by Adolf Hitler
As a matter of fact, indeed, France also had never taken part in a coalition in which German interests in any way would have been promoted. In the last three hundred years, Germany had been attacked by France twenty nine times all told up to 1870. A fact which, on the eve of the Battle Of Sedan, moved Bismarck to oppose the French General Wimpffen most sharply when the latter tried to achieve a mitigation of the terms of surrender. It was Bismarck at that time who, in response to the declaration that France would not forget a German concession but would remember it gratefully forever in the future, immediately stood up and confronted the French negotiator with the hard, naked facts of history. Bismarck stressed, in this sense, that France had attacked Germany so often in the last three hundred years, regardless of the prevailing form of government, that for all the future he was convinced that regardless how the capitulation was formulated, France would immediately attack Germany anew as soon as she felt strong enough for it, either through her own strength or through the strength of allies.
Thereby Bismarck had more correctly appraised French mentality than our present political leaders of Germany.
He could do this because he, who himself had a policy aim in view, could also have an inner understanding of the policy goals others set themselves. For Bismarck the intention of French foreign policy was clearly established. It is incomprehensible to our presentday leaders, however, because they are lacking in every clear political idea.
If, moreover, France, on the occasion of her entry into the World War, had only the intention of regaining Alsace-Lorraine as a definite aim, the energy of the French war leadership would not have been nearly what it was. The political leadership, especially, would not have come around to a determination which seemed worthy of the greatest admiration during many situations during the World War. It lay, however, in the nature of this greatest coalition war of all times that a complete fulfilment of all wishes was all the less possible since the internal interests of the participant nations themselves had exhibited very great divergences. The French intention [desire] of a complete effacement of Germany in Europe still stood opposed to the English desire to prevent an unconditional French position of hegemony, as much as such a one for Germany.
Thus, for the curtailment of French war aims, it was important that the German collapse take place in forms that did not yet make public opinion fully aware of the whole dimension of the catastrophe. In France they had come to know the German Grenadier in such a way that only with hesitation could they look forward to a possibility that France might be forced to step forth alone for the fulfilment of her ultimate political goal. Later, however, under the impact of Germany’s inner defeat, now become generally visible, when they might have been more determined on such an action, the war psychosis in the other parts of the world had already so widely abated that a unilateral action by France for a final aim of such magnitude could no longer have been carried out without opposition on the part of her former allies.
Thereby we are not saying that France renounced her aim. On the contrary, she will try as persistently as before to achieve in the future what the present prevented. France will also in the future, as soon as she feels capable of this through her own power or the power of her allies, attempt to dissolve Germany, and try to occupy the bank of the Rhine River in order in this way to be able to commit French strength elsewhere with no threat to her rear. That thereby France is not in the least irritated in her intention by changes in the forms of German Government is all the more comprehensible since the French Folk itself, indeed, without any regard to its constitutions of the moment, clings equally to its foreign policy ideas. A Folk which itself always pursues a definite foreign policy goal, paying no regard as to whether as rulers it has a republic or a monarchy, bourgeois democracy or a Jacobin terror, will have no understanding that another Folk, perhaps by a change of its form of government, could also undertake a change of its foreign policy aims. Hence nothing will change France’s attitude to Germany as such, regardless whether in Germany an Reich or a Republic represents the nation, or even socialist terror rules the State.
Obviously, France is not indifferent vis-à-vis German events, but at the same time her attitude is determined only by the probability of a greater success, that is, of a facilitation of its foreign policy action by a definite German form of government. France will wish Germany the constitution which will leave France to expect the least resistance to Germany’s destruction. If, therefore, the German Republic as a special sign of its value tries to induce French friendship, in reality this is the most devastating certificate of its incapacity. For it is welcomed in Paris only because France regards it as poor in values for Germany. In no way is it thereby said that France will confront this German Republic otherwise than as it has in analogous conditions of our governmental weakness in past times. On the Seine River they were always fonder of German weakness than German strength because it seemed to guarantee France’s foreign policy activity an easier success.
This French tendency will in no way be changed by the fact that the French Folk suffer from no lack of territory. For in France policy for centuries has least been determined by sheer economic distress, but much more by impulses of feeling. France is a classic example of the fact that the sense of a healthy territorial gain policy can easily change over into its opposite, once Folkish principles are no longer determining, and so called governmental national principles take their place. French national chauvinism has departed from Folkish points of view to such an extent that, for the gratification of a mere power titillation, they Negrify their own blood just to maintain the character of a grand nation numerically. Hence France will also be an eternal disturber of world peace for as long as a decisive and fundamental lesson is not administered to this Folk some day. Moreover, nobody has better characterised the nature of French vanity than Schopenhauer with his utterance: Africa has its monkeys, Europe has its French.
French foreign policy has always received its inner impulse from this mixture of vanity and megalomania. Who in Germany wants to wait and hope that, the more France is estranged from rational clear thinking, in consequence of her general Negrification, she will yet one day undertake a change in her disposition and intentions toward Germany?
No, regardless of how the next development in Europe proceeds, France, by utilising momentary German weaknesses and all the diplomatic and military possibilities at her disposal, will always seek to inflict harm on us and to split our Folk so that she can ultimately bring it to a complete disintegration.
Hence for Germany any coalition which does not signify a binding of France is by itself impermissible.
The belief in a German Russian understanding is in itself fantastic as long as a regime rules in Russia which is permeated by only one aim: to carry over the Bolshevist poisoning to Germany. It is natural, therefore, for communist elements to agitate for a German Russian alliance. They thereby hope, rightfully, to be able to lead Germany herself to Bolshevism. It is incomprehensible, however, if national Germans believe that it is possible to achieve an understanding with a State whose greatest interest is the destruction of this very national Germany. Obviously, should such an alliance finally come into being today, its result would be the complete rule of Jewry in Germany exactly as in Russia. Likewise incomprehensible is the opinion that one can wage a war against the capitalist Western European world with this Russia. For, in the first place, presentday Russia is anything but an anticapitalist State. It is, to be sure, a country that has destroyed its own national economy, but, nevertheless, only in order to give international finance capital the possibility of an absolute control. If this were not so, how could it be, secondly, that the very capitalist world in Germany takes a position in favour of such an alliance? It is after all the Jewish press organs of the most outspoken stock exchange interests who espouse the cause of a German Russian alliance in Germany. Does one really believe that the Berlin Daily Paper or the Frankfurt Times and all their illustrated papers speak more or l
ess overtly for Bolshevik Russia because the latter is an anticapitalist State? In political matters, it is always a curse when the wish becomes father to the thought.
To be sure, it is conceivable that in Russia itself an internal change within the Bolshevik world may ensue to the extent that the Jewish element, perhaps, could be crowded out by a more or less Russian national element. Then the possibility might not be excluded that presentday Bolshevik Russia, in reality Jewish capitalistic, would be driven toward [to a] national anticapitalist tendencies. In this case, to which many things seem to point, it would be conceivable, to be sure, that Western European capitalism would seriously take a position against Russia.
But then an alliance of Germany with this Russia would also be complete insanity. For the idea that such an alliance could somehow be held secret is as unjustified as the hope to arm ourselves for the conflict through military preparations that are made quietly.
Then there would only be two real possibilities: either this alliance would be viewed by the Western European world, poising itself against Russia, as a danger, or not. If yes, then I don’t know who can seriously believe that there will be time for us to arm ourselves in a manner suitable at least to prevent a collapse in the first twenty four hours. Or do people really believe in earnest that France will wait until we have built our air defence and our tank defence? Or do they believe that this can happen secretly in a country in which treason is no longer considered shameless, but a courageous deed worthy of emulation? No, if Germany really wants to enter into an alliance with Russia against Western Europe, then Germany will again become a historic battlefield tomorrow.
On top of this, it requires an entirely uncommon fantasy to fancy that Russia could somehow come to Germany’s help, in what way I know not. The only success of such an action would be that Russia could thereby still escape a catastrophe for a certain time, as it would first break over Germany. But a popular inducement for such a struggle against Germany could hardly exist, especially in the western States. Just imagine Germany allied with a real anticapitalist Russia, and then picture how this democratic world Jewish press would mobilise all the instincts of the other nations against Germany. How, especially in France, complete harmony would immediately be established between French national chauvinism and the Jewish stock exchange press. For let one not confuse such a process with the struggle of White Russian Generals against the Bolshevism of an earlier time. In the years 1919 and 1920, national White Russia fought against the Jewish stock exchange revolution, in truth international capitalist red revolution in the highest sense. Today, however, anticapitalist Bolshevism, become national, would stand in a struggle against world Jewry. Whoever understands the importance of press propaganda, and its infinite possibilities for inciting nations and besetting people, can imagine to what orgies of hate and passion against Germany the European western nations would be whipped. For then Germany would no longer be allied with the Russia of a great, noteworthy, ethical, bold idea, but with the despoilers of the culture of mankind.
Above all, there could be no better chance for the French government to master its own inner difficulties than to undertake a fully dangerfree struggle against Germany in such a case. French national chauvinism could be all the more satisfied since then, under the protection of a new world coalition, it could come much closer to the fulfilment of the ultimate war aim. For regardless of the nature of the alliance between Germany and Russia, militarily, Germany alone would have to sustain the most terrible blows. Wholly apart from the fact that Russia does not border directly on Germany and, consequently, must itself first overrun the Polish State — even in the case of a subjugation of Poland by Russia which as such is quite improbable — in the best of circumstances such Russian help could essentially arrive on German territory only when Germany no longer existed. But the idea of a landing of Russian Divisions anywhere in Germany is completely excluded as long as England and France have complete control of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, the landing of Russian troops in Germany would fail because of countless technical deficiencies.
Thus, should a German Russian alliance some day have to undergo the test of reality, and there is no such thing as an alliance without the idea of war, Germany would be exposed to the concentrated attacks of all Western Europe without being able to provide for her own defence in a serious way.
But now there remains the question of just what meaning a German Russian alliance should have in general.
Only the one of preserving Russia from destruction and sacrificing Germany for that? Regardless of how this alliance would turn out in the end, Germany could not arrive at setting a decisive foreign policy goal. For thereby nothing would be changed regarding the fundamental vital question, indeed regarding the vital needs, of our Folk. On the contrary, Germany, thereby, would be more than ever cut off from the only rational territorial policy in order to pad out her future with the scuffle over unimportant border adjustments. For the question of space for our Folk cannot be solved either in the west or in the south of Europe.
The hope in a German Russian alliance, which haunts the minds of even many German national politicians, however, is more than questionable for still another reason.
In general, it seems self evident in national circles that we cannot very well ally ourselves with a Jewish Bolshevist Russia, since the result, according to all probability, would be a Bolshevisation of Germany.
Obviously, we do not want this. But we base ourselves on the hope that one day the Jewish character — and thereby the most fundamentally international capitalistic character of Bolshevism in Russia — might disappear in order to make place for a national communism, anticapitalist on a world scale. Then this Russia, permeated once more by national tendencies, might very well come up for consideration in terms of an alliance with Germany.
This is a very great error. It rests on an extraordinary ignorance of the psyche of the Slavic Folk Soul. This should not amaze anybody if we reflect on how little knowledge even politically minded Germany had of the spiritual conditions of her erstwhile allies. Otherwise we would never have fallen so low. If, therefore, today the national politicians in favour of friendship with Russia try to motivate their policy by reference to Bismarck’s analogous attitudes, they disregard a whole multitude of important factors which at that time, but not today, spoke in favour of Russian friendship.
The Russia which Bismarck knew was not a typical Slavic State, at least insofar as it was a question of the political leadership of the same. In general, Slavdom is lacking in Stateforming forces. In Russia especially, government formations were always attended to by foreign elements. Since the time of Peter The Great there were, above all, very many Baltic Germans who formed the skeleton and the brains of the Russian State. In the course of centuries, countless thousands of these Germans have been Russified, but only in the sense in which our own bourgeoisie, our national bourgeoisie, would like to Germanise or Teutonise Poles or Czechs. Just as in this case the new fledged German is in truth only a German speaking Pole or Czech, likewise did these artificial Russians remain German, or better, Teutons, according to their blood and hence their capabilities. Russia is indebted to this Teutonic upper stratum for her political State as well as for what little exists of her cultural value. A great Russia would neither have arisen nor would she have been able to preserve herself without this really German upper and intellectual stratum. As long as Russia had been a State with an autocratic form of government, this upper stratum, which in truth was not at all Russian, also decisively influenced the political life of the gigantic empire. Even Bismarck knew this Russia at least in part. It was with this Russia that the master of German political statesmanship had political dealings. But, even in his lifetime, the reliability and stability of Russian policy, both domestic and foreign, fluctuated precariously and became in part incalculable.
This lay in the gradual suppression of the German upper stratum. This process of the transformation of the Russian intelligentsia was caused
in part by a bleeding of the Russian nation in consequence of many wars, which, as has been already mentioned in this book, primarily decimate the racially more valuable forces.
Actually the officer corps especially was for the most part non Slav by descent, but in every case not of Russian blood. On top of this came the slight increase in the upper stratum of the intelligentsia as such, and finally the artificial training by the schools of a real Russiandom with regard to blood. The slight Statepreserving value of the new Russian intelligentsia as such was grounded on blood, and revealed itself most sharply perhaps in the nihilism of the Russian universities. Most fundamentally, however, this nihilism was nothing but the opposition, determined by blood, of real Russiandom to the racially alien upper stratum.