Newer, but even less perfect, tools to measure and compare the soft power of countries are specific rankings recently developed by several institutions. One of the most important is the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, which measures the global image or a brand of 50 countries. First developed in 2005, it measures state perceptions in six dimensions: culture, governance, people, exports, tourism, investment and immigration. It presents a commercial approach to a country that, like any product, needs proper marketing to maximise profits. It is based on the assumption that “the way a country is perceived by international public opinion makes a critical difference to the success of its business, trade and tourism efforts, as well as its diplomatic and cultural relations with other countries” (Simon Anholt website, 2014).
Another interesting option is the IfG Monocle Soft Power Index, developed in 2010 by the British Institute for Government and Monocle magazine, which evaluates the soft power of countries according to 43 different parameters, derived from existing rankings and indices, grouped within five categories: government, culture, diplomacy, education, and business/innovation, supplemented by seven subjective elements evaluated by panel of experts. Its third edition, in 2012, evaluated 40 countries.
One recent variation of the soft power index is the Rapid Growth Markets Soft Power Index. This measures a country’s soft power according to 13 soft power variables, divided into three major categories: global image, global integrity and global integration. The variables all impact a sovereign state’s soft power on the global stage. Due to limited data availability of a few of the variables, the index only covers six years, from 2005 to 2010
Other, less direct, but relevant, soft power indices include, among others: the Global Peace Index, and the Good Country Index. The Global Peace Index (GPI)ranks nations according to their level of peace. Is seems hardly imaginable that states at war with others or with themselves can be seen as a source of attraction. The index is composed of 22 qualitative and quantitative indicators from other respected sources and ranks 162 independent states, covering 99.6 per cent of the world’s population. It gauges global peace using three broad themes: the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict, and the degree of militarisation (GPI website, 2014).
In 2014, Simon Anholt, author of the nation-branding concept, suggested another innovative ranking – the Good Country Index, which measures how much each country on earth contributes to the planet and to the human race. It uses 35 reliable datasets that track the way most countries on earth behave, five in each of the seven categories: science and technology, culture, international peace and security, world order, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and health and wellbeing. Its first edition, in 2014, evaluated 125 countries. Most of the datasets used are produced by the United Nations and other international agencies, with a few contributions from NGOs and other organisations. According to Anholt, this ranking gives “each country a balance-sheet to show at a glance whether it’s a net creditor to mankind, a burden on the planet, or something in between.” It is, hence, not a moral judgment of a country, and “good” is not seen in opposite to bad, but to “selfish” (Good Country Index website, 2014).
If soft power is about the relative attractiveness of a country, another indication of soft power may be the number of tourists visiting every year or the number of foreign students attending that country’s universities. Migration flow is still considered auxiliary information about how a country is seen by its own citizens and foreigners. Naturally, there are many more additional ways to calculate country’s power attraction, adjusted to its specificity. For instance, other measures of evaluation that Nye used in his assessment of US soft power are data such as the number of patents, Nobel Prize winners, number of Internet users, expenditure on research and development, and many more (Nye, 2004). The list of specific attributes of soft power is not precisely defined and, therefore, specific research may try to draw its own set of variables according to which soft power can be measured.
Towards Smart Power
As was mentioned before, soft power does not exclude or replace hard power. The two should not be seen as contradictory but rather as two extremes on the continuum of power “from the softest forms of attraction to the hardest forms of physical control over another” (Rothman, 2011: 60). In fact, hard and soft powers are inherently interlinked, and the relationship is both complex and interactive. As Nye claims: “Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other” (2004: 25). As shown above, soft power can both enhance hard power and weaken it and hard power can undercut soft power, or, be a source of its enhancement. To better escape the inherent contradictions of the soft power concept, in 2003, Nye introduced a new term, “smart power”, which combines two dimensions. As he explains, the “smart power” term was developed “to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy” (Nye, 2011:20). Instead, he warns, “it is a mistake to rely on hard power or soft power alone.” And he calls the situation when the two are effectively combined “smart power” (Nye, 2006a).
The new term soon became popular in policymaking and academic circles in the US, drawing a number of analyses and commentaries. A special US bipartisan Commission on Smart Power, established in 2006, warned that overreliance on military power is not a wise strategy to guide America’s global engagement. The authors called for the United States to become a smarter power by “complementing U.S. military and economic might with greater investments in its soft power” (CSIS, 2007: p.5). Smart power was defined as “neither hard nor soft” but “the skillful combination of both” (ibid: 7). In 2009, US Secretary of State Secretary Hilary Clinton officially introduced smart power as a US foreign policy strategy, composed of the three “D’s”: diplomacy, development and defence (Clinton, 2010).
Smart power is sometimes described as “soft power 2.0”, as it encompasses a larger role for soft power in a country’s external relations. It is based on the assumption that soft power is often a better tool to realise certain aims rather than operating only by coercive measures. It is not advocated to replace hard with soft power, but to obtain optimal diversification between both dimensions of power to wield maximum influence in international affairs (Gallarotti, 2011: p.42). In this sense, soft power can be used to supplement hard power resources or achieve different national objectives (Lee, 2010c: p.12). A country that wants to be effective in international relations must have both kinds of power. As one Indian commentator rightly observed: “Hard power without soft power stirs up resentments and enmities: soft power without hard power is a confession of weakness” (Tharoor, 2012: p.287).
Thus, it is important to choose the right policy tools and correct mix of soft and hard power policies to a specific situation and objective. Nye observes, “soft power got nowhere in attracting the Taliban government away from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990s. It took hard military power to remove them. That said, other goals, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights, are better achieved by soft power. Coercive democratisation has its limits, as the Bush Administration found out in Iraq” (Nye, 2006b: p.106).
Military power continues to be indispensable for providing security and stability to a country. “Economic power is bedrock of a country’s international influence, which expands its capacities to act also in other areas. Soft power is essential to win hearts and minds and make realisation of one’s aims less contested and resisted. Militaries are well suited to defeating states, but they are often poor instruments to fight ideas” (CSIS, 2007: 6). It can be said that, whereas military power is crucial to winning wars, soft power is essential to winning peace. Therefore, both are necessary.
Finally, it is also important to mention some limitations of the smart power strategy. Despite its rising popularity in academia and policy-making circles in many countries, implementation of smart power strategy is facing stiff resistance and a number of institutional, intelle
ctual and practical barriers. First, the old paradigm and tradition to look at foreign policy through a hard power lens is pervasive and not easy to change; old habits die hard. Moreover, “the institutions of hard power are vastly, disproportionately larger, better funded and more influential than the institutions of soft power” (Wilson III, 2008: p.116).
Despite the fact that many countries have happily avoided an open conflict or war, governments often prefer to spend a large share of their budgets on defence rather than investing in soft power instruments. For instance, in 2008, the budget of the US Department of Defense was around US$ 260 billion, with 3 million people under its authority, whereas the main body responsible for civilian actions in foreign policy – the US Department of State – had a budget of US$ 10 billion, out of which only US$ 1.5 billion was precisely accounted for public diplomacy (ibid: 117). The defence lobby, military-industrial complex and security experts try to ridicule soft power as an inappropriate response meddling in serious state affairs. It is not only in the US that hard power has more numerous and powerful allies than soft power proponents. Hard power’s easily quantifiable nature and straightforward rules make it more real to many politicians and experts. As correctly observed by one American scholar: “Given the complexity of these problems – conceptual, institutional, political and cultural – smart power will not be easy to achieve, especially in the short term” (Wilson III, 2008: p.122).
Similar to soft power, smart power is not restricted to any one country or group of countries. Nye asserts that smart power “is available to all states (and non-state actors), not just to the United States” (2011b: p.20). He specifically writes about India as potential smart power saying: “it is a safe bet that India’s hard and soft power are likely to rise in the coming times. If India can combine the two successfully, it will be a ‘smart power’” (Nye, 2006a).
Conclusion
The idea of soft power is still evolving, and more research is required to better understand and operationalise the concept. This chapter examined the basic tenets of soft power to present an updated definition. Having found that although soft power is associated naturally with intangible assets (ideas, values, culture, etc.), material resources are also a source of soft power. Therefore, the distinction between hard and soft power rests not so much in the character of resources but in the method of power use. In a very broad sense, soft power means “soft use of power”. It works indirectly through agenda setting, persuasion, and attraction, in contrast to hard power, which works by coercive means.
Soft power resources must not necessarily be limited only to the three elements enumerated by Joseph Nye (culture, political values, foreign policy), and should include other assets, depending on the specific context and a country’s unique potential. It can be argued that soft power encompasses both resources and behaviour, which together help to build a positive image of a country, making it more attractive and legitimate in the perception of other states. Many countries, while adopting soft power, have actually enunciated a broader idea of soft power than Nye did (Thussu, 2013: p.38). It seems that in India’s case, soft power resources would include, along with culture, political values, foreign policy, its diaspora, and growing economic potential.
Today, soft power functions mainly as an element of smart power. It envisages states that use all their resources – both soft and hard – to realise their interests in external relations. A skillful combination of these two elements in a comprehensive foreign strategy is the most appropriate way to wield more influence in the interconnected world of the information era. Thus, not is just military and economic power important, but also the ability to influence other states and set the agenda of international institutions. Even though the US is the most powerful smart power today, other countries have recognised the importance of investing in both hard and soft power. India is set to emerge as next important smart power.
2
Evolution of Power in Indian Foreign Policy
India is a country with a long history. Over the centuries its cultural, economic and political influence has stretched far beyond the nominal boundaries of contemporary political entities present on the Indian subcontinent. In the post-independence period, India’s longstanding foreign policy goal has been to achieve major power status in the international system (Nayar and Paul, 2003; Zajaczkowski, 2008). Over the years, Indian leaders have employed different strategies and used diverse resources in their search for this global role.
This chapter sets the foundation for an in-depth analysis of soft power in modern India by providing a historical context and summarising ways the interpretation and role of power has changed in Indian foreign policy since 1947. It proposes to look at this evolution in three periods. The first period is characterised by the prevalence of a soft power approach, which began with India’s independence in 1947 and ended with the death of its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1964. The second period ranges between 1964 and 1998, when India relied mostly on hard power in external relations. The third period depicts contemporary India, and is characterized by the emergence of a smart power strategy.
This chronology differs slightly from the more popular description of Indian foreign policy, seen as shifting from idealism to realism and then to pragmatism. For instance, David Malone (2011: p.47) writes: “India’s journey from 1947 till the present day, both in terms of foreign policy and domestic politics, can be seen as transition from idealism under Nehru, through a period of ‘hard realism’ (or realpolitik) lasting roughly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (coinciding with the dominance of the Indian political scene by Indira Gandhi) to the economically driven pragmatism of today.” The second period is extended by several years to year 1998 because India’s nuclear tests had fundamental value for its hard power status and repercussions for its foreign policy. It is argued here that since then, India again has employed more soft power resources for realisation of national objectives in international relations. Revival of soft power thinking – together with continuing development of its hard power potential – means that India is pursuing a smart power strategy.
Power in Indian Strategic Thought
Soft power is definitively not a new phenomenon in India, although its understanding and application in the Indian political context have had different phases over the decades. If the term had already been used during the Cold War era, India would have been considered among the greatest soft powers in the world. The long and successful non-violent fight against the British “under Gandhi’s leadership was perhaps the most spectacular historical example of the potential effectiveness of political strategies based on soft power” (Hymans, 2009: p.241). This positive legacy imprinted a dose of idealism on the foreign policy of independent India and remains an important element of its external relations today.
In a popular, though not always correct, view, India was a pacifist state following a moral-based foreign policy that did not use force in foreign affairs. In reality, however, there were several instances when India did resort to the use of arms, consequently lessening its idealism over the years. Indeed, relations between idealists and realists were far more complicated, and discussion around the kind of power that India ought to be continues to this day. Should India act on the premises of its civilization and use the example of its high moral standards to transform world order? Or should it concentrate on accumulation of economic wealth for more effective influence in foreign affairs? Should India have a strong army if it wants its voice to be heard and its interests respected? Should it coerce others – or attract them – in order to achieve its aims in foreign relations? And, what resources constitute India’s assets and source of power in international relations?
Over the years, answers to these questions have varied, depending on international context and the capacities of contemporary India. In general, the sources of India’s power have been its geography, demography, economy, military and civilizational heritage. Today, India is one of the largest and second
-most populous countries in the world. After two decades of rapid growth, it is the world’s ninth largest economy, with significant achievements in technology—especially in the nuclear and space sectors. In military terms, it has the third largest army in the world and is one of few countries with nuclear weapons. Finally, as an old civilization, it presents a distinct cultural and philosophical model with considerable appeal to people in other countries. This variety of significant resources gives India numerous options in pursuing foreign policy. Indeed, Indian strategists and politicians have often presented competing views about what constitutes India’s greatest international strengths and what kind of power India should use to attain its foreign policy interests.
The debate between soft and hard power proponents has a long tradition in India. On the one hand, Kautliya, an advisor to Emperor Chandragupta, is seen as a precursor of realism in external affairs in India. His main work, Arthashastra, and the concepts of mandalas, are seen as a classic work in international relations on realism, even though he well understood the importance of perceptions in foreign affairs. His heritage lends a strong foundation to a vibrant community of contemporary Indian realists and pragmatist security analysts. On the other hand, the philosophical concepts of Buddhism and Hinduism, based on principles of non-violence and peaceful coexistence, formed an indigenous basis for principle-based foreign relations. The concept of Saam – “convincing in a mutual and conciliatory way” as one of several policies recommended for successful state craft in the Hindu epic the Mahabharata (along with Dand, Daam, Bhed) – can be seen as a precursor of today’s soft power approach (Das, A. K., 2006: p.6).
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