Eisenhower in War and Peace

by Jean Edward Smith

  As Clay recalled,

  I said to President Eisenhower, “If you are going to go to the business world for the secretary of defense, why not go to the biggest business we have?” So that’s why we went to Mr. Wilson. We felt that Defense was the most difficult administrative job in government, and here was a man with certainly as wide an administrative experience as any man in the country. As a result of the Defense reorganization [under the National Security Act of 1947], we had created a huge department, and it seemed to me that its first need was to be established on a sound administrative basis. That may not have been the right decision, but in spite of all the things that happened,c I think Mr. Wilson set up a pretty fair administrative structure in the defense department.6

  At Treasury, Clay settled on George M. Humphrey, who was president of M. A. Hanna and Company of Cleveland—a large multinational conglomerate involved in iron and steel production, banking, and plastics. “Mr. Humphrey may have been suggested by Sidney Weinberg,” said Clay.

  Certainly Mr. Weinberg thought highly of him, as did I. Mr. Humphrey was a man with a great deal of experience in the financial world. I had met him when I was in Germany. He had been appointed by President Truman [in 1948] to look into the reparations question. And we were in considerable disagreement at the time. But I formed a great respect for his fairness and his ability. It was not because we were operating on the same wave length. We were not. He wanted to cancel all reparations. It did not seem to me that was consistent with the commitments we had made [to our allies].7

  Eisenhower did not hit it off with Wilson, whom he considered narrow and simplistic, but he found Humphrey enormously congenial, and he was the only member of the cabinet with whom Ike formed a close personal relationship. Like Eisenhower, Humphrey exuded a natural warmth. He and Ike were the same age, both abhorred high taxes and deficit spending, and they shared a love for hunting and fly-fishing. At their first meeting, Eisenhower grinned as he greeted the balding Humphrey with, “Well, George, I see you comb your hair just the way I do.”8 According to legend, Humphrey stipulated one condition for his acceptance of the post. “If anyone talks to you about money,” he told Ike, “you tell him to go see George.”9 Clay erred in not clearing Humphrey’s appointment with Taft—the senior senator from Ohio—but of all the original cabinet appointees, Humphrey proved to be the most successful.d

  For Interior, Clay and Brownell picked outgoing governor Douglas McKay of Oregon. “Our first choice had been Governor Arthur Langlie of Washington,” said Clay, “but he had just been elected to a four-year term, and he declined.”

  We recommended Ezra Taft Benson of Utah for Agriculture. We considered both Congressman Clifford Hope of Kansas and Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas, but we wanted someone from further west. Benson was not too partisan and he had a record of agricultural reform. He was also strongly recommended by Senator Taft. Neither Brownell nor I knew him, but we thought it was a good idea to have at least one person recommended by Taft in the cabinet. Benson was one of the twelve apostles of the Mormon Church, and I think President Eisenhower rather liked that.10

  Sinclair Weeks, a conservative New England banker, was named secretary of commerce. Weeks anchored the right flank of the Eisenhower administration, and would have felt more at home serving under Calvin Coolidge. Determined to emasculate the federal government, Weeks reduced the budget of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to the point where air safety became a serious national problem. Shortly after the administration took office, Eisenhower complained in his diary that Weeks “seems so completely conservative in his views that at times he seems to be illogical. I hope that I am mistaken or if not that he will become a little more aware of the world as it is today.”11

  For postmaster general, traditionally the gatekeeper of political patronage, Clay and Brownell turned to Arthur Summerfield, a Michigan automobile dealer who had recently become chairman of the Republican National Committee. Much to Summerfield’s surprise, Eisenhower insisted he step down as party chairman. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who lost his Senate seat to John F. Kennedy, was named United States ambassador to the United Nations and given cabinet rank. Oveta Culp Hobby, publisher of The Houston Post, leader of “Democrats for Eisenhower,” and commander of the Women’s Army Corps during the war, was named head of the Federal Security Agency (a forerunner of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), also with cabinet rank. Joseph Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, who had headed economic affairs for Clay in Germany, was named director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Sherman Adams became White House chief of staff.

  The most difficult position to fill was secretary of labor. “We were thinking about appearances at that point,” said Clay, “and we wanted more diversity. If possible, we wanted someone from the AFL. Finally, someone recommended Martin Durkin, who was president of the plumbers and steamfitters union. He was a Democrat and a Catholic. We thought it was a good idea to have a Catholic in the cabinet.”12 Taft disagreed and called Durkin’s appointment “incredible,” and it proved to be a poor fit. “Eight millionaires and a plumber,” crowed The New Republic, when the choice was announced.

  Eisenhower’s cabinet was conservative but not excessively partisan.13 What is remarkable is that not one of the appointees had prior experience in Washington; none was a professional politician (McKay, like Summerfield, was an automobile dealer—prompting Adlai Stevenson to quip that the New Dealers had been replaced by the car dealers); none had served an apprenticeship in party ranks; and few were known to Eisenhower beforehand.14 All were highly successful in their trade or profession, and they came to Washington with their intellectual baggage uncluttered with complexity. Thanks to the intimate friendship between Sidney Weinberg and Lucius Clay, the new secretary of the Treasury reflected the suggestion of Goldman Sachs.e Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

  On November 29, 1952, Eisenhower departed for Korea. He was accompanied by Omar Bradley, Charles Wilson, and Herbert Brownell, and was joined en route by Admiral Arthur Radford, the commander in chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC). Before leaving, Eisenhower was briefed at the Pentagon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They saw only two options in Korea—to continue fighting indefinitely along the present battle line, or to seek a military victory by conventional means, which would involve a significantly greater commitment of American forces with a corresponding increase in casualties. Ike dismissed both options.15

  Eisenhower spent three days in Korea. Once again he was the supreme commander visiting the front, and only incidentally the president-elect.16 The overall commander of the UN forces was Mark Clark, who ten years before had served with Ike in North Africa. James Van Fleet, Eisenhower’s West Point classmate and a division commander in Europe during the war, commanded the U.S. Eighth Army. Ike knew both intimately. He knew their strengths as well as their weaknesses, and there was no question where they fit in the chain of command.

  Ike eating at the field mess of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry in Korea—the same unit he commanded at Fort Lewis in 1940. (illustration credit 20.1)

  Eisenhower visited frontline units and talked to senior commanders and their men. Despite the bitter cold, he wanted to see for himself. Bundled in a heavy pile jacket and GI thermal boots, he surveyed the terrain and watched an artillery duel through binoculars. He met his son John, now a major, who was serving at the front, and ate an outdoor meal from a mess kit with the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry, the unit he had commanded at Fort Lewis in 1939–40. The high point of the trip was a reconnaissance flight along the length of the front—essentially the thirty-eighth parallel—in an artillery spotter plane. Squeezed behind the pilot in the Army’s equivalent of a Piper Cub, Ike thought the terrain below was reminiscent of Tunisia—only worse.17 It was mountainous, rocky, snow covered, and desolate. The North Koreans and Chinese had developed a formidable defensive position supported with a series of tunnels to shield their artillery. “It was obvious that any frontal attack would present great dif
ficulties,” Eisenhower concluded.18

  Ike met briefly with South Korean president Syngman Rhee, who was full of fierce threats to drive the Communists back to the Yalu and unify Korea. Mark Clark shared the view that a renewed UN offensive would be successful. According to Bradley, “Clark and Van Fleet had cooked up a victory plan [Oplan 8-52] that could only be described as ‘MacArthuresque.’ ”19 Clark wanted Eighth Army, reinforced by eight divisions, to advance all along the front. At the same time, he would launch air and sea operations against the Chinese mainland. Clark also sought to use Chiang Kai-shek’s troops from Formosa (which President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had rejected), and proposed that “serious consideration” be given to using atomic weapons.20 Clark kept Ike up until 3 a.m. arguing that victory was possible. When Clark finally ran out of steam, Eisenhower told him to forget it. “I know just how you feel, militarily,” said Ike, “but I have a mandate from the people to stop this fighting. That’s my decision.”21

  A president-elect without Eisenhower’s military experience—Governor Stevenson or Senator Taft, for example—might have been swayed by the determination of the commander on the spot, particularly when his view was enthusiastically reinforced by the local head of state. Eisenhower trusted his own judgment and dismissed what he heard as poppycock. Rhee was a petty despot who would have invaded Japan if given the opportunity, and Clark’s military credentials were underwhelming. Eisenhower had been on the verge of relieving him at Salerno, and Clark’s subsequent conduct of the Italian campaign was at best lackluster. The war must be ended. “At this time—December 1952,” wrote Eisenhower, “it had been tacitly accepted by both sides that we were fighting defensively and would take no risks of turning the conflict into a global war.… My conclusion as I left Korea was that we could not stand forever on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war.” It was time to negotiate a settlement.22

  Eisenhower left Seoul on December 5 headed for Guam, where he boarded the cruiser USS Helena bound for Hawaii. He was accompanied by Wilson and Brownell, while Bradley and Admiral Radford flew ahead to Pearl Harbor. At Wake Island, on the seventh, Ike’s party was joined by Dulles, Humphrey, Clay, and budget director Joseph Dodge. The week at sea provided a shakedown cruise for the principal members of the cabinet, and gave Eisenhower the opportunity to set the broad outlines of policy before assuming office. “By the time we finished that trip,” Humphrey recalled, “we knew each other pretty well and knew pretty well what each of us thought and what each of the others thought about the things we were about to do.”23

  Like FDR’s wartime conferences with his staff aboard the Iowa, Eisenhower was very much in command, and the shape of the administration for the next four years was charted out. The Korean War would be brought to an end; Europe would remain the focus of American foreign policy; containment would be pursued; and foreign aid would continue. To reduce the budget deficit, conventional forces would be drawn down and nuclear-war capabilities enhanced. Domestically, tax cuts would be deferred until the budget was balanced. Price and wage controls would be terminated, but basic New Deal programs such as Social Security and agricultural price supports would continue. Savings would be achieved by managing the government more efficiently.

  Eisenhower’s goals fell far short of what the Republican platform had promised. There would be no victory in Korea, no reduction in foreign aid, no shift in emphasis from Europe to Asia, no immediate tax cut, and no end of the New Deal.24 The changes would be incremental. Eisenhower was a realist, not an ideologue, and his policies would hew to the middle of the road. The difference between the new Republican administration and the Democrats—aside from ending the war in Korea and terminating wage and price controls—would be in more efficient management.f

  When the Helena arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 14, Eisenhower made a brief statement to the press about Korea. “We face an enemy,” he said, “whom we cannot hope to impress by words, however eloquent, but only by deeds—executed under circumstances of our own choosing.”25 Eisenhower was laying down a smoke screen. He made no threat to use atomic weapons, but the implication was clear. Unless the Chinese accepted an armistice in Korea, the new administration would escalate the war.

  Eisenhower returned to 60 Morningside Drive, met with his prospective cabinet twice in early January at the Commodore Hotel, and departed for Washington by rail on January 19, 1953. He was accompanied by Mamie, his son John, and John’s wife, Barbara. Two weeks earlier, President Truman had ordered John back from Korea to attend his father’s inauguration. Truman gave the order directly to the Army’s adjutant general, bypassing the normal chain of command (neither Bradley nor Army chief of staff J. Lawton Collins was informed), and he intended to keep the origin of the order secret as an unexpected surprise for the Eisenhowers. “I always appreciated Mr. Truman’s kind gesture,” John wrote later.26

  Eisenhower messed up badly on inauguration day and allowed personal pettiness to cloud his normal good judgment and common sense. It is customary for the president-elect to call on the president at the White House and ride with him up Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol for the ceremony.g It is also customary for the president-elect to dismount from his vehicle and enter the White House to greet the president. In March 1933, Franklin Roosevelt, because he was unable to walk, had remained in the car, but President Hoover was informed beforehand and graciously came out on the north portico while the presidential party assembled. In 1953, instead of observing what normal courtesy required, Eisenhower deliberately snubbed President Truman. When the presidential limousine arrived at the White House, Ike remained seated and waited for the president to appear. Mrs. Truman had laid out coffee, but Eisenhower refused the invitation. The president of the United States would have to join him for the ride to the Capitol.

  Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson administers the presidential oath to Eisenhower, January 20, 1953. (illustration credit 20.2)

  “It was a shocking moment,” remembered CBS correspondent Eric Sevareid, who was on the portico close by. “Truman was gracious and he had just been snubbed. He showed his superiority by what he did.”27

  It is routinely asserted that Eisenhower snubbed Truman because he was offended by the intensity of the president’s partisanship during the campaign. That cannot be taken seriously. Eisenhower was not a political babe in the woods. For the past ten years he had been dealing with the likes of Churchill, de Gaulle, Stalin, and Roosevelt—to say nothing of Taft, Stevenson, Montgomery, and MacArthur—and he understood the cut and thrust of politics. It is inconceivable that Truman’s partisan criticism would have aroused such animosity. A more plausible explanation is that Eisenhower knew that the White House had threatened to release Marshall’s 1945 letter harshly critical of his plans to divorce Mamie and marry Kay, and he took this personally. He resented having been held hostage by the president. Eisenhower, of course, had been the author of his own misfortune, and his behavior on inauguration day was churlish.

  The Eisenhowers settled into the White House with little difficulty. After Quarters 1 at Fort Myer, 60 Morningside Drive, and the Villa Saint-Pierre, it was simply institutional living on a larger scale. Ike’s personal retainers continued to serve, and Mamie was assisted by a professional White House staff led by veteran chief usher Howell G. Crim and his deputy, J. Bernard West. The Executive Mansion contains 132 rooms and is 1.6 million square feet in area, but the family quarters on the second floor are relatively intimate. The entire structure had been gutted and renovated during the Trumans’ tenure, and the finishes and fixtures were all new. Mamie converted the small bedroom in which Eleanor Roosevelt and Bess Truman slept into a dressing room, and made their considerably larger reception room her bedroom, moving in a king-size bed and her personal furniture from 60 Morningside. Mamie wanted the king-size bed, she said, so that “I can reach over and pat Ike on his old bald head anytime I want to.”28

 
Mamie customarily slept late, and because Eisenhower habitually rose early, he occupied the same presidential bedroom that FDR and Truman had, with an adjoining sitting room. Ike made his morning coffee with an electric percolator (later a small kitchen was added to the family quarters), and ate breakfast alone in his sitting room while reading the morning papers: the New York Herald Tribune, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. He then walked over to the West Wing with Colonel Robert Schulz, his military aide, and was in his office by seven-thirty. Eisenhower normally worked at his desk until one, had a business lunch, and returned briefly to the office. Ordinarily his business day ended between three and four. Unlike Truman and FDR, Eisenhower did not take papers back to the family quarters. “After you spend a certain number of hours at work,” he told J. B. West, “you pass your peak of efficiency. I function best in my office when I can relax in the evenings.”29 Eisenhower had an unused bedroom (facing north) converted into a painting studio, and continued his regular rounds of golf and bridge with the Gang. Most evenings the Eisenhowers ate alone upstairs in the family dining room. Later, when color television came in, they ate from trays set up in front of the TV set. Several nights a week the Eisenhowers watched movies in the White House theater. Ike was often in bed by nine-thirty; Mamie was a night owl and usually stayed up past midnight.30

  “My first day at the president’s desk,” Eisenhower wrote in his diary on January 21, 1953. “Plenty of difficult problems. But such has been my portion for a long time. The result is that this just seems (today) like a continuation of all I’ve been doing since July, 1941—even before that.”31

  Eisenhower was pleasantly surprised at how smoothly the transition had gone. By the third day in office he had recovered his good judgment and wrote President Truman a gracious letter to express his appreciation.