MacArthur delegated day-to-day operations to Eisenhower and Ord. Although he was the titular commander of the Philippine Army, the actual command was exercised by Filipino officers. “We didn’t attempt to command them from our office,” said Lucius D. Clay, who served with MacArthur in Manila from 1937 to 1938.d Instead, the mission focused on developing policy for the Army. MacArthur established the guidelines and left it to Ike to fill in the details. “General MacArthur never came to the office but about an hour a day,” Clay recalled. “He would come down about one o’clock and stay until about two. The rest of the time he wasn’t in the office at all. I don’t mean that he wasn’t thinking, planning, or whatnot over in his hotel suite. The fact is he did most of his work at home. Every once in a while, he’d call me up and we would go to a prize fight. He loved prize fights. Except for that, we didn’t see very much of him. No one did. He simply didn’t socialize at that point in his career.”23
MacArthur believed that given sufficient time to prepare, plus a modicum of American support, the Philippines could defend themselves. Eisenhower shared that view. As he wrote in the introduction to the handwritten Philippine diary he began to keep, “If the Filipino people can be, within the next ten years, thoroughly prepared for their own defense … they should continue to flourish as a product of Western civilization and contribute to stability and peaceful relationships in the Asiatic area.”24
War Department opinion had fluctuated. In 1924 the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange, the planning document for war in the Pacific, emphasized the need for immediate reinforcements to be rushed to Manila in the event of war.25 By 1928 the euphoria growing out of World War I had receded and Washington became more realistic. That year’s revision of War Plan Orange drew America’s defensive perimeter in the Pacific from Alaska to Hawaii to Panama, and recognized that the Philippines would likely fall before reinforcements could arrive. “We must plan on conditions as they are in reality and not as we would wish them to be,” said military planners.26
When he became chief of staff in 1930, MacArthur—who had just returned from the Philippines—set aside the revised War Plan Orange and told President Hoover that in the event of war, he would immediately dispatch two of America’s stateside divisions to Manila via the Suez Canal.27 Washington rewrote Plan Orange in 1933 to accommodate MacArthur’s views. The Army undertook the immediate commitment of two divisions, some fifty-six thousand men, to defense of the Philippines.28 But with MacArthur’s departure as chief of staff, military planners reverted to hemispheric defense. The 1936 War Plan Orange made no mention of a Philippine relief force.29 By 1938, with war in Europe looming, the Army made it explicit. The military would protect the continental United States, Alaska, Oahu, and Panama, “but the defense of the Philippines would be left to the garrison and whatever local forces could be raised.”30
The shift in War Department priorities undercut MacArthur and Eisenhower. They went to the Philippines expecting quick reinforcement from the United States. With that in the offing, it was possible that the Philippine Army could mount an effective defense of the islands, particularly if the U.S. Navy interdicted Japanese shipping. The mission’s efforts in 1936 and 1937 have to be appraised in that context. An active defense of the islands by a reinforced Philippine Army was not just a pipe dream.
Eisenhower and Ord moved quickly to lay the groundwork. But the difficulties were enormous. Stateside planning suggested that an annual budget of $24 million was the bare minimum to get the Philippine Army off the ground. Budget imperatives in Manila cut that figure to $8 million. Weapons were antiquated, ammunition was in short supply, there were no training camps or cantonments, and the officer corps, which was taken over from the old constabulary, was insufficient to train the recruits that would be enlisted. Even worse was the attitude Ike and Ord encountered. “We have learned to expect from the Filipinos with whom we deal,” wrote Eisenhower, “a minimum of performance from a maximum of promise. When any detail is under discussion, they seem to grasp the essentials of the problem, and readily agree to undertake accomplishment of whatever decision is arrived at. But thereafter it is quite likely that nothing will be done.”31
Even obtaining obsolescent Enfield rifles from the United States proved particularly complicated. When the mission’s routine request for the surplus weapons was submitted to the War Department, the Army’s general staff deemed it a political issue that required a presidential decision. “We are at a loss to determine what the question of policy may be,” Eisenhower recorded in his diary on January 20, 1936. Ike speculated that it might relate to pacifist opinion in the United States, neutrality legislation pending in Congress, or fear that the weapons might fall into the hands of rebels who would use them against the central government. “We must never forget that every question is settled in Washington today on the basis of getting votes in November. To decide the matter completely in our favor would gain no votes. While to disapprove the request and give the matter some publicity might be considered as a vote getting proposition among the pacifists and other misguided elements of the American electorate.”32
For FDR the matter was small potatoes. He had no interest in fanning neutralist sentiment and discounted a possible insurrection. Roosevelt referred the question back to Frank Murphy, the U.S. high commissioner in Manila, and upon Murphy’s recommendation approved the immediate sale of 100,000 Enfield rifles with an additional 300,000 to be made available over the next eight years.33
Meanwhile, Ike’s relations with MacArthur, which had bordered on hero worship, began to fray. “It is rapidly becoming apparent that either here or somewhere else it will be advisable for me to keep some notes that I cannot, with propriety dictate,” he recorded in his diary at the end of January.
The General is more and more indulging in a habit of damning everybody who disagrees with him over any detail, in extravagant, sometimes almost hysterical fashion. I’ve seen him do this, second hand, in the past, but now he seems to consider that the combined use of his rank, a stream of generalizations that are studded with malapropos, and a refusal to permit the presentation of opposing opinion will, by silencing his subordinates, establish the validity of his contentions.34 e
The size of the Philippine Army proved a major source of discord. Ike and Ord believed that the budget would eventually support one regular division and ten reserve divisions. “We want to train 20–25,000 men yearly for a minimum period of 10½ months.” By contrast, MacArthur insisted on an immediate goal of thirty divisions. “After days of wrangling and arguing on the subject he gave J. [James Ord] and me a ridiculous lecture on ‘sufficiency in strength’ in armies. He makes nasty cracks about ‘technicians’ and ‘small-minded people’ when we try to show that we are simply arguing from the standpoint of the amount of money available.”35
From the beginning, Eisenhower and Ord urged MacArthur to spend more time cultivating President Quezon. “Things happen, and we know nothing of them,” Ike confided to his diary on May 29, 1936. “We’re constantly wondering whether the President will approve or disapprove. We ought to know. We could if the general would take the trouble to see Q[uezon] weekly—but apparently he thinks it would not be in keeping with his rank and position for him to do so!!!!!”
A lighter issue involved MacArthur’s determination to assume the rank of field marshal in the Philippine Army. The origins of the idea are obscure. MacArthur insisted the proposal came from Quezon. Quezon later told Ike it had originated with MacArthur, who still chafed over having been reduced from four stars to two.36 Included in the proposal was the suggestion that Eisenhower and Ord be commissioned brigadier generals in the Philippine Army, and that Davis assume the rank of colonel. Ike was appalled. “To any such idea I have been unalterably opposed from the start,” he noted in his diary on February 15, 1936. “I have gone so far as to inform the General that I personally would decline to accept any such appointment in the event it were tendered to me.” Davis agreed, and so did Ord, “though i
n somewhat less positive fashion.” Ike said that he and Davis also “strongly advised General MacArthur to decline … the acceptance of the title tendered him as Field Marshal.”37
The discussion became heated. Years later it was still fresh in Eisenhower’s mind. “I said, ‘General, you have been a four-star general. This is a proud thing. There’s only been a few who had it. Why in the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshalship?’ Oh, Jesus! He just gave me hell.”38
Ike suppressed his anger and did not respond. As he turned to leave the room, MacArthur reached out and put his hand on Eisenhower’s shoulder. “Ike, it’s worthwhile to argue with you sometimes just to see that Dutch temper of yours.” According to John Eisenhower, his father was charmed. “But he did not change his views.”39
Eisenhower’s disapproval evidently caused MacArthur second thoughts, but he eventually yielded and accepted the field marshalship. “The General feels that he could not decline without giving offense to the President,” Ike wrote in his diary on July 1, 1936. “Anyway, he is tickled pink, and feels that he’s made a lot of ‘face’ locally.”40 That same day, his twentieth wedding anniversary, Eisenhower was promoted to lieutenant colonel.41
Ike rekindled his love for flying in Manila. At Fort Sam Houston in 1916 he flirted with joining the aviation section of the Army Signal Corps. But John Doud, who was less than enthusiastic about a potential military son-in-law, insisted that Eisenhower give up the idea of flying if he wished to marry Mamie. In the Philippines, with Mamie in Washington, Ike decided to learn to fly.
“In the beginning of 1936,” Eisenhower recalled, “we fixed up a field outside the city limits, selected a few students, and started a miniature air force.”
The students learned rapidly and I decided to take flying lessons from Captain Lewis and Lieutenant William Lee, the American instructors. Because I was learning to fly at the age of forty-six, my reflexes were slower than those of younger men. Training me must have been a trial for Lewis and Lee.
Ike poses with members of the fledgling Philippine Air Force, 1939. (illustration credit 6.2)
Little more than thirty years had passed since Kitty Hawk and our planes were rather primitive. One had to react alertly to changes in sound or wind or temperature. The engines were good but the pilot who asked too much of one, in a steep climb, for example, learned that the roaring monster could retreat into silent surrender.42
Lee said that Ike’s flying was fair, “but not as smooth as it could be.”43 Lieutenant Hugh (“Lefty”) Parker, another instructor, said, “The biggest trouble I had with Colonel Eisenhower was eyesight. He was farsighted.f When he got around to just takeoffs and landings, he never had a bit of trouble with takeoffs. But the first lesson or two in landings he could not find the ground, which is not abnormal at all. A lot of people are ground shy on their first few landings.”44
Ike’s enthusiasm compensated for his awkwardness. He was regularly at the field at six-thirty in the morning and took his lesson before going into the office at 1 Calle Victoria in the old Spanish quarter, Cuartel de España.45 Lieutenant Jesus Villamor, a Filipino instructor with whom Ike flew occasionally, recalled that one day Eisenhower could not do anything right. “I grabbed the controls and landed the plane myself.”
“Tell me, Colonel,” Villamor asked, “surely you don’t expect the plane to do things perfectly when you don’t follow the proper procedure, do you?” When Eisenhower did not reply, Villamor repeated the question. “Damn it, Colonel, what the hell is your excuse?”
“No excuse, Lieutenant,” said Ike.
“The simplicity of his response stunned me,” said Villamor. “His bearing, his manners, his attitude, made me feel completely ashamed of myself. He could very easily have pulled rank on me. Instead, he waited patiently, and at the right moment, brought me down to reality in simple man-to-man fashion.”46
Eisenhower received his private pilot’s license on July 5, 1939, having logged 350 hours of flight time. Shortly before, he wrote about his flying to Lieutenant Parker, who had returned to the United States. “My flying is very intermittent these days,” wrote Ike. “Jew Lewis [Captain Mark K. Lewis] says that I did not fall off in coordination … but as far as I am concerned I haven’t had the same confidence in landings.”g
Jew took me on my first blind flying about a week ago! You will remember that you gave me a book on the stuff, and at the time I memorized the essential paragraphs. But Lordy, Lordy, it took me only about 4 minutes to get into a steep diving spiral. I tried everything I could think of except throwing the stick out of the cockpit. I’ve had 3 lessons [in blind flying] now—and I’ve gotten to the point where I mess along in an approximate fashion—but, so far as I’m concerned, that’s one feature of flying that is plain hard work!
Eisenhower’s pilot’s license. (illustration credit 6.3)
But I have a lot of fun—and even better than that—I think I furnish a lot of fun for the others out at the field, because I often see them grinning at me.47
Eisenhower’s relations with MacArthur continued to fluctuate. When General William D. Connor, the superintendent at West Point, asked MacArthur whether Ike was available to become commandant of cadets, MacArthur abruptly refused, asserting that Ike was engaged in “duties of the gravest importance. He could not adequately be replaced.”48 Eisenhower was not consulted, but in any case he would have declined the post. “I wanted no part of that,” he wrote to a friend at West Point many years later. “The Commandant was merely [in charge of discipline] and I had no ambition to get into that kind of business.”49
The fact that MacArthur considered Eisenhower indispensable did not shelter him from the general’s temper tantrums. “TJ [Davis] and I came in for a terrible bawling out,” Ike recorded in his diary on September 26, 1936. “The Gen. has been following the Literary Digest [presidential] poll, and has convinced himself that Landon is to be elected, probably in a landslide.” When Davis and Eisenhower suggested the poll might be incorrect, MacArthur erupted. “We couldn’t understand the reason for his almost hysterical condemnation of our STUPIDITY until he suddenly let drop that he had gone out and urged Q[uezon] to shape his plans for going to the U.S. on the theory that Landon will be elected.” Neither Davis nor Ike could understand why MacArthur should take such a risk. “But WHY should he get sore just because we say ‘Don’t be so d—— certain????’ Both of us are ‘fearful and small minded people who are afraid to express judgments that are obvious from the evidence at hand.’ Oh hell.”h
Eisenhower’s daily schedule was remarkably constant. Like most in the military he arose early, and left the Manila Hotel for the airfield shortly after six. The combination of a low wage scale for native Filipinos and his own generous salary permitted him to employ a local driver who also served as a valet and personal assistant. Ike was at his desk well before eight and worked until one or two in the afternoon. If MacArthur came to the office, Eisenhower usually rode back to the Manila Hotel with the general in his limousine. After lunch and a short nap, Eisenhower joined members of the American expatriate community for bridge in a formal room off the hotel lobby. Other afternoons he would head for the golf course at the Army-Navy Club. Evenings he dined in the hotel’s opulent dining room. Later, when Mamie joined him, they dined there together every evening. Bedtime was early—except when social obligations intervened. Manila enjoyed a reputation as the liveliest, most social city in the Orient. As one journalist wrote, “Parties are wetter and held oftener; are bigger, showier, more lavish, and last longer, than any other place in the world. Durability is required of the guests.”50 Eisenhower, as a stand-in for MacArthur, ranked high on every guest list.
Ike became a favorite of President Quezon’s. He was given an office at the presidential palace, where he handled the mission’s business on MacArthur’s behalf, and became a regular at the president’s all-night bridge and poker games. (Quezon, like Eisenhower, was an expert at bridge and poker.) Weekends were often spent on th
e presidential yacht, the Cassiano, where the games continued nonstop. Another favorite partner for Ike was Marian Huff, the comely wife of Lieutenant Sidney Huff, MacArthur’s naval aide. Mrs. Huff was not only young and perky, but also played excellent bridge and a superb game of golf. Whether there was anything more than golf and bridge between Ike and Marian Huff is a matter of conjecture. Mamie certainly saw her as a rival for Ike’s affections, but Lieutenant Huff “did not seem in the least bit concerned.”51
Mamie, for her part, had no intention of becoming a recluse while Ike was in Manila. The social swirl of Club Eisenhower did not continue as such, but Mamie entertained frequently and was frequently entertained in return. “Throughout the winter and spring, Mamie had no shortage of activities to occupy her, no lack of friends to see or escorts to lend their arms,” wrote Susan Eisenhower. “Whatever her deepest feelings, Mamie made a life for herself during Ike’s absence, and word of her apparent independence and resourcefulness no doubt made its way to Manila.”52
Eisenhower’s letters to his wife became less frequent and, according to Mamie, were “far from cheerful.” She wondered if he still cared. “I haven’t had a letter from Ike in over two weeks,” she wrote her parents on March 31, 1936. “You know he always acts queer in the tropics and if he’s not coming home I feel I should go out there—altho I don’t think he’s very keen about it.… He’s never told me how much extra pay he’s drawing or what rank he is holding.”53
Mamie finally realized that if she wished to stay married to Ike, she would have to go to the Philippines. In the fall she closed the apartment at the Wyoming, put their furniture in storage, and with Johnnie in tow boarded the Army transport President Grant for Manila. Ike was at the dock when they arrived. The reception was chilly.54 On their way to the Manila Hotel, Ike said tersely, “I gather I have reason for a divorce, if I want one.” Eisenhower family legend holds that Ike’s comment referred to the fact that Mamie had not sat at home during her time in Washington. “There has never been a suggestion that he was accusing her of violating her wedding vows.”55
Eisenhower in War and Peace Page 15