by Edgar Snow
First of all, the Reds argued that, after Nanking split the living forces of the revolution, China rapidly lost much ground. Compromise followed compromise. The failure to realize agrarian reforms resulted in widespread discontent and open rebellion from the rural population in many parts of the country. General conditions of poverty and distress among the rural populace seriously worsened. China now had some passable motor roads, an excellent fleet of airplanes, and a New Life movement,* but reports came in daily of catastrophes which in China were considered more or less routine. Even as I was writing this chapter, for example, the press brought this appalling news from Central and West China:
“Famine conditions continue to be reported in Honan, Anhui, Shensi, Kansu, Szechuan, and Kweichow. Quite evidently the country faces one of the most severe famines of many years, and thousands have already died. A recent survey by the Szechuan Famine Relief Commission discovered that 30,000,000 people are now in the famine belt of that province, where bark and ‘Goddess-of-Mercy’ earth † are being consumed by tens of thousands. There are said to be over 400,000 famine refugees in Shensi, over 1,000,000 in Kansu, some 7,000,000 in Honan, and 3,000,000 in Kweichow. The famine in Kweichow is admitted by the official Central News to be the most serious in 100 years, affecting sixty districts of the province.”1
Szechuan was one of the provinces where taxes had been collected sixty years or more in advance, and thousands of acres of land had been abandoned by farmers unable to pay rents and outrageous loan interest. In my files were items, collected over a period of six years, showing comparable distress in many other provinces. There were few signs that the rate of frequency of these calamities was diminishing.
While the mass of the rural population was rapidly going bankrupt, concentration of land and wealth in the hands of a small number of landlords and land-owning usurers increased in proportion to the general decline of independent farming.* Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was reported to have said that there was no middle class in China, but only the incredibly poor and the very rich. Enormous taxes, the share-crop method, and the whole historical system of social, political, and economic relationships described by Dr. Karl August Wittfogel as the “Asiatic mode of production,” contrived to leave the landless peasantry constantly heavily in debt, without reserves, and unable to meet such crises as draught, famine, and flood.
Mao Tse-tung, when a secretary of the Kuomintang’s Committee on the Peasant Movement in 1926 (and a candidate to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang),† supervised the collection of land statistics for areas in twenty-one provinces. He asserted that this investigation indicated that resident landlords, rich peasants, officials, absentee landlords, and usurers, about 10 per cent of the whole rural population, together owned over 70 per cent of the cultivable land in China. About 15 per cent was owned by middle peasants. But over 65 per cent of the rural population, made up of poor peasants, tenants, and farm workers, owned only from 10 to 15 per cent of the total arable land.2
“These statistics were suppressed after the counterrevolution,” according to Mao. “Now, ten years later, it is still impossible to get any statement from Nanking on land distribution in China.”
The Communists alleged that rural bankruptcy had been accelerated by the Kuomintang’s policy of “nonresistance to imperialism”—in particular, Japanese imperialism. As a result of Nanking’s “no-war policy” against Japan, China had lost to Japanese invaders about a fifth of her national territory, over 40 per cent of her railway mileage, 85 per cent of her unsettled lands, a large part of her coal, 80 per cent of her iron deposits, 37 per cent of her finest forest lands, and about 40 per cent of her national export trade. Japan now controlled over 75 per cent of the total pig iron and iron-mining enterprises of what remained of China, and over half of the textile industry of China. The conquest of Manchuria also robbed China of its own best market as well as its most accessible raw materials. In 1931, Manchuria took more than 27 per cent of its total imports from other Chinese provinces, but in 1935 China could sell Man-chukuo only 4 per cent of those imports. It presented Japan with the region of China best suited for industrial development—and enabled her to prevent that development and shuttle the raw materials to her own industries. It gave to Japan the continental base from which she could inexorably continue her aggression in China. Such changes, many felt, completely wiped out the benefits of any reforms that Nanking might be able to claim to its credit for generations in the future—even provided the rest of China remained intact.
And what was achieved by Nanking’s nine years of war against the Reds? The Northwest junta had recently summarized the results in a manifesto opposing preparations for the sixth anti-Red “final annihilation” drive.* It reminded us that Manchuria had gone to Japan during one “final-annihilation” drive, Shanghai had been invaded during another, Jehol had been given up during the third, East Hopei lost during still another, and the sovereignty of Hopei and Chahar provinces had been badly impaired during the fifth “remnant-bandit extermination.”
Of course Nanking could not stop civil war as long as the Reds continued to attempt to overthrow the government by force. In April, 1932, when the Chinese Soviet Republic declared war against Japan, it had offered to combine with anti-Japanese elements. Again in January, 1933, it had proposed to unite with “any armed force” in a “united front from below.” There was no real offer, however, to compromise with Chiang Kai-shek.3 By mid-1936 the Communists (and the Comintern) had radically changed their position. In a search for broad national unity, they included the Kuomintang and even Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communist Party now promised to unite its Red Army and the soviet districts under the sovereignty of the Kuomintang Central Government, provided that the latter would agree to “establish democratic representative government, resist Japan, enfranchise the people, and guarantee civil liberties to the masses.”† In other words, the Reds were ready to “remarry” the Kuomintang if it would return to the “bourgeois-nationalist” program of anti-imperialism and antifeudalism. But of these two basic aims they realized that the fight for national survival was paramount, and must be conducted even at the expense of modifying the internal struggle over the land question; that class antagonisms might have to be sublimated in, certainly could not be satisfied without, the successful solution of the external struggle against Japan.
To quote Mao in his interview with me:
“The fundamental issue before the Chinese people today is the struggle against Japanese imperialism. Our soviet policy is decisively conditioned by this struggle. Japan’s warlords hope to subjugate the whole of China and make of the Chinese people their colonial slaves. The fight against the Japanese invasion, the fight against Japanese economic and military conquest—these are the main tasks that must be remembered in analyzing soviet policies.
“Japanese imperialism is not only the enemy of China but also of all people of the world who desire peace. Especially it is the enemy of those peoples with interests on the Pacific Ocean, namely, the American, British, French, and Soviet Russian nations. The Japanese continental policy, as well as naval policy, is directed not only against China but also against those countries. …
“What do we expect from the foreign powers? We expect at least that friendly nations will not help Japanese imperialism, and will adopt a neutral position. We hope that they will actively help China to resist invasion and conquest.”
In using the word “imperialism,” the Communists sharply distinguished between Japan and friendly and nonaggressive democratic capitalist powers. Mao Tse-tung explained:
“Concerning the question of imperialism in general we observe that among the great powers some express unwillingness to engage in a new world war, some are not ready to see Japan occupy China: countries such as America, Great Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium. Then there are countries permanently under the menace of the aggressive powers, such as Siam, the Philippines, Central American countries, Canada, India, Australia, the Dutch
Indies, etc.—all more or less under the direct threat of Japan. We consider them our friends and invite their cooperation. …
“So, except for Japan and those countries which help Japanese imperialism, the categories mentioned above can be organized into antiwar, antiaggression, anti-Fascist world alliances. … In the past, Nanking has received much help from America, England, and other countries. Most of these funds and supplies have been used in civil war. For every Red soldier killed, Nanking has slain many peasants and workers. According to a recent article by the banker Chang Nai-ch’i it has cost the Chinese people about $80,000 for every Red soldier killed by Nanking.* Such ‘help’ therefore does not seem to us to have been rendered to the Chinese people.
“Only when Nanking determines to cease civil war and to fight against Japanese imperialism, and unites with the people’s revolution to organize a democratic national defense government—only then can such help be of real benefit to the Chinese nation.”
I asked Mao whether the soviets were in favor of canceling unequaltreaties. He pointed out that many of these unequal treaties had, in effect, already been destroyed by the Japanese, especially in the case of Manchuria. But as for the future attitude of a representative government in China, he declared:
“Those powers that help or do not oppose China in her war of independence and liberation should be invited to enjoy close friendly relations with China. Those powers which actively assist Japan should naturally not be given the same treatment: for example, Germany and Italy, which have already established special relations with Manchukuo, and cannot be regarded as powers friendly to the Chinese people.
“With friendly powers, China will peacefully negotiate treaties of mutual advantage. With other powers China is prepared to maintain cooperation on a much broader scale. … So far as Japan is concerned, China must by the act of war of liberation cancel all unequal treaties, confiscate all Japanese imperialist holdings, and annul Japan’s special privileges, concessions, and influence in this country. Concerning our relations with other powers, we Communists do not advocate any measure that may place at disadvantage the world position of China in her struggle against Japanese imperialism.
“When China really wins her independence, then legitimate foreign trading interests will enjoy more opportunities than ever before. The power of production and consumption of 450,000,000 people is not a matter that can remain the exclusive interest of the Chinese, but one that must engage the many nations. Our millions of people, once really emancipated, with their great latent productive possibilities freed for creative activity in every field, can help improve the economy as well as raise the cultural level of the whole world. But the productive power of the Chinese people has in the past scarcely been touched; on the contrary, it has been suppressed—both by native militarists and Japanese imperialism.”
Finally I asked, “Is it possible for China to make anti-imperialist alliances with democratic capitalist powers?”
“Anti-imperialist, anti-Fascist alliances,” replied Mao, “are in the nature of peace alliances, and for mutual defense against war-making nations. A Chinese anti-Fascist pact with capitalist democracies is perfectly possible and desirable. It is to the interest of such countries to join the anti-Fascist front in self-defens. …
“If China should become completely colonized it would mean the beginning of a long series of terrible and senseless wars. A choice must be made. For itself, the Chinese people will take the road of struggle against its oppressors, and we hope also that the statesmen and people of foreign nations will march with us on this road, and not follow the dark paths laid down by the bloody history of imperialism. …
“To oppose Japan successfully, China must also seek assistance from other powers. This does not mean, however, that China is incapable of fighting Japan without foreign help! The Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and the Chinese people are ready to unite with any power to shorten the duration of this war. But if none join us we are determined to carry on alone.”
Did the Reds really imagine that China could defeat Japan’s mighty war machine? I believed that they did. What was the peculiar shape of logic on which they based their assumption of triumph? It was one of dozens of questions I put to Mao Tse-tung.
3
On War with Japan1
On July 16, 1936, I sat on a square, backless stool inside Mao Tse-tung’s residence. It was after nine at night, “Taps” had been sounded and nearly all lights were out. The walls and ceiling of Mao’s home were of solid rock; beneath was a flooring of bricks. Cotton gauze extended halfway up windows also hollowed from stone, and candles sputtered on the square, unpainted table before us, spread with a clean red-felt cloth. Mrs. Mao was in an adjoining room making compote from wild peaches purchased that day from a fruit merchant. Mao sat with his legs crossed, in a deep shelf hewn from the solid rock, and smoked a Chien Men cigarette.
Seated next to me was Wu Liang-p’ing,* a young soviet “functionary” who acted as interpreter in my “formal” interviews with Mao Tse-tung. I wrote down in full in English Mao Tse-tung’s answers to my questions, and these were then translated into Chinese and corrected by Mao, who is noted for his insistence upon accuracy of detail. With the assistance of Mr. Wu, the interviews were retranslated into English, and because of such precautions I believe these pages to contain few errors of reporting. They were, of course, the strictly partisan views of the leader of the Chinese Communists—views being made known to the Western world for the first time.
Wu Liang-p’ing, to whom I am indebted for much assistance in gathering material, was the son of a rich landlord in Fenghua, Chiang Kai-shek’s native district in Chekiang. He had fled from there some years ago when his father, apparently an ambitious burgher, wished to betroth him to a relative of the Generalissimo. Wu was a graduate of Ta Hsia University, in Shanghai. There Patrick Givens, chief of the Criminal Investigation Department of the British-controlled police of the International Settlement, had arrested Wu Liang-p’ing. Charged with Communist activity, Wu spent two years in the Settlement’s Ward Road Jail. He had studied in France, England, and Russia, was twenty-six years old, and for his energetic labors as a Communist received his uniform, room, and food—the latter consisting chiefly of millet and noodles.
Mao began to answer my first question, about Communist policy toward Japan, which was this: “If Japan is defeated and driven from China, do you think that the major problem of ‘foreign imperialism’ will in general have been solved here?”
“Yes. If other imperialist countries do not act like Japan, and if China defeats Japan, it will mean that the Chinese masses have awakened, have mobilized, and have established their independence. Therefore the main problem of imperialism will have been solved.”
“Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can exhaust and defeat the forces of Japan?” I asked.
He replied: “Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves.”
My question: “How long do you think such a war would last?”
Mao’s answer: “That depends on the strength of the Chinese People’s Front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese People’s Front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from those governments which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war * will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, o
nly the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world.”
Question: “What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?”
Answer: “Two questions are involved here—the policy of the foreign powers, and the strategy of China’s armies.
“Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed and is well known. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making economic, political, or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the advance of Japan, are only indulging in Utopian fancy. Nanking has in the past adopted erroneous policies based on this strategy, and we have only to look at the map of East Asia to see the results of it.
“But we know well enough that not only North China but the Lower Yangtze Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental program. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese navy aspires to blockade the China seas and to seize the Philippines, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. In the event of war, Japan will try to make them her strategic bases, cutting off Great Britain, France, and America from China, and monopolizing the seas of the southern Pacific. These moves are included in Japan’s plans of naval strategy, copies of which we have seen. And such naval strategy will be coordinated with the land strategy of Japan.
“Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue her fight against Japan once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast and enforced a blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army. In certain periods our forces have been exceeded numerically some ten or twenty times by the Kuomintang troops, which were also superior to us in equipment. Their economic resources many times surpassed ours, and they received material assistance from the outside. Why, then, has the Red Army scored success after success against the White troops and not only survived till today but increased its power?