The Tower and Beyond
If Stillington was actually the original source of Richard’s information concerning the pre-contract and its crucial implications, he received precious little reward for effectively elevating the Duke of Gloucester to the throne. For example, even Kendall notes that ‘Resentment against Edward for the loss of high office, a desire for revenge upon the Woodvilles may have urged him (Stillington) to make his declaration. No discernible reward did he receive from Richard …’67 Stillington did take part in the coronation of Richard III, where he was noted as performing the ceremony of hallowing the king and queen.68 Again, interpretation of this participation very much depends upon how one sees Stillington. If he did confirm the pre-contract then he would have understood that Richard was the rightful king. If he did not, or in actuality the pre-contract was only confabulation, then his actions at the coronation must have been of the highest order of hypocrisy.69 As is evident from the tenor of the present text, I tend toward the former interpretation.70 Thus, I believe he must have seen Richard as his rightful king, but, again, we see very little evidence of any tangible reward for Stillington in the short years of Richard’s reign up to the time of Bosworth.71 However, if Richard did not reward him, on the up side, Henry did not punish him to any significant extent either.
Regime change is an unsettling event and the days following the unexpected victory of Henry VII at Bosworth must have been quite dramatic for those who lived through them. Often the immediate actions of the new regime betray their most critical fears and some of the dictates of the new monarch can be viewed with this perspective in mind. It seems Henry was very anxious to secure at least two individuals who very much concern us here. Although we do not know where Stillington was on 22 August 1485, we do know that a warrant was issued for his arrest the next day in Leicester.72 It must have been pursued with some dispatch by Rawdon and his colleagues who were sent after the Bishop, since we understand that five days later Stillington was detained in prison in York and was ‘sore crased by reason of his trouble.’73 He certainly should have been. Not only had he taken part in efforts to extradite the one-time Earl of Richmond, now Henry VII, he was also the putative source of information on the pre-contract which bastardised Elizabeth of York, whom Henry was sworn to marry in an attempt to unify the country and solidify his own very shaky claim to the crown. We know that Henry took great pains to suppress the Titulus Regius, the central concern of which must have been the notation of the the pre-contract.74 All this would militate strongly against the continued health and well-being of Robert Stillington who, at the very best, seemed to be looking at a long term of imprisonment. After all, as the reputed author of the bill and the source of the revelation of the pre-contract to Richard, Duke of Gloucester, he must have surely been viewed as a very dangerous individual indeed to the new monarch. Yet where do we next meet Stillington? Puzzlingly, he is officiating at the coronation of Henry VII. This indeed is one of the central mysteries of Robert Stillington’s story. Why was he treated so leniently by an individual who would earn a reputation for exactly the opposite sort of behaviour?
In respect of Henry’s actions following Bosworth, we can compare his respective treatment of Catesby and Stillington. Here we find eminent differences. Catesby was executed even before Stillington was detained. If the reason were jealously on behalf of others in Richard’s realm it is difficult to see how Catesby had so offended the new King Henry VII if all he had done was work assiduously for the former king. Many had done so and even fought for Richard that day at Bosworth; these individuals were not beheaded, and some were not even punished. It may be that their noble birth and high station saved them, for Henry would need the nobility as all of his predecessors had. However, if Stillington was truly the source of the revelation of the pre-contract, surely he would have seen a much harsher punishment. The contrasting harshness to Catesby and the relative leniency to Stillington suggest that the culpability of the former (at least in the new regime’s eyes) was much greater. For me, it argues that Catesby was the source and Stillington the confirmation, and their respective levels of punishment reflected this. Of course, Stillington’s clerical status may also have been instrumental in him avoiding execution, but it is hard to see how it could act as a shield against a harsh sentence. From the perspective I have created, Stillington’s plea to Henry would have been that he was acting as a neutral churchman, answering to the then king as his duty dictated. I believe Henry accepted this explanation and excused Stillington any greater punishment on the promise of the same degree of loyalty to his own monarchy.75 Despite this degree of reconciliation, I do not argue that Stillington became either favoured by, or friends with, the new king. I believe that he had earned and suffered at least a degree of Henry’s disapprobation and, of course, Stillington was Yorkist to the last.
Some authors argue that Stillington’s exclusion from Henry VII’s first Parliament signifies the disgrace that he was in, yet we find that on 22 November 1485, just two months after Bosworth, Stillington was granted a full pardon.76 The only material penalty that he suffered was the deprivation of the deanery of St Martin. In the act repealing the Titulus Regius, Stillington was indeed accused of ‘horrible and haneous offences ymagined and doune by him against the King.’ Despite this rhetoric, very little in the way of real punishment was visited upon the good bishop. One would think that given this history of close shaves with the power of the throne, Stillington would have suspended his political activities and, at the age of at least sixty-five, retired to his religious calling. Yet this was not the case. He was directly involved with the Lambert Simnel rebellion. It was Stillington who himself had at least confirmed the existence and effect of the precontract, so presumably in 1487, in supporting Simnel, he understood that his previous actions had invalidated the claim of the pretender, whether he was purported to be Edward V or his younger brother, Richard, Duke of York. Was it because as a Yorkshireman he was loyal to the Yorkist party from first to last and sought to support what he wished or knew to be the last viable remaining male heir of the House of York? Even today, Yorkshiremen in general are known for their stubbornness and indeed their loyalty. Was this the last act of a faithful servant who must have known that he had little time left? Until we discover further evidence, this will remain just one of the many mysteries of the long-lived bishop.
After the defeat at the Battle of Stoke on 16 June 1487, four years to the day after the young Richard, Duke of York had been escorted from Westminster Abbey to the Tower, Stillington took refuge within the University of Oxford. At first the university authorities refused to give up the bishop, but eventually, under pressure from the king, he was delivered up, and imprisoned at Windsor in October 1487. Some three and a half years later, in May 1491, Stillington died, still a prisoner.77 His body was taken for burial at Wells Cathedral in a chapel which he himself had had caused to be built. By all accounts it was a splendid structure,78 but sadly it no longer stands today, having been pulled down some time early in the reign of Edward VI.
7
Return to the Tower
Forbade to wade through slaughter to a throne.1
When was the Fateful Decision Made?
Any comprehensive and compelling account of Richard III and his assumption of the throne of England must explain where and when he made the fateful decision to depose his young nephew, Edward V, and to become king himself.2 As I have indicated in the opening chapter, one’s opinion on this matter very much dictates how one views Richard in general, with an adverse assessment directly corresponding with earlier estimates.3 In my preceding arguments, I have proposed that the window which brackets this decision is actually a fairly small one. I believe the evidence we have supports the contention that the change in Richard’s mind from de facto Protector to aspiring monarch came on that momentous day of Friday 13 June 1483 at the Tower of London. I do not wish to assert necessarily that the whole of his decision process was played out in just one single, critical mome
nt. However, I do think that the pivotal revelation of the precontract and the consequent understanding by Richard that his nephews were therefore ineligible to inherit, stemmed from information presented to him on the morning of that day.4 The subsequent securing of the young Richard, Duke of York from sanctuary sprang from this understanding and therefore Richard’s actions of Monday 16 June immediately following the execution of William, Lord Hastings three days earlier are eminently understandable in light of this timeline of events. The following then, is my version of the happenings of that day in the Tower of London and my associated observations upon how the present explanation of this course of events serves to address a number of issues whose previous explanations have been in my view, at best, less than satisfactory.
The Letters of 10 and 11 June 1483
While it will clearly always be possible to read different interpretations into the actions of Richard, Duke of Gloucester as Protector, I believe it is fair to say that there is no substantive documentary evidence that he overtly sought to secure the throne before the fateful meeting on 13 June. In this I think we have to agree with Wood5 that the citation of the York letter of 10 June and the Neville letter of 11 June actually represent evidence for, rather than against, this interpretation. If Richard was planning some form of coup to occur on the 13th, he clearly must have known that an appeal for troops, issued on the 10th and dispatched at the earliest possible moment on 11 June cannot have got to the north much earlier than 14 June. Further, such troops could not have reasonably been expected to have reached the capital until about the 19th, even at their best rate of progress. Again, Wood’s interpretation that the summons was most probably meant to bring aid and leverage to Richard in order to influence the decisions of the form of Parliament which was proposed to take place on the 25th is certainly a reasonable one. Such force may well have been to back his claim to retain his status as Protector.6 This is a far more plausible interpretation of these letters than seeing them as a direct part of a plot for the throne and especially as preparatory to Hastings’ demise only two days later on the 13th. This being so, it suggests that by the time Ratcliffe left for York and other parts north, Richard had no more malevolent intention than that of sustaining the status quo in terms of his own safety and security. In terms of what Richard must have known had happened to Humphrey, a previous Protector and Duke of Gloucester, this course of action would seem to be a wise precaution. The letter, in my view, provides at best marginal evidence that Richard aspired to the throne at this precise juncture and reasonably tangible evidence that he did not.
Troops in the Capital
One of the major considerations of any actions taken at this time must have thus centred around the number of troops that Richard can realistically have commanded, called upon and relied upon in and around the capital. De Blieck’s point is very well made here.7 Any pre-meditated move radically to alter the on-going course of events must have been founded upon the belief that such a decision could be backed up by force if necessary. Presumably there were Woodville forces as well as those of Lord Hastings, the Duke of Buckingham and those supporters Richard had brought south with him, all in and around the capital at this time. However many London-based troops Richard actually did command at that time, he clearly thought that he needed more support and thus the 10 June summons to those of his affinity in the north. The latter appeal argues for his recognition that, at this point he did not have enough strength present. Stallworth’s fear was expressed in his letter of the 21st, where he noted: ‘Yt is thought ther schalbe xx thousand of my lord protectour and my lord of Bukyngham men in London this weeke.’ This observation was clearly rumour, but Stallworth’s general tenor suggests at least some, if not many, forces were in and around the capital already. His ruminations were confirmed, when following Hastings’ execution, ‘All be lord chamberleyne mene be come my lordys of Bokynghame menne.’ While Richard and Buckingham had men present, it was unlikely these were enough for a carefully considered, planned, pre-emptive strike. And even if this were so, would such a strike have taken the form of the actions that we know occurred on the 13th? A fully thought-out plan would, most probably, not have been primarily directed at Hastings. This being so, it furthers the idea that the events of 13 June were reactive and not pre-meditated in nature. Thus, although I do not think with the present information that we have that we can fix, with absolute certainty, the point where Richard decided to take the crown itself, we can say with some confidence that the expected course of events in respect of Edward V’s ascension to the throne very much changed that Friday morning in the Tower.
Strawberries and Treason
Our account of the fateful morning meeting that day comes primarily from Thomas More, and when we say More, I think it is fair to reinforce the probability that this version of events is fairly heavily influenced by Morton.8 Since we have then to distill our explanation through the filter of one of Richard’s most virulent enemies, I think I have to declare my bias here. In my view, Morton was a very astute and clever individual.9 In using More in part as his de facto mouthpiece, he did not seek to provide a totally false account.10 Such an effort at deception would have been too obvious to too many individuals, some of whom would still have been alive and able to comment on any evident fabrications. Providing specific detail could, such as the case of the citation of Elizabeth Lucy, be liable to lose vital credibility. Rather, I think he sought to present a fairly accurate account, but one salted with misdirection at crucial points in order to sway subsequent opinion. I think, therefore, the basic account of the Council meeting is fairly accurate, but cleverly manipulated.11
Croyland, in his post hoc interpretation of the day’s events, adjudges Richard to have been ‘shrewd’ in splitting the Council that day. However, this may well have been a simple matter of expediency. There was a country to run and a king to be crowned and, as again Stallworth noted, much business to be accomplished, especially in relation to the coronation. If Richard did plan this division with a mind to what subsequently occurred, he must have known something by the 12th and yet, apparently, not on the 11th, since he had held over Ratcliffe’s departure from the day before, as evidenced by the Neville letter. I cannot dismiss this degree of perhaps one day’s foreknowledge as at least a potential possibility. However, as I shall argue, it is the emotion which is expressed and precipitate action taken on the 13th that implies that what changed Richard’s mind happened that very morning.
Sir Thomas More reports that at the start of the Council meeting there was an affable tenor to proceedings and the Protector himself was in good spirits. But now something must have happened. It is not clear whether Richard was called away from the meeting (which is what I suspect happened) or whether he himself initiated a short break. I am inclined to the former interpretation, although I am a firm believer in strawberries. This small point about strawberries, so insignificant in itself, seems to me to have the ring of truth about it.12 It may well be that Richard used this as a ‘time-filler’ to cover what he might have anticipated would be only a short interruption. Since I believe he had not yet received the crucial revelation, I read no malevolence into the request, but one that roughly equates to the modern idea of a morning coffee break.
I think the interruption was made at the behest of Catesby. It is my thesis that on that morning, Catesby provided Richard with evidence, and perhaps indeed written evidence,13 of the existence of the pre-contract. I think this evidence came from Catesby’s direct association with Eleanor Butler through his father and step-mother,14 and his own personal relationship. I suspect the written evidence was something that he had retained since the time of the pre-contract itself, now some decades earlier; after all, he was a lawyer. Further, I think Catesby told Richard that he had not revealed this to him earlier either on the tacit or explicit orders of Lord Hastings, who at some juncture in the past had told Catesby to remain silent on the issue. I believe that this was the knowledge which Hastings had shared with his fri
end and former king, Edward IV. It left Richard in a terrible quandary. If the information was true, he was rightful King of England and one of his oldest allies and comrades in arms, William, Lord Hastings had kept the fact from him. It was, I believe, this betrayal by the absence of an action which left Richard in a white heat of anger. It was this anger that spilled over when he re-entered the council chamber. In the interim interval of about an hour, I think Richard had been very busy. He must have assembled a body of armed men who waited outside the chamber for the crucial signal (see Figure 24). The signal was to be a banging on the council table, at which the armed men were to take up the cry of ‘Treason.’ It was also clear that some thought had been given as to who would be arrested and detained from those present in the council chamber. Overwhelmingly angry as he was with Hastings, there were others in that room who had no love for the Protector and from whom Richard understood that he himself needed subsequent protection.
Richard III and the Murder in the Tower Page 15