As summarised by Shashi Tharoor (2008):
So when India’s cricket team triumphs or its tennis players claim Grand Slams, when a Bhangra beat is infused into a western pop record or an Indian choreographer invents a fusion of Kathak and ballet, when Indian women sweep the Miss World and Miss Universe contests or when Monsoon Wedding wows the critics and Lagaan claims an Oscar nomination, when Indian writers win the Booker or Pulitzer prizes, India’s soft power is enhanced.
Historically, India’s soft power was directed mostly at Asia (Thusssu, 2013: p.10). India’s ideas were disseminated through the medium of the sacred languages of Hinduism (Sanskrit) and Buddhism (Pali). With the advent of the globalised era and quickened flow of people and information, India’s influences reached the furthest corners of the world. Western curiosity in India’s culture and history started only with the arrival of colonial administrators to India, and it gained momentum in the 19th century with the establishment of Indian studies at major European universities in the UK, Germany, France, Russia, and Central Europe. This stimulated research on Indian religions and philosophy and led to the popularisation of the image of a spiritual India. Indian nationalist leaders who dared to challenge the world’s empire with non-violent means – those such as Mahatma Gandhi – spurred additional attention in India.
The next wave of curiosity about India came after the Second World War. Indian culture and spirituality had a great effect on counter culture in the West in the 1960s – inspiring hippies and “flower power” movements. Pacifism and idealism preached by India’s leaders and spirituality of religious gurus confronted the materialistic and violent policies in the West and corrupt leadership in the Vietnam War. Cultural personalities, such as British singer George Harrison and his fellow Beatles, were among the many Westerners who came to India in search of the traditions of wisdom and eternal truth propagated by Eastern spirituality and thought. Their interactions with Maharishi Mahesh Yogi at his ashram by the holy Ganga, triggered further Western fascination with India. It is argued that, “by the 1970s, India had accumulated a sizeable amount of attractive soft power with the rising youthful forces in American culture” (Hymans, 2010: p.250).
A concrete example of how this soft power could serve India’s foreign policy goals was “Harrison’s explosively successful ‘Concert for Bangladesh’, held at Madison Square Garden in August 1971, which was the first pop concert explicitly dedicated to raising consciousness about a human rights issue” (Hymans, 2009: p.250). Moreover, Hymans (ibid: p.251) may be right in arguing the practical implementations of using culture as a tool when he asserts that “Harrison ended up providing significant moral cover for Mrs. Gandhi’s December 1971 humanitarian invasion, which of course was also – and, in truth, in her eyes more importantly – a smashing strategic victory over India’s enduring rival.”
There is growing recognition in India that culture may be a powerful instrument of wielding India’s influences abroad. Pavan Varma, former head of the Indian Council on Cultural Relations (ICCR) claimed, “in the field of culture, however, we have always been a superpower, given our civilizational depth and antiquity. […] India stands today at the threshold of being accepted as a new global cultural ambassador, a perception no doubt modulated by the fact that we are emerging as a significant global power in other arenas as well” (Varma, 2007: p.1137–8). In some views, India “offers one of the more dynamic alternatives to the Western cultural ethos” (Paul and Nayar, 2003: p.59). And, “Indian assets of soft power, such as its ethnic, religious, linguistic diversity, have not been discussed enough to make others aware about India richness in this area” (Chenoy, 2012).
Political Values
The Indian state is based on values that are fundamental to a country’s soft power: democracy, pluralism, secularism and federalism. Following the peaceful struggle against British colonialists, independent India adopted a political system resembling that of its past occupiers – a parliamentary democracy. The constitution, which came into force on 26 January 1950, gave universal suffrage to all citizens 18 years of age and above, abolished untouchability and guaranteed fundamental rights of equality and freedom, against exploitation etc. It was one of the first democratic constitutions adopted in the developing and post-colonial world, and it undoubtedly laid the founding base for empowerment, entitlement and enfranchisement of ordinary people.
The decision of the founding leaders to base the new system on universal suffrage, secularism and federalism is often regarded as a prime reason for the success of Indian democracy (Kohli, 2001; Oldenburg, 2010). It is rightly cherished that “democracy has taken roots in India against considerable odds: a low-income economy, widespread poverty and illiteracy and immense ethnic diversity – defying prevailing theories that stipulate preconditions for democracy” (Kohli, 2001: 1). It undermined common beliefs and scientific theories, according to which democracy cannot develop in post-colonial states with low levels of GDP per capita (such as a modernization theory). And, despite numerous challenges, this democratic experiment continues to this day (with a short interruption during the Emergency clamped down in India between 1975 and 1977).
The regular elections, a strong Election Commission, an independent judiciary, a free press and a burgeoning civil society are seen as intrinsic pillars of the Indian system. Over the decades, India has evolved from a dominant-party to a multi-party system, with many strong regional parties and coalition governments. Today, there are several national parties and over 1,600 state parties in India. The democratic selection of representatives at three distinct levels – local (panchayat), state, and national – keeps India in the election process almost constantly. Mammoth general elections, which take place every fifth year, attract the attention of foreign media and tourists who come to India to witness the “largest democratic exercise on earth” and is now a phenomenon which has given birth to a new branch in the tourism industry: its called “election tourism”. The rise in turnout from 45.7 per cent in the ever first elections in the country, which were held in 1947—to a record 66.38 per cent in the 15th voting election, in 2014, is relatively high and suggests the general trust of the populace in India’s democratic process.
Indian democracy has been positively evaluated by many international rankings. The Economist Intelligence Unit gives India a “free democracy” label in its overview of countries’ political systems (EIU, 2012). Freedom House (2013) labels India as “free”. The significance of this value ascribed to India becomes even clearer when seen through the prism of the regional context. One major study, done by Oxford in 2008, confirms that India is the strongest democracy in South Asia and that democratic values are rooted deepest in India compared to other countries in the region (Sethi, 2008).
Democracy worked effectively to assimilate and protect against extreme pluralism of Indian society. This highly diverse group – in terms of religion, race, ethnicity, language and caste – is brought together under the umbrella of one nation by the idea of “unity in diversity” and democratic safeguards (Khilnani, 1997). The concept, developed and promoted by Nehru, was seen as the only way to guarantee tolerance and social peace in a multi-religious society. Despite having a clear majority of Hindus, India is a secular country with no single privileged religion. Its Muslim minority, representing 14 per cent of India’s population, makes Indian Muslims the third largest in the world (behind Indonesia and Pakistan). It also has a considerable number of Sikhs, Christians, and Buddhists along with many local religions of the tribal population. The Indian model of multiculturalism is one of the most successful in tackling large internal diversity and can be of interest to other developing countries.
Another important political value is federalism. Officially, India is a federal state (union of states), with a strong central government, but a significant level of prerogative is conferred on state authorities. After several phases of state reorganization—along linguistic lines, India now has 29 states and seven Union Territories. This solutio
n allowed for accommodation of ethnic and linguistic diversity within one political structure. Regions are thus governed by local political forces, which play an active role in national politics and foreign policy. To acknowledge distinct local identities, the Indian constitution recognizes 22 official languages, with Hindi as the national language. This recognition of regional differences explains, partly, why India has not shared the experience of secession, as many of its multi-ethnic peer states in Asia or Africa have. Apart from Kashmir and North East states, most of India is free from major secessionist movements.
Even if democratic India lacked Western appreciation in the first decades following its independence, the end of the Cold War, and subsequent replacement of ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism by competition between authoritarianism and democracy, has put India in the limelight and raised the value of India’s example. Democracy became an important source of India’s self-confidence and recognition in the West. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998), former security advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, pointed out that the Indian example shows democracy is not an exclusively Western concept, restricted only to developed countries. Certainly, the political system gives India an edge over China, or other authoritarian states, in soft power terms (Lee, 2010b). Joseph Nye (2006) also admitted, “democratic India has passed the test which China has not yet taken.” In other words, India has successfully embraced Enlightenment values. As an Indian author, Raja Mohan (2003: p.270) argues:
That India remains the single most important adherent of the Enlightenment in the non-Western world has begun to acquire an unprecedented importance in international politics. In a world where the ideas of individual freedom, democracy and rational inquiry are being challenged by both post-modernists and pre-modernists wearing the garb of religion, India, warts and all, is the living demonstration that enlightenment values are universal.
Not surprisingly, Indian leaders are continuously projecting India as a potential inspiration for other countries and using this asset in furthering external relations. As Dr. Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister observed in 2005, India is an example “of democracy functioning in a low-income environment” (Singh, 2005). “Success of Indian democracy,” according to Dr. Manmohan Singh (2011), “is perhaps relevant to others who are still facing these challenges.” He stressed the value of the Indian example saying: “a democratic, plural and secular India can contribute to tolerance and peaceful co-existence among nations” (Singh, 2011). Indeed, as a democratic, pluralistic, secular, and federal state, India may appear attractive to internally divided countries around the globe. Some even claim that India “could be an institutional alternative to Western political system” (Blarel, 2012).
Foreign Policy
According to Nye, foreign policies need to be seen as “legitimate and having moral authority” in order to be a country’s soft power source. It seems that in this arena as well, India has amassed significant potential over the last 60 years. There are, indeed, only a few countries that have attached so much importance to morality and legitimacy in international relations as India has. There are several elements that have contributed to India’s soft power, including principle-based policy, support for multilateral diplomacy and international law, participation in UN peacekeeping missions, and enthusiasm for economic cooperation.
Independent India emerged as a result of the moral and legal struggle with a colonial Empire. As observed by Tharoor (2012: p.286), “after all Mahatma Gandhi won India its independence through the use of soft power – because non-violence and satyagraha were indeed classic uses of soft power before the term was even coined.” This heritage formed the founding stone of the young state’s foreign policy. The architect of Indian foreign policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, shared this belief in India’s exceptionalism and special mission that (“tryst with destiny”) the country should manifest in the world. He saw India as a unique country based on its civilisational background, ethics and values – a country that extolls not only a softer kind of power, but also one that can transform the international system into a more peaceful environment. India presented itself to the world as a “moral power” that pursues a principle-based foreign policy, not only in its own interest but also for the larger good.
The rejection of power politics based on narrow national interests and spheres of influence made Nehru declare war against colonialism, poverty, racism, xenophobia and militarism rather than join one bloc against the other in the style of Cold War confrontation. India stood for a more just, fair and peaceful international system, fighting against all forms of discrimination and injustice. It was a vocal supporter of decolonisation and de-nuclearisation—and a staunch critic of imperialism, apartheid and the arms race. India soon emerged as a leader of the developing world, leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and a proponent of rule-based international order. According to Tharoor (2012: p.286), “Jawaharlal Nehru was also a skilled exponent of soft power: he developed a role for India in the world based entirely on its civilisational history and its moral standing, making India the voice of the oppressed and the marginalized against the big power hegemons of the day.”
Although Nehru’s policy hardly withstood the stress test when confronted with the military might of China in the 1962 war, some of its legacy survived. The legitimacy and credibility gathered in India’s first years of independence positively influenced the perception of India in other countries. Although it became more pragmatic and opportunistic after the Cold War, the panchsheel principles still form an ideological base for India’s external strategy. As stated by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the UNGA in September 2011, in the aftermath of the Western intervention in Libya: “The observance of the rule of law is as important in international affairs as it is within countries. Societies cannot be reordered from outside through military force. People in all countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future” (Singh, 2011).
India’s unique perspective on foreign relations was also evident in the country’s support for multilateral diplomacy and negotiated solutions rather than unilaterally imposed decisions by stronger countries. From the first Asian Conference, organized even before its independence in 1947, India has called on Asian and developing nations for solidarity and common standing on important issues in international affairs. Its activism on multilateral forums gave India a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), group of G-77 countries in the UN, and trade negotiations, where it emerged as a speaker for developing countries.
Its preference for multilateralism continued after the Cold War, when India became a founder and member of several new groups. As its influence on existing structures of global governance (e.g., the UN Security Council, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) remained limited, India joined hands with other emerging powers to form BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) to work together for a multipolar world order. India was also admitted to several regional and global forums, such as the G-20 (bringing together the 20 largest economies in the world), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); it also became an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others. India has also played an active role in forming several multilateral forums in its neighbourhood. India’s multilateral engagements have become more active than ever and its global place better felt.
Another element in India’s traditional strategy of building a positive image and acquiring international credibility has been the active participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In fact, India used to be one of the largest contributors of personnel to UN missions. In 2012, it was the third largest troop contributor, with 8,093 people located in 10 peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Golan Heights on the Syria-Israel Border (UNDOF), Liberi
a (UNMIL), Cote d’Ivore (UNOCI), Cyprus (UNFICYP), East Timor (UNMIT), Haiti (MINUSTAH), Abyei (UNISFA) and South Sudan (UNMISS) (MEA, 2013: p.96). India regards the UN as the only international body eligible to authorise peacekeeping missions and regularly declines to participate in missions undertaken without a UN mandate, such as Iraq in 2003. This reinforces the country’s image as one of defending the major role of the UN and observance of international law. In the past, India’s contribution to peace efforts included active participation as a peace broker and mediator between warring parties in several conflicts, from the first involvement as chair of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the Korean peninsula, after the Korean war of 1950–1953, and one of three member states in the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (ICSC) since 1954.
After the Cold War, India promoted its image of being a status-quo power. It is one of the few countries that managed to build friendly relations with many countries, despite conflicting interests. While putting itself closer to the West in recent years, India has continued cooperation with internationally isolated regimes, such as those in Iran or Myanmar; it has remained a supporter of an independent Palestine and yet has built up strong security and intelligence links with Israel—and it has expanded its interests in Africa without alarming the international community as China did. Despite exercising its nuclear option in 1998 and staying outside the NPT regime, India has managed to project itself as a “responsible nuclear power” and gained de facto recognition as a member of the atomic club by signing a nuclear deal with the US, in 2008.
India’s Soft Power Page 10