US-China Relations (3rd Ed)

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US-China Relations (3rd Ed) Page 18

by Robert G Sutter


  or “Neo-isolationist” school, it also was in line with realism in IR theory,

  though it stressed different elements than the first school of thought noted

  above. Rather, it contended that the United States had become overextended

  in world affairs and was being taken advantage of in the current world

  security-economic system. It called for sweeping cuts in spending for inter-

  national activities, favoring US pullback from foreign bases and major cuts

  in foreign assistance and foreign technical-information programs. Some in

  this school favored trade measures that were seen as protectionist by US

  trading partners. 17

  A third school of thought seemed to combine elements of liberalism with

  realism and a strong American identity in line with constructivism. It argued

  for policy that would promote more vigorously US interests in international

  political, military, and economic affairs and would use US influence to pres-

  sure countries that do not conform to the US-backed norms on an appropriate

  world order. Supporters of this stance wanted the United States to maintain

  military forces with worldwide capabilities, to lead strongly in world affairs, and to minimize compromise and accommodation in promoting American

  interests and values.

  Those who supported this view perceived a global power vacuum, caused

  mainly by the collapse of the Soviet empire, which allowed the United States

  to exert greater influence. 18 In the immediate post–Cold War years, some advocates of this third view were most vocal in pressing for a strong US

  policy in support of democracy and human rights. They opposed economic or

  trading policies of other countries seen as inequitable or predatory. They

  pressed for a strong policy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-

  tion. Members of this school also argued variously for sanctions against

  countries that practiced coercive birth control, seriously polluted the environment, harbored terrorists, or promoted the drug trade. Proponents of this view

  came from both the left and the right in the American political spectrum. In

  Congress, they included conservative Republican Newt Gingrich and liberal

  Democrat Nancy Pelosi, both of whom would serve as speaker of the US

  House of Representatives.

  As far as US policy toward China was concerned during the 1990s, advo-

  cates of the third group—proponents of active US leadership and internation-

  Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000

  99

  al intervention—were forceful in calling for policies opposing Chinese hu-

  man rights violations, weapons proliferation, and protective trade practices.

  They pressed Beijing to meet US-supported international norms and called

  for retaliatory economic and other sanctions. By contrast, the more cautious

  and accommodating first group believed that the advocates of strong asser-

  tion of US values and norms were unrealistic about US power and were

  unwilling to make needed compromises with the Chinese government in

  order to (1) protect and support US interests and regional stability and (2)

  avoid strategic enmity. 19

  As the decade wore on, it was unclear what approach to China would

  prevail in US policy. Some in the George H. W. Bush and Clinton adminis-

  trations advocated a moderate, less confrontational policy of “engagement”

  with China, for fear that doing otherwise could, among other things, promote

  divisions in—and a possible breakup of—China, with potentially adverse

  consequences for US interests in Asian stability and prosperity. Impressed by

  subsequent growth in Chinese economic and national strength later in the

  decade, many US officials, business interests, and others sought opportu-

  nities in closer economic and other relations with China. They also promoted

  engagement in order to guide China’s power into channels of international

  activity compatible with American interests.

  A tougher approach was supported by US officials and advocates outside

  the US government who stressed that China’s leaders were biding their time

  and conforming to many international norms in order to avoid difficulties as

  China built national strength. Once the Chinese government succeeded with

  economic and related military modernization and development, Beijing was

  expected to become even less inclined to sacrifice nationalistic and territorial ambitions for the sake of cooperation in engagement policies by the United

  States and the West. Given this reasoning, US leaders were urged to be firm

  with China, to rely on military power as a counterweight to rising Chinese

  power, to remain resolute in dealing with economic and security disputes

  with China, and to work closely with US allies and friends along China’s

  periphery in dealing with actual or potential Chinese assertiveness. Senator

  John McCain was identified with this view. 20

  An even tougher US approach to China at the time was advocated by

  some leaders in the Congress along with commentators and interest group

  leaders who believed that China’s political system needed to change before

  the United States could establish a constructive relationship with Beijing.

  China’s Communist leaders were perceived as inherently incapable of partic-

  ipating in truly cooperative relationships with the United States. US policy

  should aim to change China from within while maintaining vigilance against

  disruptive Chinese foreign policy. Prominent congressional leaders such as

  Senator Jesse Helms, Representative Frank Wolf, and Representative Chris-

  topher Smith were associated with these views. 21

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  Nongovernment advocacy groups interested in influencing China policy

  found fertile ground in the often acute debate in the 1990s over the proper

  American approach to China and the broader debate over the appropriate

  course of US foreign policy after the Cold War. The groups endeavored to

  muster recruits, gain financial support, and build coalitions by focusing on

  issues related to China policy. Their concerns focused on issues like human

  rights, trade disputes, weapons proliferation, and other topics. Competing

  coalitions of interest groups fought bitterly, especially during major crises

  such as the decisions of the Bush and Clinton administrations to grant MFN

  tariff treatment to China. 22

  In general, the organized American interest groups active in China policy

  following the end of the Cold War can be divided among those dealing with

  economic interests, specific values or causes, ethnic issues, and issues impor-

  tant to foreign governments and foreign economic interests. Within the eco-

  nomic realm, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of

  Commerce, and the Business Roundtable endeavored to promote such busi-

  ness concerns as foreign trade and investment beneficial to American compa-

  nies. The Emergency Committee for American Trade worked successfully to

  ensure that the United States would continue nondiscriminatory trading rela-

  tions with China. 23

  Often at odds with these pro-business groups were groups representing

  organized labor. They favored more trade restrictions; they often viewed

 
Chinese exports to the United States as a threat to US jobs; and they also

  weighed in on a variety of social justice issues including human rights and

  labor rights and the use of prison labor to produce Chinese exports. 24

  A number of public interest or citizen groups have common concerns of a

  noneconomic or nonoccupational nature. Many of these organizations focus

  on a single issue or a small group of issues. Examples include groups con-

  cerned with independence or greater autonomy for Tibet (e.g., the Interna-

  tional Campaign for Tibet); freedom for political prisoners in China (e.g.,

  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch); religious freedom and

  freedom from coercive birth control and abortions (e.g., the Family Research

  Council, very active in the 1990s); as well as those concerned with curbing

  Chinese practices that endanger the regional and international environment

  or that promote instability and possible conflict through the proliferation of

  weapons of mass destruction and related technology (e.g., the Wisconsin

  Project, prominent in the 1990s in its focus on egregious Chinese failings in

  the area of weapons proliferation). 25

  Ethnic groups have long been a key factor in American foreign policy.

  Although Chinese Americans represent around 1 percent of the US popula-

  tion, they have not become a unified ethnic bloc influencing US foreign

  policy. However, there have been instances when segments of this group

  have been active in the politics of US foreign policy making. Expatriate

  Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000

  101

  Chinese students heavily lobbied Congress and the administration during the

  years immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Their influ-

  ence waned as the students became divided over their goals regarding US

  policy toward China. A much more cohesive ethnic group has been the more

  than half million Americans who trace their family background to Taiwan.

  Taiwanese-Americans have formed a variety of organizations that have ac-

  tively encouraged US foreign policy to respect Taiwan’s separate status and

  autonomy from the mainland. Many of these groups are strong advocates of

  independence for the island. 26

  Foreign governments, foreign businesses, and other elites also work ac-

  tively to influence US foreign policy. Government, business, and other lead-

  ers of Taiwan have been active for many years in pressing their points of

  view on the US government. With the break in official Taiwan relations with

  the US government in 1979, they have focused more effort to lobby the

  Congress. Reports have linked the Taiwan government and other groups

  supportive of Taiwan with sometimes large campaign contributions to US

  political candidates. Taiwan government and nongovernment entities also

  have been prominent in promoting academic, think tank, media, local

  government, and other research and exchanges that enhance goodwill and

  positive feelings between Taiwan and the United States. 27

  The mainland Chinese government, business leaders, and other elites

  were much less active on these fronts, though their efforts to influence US

  foreign policy continue to grow. Media and congressional reports in the

  1990s focused on charges that the Chinese government clandestinely was

  funneling campaign contributions to US candidates. Chinese government and

  business leaders found they were more attractive to and influential with US

  officials and elites as a result of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.

  Against this background, the Chinese government was successful in promot-

  ing regular exchanges with Congress. The Chinese government also worked

  closely with like-minded US business leaders and officials in sustaining vi-

  brant economic interchange with the United States. 28

  Relations during the Bush and Clinton Administrations

  Developments in US-China relations after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989

  and through the 1990s witness repeated cycles of crisis heavily influenced by

  the newly active domestic debate in the United States over American policy

  toward China. The first major turning point came during the George H. W.

  Bush administration with US reaction to Tiananmen and the concurrent end-

  ing of the Cold War and emergence of Taiwan democratization. The second

  turning point came with President Clinton’s advocacy in 1993 and then his

  withdrawal in 1994 of linkage between Chinese human rights practices and

  the granting of nondiscriminatory US trade status to China. A third and more

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  Chapter 5

  serious crisis resulted from Clinton’s decision in 1995 to allow the Taiwan

  president to visit the United States; Chinese military demonstrations in the

  Taiwan area ultimately prompted the deployment of two US aircraft carrier

  battle groups to the area in 1996. In 1999, contentious negotiations over

  China’s entry into the WTO, Chinese mass demonstrations following the US

  bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and a crescendo of congres-

  sional opposition to and criticism of the president and his China policy repre-

  sented a fourth period of crisis since 1989. 29

  What would turn out to be a twisted course of US policy in this decade at

  first saw President George H. W. Bush strive to preserve cooperative ties

  amid widespread American outrage and pressure for retribution and sanc-

  tions against the Chinese leaders. President Bush had served as the head of

  the US Liaison Office in China in the mid-1970s. He took the lead in his own

  administration (1989–93) in dealing with severe problems in US-China rela-

  tions caused by the Tiananmen crackdown and the decline in US strategic

  interest in China as a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. He resorted to secret diplomacy to maintain constructive communication with senior Chinese leaders; while senior administration officials said all high-level official contact with China would be cut off as a result of the Tiananmen crackdown,

  President Bush sent his national security adviser and the deputy secretary of

  state on secret missions to Beijing in July and December 1989. When the

  missions became known in December 1989, the congressional and media

  reactions were bitterly critical of the administration’s perceived duplicity. 30

  Bush eventually became frustrated with the Chinese leadership’s intransi-

  gence and took a tough stance on trade and other issues, though he made

  special efforts to ensure that the United States continued MFN tariff status

  for China despite opposition by a majority of the US Congress, much of the

  American media, and many US interest groups newly focused on China.

  Reflecting more positive US views of Taiwan, the Bush administration up-

  graded US interchange with the ROC by sending a cabinet-level official to

  Taipei in 1992, the first such visit since official relations were ended in 1979.

  He also seemed to abandon the limits on US arms sales set in accord with the

  August 1982 US communiqué with China by agreeing in 1992 to a sale of

  150 advanced F-16 jet fighters, worth more than $5 billion, to Taiwan. The

  president’s motives for the sale were heavily influenced by a need to appear

  to be protecting
US manufacturing jobs at the F-16 plant in Texas, a key state

  in the Bush reelection plan. 31

  Presidential candidate Clinton used sharp attacks against Chinese govern-

  ment behavior, notably the Tiananmen crackdown, and President Bush’s

  moderate approach to China to win support in the 1992 election. The presi-

  dential candidate’s attacks, though probably reflecting sincere anger and con-

  cern over Chinese behavior, also reflected a tendency in the US-China debate

  in the 1990s to use China issues, particularly criticism of China and US

  Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000

  103

  policy toward China, for partisan reasons. The president-elect and US politi-

  cians in following years found that criticizing China and US policy toward

  China provided a convenient means to pursue political ends. For candidate

  Clinton and his aides, using China issues to discredit the record of the Repub-

  lican candidate, incumbent George H. W. Bush, proved an effective way to

  take votes from him. Once Clinton won the election and was in office, he

  showed little interest in China policy, leaving the responsibility to subordi-

  nates. 32

  In particular, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs Winston

  Lord in 1993 played the lead administration role in working with congres-

  sional leaders, notably Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Representa-

  tive Nancy Pelosi, who was a House leader on China and human rights

  issues, and others to establish the human rights conditions the Clinton admin-

  istration would require before renewing MFN tariff status for China. The

  terms he worked out were widely welcomed in the United States at the time.

  However, Chinese government leaders were determined not to give in on

  several of the US demands, and they appeared to calculate that US business

  interests in a burgeoning Chinese economy would be sufficient to prevent the

  United States from taking the drastic step of cutting MFN tariff treatment for

  China and risking the likely retaliation of the PRC against US trade interests.

 

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