US-China Relations (3rd Ed)

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US-China Relations (3rd Ed) Page 47

by Robert G Sutter


  ative trends in US-China relations, there remain optimists among American

  officials, specialists, journalists, and others with an interest in human rights in China. They tend to argue that US policies and practices of political and

  economic engagement with China that seek cooperation and avoid confronta-

  tion are helping foster trends in China that create conditions in which

  progress in democracy and other aspects of human rights has been and will

  continue to be made. Pessimists among these groups of Americans point out

  that US policies of engagement and avoidance of confrontation have appar-

  ently failed to produce political transformation of China’s continued authori-

  tarian political system and have not even worked effectively in setting in

  motion meaningful political change. The pessimists aver that efforts to pro-

  mote democracy and better human rights conditions through quiet diplomacy

  and dialogues have been ineffectual; some argue for a much tougher US

  public stance regarding human rights issues with China. 70

  The George W. Bush administration from time to time, and congressional

  leaders more frequently, pressured China though public criticism of human

  rights conditions and calls on Chinese leaders to honor the rights guaranteed

  under its own constitution, bring its policies and practices into line with

  international standards, release prisoners of conscience, and undertake major

  political reforms. President Bush appealed personally to President Hu Jintao

  to allow more religious freedom; the president met in the White House with

  Chinese independent Christian leaders, the Dalai Lama, and prominent Chi-

  nese political dissidents. The Democratic-led 110th Congress (2007–8) spon-

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  sored around twenty resolutions aimed at promoting improved human rights

  conditions in China. The US government also provided funding for programs

  within China that helped strengthen the rule of law, civil society, government

  accountability, and labor rights. In addition, Washington supported US-based

  NGOs and Internet companies that monitored human rights conditions in

  China and helped enable Chinese Internet users to access Voice of America,

  Radio Free Asia, and other websites that are frequently blocked by the Chi-

  nese government. 71

  The Obama administration and the congressional leaders generally pursed

  the above courses of action. In public interactions with Chinese leaders,

  human rights issues received secondary priority. President Obama went to

  extraordinary efforts to avoid offending China by not meeting the Dalai

  Lama when he visited Washington in October 2009, a few weeks before the

  president’s first visit to China. Obama did meet the Tibetan leader in Wash-

  ington several weeks after he returned home from Beijing. Despite their

  actions in China in the 1990s showing strong opposition to Chinese human

  rights practices, both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and House of Repre-

  sentatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi adopted a generally low profile on human

  rights issues during their official visits to China. 72

  The Chinese government has cooperated with the United States on some

  programs promoting the rule of law, civil society, village elections, and other programs dealing with aspects of human rights seen as beneficial for China’s

  development; Chinese officials engage in human rights dialogues with the

  United States and other governments. The Chinese authorities remain sensi-

  tive to perceived US or other foreign interference in Chinese internal affairs

  affecting the continuation of authoritarian one-party rule in China. Beijing

  takes or threatens strong action against perceived infringements on sensitive

  issues. Chinese officials have been especially sensitive regarding Tibetan

  matters and issues involving Uighur dissent in Xinjiang in recent years.

  Chinese statements affirm China’s commitment to a number of broad princi-

  ples and practices governing international human rights. They sometimes

  offer negative commentaries regarding the human rights practices of the

  United States and other countries that tend to be critical of Chinese human

  rights policies and practices. 73

  Some activists argue that the United States should take principled stands

  against China’s human rights abuses more openly, forcefully, and frequently.

  Many prominent Chinese dissidents have emphasized that international pres-

  sure and attention has protected them from harsher treatment by PRC author-

  ities. Other experts believe that more overt efforts may undermine human

  rights objectives. Some observers contend that US open criticism of PRC

  human rights policies can strengthen hard-liners in the PRC leadership or

  create greater suspicion of foreign influences and ties.

  Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations

  263

  Against that background, US experts and policy makers have disagreed

  over the best methods to apply toward promoting democracy and human

  rights in China. Congress and successive administrations often have em-

  ployed a range of means simultaneously. Policy tools include open criticism

  of PRC human rights policies and practices, quiet diplomacy, hearings,

  foreign assistance programs, support for dissident and pro-democracy groups

  in China and the United States, sanctions, coordination of international pres-

  sure, bilateral dialogue, Internet freedom efforts, and public diplomacy.

  Some experts recommend a “whole-of-government” strategy whereby hu-

  man rights policies are coordinated across US government departments,

  agencies, and delegations to China. 74

  Offering a comprehensive approach for American policy options in this

  issue area, the Asia Society Task Force on US-China Relations reported in

  2017 an overall negative assessment of recent trends in US-China relations

  that gave special attention to human rights. Its recommendations were in line

  with the group’s emphasis on US insistence on reciprocity with China in all

  areas of the relationship.

  Following are its recommendations on human rights:75

  • Seek Chinese agreement to allow US counterparts to China’s Confucius

  Institutes, such as government-funded American Corners or privately

  funded Jefferson Institutes or Lincoln Centers, to operate in China.

  • Increase support for US government–funded media and research outlets—

  such as the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the National Endow-

  ment for Democracy—and support the development of technology that

  would enable more Chinese citizens to circumvent the Great Firewall

  blocking their access to the global Internet.

  • Open high-level bilateral government discussions seeking similar access

  for US media outlets to operate, publish, and broadcast in Chinese markets

  that their Chinese counterparts enjoy in US markets.

  • Seek a negotiated end to the harassment, delays, cancellations, and out-

  right denials of visas for US journalists, academics, and NGO representa-

  tives who end up on political “blacklists.”

  • Urge university and NGO boards to review their programs and campuses

  in China to make sure they meet their ow
n campuses’ principles for aca-

  demic freedom.

  • Pay more attention to the UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva by

  fielding a larger and more active US delegation that should continue to

  urge China to end its practice of repatriating North Korean refugees in

  violation of international law.

  • Change the ground rules of the bilateral human rights dialogues to in-

  crease the role of independent NGOs, and focus agendas of meetings more

  sharply to make them more substantive and productive.

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  • Make the so-called People-to-People track in the Strategic and Economic

  Dialogue more substantive.

  • Work with civil society organizations, including universities, think tanks,

  and cultural-exchange organizations, to formulate a code of conduct for

  interacting with China, especially when Chinese authorities attempt to

  dictate what can be discussed or who can participate.

  • Urge talks between Chinese leaders and the Dalai Lama concerning Tibet-

  an religious and cultural freedoms while continuing to recognize Chinese

  sovereignty over Tibet, and urge President Trump to meet with the Dalai

  Lama in his capacity as a spiritual leader, just as other US presidents have

  done in the past.

  • Collaborate with other like-minded democratic countries to coordinate

  common responses to human rights violations.

  Chapter Twelve

  Outlook

  The twists and turns in US-China relations assessed in this book argue for

  caution in predicting the future direction of the relationship. Powerful ele-

  ments of convergence and divergence have long characterized US-China

  relations. In the modern period, since the opening of official relations seen in President Richard Nixon’s summit with Mao Zedong in 1972, the changing

  mix of areas of close cooperation with enduring differences has seen rela-

  tions shift in positive or negative directions.

  This volume has depicted tenets of realism in international relations (IR)

  theory as useful in understanding these shifts from negative to positive and

  vice versa, especially since the Cold War. The kinds of cost-benefit analysis

  seen in realism seem evident in decision making in Beijing and Washington

  during key episodes—notably, the breakthrough under Nixon and Mao in the

  1970s, Deng Xiaoping’s pullback from pressing the Ronald Reagan adminis-

  tration in the 1980s, the mutual accommodation in line with China’s avowed

  “peaceful rise” during the George W. Bush administration, and the Chinese

  government’s greater international assertiveness at US expense in the past

  decade.

  Liberalism in IR theory has been employed to explain promoting cooper-

  ation through increased engagement—notably, economic interchange. Liber-

  alism also has been used to explain the strong US disapproval of the Tianan-

  men crackdown of 1989 as Chinese leaders reversed nascent politically liber-

  al trends in the period of reform. US disappointment also was registered to

  some degree recently in the face of the Xi Jinping government’s tightening of

  control over Chinese civil society.

  Constructivism in IR theory has been used to explain the positive signifi-

  cance of mutual learning by participants on both sides as they discerned and

  acted upon areas of common ground and mutual interest. At the same time,

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  constructivism has also explained the distinct and often strongly divergent

  identities of China and the United States that seriously impede improving

  relations, especially in sensitive policy areas involving ideology, sovereign-

  ty, and security.

  Looking ahead in 2017, the changeable mix of positive and negative

  elements in US-China relations now features two assertive and dynamic

  presidents who avow a close and cooperative relationship, at least for the

  present. As reviewed in chapter 7, the Donald Trump government’s seeming-

  ly high expectations regarding China’s role in halting North Korea’s nuclear

  weapons amid warnings of confrontation and unspecified US military action

  against Pyongyang will be disappointed unless China reverses past policy

  calculations and is prepared to apply a lot more pressure and risk major

  tensions with its recalcitrant neighbor. Whether President Trump’s positive

  rhetoric about the Chinese president is contingent on the US leader getting

  what he wants from China on North Korea remains to be seen. Meanwhile, as

  explained in chapter 7, the US administration’s defense plans seem at odds

  with China’s interests and its economic policy is conflicted on how to deal

  with various trade and investment issues.

  In the pursuit of his top priority of Chinese rejuvenation in accord with

  what Beijing calls the “China Dream,” Chinese President Xi Jinping has

  overseen substantial advances in Chinese control in the disputed South China

  Sea at America’s expense. As explained in chapter 7, Xi also has challenged

  US economic leadership through massive Chinese economic initiatives high-

  lighted by various silk road investment and infrastructure plans. By collabo-

  rating more closely with Russian President Vladimir Putin on a variety of

  issues challenging the United States, the Chinese president underscores rival-

  ry with America. Under his rule, Chinese trade and investment practices

  disadvantaging American interests persist as does the massive Chinese mili-

  tary buildup focused on the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific

  region. The Chinese security forces confront and try to intimidate Taiwan

  and US ally Japan. The Chinese government’s negative turn against US and

  other Western interests in China, the nongovernment organizations (NGOs)

  they support, and gross violations of US-backed human rights at home and

  abroad have negatively affected American attitudes toward China.

  Such differences offset the many positive mutual benefits in the Sino-

  American relationship and have moved recent ties in a negative direction. As

  shown in chapter 6, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, such

  important differences were held in check by pragmatism of leaders on both

  sides who recognized the benefits of positive engagement, the perceived

  costs of friction given the increasingly interdependent US-China relation-

  ship, and preoccupations by leaders of both countries with other important

  problems. Unfortunately, the Xi Jinping government calculated that it could

  be more bold and assertive in pursuing various challenges to American inter-

  Outlook

  267

  ests without upsetting the overall US-China relationship in ways disadvanta-

  geous to China. As explained in chapter 7, in retrospect, that calculation

  seemed broadly correct as the Barack Obama government continued to give

  priority to maintaining stable and positive relations with China despite the

  challenges to American interests coming from the Xi government’s often

  bold initiatives.

  For the time being in 2017, the Xi government has not followed the path

  it used with President Obama and thus far has avoided challenges likely to

&
nbsp; prompt sharp reactions from the more unpredictable Trump government. In

  addition to concern about President Trump’s possible responses to Chinese

  assertiveness, another reason that the current Chinese government may be

  following a less assertive posture is China’s stated assessment that interna-

  tional trends are moving in its favor, notably in the all-important Asia-Pacific region, 1 especially as the Trump government’s policies and practices in the region seem fragmented and less than effective.

  TRUMP ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

  The Trump government’s preoccupation with North Korea and China rein-

  forced a prevailing drift in American policy in Southeast Asia and much of

  the rest of the region. Trump and his officials have announced the end of the

  Obama government’s “pivot to Asia” policy and repudiated its economic

  centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). 2

  The Obama administration attached high priority to Southeast Asia,

  which has traditionally been second in American attention to Northeast Asia.

  In contrast, Southeast Asia was rarely mentioned in the long 2015–16 US

  presidential campaign. Trump’s only references to the region were occasion-

  al criticisms of China’s island-building in the South China Sea. 3

  As of mid-2017, President Trump’s policy in Southeast Asia, South Asia,

  and Central Asia at best reflected belated and episodic attention based on a

  poorly staffed administration with no coherent strategic view. In contrast

  with a sharp focus on North Korea, China, and Northeast Asia, only very

  recently did administration officials begin to take steps to show interest in

  positive engagement with other parts of the Asia-Pacific. 4

  On security, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Vice President Mi-

  chael Pence were leading administration officials in persuading the president

  to play down his campaign rhetoric on Japan and South Korea—namely, that

  American alliance commitments to these allies were dependent on their pay-

  ments to the United States. US military presence in these countries is viewed

  as a stabilizing influence by US partners in Southeast Asia and the Asia-

  Pacific.

 

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