was declared every German became an object of suspicion, and his usefulness in spying that is, the obtaining of military, naval, political and diplomatic secrets was ended immediately. For that reason Germany and every other Government which has spies in the enemy country make a practice during War of employing virtually no known citizens of its own country.
At the present time more than 90 per cent, of the German spies in England are Englishmen. The rest are Russians, Dutchmen, Roumanians what you will anything but Germans.
One of the former heads of the French secret service in America was a man who called himself Guillaume. His real name is Wilhelm and he was born in Berlin!
For that reason to arrest such men as Carl Heynen or Professor Hanneck is merely a precautionary measure. Whatever connection these men may have had with the German Government formerly, their work is now done, and their detention does not hinder the workings of the real spy system one iota.
HOW THE SPY SYSTEM WORKS
It is difficult to distinguish between the work done in neutral countries by the secret diplomatic agent the man who is engaged in fomenting disorders, such as I have described and the spy who is seeking military information which may be of future use. The two work together, in that the secret agent reports to Berlin the names of inhabitants of the country concerned who may be of use in securing information of military or naval value. It is well to remember, however, that the real spy always works alone. His connection with the Government is known only to a very few officials, and is rarely or never suspected by the people who assist him in securing information. Here permit me to make a distinction between two classes of spies: the agents or directors of espionage, who know what they are doing; and the others, the small fry, who procure bits of information here and there and pass it on to their employers, the agents, often without realising the real purpose of their actions.
In the building of the spy system in America Germans and German-Americans have been used. Business houses such as banks and insurance companies, which have unusual opportunities of obtaining information about their clients, most of whom, in the case of German institutions in America, are of German birth or descent have been of service in bringing the directors of spy work into touch with people who will do the actual spying.
The German secret service makes a point of having in its possession lists of people who are in a position to find out facts of greater
or less importance about Government officials. Housemaids, small tradesmen, and the like, can be of use in the compiling of data about men of importance, so that their personal habits, their financial status, their business and social relationships become a matter of record for future use. These facts are secured, usually by a little "jollying" rather than the payment of money, by the local agent a person sometimes planted in garrison towns, State capitals, etc. who is paid a comparatively small monthly sum for such work. This information is passed to a director of spies, who thereby discovers men who are in a position to supply him with valuable data and who determine whether or not they can be reached.
My Adventures as a German Secret Service Agent Page 17