By striking an enlisted man, Patton had committed a court-martial offense.k In Patton’s case, because of his rank, it would have been a general court-martial. Eisenhower accepted responsibility and brushed the affair under the rug. Ike said later that he would never promote Patton above the rank of an army commander, but that on the battlefield he was irreplaceable.
* * *
a The other three active volcanoes were Vesuvius, Stromboli, and Santorini.
b Since October 1942, Ike’s principal driver had been Sergeant Leonard D. Dry. Summersby drove only when Ike asked her. Dry served with Eisenhower throughout the North African campaign and later in England and on the Continent. Dry remained Ike’s driver after the war, and as a master sergeant drove for Mamie during the presidential years. After his retirement from the Army, he continued to drive for the Eisenhowers at Gettysburg. Lester David and Irene David, Ike and Mamie: The Story of the General and His Lady 149 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981).
c General Bradley’s skepticism is well taken. When Letters to Mamie was published in 1978, John stated that Eisenhower “apparently destroyed all the letters [Mamie] wrote him.” By publishing only Ike’s letters, John gives his father the last word and deprives Mamie of any opportunity to make her case.
After publishing Eisenhower’s letters, John sold the originals to a private party for what officials at the Eisenhower Library call “a substantial sum.” The Eisenhower Library has photocopies, but the originals are in private hands. Perhaps Mamie’s are too.
DDE, Letters to Mamie 12, John S. D. Eisenhower, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978).
d What goes around comes around. When Eisenhower was inaugurated president in January 1953, Eleanor Roosevelt was serving as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations. Like all diplomatic appointees, she routinely submitted her resignation to the new administration when Ike took office. She was surprised when Eisenhower accepted it. Joseph P. Lash, A World of Love: Eleanor Roosevelt and Her Friends, 1943–1962 385 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984).
e Eisenhower held the permanent rank of lieutenant colonel. On August 30, 1943, he was promoted to major general in the Regular Army, skipping the ranks of colonel and brigadier general.
f The two soldiers involved were Private Charles H. Kuhl, Company F, 26th Infantry, and Private Paul G. Bennett, C Battery, 17th Field Artillery. Kuhl had been hospitalized for “psychoneurotic anxiety,” ran a fever of 102.3, and had suffered diarrhea for the past month, having as many as ten to twelve stools a day. He was ultimately diagnosed as suffering from chronic dysentery and malaria. Bennett, a veteran of four years in the Regular Army, had been evacuated from his unit against his will with symptoms of “dehydration, listlessness, and confusion.” Report of Lieutenant Colonel Perrin H. Long, Medical Corps, to the Surgeon General, NATOUSA, August 16, 1943, reprinted in Blumenson, 2 Patton Papers 330–31.
g At a time when journalists were more deferential to authority, Pearson’s Washington Merry-Go-Round column in The Washington Post was a lively source of political muckraking. His column was carried by 650 newspapers—more than twice as many as any other journalist. In addition to the MacArthur–Rosario Cooper affair, Pearson exposed the Sherman Adams–Bernard Goldfine payola scandal during the Eisenhower administration, forcing Adams’s resignation; the kickbacks of House of Representatives employees to Congressman J. Parnell Thomas, resulting in Thomas’s conviction for tax evasion; and was the first to disclose that Attorney General Robert Kennedy had authorized the FBI’s electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Perhaps Pearson was wrong as often as he was right, but in Patton’s case his facts were correct. He stated clearly that Eisenhower had informally reprimanded Patton. Time, December 2, 1943.
h “I had been expecting something like this to happen,” Patton recorded in his diary on November 22, 1943. “I am sure it would have been much better to have admitted the whole thing to start with, particularly in view of the fact that I was right [in what I did].” Blumenson, 2 Patton Papers 374.
i On November 23, The New York Times reported that “Allied Force Headquarters denied tonight that Lieut. Gen. George S. Patton had been reprimanded by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower and stated that General Patton is still in command of Seventh Army.”
The article quoted Smith even more damagingly: “General Patton has never been reprimanded at any time by General Eisenhower or by anyone else in this theater.”
j Stimson had known Patton on a personal basis for many years, and he expressed his disappointment that “so brilliant an officer should so far have offended against his own traditions.” According to Patton’s most uncritical biographer, “It was Stimson’s letter more than anything else that brought home to Patton the true seriousness of the situation. Until its receipt … he was inclined to dismiss the incident with a shrug. But the Stimson letter was a hard blow. For the first time during the ‘hullabaloo’ he became remorseful and conscience-smitten.” Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph 357 (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 1963).
k Article 95 (section 2, number 8) of the Articles of War states, “Striking a soldier as a punishment for a dereliction of duty is an offense against military law punishable under this, or the 96th (General Article) according to the seriousness of the case.”
Article 96 reads, “Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary court-martial, according to the nature of and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.”
The Articles of War, Annotated by Lee S. Tillotson (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing, 1943).
TWELVE
Supreme Commander
Won’t you come back here, Child, and have lunch with a dull old man?
—FDR TO KAY SUMMERSBY,
November 21, 1943
Eisenhower played no direct role in the battle for Sicily. “I am the Chairman of a Board,” he told Lord Louis Mountbatten.1 Alexander, with his headquarters close to the fighting in Sicily, controlled the ground war. Cunningham, at the Royal Navy’s base on Malta, directed the war at sea. And Tedder waged the air war from Tunis. Ike remained at Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) in Algiers and was primarily concerned with keeping London and Washington abreast of the fighting while overseeing civil affairs in French North Africa and coordinating the work of his deputies. But as the escape of the German Army across the Strait of Messina demonstrated, the commanders in chief were too widely separated to be coordinated easily, and at the close of the Sicilian campaign Eisenhower ordered them back to Algiers.
Ike was pampered. Even before the return of Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder, and their staffs to Algiers, AFHQ numbered more than four thousand officers, most with John C. H. Lee’s Services of Supply, although Bedell Smith shared Lee’s preference for redundancy, and the necessity to commingle British and American officers sometimes doubled the normal staff complement.a
The sheer size of Allied Forces Headquarters meant that Ike’s personal preferences could be accommodated easily. He lived in a spacious seven-bedroom villa overlooking the Mediterranean, enjoyed a country retreat near Carthage, and had a personal staff (his “family”) that catered to his needs. Sergeant Mickey McKeogh supervised the household; his valet, Sergeant John Moaney, dressed him each morning; and Tex Lee and Harry Butcher ran whatever errands were required. The duty day began at seven with cigarettes and countless cups of scalding black coffee, and continued until about four, when Eisenhower headed for his country place, went riding with Kay when weather permitted, and returned for cocktails about six. Dinner was informal, unless visiting dignitaries were present, and was inevitably followed by a rubber of bridge with Ike and Kay taking on Butcher and whoever else might be available, usually T. J. Davis, the theater
adjutant general. Kay made Eisenhower’s off-duty moments as pleasant as she could, and often attended top-level meetings as his personal assistant and confidant. “We have no secrets from Kay,” Ike was quoted as saying.2 Curious about their relationship, General James Gavin of the 82nd Airborne asked veteran correspondent John “Beaver” Thompson of the Chicago Tribune if the rumors they were having an affair were true. “Well,” Thompson replied, “I have never before seen a chauffeur get out of a car and kiss the General good morning when he comes from his office.”3
Eisenhower’s executive ability—his capacity to delegate while assuming ultimate responsibility—was exceptional. After the war, Omar Bradley said that Ike “did not know how to manage a battlefield,” but as a theater commander he proved uniquely gifted. Montgomery concurred. He would not class Eisenhower as a great soldier, said Monty, “but he was a great Supreme Commander—a military statesman.”4 b No other general officer, British or American, could have dealt as effectively with Washington and London, kept headstrong subordinates working in harmony, and (with the help of John C. H. Lee) amassed the matériel that ensured ultimate victory. In a sense, Ike was like a giant umbrella. He absorbed what was coming down from above, shielded his commanders from higher authority, and allowed them to fight the war without excessive second-guessing.
But the pressures took a toll. Harold Macmillan, whom Churchill had dispatched to provide political guidance, noted in his diary during the Sicily campaign that Ike
was getting pretty harassed. Telegrams (private, personal and most immediate) pour in upon him from the following sources:
(i) Combined Chiefs of Staff (Washington), his official masters.
(ii) General Marshall, Chief of U.S. Army, his immediate superior.
(iii) The President.
(iv) The Secretary of State.
(v) Our Prime Minister (direct).
(vi) Our Prime Minister (through me).
(vii) The Foreign Minister (through me).
“All these instructions are naturally contradictory and conflicting,” said Macmillan, and it was like a parlor game to juggle them and get things right.5
Eisenhower described his job in a lengthy letter to Admiral Louis Mountbatten in mid-September 1943. Mountbatten had recently been named supreme Allied commander for Southeast Asia, and wrote to ask Ike’s advice. Eisenhower stressed the importance of personal relationships. Allied unity “involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with persons of the opposite nationality, is absolutely essential.” Ike said the three commanders in chief (air, ground, and sea) must be given broad authority. “Without a great degree of decentralization no allied command can be made to work.”
Eisenhower told Mountbatten that mutual respect and confidence among the senior commanders was the most important ingredient in achieving allied unity.
All of us are human and we like to be favorably noticed by those above us and even by the public. An Allied Commander-in-Chief, among all others practicing the art of war, must more sternly than any other individual repress such notions. He must be self-effacing, quick to give credit, ready to meet the other fellow more than half way, must seek and absorb advice and must learn to decentralize. On the other hand, when the time comes that he feels he must make a decision, he must make it in a clean-cut fashion and on his own responsibility and take full blame for anything that goes wrong; in fact he must be quick to take the blame for anything that goes wrong whether or not it results from his mistake or from an error on the part of a subordinate.
Ike said that while clear-cut lines of authority were important, in the last analysis “your personality and your good sense must make it work. Otherwise Allied action in any theater will be impossible.”6
It was during the Sicily campaign that Mussolini fell from office and Italy sued for peace. On July 19, 1943, Allied bombers hit Rome for the first time. More than five hundred bombers from bases in North Africa and Pantelleria struck at the sprawling Littorio rail yards in the center of the city. Historic sites and the Vatican were spared, although a single thousand-pound bomb ripped through the roof of the Basilica of San Lorenzo, built in the fourth century and considered one of Rome’s finest churches. Estimates of the dead ranged from seven hundred to three thousand, with many more injured.7
The bombing of Rome, combined with the reverses in North Africa and Sicily, meant that Mussolini’s days were numbered. On July 25 the Grand Council of Fascism (which had not met since 1939) voted no confidence in Il Duce. King Victor Emmanuel relieved him of office that evening, and Mussolini was placed in protective custody. News of the dictator’s fall triggered massive celebrations in the streets of Rome, and Victor Emmanuel, instead of naming a Fascist replacement, turned to Italy’s most distinguished soldier, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. “Fascism fell like a rotten pear,” said Badoglio later.8
In 1936, Badoglio had turned the Italian debacle in Ethiopia into victory, and subsequently served as chief of the Supreme General Staff (Commando Supremo) until December 1940, when he broke with Mussolini over the invasion of Greece. As soon as he was installed in office, Badoglio assured Hitler of Italy’s continued loyalty. He then initiated secret discussions with the Allies, first in Madrid, then Lisbon. Eisenhower’s headquarters was represented by Bedell Smith and British brigadier Kenneth Strong, and after considerable to-ing and fro-ing an armistice was set to take effect the evening of September 8.9 “The House of Savoy,” a Free French newspaper observed, “never finished a war on the same side it started, unless the war lasted long enough to change sides twice.”10
The Italian surrender had little practical effect. Badoglio and the King fled to Brindisi (on the heel of the Italian boot), the Germans occupied Rome, and the Italian Army was disarmed and demobilized. The principal gain was that the Italian fleet sailed from its bases in La Spezia and Taranto to Malta to be interned. Ike and Admiral Cunningham watched from the deck of the destroyer HMS Hambledon as the Taranto squadron sailed into St. Paul’s harbor, flags aloft, sailors manning the rails. “When they replied to our bosun’s whistle,” Butcher remembered, “I swear theirs had an operatic trill.”11 By mid-September, six battleships, eight cruisers, thirty-three destroyers, and one hundred merchant ships had surrendered to the Allies.12
Meanwhile, Roosevelt and Churchill met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec (QUADRANT) to plan the invasion of Europe. Despite Churchill’s misgivings, it was agreed that Allied forces would cross the Channel in May 1944. It was further agreed that seven divisions, three British and four American, would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and shipped to Great Britain to take part in the landings. But to satisfy Churchill’s desire to pursue a Mediterranean strategy and hit Germany through what he persistently referred to as Europe’s “soft underbelly,” it was also agreed to land in Italy following the fall of Sicily. In effect, QUADRANT gave something to everyone. Roosevelt and Marshall obtained Britain’s commitment to land in France in 1944, and Churchill got American approval to invade Italy, although with fewer forces than he would have liked.
Most significantly, Roosevelt insisted that the invasion of France (code name OVERLORD) be commanded by an American. By 1944, the United States would be furnishing the greater number of troops, said FDR, and the American public would demand an American supreme commander. Churchill yielded gracefully, although he had previously promised the position to General Sir Alan Brooke.c No one was named to the post, but it was widely assumed that it would go to Marshall and that Eisenhower would return to Washington as chief of staff.
QUADRANT also approved rearming the French. Following a recommendation from Eisenhower, it was agreed that the United States would provide the equipment to outfit eleven French divisions—four armored and seven infantry—to be raised in North Africa. The divisions would be earmarked for the invasion of southern France (ANVIL), which would be coordinated with OVERLORD.13 Britain and the United States also accepted the
French Committee of National Liberation as the responsible French authority for the conduct of the war, although FDR remained adamant against formal diplomatic recognition. Roosevelt said he wanted “a sheet anchor out against the machinations of de Gaulle” and that he would not “give de Gaulle a white horse on which he could ride into France and make himself the master of the government there.”14
When the time came, the invasion of Italy was mishandled as badly as the invasion of North Africa had been. Instead of landing in one location with overwhelming force as Eisenhower had insisted on doing in Sicily, the Allies once again landed piecemeal. On September 3, 1943, Montgomery crossed the Strait of Messina with two veteran divisions from Eighth Army, landed on the toe of the Italian boot, and secured the adjacent coastline to protect Allied shipping (BAYTOWN). Six days later, three divisions from Mark Clark’s Fifth Army landed at Salerno, three hundred miles north of Montgomery, and less than fifty miles below Naples (AVALANCHE). No effort was made to coordinate the landings, and by dividing his forces, Eisenhower not only weakened the landing at Salerno, but deprived AVALANCHE of the battle-tested troops of Eighth Army.d
Eisenhower, his AFHQ staff, and his commanders in chief overestimated the impact of Italy’s surrender, underestimated Kesselring’s ability to mount a spirited defense, and again failed to comprehend the topographic impediments that an army would encounter pressing north. The uninterrupted strand of beaches at Salerno provided a favorable landing site. But they were ringed by low-lying mountains from which German mortars and artillery could blast the troops coming ashore. As one Navy planner put it, “The landing site was like the inside of a coffee cup.”15 And although Salerno appeared on small-scale planning maps to be just south of Naples, it was separated from the city by the Vesuvian massif, a barrier just as formidable as Mount Etna had proved to be in Sicily. Eisenhower assumed that Naples would be in Allied hands within the week and planned to move his headquarters there later in the month. Clark shared Ike’s optimism. “You don’t have to worry about this operation,” he told an old Army friend. “This will be a pursuit, not a battle.”16 The fact is Clark’s troops did not enter Naples until October 1, 1943, after three weeks of some of the most difficult fighting of the war.
Eisenhower in War and Peace Page 33