US-China Relations (3rd Ed)

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US-China Relations (3rd Ed) Page 23

by Robert G Sutter


  showed that US standing as Asia’s leading power was basically sound.

  American military deployments and cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific

  region were robust. US economic importance in the region was growing, not

  declining. Overall, it was clear that no other power or coalition of powers

  was even remotely able or willing to undertake the costs, risks, and commit-

  ments of the United States in sustaining regional stability and development

  essential for the core interests of the vast majority of regional governments. 21

  Thus, China’s rise—while increasingly important—posed less substantial

  and significant challenge for US interests than many of the published com-

  mentaries and specialists’ assessments might have led one to believe.

  On this basis, the US administration increasingly emphasized positive

  engagement and a growing number of dialogues with China, encouraging

  China to act responsibly and building ever-growing webs of relationships and

  interdependence. This pattern fit well with Chinese priorities regarding na-

  tional development in a period of advantageous international conditions

  while building interdependencies and relationships that constrained possible

  negative US policies or behaviors.

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  Domestic criticism of US policy toward China declined sharply with the

  election of President Bush and Republican majorities in the Congress and the

  American preoccupation with the war on terrorism. As explained below,

  Bush’s initially tougher posture toward China was in line with views of the

  vocal critics of Clinton administration engagement policies, and the president

  benefited from strong Republican leadership and discipline that kept Con-

  gress in line with the president’s foreign policies. American politicians and

  interest groups seeking prominence and support in attacking Chinese policies

  and practices were overwhelmed with the shift in the country’s foreign policy

  emphasis after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Domestic criti-

  cism of the president’s management of an increasingly close engagement

  with China began to revive in 2005 as the war on terrorism wore on and the

  conflict in Iraq reflected major setbacks for the Bush administration. Eco-

  nomic and trade issues dominated the China policy debate. At the same time,

  congressional, media, and interest groups revived criticism of China on a

  variety of other issues involving, notably, human rights, international energy

  competition, and foreign relations with perceived rogue regimes.

  Democrats led by long-standing critics of China won majority control of

  both houses of Congress in the November 2006 elections. Democratic Party

  candidates for the 2008 presidential election generally were critical of the

  Bush administration’s free-trade policies, which saw the US annual trade

  deficit with China rise to more than $250 billion and coincided with the loss

  of good-paying manufacturing jobs in the United States. They also tended to

  take a tougher line than the US administration on human rights, Tibet, and

  other issues in US-China relations. In the face of American criticism of

  China and of US government moderation toward China, the Bush administra-

  tion, some in Congress, and some US interest groups emphasized pursuit of

  constructive engagement and senior-level dialogues as means to encourage

  China to behave according to US-accepted norms as a “responsible stake-

  holder” in the prevailing international order and thereby show that the posi-

  tives in US-China relations outweighed the negatives. 22

  Viewed from the perspective of international relations theories, the pat-

  terns of US administration and Chinese government approaches to one an-

  other during this period seem well explained through cost-benefit analyses

  associated with realism. The differences in interests and values remained, as

  did the very different identities of the two societies, but pragmatic leaders on both sides viewed carefully the power realities that they were attempting to

  change to their advantage. They weighed costs and benefits of emphasizing

  various differences and, on the whole, saw the benefit in pursuing paths of

  convergence of mutual interest.

  Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration

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  PRIORITIES AND ISSUES IN US POLICY TOWARD CHINA

  As seen in chapter 5, the US debates over policy toward China after the Cold

  War generally had more to do with developments in the United States, espe-

  cially changes in US perceptions of Chinese government policies and behavior, than with changes in those Chinese policies and behavior. From one

  perspective, the Chinese authorities generally were following broadly similar

  policies in the post-Mao (d. 1976) period designed to build national wealth

  and power, maintain territorial integrity and achieve unification with Taiwan,

  enhance the leadership of the authoritarian Communist Party, and improve

  the economic livelihood and social opportunities for the Chinese people.

  Their challenge to US-supported norms regarding such subjects as human

  rights, weapons proliferation, environmental protection, the use of force to

  settle territorial disputes, and other sensitive issues continued to wax and

  wane over the years. They often posed serious problems for the United States

  and US interests, but on balance they became less serious at the outset of the

  twenty-first century than they were in the Mao period or even during much of

  the rule of Deng Xiaoping. 23

  However, the shock of the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the end of the

  Cold War fundamentally changed the way the United States dealt with Chi-

  na. A pattern prevailing into the twenty-first century saw the US administra-

  tion generally continue to seek closer ties, including frequent high-level leadership meetings and various senior official dialogues, in order to develop

  areas of common ground while managing differences. The US administration

  and the Chinese government typically highlighted the many positive results

  from US-China cooperation and dialogue. These included cooperation in

  facilitating mutually advantageous trade and investment relations, coopera-

  tion in managing such regional crises and threats as the Asian economic

  crisis of 1997–98, the crises in 1994 and later (beginning again in 2002) over

  North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the 1998 crisis prompted by nucle-

  ar weapons tests by India and Pakistan, the global war on terrorism beginning

  in 2001, and the global economic crisis beginning in 2008. Under the rubric

  of engagement or cooperation, the US administration officials and their Chi-

  nese counterparts presided over an ever-increasing economic interdepen-

  dence between the United States and China, supplemented by growing cul-

  tural and political contacts and developing military contacts.

  In contrast, a variety of US groups were in the lead among US critics who

  applied pressure in the Congress, the media, and in other public discourse to

  encourage a firmer US policy designed to press the Chinese government to

  conform more to US-backed norms. As discussed in chapter 5, some of these

  groups and advocates had var
ied motives that related less to China and its

  government’s behavior and more to partisan or other ulterior benefits these

  groups and advocates derived from taking a tough stand against Chinese

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  practices. The influence of the critics was sometimes evident in debates

  within US administrations. It was reflected more clearly in the varying inten-

  sity and scope of congressional debate and criticism of administration China

  policy that generally emphasized positive engagement in the post–Cold War

  period. On the whole, such criticism and the negative impact it had on devel-

  oping US-China relations was seen to decline along with the overall influ-

  ence of Congress in determining American foreign policy in the twenty-first

  century. In particular, in the 107th Congress (2001–2), which coincided with

  the start of the George W. Bush administration, there was a marked decline

  in the scope and intensity of domestic American debate over China policy

  compared to those seen in the 1990s. There were several reasons for the

  decline. First, the early actions of the Bush government supported firmer

  policies toward China that were backed by many in Congress regarding

  Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, and security concerns. These actions helped

  calm the strong congressional debate over China policy that prevailed in the

  previous Congress. Second, partisan attacks on the US administration’s en-

  gagement policy toward China also diminished as the Bush White House and

  the Congress both were controlled by a Republican Party leadership intent on

  showing unity and party discipline on China policy and other sensitive is-

  sues. 24 Third, US preoccupation with the war on terrorism, including the USled military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, made it more difficult for US

  interest groups and other activists to gain the public and private attention in Congress and elsewhere that they seemed to need in order to pressure for

  changes in US policies toward China.

  Congress and China Policy

  To help grasp the scope and depth of the US domestic debate over China

  policy during the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is instructive to review the issues that were raised in debates, notably in the US Congress.

  Because of its receptivity to US domestic political movements and constitu-

  ent pressures, Congress has remained a focal point for those US individuals

  and groups critical of China’s policies and practices, who pressed for change

  in US policy toward China. The record of the post–Cold War debate in

  Congress over China policy is long and wide-ranging. It deals with clusters

  of sensitive issues involving human rights and democratic political values,

  security issues, economic questions, and sovereignty issues, especially re-

  garding Taiwan and Tibet. Highlights of the issues considered in congres-

  sional debate and actions at the outset of the twenty-first century are noted

  below. They provide evidence of the broad range of American interests that

  were trying to influence policy toward China and the directions these inter-

  ests wanted China policy to follow. In general terms, the pattern shows these

  groups often opposed improvements or other forward movement in US-Chi-

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  na relations until the Chinese government changed its policies and practices

  more in accord with US-supported norms. The groups sometimes favored

  sanctions or other pressures to force the Chinese government to change,

  although US business interests and others with a strong economic stake in

  China often were successful in seeking to sustain constructive trade relations

  without such pressures.

  After the intense US domestic debates over China policy in the 1990s, the

  overall impact of the groups and the actions of Congress served in the first

  decade of the twenty-first century more as a drag on forward movement in

  US-China relations than an impetus for tougher US policy toward China.

  There was little support for serious retrogression in key areas of US-China

  relations. And, as in the case of the 1990s, there was almost no support for a

  US policy that would lead to military confrontation or strategic containment

  of China. 25

  A high point of revived congressional pressure on the administration’s

  China policy came with the inauguration of the Democratic Party–controlled

  110th Congress in 2007; Democratic leadership continued with stronger ma-

  jorities in control of the 111th Congress beginning in 2009, though the parti-

  san incentive of the Democratic-led Congress to differ with the president,

  now Democratic leader Barack Obama, declined. Overall, while some during

  these years forecast major challenges to existing US China policy from do-

  mestic US critics in the Congress and those working through the Congress,

  the outcome was more in line with predictions of a much more mixed out-

  look with pressures for a tougher US China policy offset by important

  countervailing factors. 26

  Congress dealt with each of the policy priorities and issues noted below in

  a variety of ways, through press releases and statements reacting to US media

  stories highlighting negative Chinese practices, legislation, hearings, so-

  called dear colleague letters, formal letters to the administration, speeches in and out of Congress, and other means. 27

  Human Rights Issues

  China’s human rights abuses remained among the most visible and persistent

  points of contention in US-China relations in the post–Cold War period.

  China’s human rights record presented a mixed picture, with both setbacks

  and minor improvements providing plenty of ammunition for US policy

  debate in the Congress and elsewhere. Among the more positive develop-

  ments in China’s human rights record, the Chinese government signed two

  key human rights agreements: the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and

  Cultural Rights (October 27, 1997) and the International Covenant on Civil

  and Political Rights (March 12, 1998). The government also was allowing

  local, competitive elections in rural areas in China, and it implemented legis-

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  Chapter 6

  lation to make political and judicial processes more transparent and to hold

  law enforcement officials more accountable for their actions.

  Crackdowns against Dissidents and the Falun Gong Group

  In 1999,

  American news accounts began to give wide coverage to reports that the

  Chinese government was arresting prominent activists and giving out harsh

  jail sentences for what most Americans considered to be routine and benign

  civil acts. On July 22, 1999, the government outlawed Falun Gong, a spiritu-

  al movement with an impressive nationwide organization in China, said to

  combine Buddhist and Taoist meditation practices with a series of exercises.

  The government arrested Falun Gong leaders, imposed harsh prison sen-

  tences, closed Falun Gong facilities, and confiscated Falun Gong literature.

  At that time, the Chinese government also cracked down on democracy

  activists trying to register a new independent political party, the Chinese

  Democracy Party. Promoters
of the new party were convicted on subversion

  charges and given long prison sentences. 28

  Tibet and Xinjiang

  Chinese officials also harshly suppressed dissents

  among ethnic minorities, particularly in Tibet and in the Xinjiang-Uighur

  Autonomous Region, in China’s far west. In April 1999, Amnesty Interna-

  tional issued a report accusing the Chinese government of gross violations of

  human rights in Xinjiang, including widespread use of torture to extract

  confessions, lengthy prison sentences, and numerous executions. Harsh Chi-

  nese suppression continued as the global war on terrorism saw the Chinese

  government brand dissidents in Xinjiang as terrorists with some links to al

  Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations. Although US adminis-

  tration officials warned, after September 11, 2001, that the global antiterror

  campaign should not be used to persecute Uighurs or other minorities with

  political grievances against Beijing, some believe that the US government

  made a concession to the PRC on August 26, 2002, when it announced that it

  was placing one small group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, on the

  US list of terrorist groups. 29

  A significant episode of anti-China activism and rhetoric in Congress

  accompanied public protests in the United States and harsh American and

  other Western media criticism of China’s crackdown of dissent and violence

  in Tibet in 2008. Congressional leaders called for a boycott of the summer

  2008 Olympic Games, but President Bush announced firmly that he would

  attend the games.

  Chinese Prisons/Prison Labor

  Prisons in China were widely criticized

  for their conditions, treatment of prisoners, and requirements that prisoners

  perform productive work. From the standpoint of US policy, one issue was

  the extent to which products made by Chinese prisoners were exported to the

  US market, a violation of US law. Meanwhile, periodic reports of Chinese

  security forces taking organs from executed prisoners and selling them on the

  Pragmatism amid Differences during the G. W. Bush Administration

 

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