Also joining Sulla’s slow-moving army was a man who would become Pompey’s great rival in the years to come. Now over thirty, Marcus Licinius Crassus was the younger cousin of Crassus the Orator, but more importantly, the son of one of the proscribed victims in the Marian terror. While his father and older brother had been forced to commit suicide, Crassus himself had gotten away. After fleeing Rome, Crassus went to Spain, where his father had built an extensive network of clients. Taken in by a loyal friend of the family, Crassus lived in cave near the sea for eight months, his food, supplies, and even two slave girls provided by his benefactors. When Cinna died, Crassus emerged from hiding and, like Pompey, went round raising a personal legion to contribute to Sulla’s inevitable war effort. With a small army under his command, Crassus sailed to Italy and presented himself to Sulla. It was while in Sulla’s camp that Crassus opened his legendary rivalry with Pompey. Sulla treated young Pompey like a near equal while Crassus was treated as a junior officer—and Crassus sulked over the perceived slight. When Sulla dispatched Crassus north to recruit more men and Crassus asked for a military escort, Sulla shot back: “I give you as an escort your father, your brother, your friends, and your kinsmen, who were illegally and unjustly put to death, and whose murderers I am pursuing.”16
In addition to winning over neutral leaders, Sulla also attracted former enemies now looking to secure a spot on the winning side. Though Sulla knew how to nurse a grudge, he was also eager to make ostentatious displays of forgiveness. The consummate survivor Marcius Philippus—last seen in 91 railing against the optimates during the tribunate of Drusus the Younger—abandoned Rome and presented himself to Sulla. Far from being punished for collaborating with the Cinnans, the ex-consul was given a high command in Sulla’s army. Sulla’s broad clemency at this late stage even applied to core members of Marius’s inner circle. Publius Cornelius Cethegus had been among the twelve proscribed men specifically named by Sulla after his first march on Rome. Cethegus had managed to dodge Sulla’s patrols but now delivered himself into the hands of his former pursuer in the hope of surviving this latest crisis. Sulla welcomed these supplications as a chance to show clemency and forgiveness. And it was not just an empty show. Cethegus was given important responsibilities during the war. But the time was fast approaching for Sulla’s benevolence to give way to sterner treatment for his more incorrigible enemies.17
NOT EVERYONE WAS flocking to Sulla’s banner, though, and the consuls Norbanus and Asiaticus still commanded large armies. With Sulla marching up from the south, both consuls deployed their forces in Campania, blocking the two principal roads to Rome. With the south already falling under Sulla’s control, the goal now was to make a stand in Campania and block the final approach to Rome.18
Sulla’s legions first made contact with Norbanus’s army at Tifata on the Via Appia. Even on the eve of battle, Sulla was not sure how his men would respond to the order to fight. But the next morning they more than proved their loyalty. Fighting as tenaciously as they had against the armies of Mithridates, Sulla’s legions broke Norbanus’s army and sent it back to the safety of Capua. Sulla later said it was after the Battle of Tifata that he knew he was going to win the war—his men would follow him anywhere.19
With Norbanus now cooped up behind the walls of Capua, Asiaticus approached Sulla from the north. But where Sulla’s men had just proved their invincible loyalty, Asiaticus’s men were getting mighty ambivalent about following the consul into battle. Sulla’s promise to respect Italian citizenship had already made the rounds, and this, combined with word of Sulla’s victory at Tifata, made fighting seem as pointless as it was dangerous. Asiaticus was aware that the commitment of his men was wavering, so after camping a short distance from Sulla’s army, Asiaticus proposed negotiations. Sulla naturally agreed, and the two leaders declared a cease-fire and exchanged hostages. Then each designated three men to carry the negotiation: Asiaticus was almost certainly accompanied by his chief legate Sertorius, while Metellus Pius accompanied Sulla.20
Ostensibly the talks were supposed to settle the political dispute and avoid open war. But Sulla’s negotiators entered talks “not because they hoped or desired to come to an agreement, but because they expected to create dissensions in Asiaticus’s army, which was in a state of dejection.” While he stalled in the negotiating tent, Sulla sent his men to mingle with the soldiers in Asiaticus’s camp to spread the word that Sulla was great, his promises would be kept, that this was really only about settling business with a few personal enemies. Sulla was the enemy of neither Rome nor Italy. Sulla’s troops also recalled that Norbanus’s army had just been trounced. Not without cause, Asiaticus’s men fell under the seductive influence of Sulla’s veterans.21
Sertortius disapproved of letting the men anywhere near each other and likely divined Sulla’s real intentions. So when Asiaticus dispatched Sertortius to inform Norbanus of the developing talks and solicit his colleague’s opinion, Sertorius made a calculated detour on the way to Capua. The town of Suessa had recently declared loyalty to Sulla, but Sertorius entered the town and occupied it by force—a clear violation of the cease-fire. When Sulla found out about the breach of peace, he declared an end to negotiations. Both sides retuned their hostages and prepared for battle—just as Sertorius likely intended.22
But by then it was too late. After the breakdown of negotiations, Asiaticus ordered his men to prepare for war, but instead they prepared to surrender. When Sulla’s army marched on Asiaticus’s position, Asiaticus’s men dutifully suited up to meet them. But as the two sides lined up on the plains, Sulla gave the signal and Asiaticus’s troops crossed over to the welcome embrace of their new commander. Unable to do anything about this mass defection, Asiaticus was found in his command tent and taken prisoner. Trying to display benevolence with every step, Sulla interviewed Asiaticus and then let the consul go free. When Carbo received word that Sulla had successfully induced the defection of an entire consular army, he said “that in making war upon the fox and the lion in Sulla, he was more annoyed by the fox.”23
Sulla’s newly combined force then turned its attention to Norbanus in Capua. Sulla sent envoys to the other consul requesting talks, but Norbanus was well informed of what had befallen his colleague and sent the envoys away without a response. Norbanus then extracted himself from Capua before Sulla’s legions arrived, and spent the rest of the war trying to avoid contact so his men would not defect.24
The confrontations with Norbanus and Asiaticus marked a turning point in Sulla’s conduct toward his enemies. Until now, he had welcomed all former enemies into his camp and avoided punitive sacking of the countryside. The limits of his magnanimity were now reached with the grand defection of Asiaticus’s army, which clearly demonstrated the gods favored Sulla. Anyone left on the other side was now beyond hope and would be treated as enemies to be exterminated rather than potential allies to be won over.
BELIEVING TIME WAS on his side, Sulla was in no hurry to force a climactic battle. Instead he recruited and politicked his way through communities throughout southern Italy to bring everyone over to his side. To combat these efforts, Carbo returned to Rome in July 83 and had the Senate declare everyone who joined Sulla an enemy of the state. Over the summer both sides fanned out to towns and cities across Italy to make their pitches. Sulla’s agents were able to point to their recent victories, defections of troops, and the allegiance of eminent statesmen. But most importantly they made the devastating promise that citizenship for the Italians would be respected. Carbo’s agents said that Sulla was known for his cruelty and duplicity. His brutal campaigns against the Hirpini and Samnites during the Social War were well known. Plus the sequence of events that had led to Sulla’s first illegal march on Rome had been kicked off by Sulla’s opposition to Italian citizenship. Most of Italy did not know whom to believe: “They were therefore obliged to shift their pretended allegiance from one side to the other, and to appease whoever was present.”25
The battle for contro
l of Picenum was particularly fierce as Carbo’s agents tried to blunt the damage of Pompey’s defection. But with most of the leading men in the region already siding with the young general, Pompey was able to raise two more legions on Sulla’s behalf. Carbo sent in a detachment of legates to disrupt Pompey’s efforts, but instead they were driven out of the region, which now fell decisively into Pompey’s hands. Sertorius had better luck recruiting in the old Marian stronghold of Etruria, and when Asiaticus arrived after being released by Sulla, Sertorius was able to present the consul with four fresh legions.26
Asiaticus led these four legions into Picenum to confront Pompey directly, but was forced to endure the same shame he had endured at Sulla’s hands. After planting his legions near Pompey’s army, the soldiers began mingling, and Asiaticus’s men were again amenable to the promises made by the other side. When Asiaticus woke up in the morning, he once again found his men had all deserted to the other side to the enemy. In an age where conflicts were led by men who commanded unprecedented personal loyalty—Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Pius, Sertorius—Scipio Asiaticus was a singularly uninspiring leader who watched two full armies abandon him on the eve of battle. He fled into Gaul, never to return. Sulla, meanwhile, was now even more impressed that Pompey, “who was still extremely young, had snatched such a large army away from the enemy, but those who were far superior to him in age and reputation could hardly keep even their own servants in a dependable alliance.”27
Asiaticus’s loss of the legions he had just raised also convinced Sertorius that the time had come to move along. Disillusioned with the leadership of the anti-Sullan forces, Sertorius decided that Italy was likely lost—and if the cause was to survive, a prudent withdrawal was in order. Having been elected praetor for the year and given Spain as his province, Sertorius abandoned Italy and made his way overland toward Spain to raise new armies. After Sulla won the Civil War and liquidated all his enemies in Italy, Sertorius’s Spanish legions would be the only force left in the world opposing him. Sertorius would emerge as principal leader of the opposition to the coming Sullan regime. Many refugees fled Rome for the safety of Sertorius’s army and he managed to avoid defeat for nearly a decade, embarrassing the authorities in Rome who were trying to pretend like everything was settled and life had returned to normal.28
DESPITE SULLA’S MOMENTUM, however, the war was far from over. Most of north and central Italy remained in opposition and skeptical of his ultimate intentions. It is telling that Sulla was still not willing to risk all in battle, because it was a battle he might lose. In the fall of 83, Rome still remained in the hands of his enemies.
With Norbanus and Asiaticus having proven themselves unequal to the task of defeating Sulla, Carbo returned to Rome for the consular elections for 82. The Assembly returned Carbo to his third consulship and for a colleague elected Marius’s son, Gaius Marius the Younger. Still in his late twenties, Marius the Younger had never served a magistracy and was not eligible to stand for the consulship. But Carbo engineered the young man’s election because, as a matter of family honor and personal predilection, Marius the Younger was a relentless—even cruel—enemy of Sulla. Besides, he was not being elected for any special military leadership or political skill. Even by Carbo’s own admission, Marius was elected because the name Marius still meant something.29
Both sides suspended war operations over the particularly harsh winter of 83–82. When the spring of 82 arrived it brought with it the first anniversary of the Civil War. It is important to remember that despite what Sulla might tell you, he did not just land in Brundisium, march on Rome, and take it. There was a prolonged fight for the hearts, minds, and swords of Italy. Even now, after a year of conflict, the end result was still in doubt.30
With the dawn of the campaign of 82, the old Cinnan strategy to control armies and supplies in Gaul, Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Macedonia had come to naught, and the remaining anti-Sullan partisans were now hunkered in a final defensive crouch in northwest Italy. Carbo returned to the north to defend Etruria, Umbria, and Cisalpine Gaul from encroachment by Pompey. Meanwhile, Marius the Younger led eight legions down to Campania to face off against Sulla—proof enough against later Sullan propaganda that Italy simply melted into his hands the minute he arrived.31
With Marius on the way, Sulla advanced, forcing Marius to withdraw to an unknown site identified only as “Sacriportus.” Sulla ordered his men to pursue Marius, but after a chase lasting all day, Sulla’s legates convinced their general to order a halt and break camp for the night. Sulla reluctantly agreed. But just as his men were setting themselves to the task, Marius the Younger showed a little initiative: rather than sitting back on his heels waiting to be cornered, he ordered his men to attack Sulla’s legions as they pitched camp. It wasn’t a bad plan necessarily, but Sulla’s tired soldiers were enraged they were being forced to drop their shovel and pick up their swords. Carried by this rage, they rallied and sent Marius’s legions careening backward toward the city Praeneste (modern Palestrina).32
The citizens of Praeneste hated Sulla and were prepared to receive Marius, but not at fatal risk to themselves. With Sulla’s army on the way, the Praenestians refused to dismantle their fortifications and open the gates. Marius and a small group of officers were hoisted into the city by a rope and sling, but the vast majority of his men were left behind in the dusty plain at the base of the wall. When Sulla’s legions appeared, they commenced a bloody slaughter. As Marius the Younger watched from the ramparts, his men were pinned against the wall and attacked mercilessly. Only after a suitable venting of blood to satisfy their rage did Sulla’s troops allow the survivors to surrender.33
When Sulla himself arrived, he displayed calculated cruelty. He ordered the survivors rounded up and all captured Samnites herded off to one side. Once disarmed and surrounded, the Samnites were slaughtered upon Sulla’s orders. He then ordered his troops to begin a siege of Praeneste. By trapping Marius, Sulla could now survey all of southern Italy; he spied no enemy army standing between him and Rome. He decided it was finally time to go home.34
BACK IN ROME, the defeat of Marius the Younger cloaked the city in dread. Most of the Sullan partisans had long since departed the city, leaving behind only Sulla’s enemies or neutral leaders who still hoped to broker a peace. In this latter group were a small collection of prominent senators who had never been “Marian” or “Cinnan,” but who had remained in Rome for the duration of their regime. With Rome all but indefensible, Marius the Younger sent instructions for all remaining anti-Sullan partisans to vacate the city and join Carbo for a last stand in Etruria. But he also sent a list of men to be dealt with before the evacuation.35
With this list in hand one of the praetors convened the Senate under false pretenses and, as soon as everyone was inside, let loose a pack of assassins. Two senators were killed immediately, including Carbo’s cousin, who was now suspected of being in league with the Sullans. Another senator tried to run but was tackled at the door of the Senate house and stabbed to death. The big name on the list, though, nearly got away. Publius Mucius Scaevola was among the last of the old generation of optimates. A friend of Scaurus, Crassus, and Antonius, Scaevola had been present at Crassus’s house for the fateful discussion of the orators on the eve of the Social War. Scaevola had remained in Rome after Cinna captured the city, and was given a wide latitude as a potential ally to be cultivated. Now marked for death, Scaevola escaped the killing in the Senate house and sought shelter inside the Temple of Vesta. The temple was a sacred sanctuary, but the assassins barged in, located Scaevola, and murdered him. The bodies of the dead, as usual, were dumped in the Tiber.36
The murders complete, the remaining anti-Sullan partisans evacuated Rome for the north. When they decamped they left only the frightened plebs urbana behind. The inhabitants of Rome had only recently joined the anti-Sullan coalition, and they had only joined out of fear of what Sulla might do when he came back. Now they would find out what their punishment would be. Sulla’s le
gions appeared on the road and methodically surrounded Rome. Eventually, the entourage of Sulla himself appeared, swinging around the city and arriving at the Campus Martius. Determining that death by starvation was worse than a quick death by the sword, the citizens of Rome opened the gates.37
But the plebs urbana were in for a pleasant surprise. After bracing for a bloody purge, they instead got word that Sulla had called a mass meeting to address the people of Rome and make his objectives clear. When the people assembled on the Campus Martius, Sulla announced that he planned to be a surgeon, not a butcher. While he would of course reclaim his own property and punish a few select enemies, the rest of the population had nothing to fear. Then, leaving behind a few trusted officers with a small garrison, Sulla departed for the north as quickly as he had come.38
Sulla’s first swing through Rome was calculated to soothe fears and induce men to lie down rather than stand up. And so far nothing in his career led anyone to believe it was not sincere. As Plutarch says, “Sulla had used his good fortune moderately, at first, and like a statesman, and had led men to expect in him a leader who was attached to the aristocracy, and at the same time helpful to the common people.” But the next time Sulla came to Rome—when the war was finished and there was no one left to challenge him—it would be quite a different story: “His conduct fixed a stigma upon offices of great power, which were thought to work a change in men’s previous characters, and render them capricious, vain, and cruel.”39
The Storm Before the Storm Page 27