Climate and ecology threats: While we endlessly debate the validity and causes of climate-change, the signs of its effects are showing everywhere. Its insidious creep obfuscates the threats to Earth’s finite ability to support a growing population. With continued desertification of cropland, severe water shortages, aberrant weather patterns, and rising energy and agricultural production costs, the ensuing threat of major famines, droughts, and widespread population migrations is high. Military and intelligence agencies, in fact, refer to climate-change as a threat multiplier affecting a wide array of global challenges.
It is a gruesome picture. What, if anything, can we do about it?
We can start by acknowledging two very important things: First, we are not helpless victims; we have choices. And second, with a healthy dose of awareness and engagement, we still have time to make a difference; our choices count.
While it is difficult to predict an exact timeframe for the perfect storm, its treacherous trajectory, like a rising tide, will eventually engulf us. Without the clarion call of a Pearl Harbor-like disaster to galvanize the nation, the incremental—but inexorable—nature of the storm will weaken the political will needed for resolute action. Who, then, do we turn to for direction?
We look in the mirror. This is where the great paradigm shift has to start. Instead of waiting helplessly for our government to recognize the dangers and respond, we will need to engage instead as individuals, families, and communities, using whatever time we have remaining to prepare for the storm. It will mean digging deep within ourselves and finding those dormant strains of self-reliance that enabled our ancestors to survive in hostile lands.
It is a formidable journey with few roadmaps, and getting started may well be the hardest part. Recognizing this, I have prepared a guide titled Weathering the Storm. It provides a blueprint for engagement and will help you chart a personal course of action. It is available to you free of charge on my website at the following address: www.weatheringthestorm.net.
A message of hope: Great challenges produce great opportunities. Imagine what could happen if Americans confronted the challenge of the perfect storm with the same grit and determination as they did in mobilizing for World War II, completing the Manhattan Project, putting a man on the moon, and winning the first Cold War.
Imagine the transformational effect of creating new economic engines of growth to address the challenge. Imagine the creation of new renewable and alternative energy systems, smart-grid power infrastructures, and transportation systems that would end our dependence on foreign oil while reducing our carbon footprint. Imagine focusing our technological and financial core competencies toward demand reduction and the development of conservation innovations exportable to other nations. Imagine having worker shortages and not unemployment as a pressing economic challenge.
Are these new opportunities achievable in America?
They could be if we learned to set aside our short-term fixation on quarterly earnings, winning the next election, vacuous sound-bite solutions, and other quick-fix schemes. By engaging and empowering the American people in a cause greater then themselves and igniting the entrepreneurial spirit that made America great, we could transform the peril we face into a dramatic new beginning. In the process, we might even rekindle a long-lost sense of patriotism, taking heart in our resilience in the face of adversity. Most of all, we would leave for future generations a world that more closely approximates the one we inherited.
We are not helpless victims. Bring up my website, and let’s get started.
Mike Conley
Research Notes
Chapter 1:
East China Sea: The ownership of the Diaoyu Islands (called Senkaku by Japan) has been contested by Japan and China for decades. The islands lie approximately 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles east of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nautical miles southwest of Okinawa. The eight uninhabited islands of barren rock have a land area of only 6.3 square kilometers.
The complex ownership disputes intensified when a 1969 UN Economic Commission report indicated the possibility of large oil and natural gas reserves in the Diaoyutai Archipelago. The reserves, subsequently developed as the Chunxiao Field, became the flashpoint for a number of conflicts between the two nations, the most recent being the arrest by the Japanese of a Chinese fishing-boat captain in September 2010. The Chunxiao Field will surely be an area of increased conflict as future energy supply tightens.
Weaponry: The weapon systems and tactics used throughout the book are based on weapons in use in 2010 or scheduled to go into production after 2010. The Japanese destroyer Harakazi is modeled after the Hatakaze class destroyer. The Chinese vessels used in the Chunxiao Incident are current ships of the fleet. American aircraft described in future chapters, namely F-22s and F-35s, are currently in different stages of development and deployment.
The naval maneuver known as water-buzzing is not an actual tactic, but rather a fictitious maneuver resembling the deadly cat-and-mouse games played between Soviet and American aircraft and submarines in the heat of the Cold War. The use of aggressive tactics to test the response of an adversary is likely to continue based on previous Cold War tactics.
Deepwater oil platforms: As conventional dry-land oil becomes harder to find, new oil will be increasingly sought in deepwater basins at depths of ten thousand feet or more. The size, technology, and transportability of deepwater platforms will escalate to accommodate such needs. A self-propelled circular rig called Sevan Driller II, which began development in 2009 for drilling in up to 12,500 feet of water, is the latest sixth-generation platform being built by the Cosco Shipyard in Nantung, China. The Dragon II platform used in the Chunxiao area in this book is a fictitious megaplatform of this type.
Because of the new platforms’ cost, vulnerability, and exposure to terrorists, platform security measures will be ramped up. Security firms are now offering specialized rig security, including protection against boat-ramming incidents; the level of defensive capability suggested for the Dragon II platform is not improbable. The ultradeep sea mines deployed around the Dragon II are not known to be in the PLAN arsenal at this time, but the need for increased deepwater security would seem to make such developments feasible by 2017.
Climate satellites and exploration: The proposed NASA budget for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 suggests major initiatives geared toward building and launching robust climate-monitoring and research satellites. The intent is to provide a greater understanding of and confidence in the future course of climate-change. Working with organizations such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and supported by climate-research satellites scheduled for launch between 2011 and 2017, the intent is to provide more accurate climate predictions and a better foundation for future mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Chapter 2:
Economic malaise: An underlying theme of this book is the close correlation between the global economy and the accessibility and affordability of oil. In this context, it is assumed that by year-end 2012, surplus oil capacity will all but disappear and oil supply will fail to keep up with nominal demand thereafter. Unfortunately, alternative energy systems will not be in place to replace oil supply deficiencies. A 2010 Department of Defense strategic-planning report suggested that “By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely disappear, and as early as 2015, the shortfall in output could reach nearly 10 MB/D [million barrels of oil per day].” (Source: The Joint Operating Environment 2010 [“JOE-10 Report”], p. 29.)
With an inverse supply-and-demand curve, oil prices will increase. A disproportionately higher percentage of GDP will be allocated for oil, creating an economic drag that diminishes GDP growth rates. Some energy analysts have observed strong correlations between rising oil prices and subsequent recessions. One such metric suggests danger whenever the aggregated cost of oil exceeds 4 percent of GDP. A cocktail-napkin calculation using an assumed American GDP of $15 trillion and oil cons
umption of seven billion barrels per year suggests a potential economic problem when the sustained price of oil exceeds $90 per barrel: greater than 4 percent of GDP.
While rising oil prices can be a significant drag on the economy, the fiscal and monetary policies of nations—including crushing debt loads, unfunded entitlement liabilities, devalued currencies, and a tendency to monetize debt via the printing press—will also make significant contributions to the global economic malaise, triggering high unemployment rates and semipermanent recessions.
Chapter 3:
Saudi Arabian government and succession: The modern nation of Saudi Arabia was established in 1931. Led by the House of Saud, a monarchy founded by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, it shares power, in theory, with the religious elite. Sons of Abdul Aziz have thus far been the only men to serve as king or crown prince. However, as the sons of Abdul Aziz age, succession issues will become increasingly problematic.
The Basic Law, adopted in 1992, codified several elements of government and succession. The candidate pool was expanded to include all male descendants of Abdul Aziz ibn Saud—not just his sons—and established the Qur’an as the constitution of the country and Shari’a law as the basis for government. In October 2006 a committee of princes was established to vote on the eligibility of future kings and crown princes. Known as the Allegiance Institution, it further defined the covenants of succession.
Succession is very much in the Saudi Arabian picture today, as King Abdullah Abdul Aziz is eighty-seven years old, and all other likely successors are elderly as well. If the succession skips a generation and moves to a grandson of the founder, the field will widen and competition for the throne will intensify. The current House of Saud is estimated to include more than five thousand princes and princesses, and the future leadership of Saudi Arabia is an open question. Close ties between the Saudi government and the ulema (the clerical establishment) will also influence the future direction of Saudi Arabia.
Chapter 4:
Chinese military structure: The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are referred to as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The navy is referred to as PLA Navy, or PLAN. The PLA is formally under the command of the Central Military Commission, which reports through a joint state government and party system, often chaired by the president.
Chapter 5:
A number of situational constructs in this chapter set the stage for the remainder of the book. The more noteworthy ones are as follows:
The New Cold War: Unlike the previous cold war between the U.S.S.R. and Western powers, the new cold war between China and the United States is being fought over resources and markets, not ideology. While less confrontational than the players in the previous cold war, China has become more assertive about protecting its economic interests. Current trends suggest the pendulum is swinging more in China’s favor, given its relative strength to the United States and other Western powers.
China is now a global economic juggernaut surpassing the United States in energy used, greenhouse gases emitted, and new automobiles sold. With GDP growth rates almost four times that of the United States’, China could approach GDP parity with America by the 2020s if current trajectories continue. (In fact, a recent IMF Report even suggested China could overtake the GDP of the United States as early as year-end 2016.) The concomitant requirements for more oil, commodities, freshwater, and world market shares will create a strain on finite global resources, causing price escalations and potential conflicts. In response, China is bolstering its military power. Indeed, stress points are now appearing regularly in the form of conflicts in the South and East China Sea and growing friction with India over Himalayan water supplies.
China’s trade surpluses, manufacturing prowess, lower cost structures, and capital surpluses give it distinct competitive advantages. Its long-term strategic focus on infrastructure development and renewable energy systems, and its quest to lock in access to scarce resources, all but guarantee its continued economic growth.
Unencumbered by the political preconditions on trade imposed by the United States and other nations (e.g., lack of overt human-rights abuses, adherence to fair labor laws, and so forth), China is a less demanding business partner for many countries. China’s boilerplate strategy seems to be to invest in the infrastructure of a new trading partner, usually in a manner that secures access to physical resources such as oil fields. The raw materials China imports are then turned into finished goods, which are sold back to the host country and others, often along with military equipment and high-tech goods. As an added inducement, China’s veto power in the UN Security Council can provide air cover for regimes fearful of sanctions. It is a win-win for China, as it ensures the continued employment of its massive work force and builds global clout through economic partnerships and not military power. China also owns a growing portion of Western economies—particularly the United States—in the form of large infrastructure investments, T-bill holdings, and massive dollar amounts held by its central banks.
Power structure in the People’s Republic of China: The structural labyrinth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is complex. While the dominant power resides in the Communist Party of China (CPC), the CPC’s central focus of power resides in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). While the workings of the PSC are not well understood outside of China, it is known to be a nine-person group that meets weekly, and it is believed to make big decisions by consensus. The larger oversight body is the twenty-four person Politburo, and Politburo members generally hold key positions in government and have a voice in key personnel matters. For purposes of this book, the title Chairman was used in place of the title President, which is now used in the PRC. As in the book, the president often holds multiple positions of power in China.
China’s SCO Pact and other alliances: As a lead partner in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), China is aligned with Russia and the oil-rich “stans” of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran, Pakistan, and other countries have observer status in the SCO. The SCO gives China access to oil and political influence in a pivotal region of the world. China has also secured a growing presence in the oil-belt areas of Africa and South America, including the new Brazilian deepwater oil fields. China’s current investments in Venezuela have provided Hugo Chavez with an alternative market for his oil, presumably replacing shipments to the United States.
China’s blue-water navy: A “blue-water” navy is one capable of operating on the high seas, as compared to a “brown-water” navy operating mainly within the confines of a nation’s coastal waters. China’s navy is ramping up its blue-water capability with strategic implications for current maritime powers. That decision reflects China’s desire to a) protect the security of international sea lanes to the Gulf Region and other distant trade partners, b) establish firmer control of the mineral-rich seabeds of the South and East China Sea, and c) extend its reach beyond the South China Sea and Philippines into what is called the second island chain, reaching out to Guam and overlapping the American navy’s area of supremacy. While not an immediate threat to American sea power, China is devoting about a third of its military budget to the development of its navy, with the most impressive growth taking place in their submarine fleet.
National security apparatus in the United States: Following the 9/11 attack and subsequent investigations of America’s intelligence failures, the intelligence-gathering apparatus of the United States was reorganized under the National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. A director of national intelligence was appointed to lead a sixteen-member intelligence community in directing the national intelligence program. Within this framework, presidents have tended to massage the National Security Council and Situation Room activities to best suit their styles. This book assumes that the U.S. intelligence apparatus was reorganized after a failed terrorist attempt to detonate an electromagnetic pulse bomb over the eastern seaboard in 2015 was made public. The restructured intel
ligence community in the book more closely resembles the intelligence apparatus existing prior to 2004.
Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS): The definition of territorial waters has become increasingly important as a determinant for jurisdictional ownership of underwater resources (i.e., oil, natural gas, seabed mining, etc.) The standard practice today is to use the 200-nautical-mile EEZ line set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea. Unfortunately, ambiguities in UNCLOS and the EEZ definitions have left the door open for conflict, and disagreements are likely to worsen as resources become tighter. The Chunxiao Incident is but one example of a potential conflict over disputed territorial waters.
Perhaps no one has more at stake with respect to UNCLOS directions than the United States, which has vast coastal areas and a blue-water navy to protect its interests. Significant future conflicts are possible in the Arctic waters and other areas where climate-change has melted the sea ice, making underwater areas more accessible to seabed mining. Gulf Coast exploration—particularly off the Florida Keys—could also create an area of conflict.
Chapter 6:
American–Japanese Security Treaty: The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed on January 19, 1960. It was a one-sided commitment whereby the United States agreed to assist Japan in case of armed attack on a Japanese-administered territory, but which precluded Japan from assisting America by virtue of their constitutional ban on overseas deployments of their armed forces. Over time, Japan has relied less on outsourcing their military protection to the United States. On February 19, 2009, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement to redeploy the III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam. For purposes of this book, Japan’s trajectory away from dependence on American military power has been assumed to continue.
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