There was no time to admire the new surroundings. The first operation under the new ‘boss’ was mounted at 09.00 on 1 February when Nos 183, led by Walter Dring in JR385, Nos 193 and 257 Squadrons went for a No-Ball site in the Pas de Calais. Low cloud obscured the primary target so the formation dive-bombed the alternative at Zudausques, 5 miles west of St Omer, with good results. During the afternoon, Walter was in the air again, leading the squadron in a wing attack on another site 10 miles south of Abbeville. Some direct hits were seen and, although flak was heavy during both operations, there were no casualties.
Always looking for better ways of plastering a target – particularly the difficult No-Ball sites – on 13 February Walter, in MN197, and his wingman Fg Off Arthur Napier, in MN144, tried out a method of target marking. The pair flew slightly ahead of the main formation with the task of accurately identifying the target. It was felt that just two aircraft appearing over a target area was less likely to ‘spook’ the flak defences quite so much as a larger force with more obvious intentions. Having located the target, they acted as ‘pathfinders’ by dropping their bombs and calling in the rest of the formation to aim at the smoke generated. This pair raked the target with cannon fire to distract the gunners, observed where the bombs fell and adjusted aiming points for the other pilots. On this occasion the results were recorded as ‘excellent’. Walter led a similar dive-bombing operation on the 15th, with equally good results, but this ‘pathfinder’ method does not seem to have been used much thereafter. Peter Brett wrote that flak encountered during dive-bombing operations was becoming more concentrated and more accurate. German gunners had worked out that if they spotted a large group of aircraft, such as Typhoons, in their vicinity, when the group changed into an echelon formation it almost certainly meant that a target was about to be attacked and, forewarned, the gunners were ready to draw a bead on each diving aircraft. Walter Dring came up with what was considered a better way of getting all the squadron’s aircraft down on a target in the shortest time possible. Generally, flying in ‘squadron’ formation to a target area involved two flights, one behind the other, each of four aircraft flying in a ‘finger-four’ formation. Walter reckoned German gunners could be deceived by not changing to a large echelon formation as they passed the target area. Instead he kept the two flights intact and made the attack dives as follows, from Peter Brett’s recollection. Walter would fly past the target, call ‘ready, steady, GO’, and on ‘GO’ the CO half-rolled into a looping dive from which he would pull out on the bombing dive angle. He would be followed immediately by the rest of his own four in the order 3, 4, 2. As soon as the leader of the second four saw the CO’s number 2 start his roll, he would follow with his four in the same order. This manoeuvre was practised many times before being tried out on ops and it was found that it took just six or seven seconds to get all eight aircraft diving at the same time. This meant that, on dive-bomb runs, the aircraft were closer to each other but their exposure to flak was minimised, giving the gunners little opportunity to pick out one particular aircraft and having to make do with putting up a barrage instead. Accuracy of bombing was maintained and ‘all you had to do was make sure that you did not start your pull-out before the chap in front because if you did, he could then have pulled out into you!’
The following day Sqn Ldr Dring, in MN144, led a flight of four aircraft as part of a wing operation. The attack was intended to be against a No-Ball site, but due to low cloud, poor visibility and a strong wind that blew the formation well off-course, an alternative target consisting of some buildings west of a wood near the village of Herbouville was bombed instead.
During March 1944 most of the squadron’s operations were dive-bombing attacks against No-Ball targets, lasting one to one and a half hours. Several times Walter Dring led his squadron in full-strength formation as part of wing operations, such as one mounted against a V–1 site at St Martin l’Hortier near Foucarment, 18 miles south-east of Dieppe, and another as part of a wing dive-bombing attack in support of a force of B–25 Mitchells against a V–1 target near Fruges St Pols.
But it was this month, too, that saw Walter’s flying career take another significant change of direction. On 15 March 1944, No 183 Squadron was transferred to the burgeoning 2nd Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) organisation and moved to No 123 Airfield, RAF Manston. Walter was still OC No 183 and the squadron’s Operations Record Book contains an entry dated 21 March which shows him still ‘leading the charge’ on one of the first two operations from the new base. The ORB entries, however, also suggest that a change of command was in the offing, since the first six aircraft that took off at 14.25 were led by Sqn Ldr Remy van Lierde. This group flew to Holland on a low-level Ranger sweep of the Twente–Enschede area, encountering thick snow clouds and losing Flt Lt Peter Raw DFC to flak into the bargain. Sqn Ldr Dring led another six Typhoons on the second Ranger sweep to Northern France/Belgium, first to the Montdidier–Florennes area and then around the Brussels–Louvain–St Trond–Florennes area between 15.50 and 17.25 hours. No enemy air activity was seen, but 4 miles from Louvain the formation was targeted by a heavy flak barrage. Walter’s aircraft MN246 was hit in two or three places, including one of his drop tanks, which he had to jettison.
During March 1944, all the wing’s Typhoons had gradually been replaced by aircraft that were built with, or modified to, a bubble canopy. This vastly improved all-round visibility but as pilot Sgt Ken Adams, formerly of No 609 Squadron, explained:
[If] a tyre burst on take-off or landing [which] resulted in the Typhoon flipping over on its back … it nearly always proved fatal because of a broken neck. Remember, we were sitting with our head above the fuselage under a Perspex canopy.
No 609 Squadron’s MO, Fg Off George Bell, also observed:
When you got within sight of an upturned Typhoon your heart sank. It was such a heavy aeroplane and when it overturned it invariably caused the tail fin to collapse. The cockpit structure was unable to take any great force at all. The result was that the pilot’s head took the crush in either flexion or extension. In many cases this meant that he sustained a broken neck and invariably death. To others, it meant quadriplegia with the rest of their life in a wheelchair.
These observations would come back to haunt the squadron.
* * *
Walter Dring was undoubtedly being groomed for higher command within No 2 TAF and both he and his future now came under its authority. Having been flying operationally for nearly two years, between 25 March and 31 May Walter found himself posted to No 3 Air Support training course at the Fighter Leader’s School (FLS) at RAF Milfield, near Berwick in Northumberland. Here he learned about tactics and methods of providing air support to the army – no doubt with the impending invasion in mind. Upon completion of the Milfield course he was posted to No 84 Group Support Unit (84 GSU) at Aston Down near Cirencester, Gloucestershire. Things had come a long way since the days of 1942 when No 56 Squadron had to learn all about the Typhoon by trial and error, and having grown up with the Typhoon, Walter was ideally placed to pass on his hard-earned knowledge and experience to pilots he might have to work with in the near future. He put in some flying time in the unit’s Spitfires and Typhoons to demonstrate his ideas and even managed a first solo in an Auster.
With an eye to the air support of fast-moving ground warfare envisaged when the proposed Allied invasion of Europe took place, No 2 TAF was created in mid–1943. By the beginning of 1944 a clearer idea of what this might entail had been worked out and one of No 2 TAF’s key operational mantras would be ‘mobility’. In November 1943, Nos 83 and 84 Groups were created as the main fighter, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance composite groups within No 2 TAF. To this end the concept included a number of mobile Typhoon wings, such as those formed within No 2 TAF’s No 84 Group. With ‘mobility’ being the watchword, after much to-ing and fro-ing of individual squadrons between numbered airfield units during March 1944, No 123 Wing finally settled into its four-Typhoon-squadron configura
tion: Nos 164, 183, 198 and 609 Squadrons, over which the New Zealander Wg Cdr Desmond Scott DFC was appointed CO. By 1 April these squadrons had left Manston and, in the first example of what their life ‘on the road’ would be like, were now living under canvas at RAF Thorney Island, near Portsmouth. No 123 Wing was to be completely mobile and self-supporting, with its own servicing and repair equipment and ground staff, transport, medical staff and facilities, tented accommodation, field kitchens, armoury and signals section; in fact, everything that would be customary to support squadrons on a normal aerodrome – but mobile. Even before the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944, plans were well in hand to make full use of the Typhoon as a ground attack fighter in the forthcoming battle and the principal weapon for the Typhoons of No 123 Wing was to be the airborne RP 3 rocket projectile.
The 3in, 60lb rockets used by Typhoon squadrons to great effect during the Normandy campaign. (Author’s Collection)
Walter Dring was attached to No 84 GSU until 9 June 1944 when he was promoted to wing commander and posted to No 20 Sector Headquarters, Thorney Island, as Wg Cdr (Flying). At this time the composition of organisational units, such as airfields, wings, sectors, HQs and their descriptive names, were undergoing an almost constant change. When, on 12 July, No 20 Sector disbanded, Walter’s movement card showed his final appointment to No 123 Wing HQ as Wg Cdr (Flying) – the post he held until his death six months later. It seems likely that service personnel records lagged well behind reality since, according to Desmond Scott’s memoirs, Walter was selected by Scott to be his deputy and Wg Cdr (Flying) during May. Desmond Scott recalled:
‘Farmer’ Dring came from Spalding [sic] in Lincolnshire and was a true son of the soil. He had served in my wing at Tangmere in 1943, where his rugged exterior, wry smile and dry sense of humour had made him a great favourite with the New Zealand boys. His promotion to be my deputy was the start of an association that was to span the hot dusty days of Normandy, the cooler though hectic days against the Channel ports, the mud of Merville, Ursel airfield in Belgium and Gilze-Rijen in flat, soggy Holland. We were to share the joys, hopes and sorrows of a modern crusade. His part in it began with a flourish, prospered and, when at its peak at the gates of a dying Germany, ended in a crash at Chièvres in the snowbound Ardennes.
The post of Wg Cdr (Flying) involved a great deal of planning, briefings, debriefings and administration, particularly since the wing was not only committed to harrying the Germans from its English base prior to D-Day, but was also preparing to embark for France once the bridgehead was established. Walter now had day-to-day control over four squadrons but still made time – indeed he thought it vital – to fly operations with them to see how they performed, find out what problems they might encounter, review current tactics and to do what he was good at – leading his pilots from the front, usually in MN711.
In the run-up to and on D-Day, No 123 Wing’s orders were quite specific: ‘Destroy all enemy radar stations between Ostend and the Channel Islands.’ These were among the most formidable targets, usually located near the coast, with clear lines of sight all round that made surprise attacks impossible and were thus veritable hornets’ nests of light flak. Many pilots and squadron commanders were lost carrying out this vital work. Of D-Day itself, Desmond Scott wrote: ‘Dring and the squadrons were coming and going, extremely busy hammering away in support of the Allied landings.’ After D-Day, once the bridgehead had stabilised and a more or less clear ‘bomb-line’ was established, the role changed to interdiction operations and the Typhoon wings went hunting behind the bridgehead for anything that moved by road, rail or river that looked like a threat to Allied forces. If anything was found it was strafed, rocketed or bombed. Seventeen Typhoons were lost on D-Day operations.
By mid-June the Allies had taken enough ground to consider moving elements of No 2 TAF on to French soil. For a short time, therefore, aircraft of No 123 Wing carrying out operations over France were put under the temporary control of No 83 Wing, whose own squadrons had the use of some hastily constructed airfields within the Allied perimeter; for example, B5 (Camilly/Le Fresney), B8 (Sommervieu) and B10 at Plumetot, only 4 miles from enemy-occupied Caen. These airfields were used for refuelling and rearming and were refuges for battle-damaged aircraft.
On 17 July the ground echelon of No 123 Wing embarked on four Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs) at Gosport and sailed for France. Disembarking off Courselles on the 18th, it proceeded in convoy to airfield B7 at Martragny, near Bayeux, where it was joined by No 2703 AA (Anti-Aircraft) Squadron, RAF Regiment, for airfield defence. It speaks volumes for the quality of the organisation that just one day later, the wing was declared fully operational and Nos 164, 198 and 609 Squadrons flew in to B7 to begin operations, being followed by No 183 Squadron on 25 July.
Now all four squadrons were at B7 Walter was keen to get them back on ops quickly and in his inimitable way tried to instil confidence in his pilots by personally leading the first operation. This took place in the afternoon of 26 July when Walter (his Typhoon now coded ‘W-D’ – the privilege of a wing commander), leading a formation of ‘A’ Flight from No 609 Squadron and one flight from No 183 Squadron, made an anti-train sweep between Yvetot and Charleville. Spotting a goods train near Merville, the Typhoons dived on it, firing rockets and cannon and leaving it a smoking wreck. In the evening of 30 July sixteen Typhoons, drawn from Nos 609 and 164 Squadrons, took to the air with Wg Cdr Dring leading the formation. Their target was an enemy infantry HQ located in a wood near Caumont. One hundred and twenty-eight RPs slammed into the target area with many direct hits on the main building and the whole site was left on fire and billowing smoke.
There was another side to Walter Dring’s job in which he had to draw upon his ability to understand his subordinates and look after their welfare. He had also to find suitable replacements for squadron commanders who were all too frequently being killed on ops. In his capacity as Wg Cdr (Flying) Walter was also aware of the effect of combat fatigue on his squadron commanders and pilots. It was occasionally necessary for him to make hard decisions about a pilot’s fitness to continue flying these highly dangerous ground attack operations. He took advice from his squadron medical officers but never shirked his own duty when the final decision had to be made. When he thought one of his ‘boys’ had gone far enough, he took him off flying, for the man’s sake as well as for the squadron’s. The CO of No 164 Squadron, Sqn Ldr Percy Beake DFC, for example, had been flying operations since the Battle of Britain and was well into his second tour. After landing at B7 from an armed reconnaissance sortie on 11 August, he recalled:
Walter called me over to his caravan and said: ‘Beaky, you have just done your last op. You are not to fly again and that is an order, until you return to England. I am arranging your relief as soon as possible.’ I was absolutely stunned. I hated sending up the squadron without myself leading. In the event my relief, Sqn Ldr Ian Waddy, was shot down by flak within two or three days of taking command, so perhaps Wally Dring had some sort of premonition that prompted my grounding.
By way of an example of the risks these pilots were running day after day, between 1 January and 5 June 1944, No 198 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and ten pilots killed, and between 6 June and 31 December 1944 it lost twenty-seven aircraft with twenty pilots killed.
Another view of Walter Dring is provided by former No 183 Squadron pilot Fg Off Peter Brett, of whom we heard earlier. He recalled that when his squadron, No 183, moved to France on 24 July 1944 he did not go with it because he was ‘tour-expired’ and due for a ‘rest posting’. The day after he arrived at his new unit, No 84 GSU at Thruxton, he was dismayed to find he was being posted back to No 123 Wing in France immediately – and not even back to No 183 but to No 198 Squadron instead. He was flown to B7 next day and duly reported to No 198 Squadron CO, Sqn Ldr Paul Ezanno. Ezanno was equally surprised to see him and took him straight to Wg Cdr Dring, who seems to have dealt with the matter in his usual forthright style. Peter Brett sai
d Dring exclaimed: ‘Peter, what the hell are you doing here? I sent you on rest! Those idiots at Command don’t know what they’re doing. You are grounded until I can sort out what has gone wrong. Just make yourself useful in the ops room.’ It took a week before the matter was sorted out, then Peter Brett was flown back to England on fourteen days’ leave before returning to No 84 GSU as a ferry pilot, relieved that he had survived his first tour.
One day in late July 1944, Wg Cdr Scott came to grief when he fell from a ‘liberated’ horse that he was riding around the airfield. Its hooves slipped on the steel matting used to form runways and taxiways for the aircraft and the horse fell on top of Desmond Scott, breaking his leg in several places and putting him completely out of action for over three weeks. The leg was also badly lacerated and he was admitted to a local Field Hospital where he was operated upon. Scott was desperate to stay at B7 and not lose command of his wing – for which his promotion to group captain was imminent – by being hospitalised in England, so he pulled every string possible to get ongoing treatment at B7 by a surgeon who happened to be awaiting a posting to England. During his recuperation, though, Scott’s wounds became badly infected and it was only by the swift scrounging of the new wonder drug penicillin from a nearby American Field Hospital by No 609’s MO, Fg Off George Bell – in exchange for a bottle of whisky – that the threat to Desmond Scott’s leg, and possibly his life, was removed. Shortly afterwards, Scott’s promotion to group captain was confirmed and he conceded that during his hospitalisation: “‘Farmer” Dring had filled my shoes as Airfield Commander and kept me well informed on the activities of the Wing.’ It could be a matter for speculation that if, as the Field Hospital had suggested, Wg Cdr Scott had returned to England for treatment, Walter might himself have been promoted to command No 123 Wing.
They Spread Their Wings Page 14