METHODOLOGY
The sheer breadth and scope of the JET program made the traditional anthropological practice of participant observation highly problematic. Arriving in Japan in late summer of 1988, I was bewildered to find that the JET Program could not be isolated in one geographic location or even in one spacially bounded organization, like a company or a school. At the national level alone, the principal actors included the three sponsoring ministries, the administrative office called CLAIR, the embassies of the participating countries, and the Japanese consulates abroad." To these structural complexities must be added the realities of implementation as the JET Program unfolded in dozens of prefectures, hundreds of district boards of education, and thousands of secondary schools across the country.
I was thus forced to modify the worn-out model of culture as an isolated, bounded entity characterized by internally consistent norms and behavior. While I did not completely jettison the idea that Japanese responses to the JET Program were culturally patterned, I assumed that alongside the dominant forces promoting integration were those that reinforced differentiation and fragmentation.57 I also assumed that the numerous external linkages in the JET Program had a significant capacity to shape internal policy forms. Finally, I knew I had to take into account how the JET program was historically situated. In short, I needed a methodology that encompassed not only multilevel linkages and internal contradictions but also the evolution of the JET Program over time.58
My solution was to use an eclectic approach to gather as many kinds of data as possible over a ten-year period. Most of the intensive fieldwork was completed during two years of on-site research in Japan from 1988 to 1990, but I returned for a month each in the summers of 1993, 1995, and 1996 and for a week in 1999. Having served as an assistant English teacher in junior high schools in Iwate Prefecture in 1980 and 1983 to 1985 in two similar but smaller programs, I had firsthand experience working in a municipal board of education and team-teaching English in secondary schools; I also had good conversational Japanese.
Initially, I decided to anchor myself in one locale in order to focus on one prefectural board of education and its downward linkages. I received a crucial introduction to the prefectural administrators in charge of the JET Program from my Fulbright sponsor. These two men, one an English teacher temporarily assigned to the board of education and the other a career civil servant, were more helpful than I ever could have expected. They arranged for me to attend all prefectural orientations, seminars, and teamteaching workshops related to the JET Program. They also set up short visits to five district boards of education and twelve secondary schools in the prefecture. Most important, they arranged for me to conduct regular visits to a high school that had recently been chosen as a base school for a British JET participant. I visited twice weekly for three months and for another six months less frequently. I spent the entire day at the school on each visit and was able to observe many team-taught and solo English classes and to interview Japanese students and teachers. I also was able to acquire a variety of written materials on hosting the ALT.
At the same time that I was relying on these formal channels, I also made informal contact with numerous JET participants as well as Japanese teachers of English. Usually interviews took place in a coffee shop, and I guaranteed anonymity. Documentation thus includes field notes from observations of thirty-two team-teaching workshops and classes and notes or audiotapes from interviews with sixty-five foreign participants, fifty-four Japanese teachers of English, and thirty-five Japanese students.
I was able to take short trips to other prefectures and to Tokyo to obtain an overview of the program. At first, I found negotiating access to Ministry of Education and CLAIR officials and gaining permission to observe national-level conferences quite difficult; a general ministry policy forbids any outside research on the JET Program. I met several Japanese researchers who had been turned down by CLAIR and heard that CLAIR officials had become incensed when a foreign researcher distributed a survey at a conference even though they had denied him permission to do so. My own relative success was aided by letters of introduction to key officials in CLAIR and the sponsoring ministries from Caroline Yang, then at the Fulbright Commission, and from Mike Smith, then dean of the School of Education at Stanford University. By far the most crucial introduction, however, was provided by my mentor, Tetsuya Kobayashi. In fact, Kobayashi-sensei was a personal friend of Wada Minoru in the Ministry of Education, and his phone call to CLAIR was instrumental in opening doors there as well. "You must thank Professor Kobayashi," I was told by a CLAIR official years later. "He is a very powerful person."
I interviewed officials at the Ministries of Education, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs who were connected with the program on several occasions during the initial fieldwork period and again during my 1993 and 1995 visits. In ten visits to CLAIR, I interviewed twelve ranking officials of CLAIR's managerial staff and fifteen of the "program coordinators" (JET Program alumni working in CLAIR) to learn their vantage point on forming and enacting program policy. The follow-up visits were particularly useful for examining the learning curve of the Japanese administrators and for systematically tracing the continuities and changes in program policies over time.
Several other vehicles for data collection also proved quite fruitful. I attended the weeklong Tokyo orientation for new JET participants in 1989, two midyear conferences for ALTs in 1989 and 199o, and two "renewers' conferences" in 199o and 1993 for JET participants who were extending their contracts. I also interviewed the JET liaisons in the German, Canadian, and American embassies in Tokyo as well as several knowledgeable professors in Japanese universities. To gain insight into the selection pro cess, I participated in a half-day orientation for new JET participants at the San Francisco consulate in 1988 and was fortunate to be able to serve on the selection committee for new JET participants in Boston in 1991. I interviewed a handful of Japanese and American officials at each of these consulates as well as several other members of the selection committees.
Finally, CLAIR officials provided me with numerous in-house surveys, documents, and manuals that have been produced over the program's tenyear history. These include copies of most monthly newsletters sent by CLAIR to program participants, copies of the JET Journal and the CIR Report (a quarterly compilation of short essays written by the foreign participants and their Japanese hosts), orientation manuals for new JET participants, programs for midyear and renewers' conferences, the newsletter published by the JET participants' "support group," internal surveys, and the monthly newsletter sent by the Ministry of Home Affairs to all local government bodies. I have also collected international, national, and local newspaper articles about the JET Program since its inception. Taken together, these documents provide a wealth of information from which to reconstruct the history and evolution of the program.
In short, I used the techniques of both the anthropologist and the historian to provide a realistic portrait of the JET Program that captures not only the diverse perspectives of its many participants but also the larger whole to which they all contributed. As with any study, there are limitations that must be acknowledged. As an outsider, I found it difficult at times to elicit anything beyond the knee-jerk response that Harumi Befu has so aptly captured: "To internationalize is fashionable and good, and not to do so or to resist doing so is a sign of the backwardness of a country bumpkin."59 On numerous occasions, particularly when I was visiting public offices for the first time, I was given only the version of the JET Program designed for public consumption. Yet I am confident that I was often able to get beyond the official, or tatemae, version. By guaranteeing anonymity, by meeting with people at neutral places, by tagging along at drinking parties whenever possible, and by nurturing a set of relationships over the entire thirteen-year period of research, I was able to obtain relatively frank opinions and accounts. In this regard, the extended time frame of the study clearly worked to my benefit. I was frequently able to locate indi
viduals, now in new posts, who had played key roles in implementing JET; removed in space and time from those responsibilities, they were now able to talk more freely.
Three methodological limitations bear particular mention. First, I must apologize to readers of other nationalities for the American slant to this account. At the time when I did much of my interviewing, Americans made up nearly three-quarters of all JET participants; moreover, I was unable to visit Japanese consulates outside the United States and thus my data on the selection process in other countries are much thinner than I would have liked. My own positioning as a middle-class Anglo-American has undoubtedly colored my analysis in subtle ways as well, though I have made a concerted effort to highlight differences among JET participants both between and within nationalities. Second, this book focuses heavily on the ALT (assistant language teacher) component of the JET program rather than the CIR (coordinator of international relations) or SEA (sports exchange advisor) components. While there are significant similarities among these, there are also important differences, and the complex roles of the CIR and SEA in local government are among the many topics that merit further study. And third, the book emphasizes conflict resolution and policy formation during the early years of the JET Program. In part, this emphasis is simply a function of the time at which I conducted most of my research; however, there are also strong theoretical reasons for it. The formative period of the program deserves a closer analysis because that is when most of the current policies were being hammered out; thus, it is when differences among the actors were thrown into highest relief. Nonetheless, I do not mean to slight the many ways in which Japanese and JET participants have worked together since those early years to create new projects beneficial to Japanese society, for it is in these cooperative activities that the program's lasting impact will be felt.
The primary emphasis in this book is on the process of "internationalization" in Japan rather than an evaluation of the JET Program per se. Put simply, I seek to understand how the JET Program evolved and how that form is a product of the historical, social, and political contexts in which the program is embedded.60
Nevertheless, the one question that I was asked over and over again during the course of my fieldwork is, Does the JET Program work? Obviously, the answer depends on one's perspective. Judged by different criteria, the JET Program can look either wonderfully impressive or horribly bad. In the course of the book, we will encounter cultural preoccupations, foreign pressures, political maneuvering, and bureaucratic decision making: these may or may not satisfy anyone as demonstrations of "internationalization" or the "failure of internationalization." As we will see, many of the foreign participants believe that what goes on in JET is not internationalization, while most Japanese officials believe that it is. Rather than seeking some absolute judgment, I examine how program outcomes are treated by participants on all sides. Are there demands for measurement? What kind? What criteria do the various parties involved in the JET Program use in evaluating the program?
I must stress that my intent is not to discredit the JET Program or anyone associated with it. Rather, this book is an account of what happens when everyone does their best. Through exploring the difficulties encountered on all levels by all participants, Japanese and foreign, during the initial phase of what was essentially a crash course in internationalization, I aim to show how particular actions are sensible products of complex cultural, political, and historical forces. Before leaping to judgments about whether the JET Program is good or bad, let us first understand the reasons why the program came to be the way it is.
Frankly speaking, the purpose of the JET Program was never focused on the revolution of English education. The main goal was to get local governments to open up their gates to foreigners. It's basically a grassroots regional development program.
A Ministry of Home Affairs official
Our main hope for the JET Program is to increase understanding of Japanese society and education among youth in the participating countries.
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official
If Japanese students and teachers improve their communicative competence in English, then they have become more internationalized. This is the goal of the JET Program from the point of view of our ministry.
A Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture official
The previous chapter sketched the broad historical context within which the key policymakers began to stress the goal of raising Japan's international standing. Yet the presence of deep-seated cultural assumptions about social relations and exclusivity suggests that an "away-with-frontiers" internationalism will not come easily to the Japanese. The social, cultural, and historical barriers to a broader formulation of Japan's national purpose are truly formidable, and many Japanese understandably find the expectation that Japanese culture must change both perplexing and threatening. Yet Japan has a long history of adaptation to changing environmental realities, and the perception is widespread that substantive change is inevitable if Japan is to maintain its economic gains of recent decades.
This chapter examines the behind-the-scenes process of policy formation and the conflicting ministerial goals that became enmeshed in the JET Program. At the national level, political maneuvering dominates: from the very moment the idea for the JET Program was conceived, its administrative structure and implementation were affected by competing goals and rivalries between the inward- and outward-looking ministries that were directly charged with its oversight. In moving from its conception to a system of national-level administration, a relatively straightforward and appealing idea became subject to the political complexities of forming a coalition of diverse actors.
AN UNLIKELY SPONSOR: THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS GOES INTERNATIONAL
Oddly enough, the story of the JET Program begins in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichisho). Literally the "Ministry of Self-Government," the agency is ostensibly concerned with local administration, fire protection, and tax affairs. Why would this ministry, which in 1987 was by almost any definition one of the least "international" ministries in Japan, take control of a program to import foreigners primarily for the purpose of teaching English in public secondary schools?
The question is all the more interesting because prior to and during World War II, the old Home Ministry (Naimusho), first established in 1873, was the nation's most powerful administrative institution. It was in charge of virtually anything related to maintaining control of the nation's population-local government, the police, religion, civil engineering, even the people's thoughts. In fact, local boards of education and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture itself were run by officials of the Home Ministry. Not surprisingly, the Home Ministry was hardest hit by the Occupation purge, with 6o percent of its top officials removed. It was then broken up into the separate Ministries of Home Affairs, Construction, Labor, and Health and Welfare and the Police Agency. After a brief period as a special agency, it renewed itself in 196o as Jichisho, with a much narrower mandate focused on supervision of prefectural and municipal governments.
By the 198os, however, Home Affairs had achieved a remarkable comeback. Its former bureaucrats occupied roughly one-third of the prefectural governorships, as well as prominent positions in municipal government. This ministry had also become quite popular among graduates from prestigious universities who sought careers in local or national politics, for it had the reputation of allowing aspiring politicians and bureaucrats to move up quickly in their careers. Karel van Wolferen even argues that by the late i98os Home Affairs had become the chief rival of the Finance Ministry as a domestic power broker.'
Nevertheless, the involvement of the Ministry of Home Affairs with overseas projects of any kind had been virtually nil. Why in the mid-198os would it suddenly decide to get on the bandwagon of internationalization? The interest of this ministry in "going international" must be viewed in the context of the rise of regionalism in Japan and the delicate balancing act required to simultaneously
promote this trend and ensure a coordinating role for itself. While every ministry in Japan has some relationship with local governments, for Home Affairs those governments are its client group. This role often pits it as the advocate for local interests against other ministries. Yet as a central ministry itself, Home Affairs stands atop the system of local public administration in Japan.'
This dual, even contradictory, role as both proponent and coordinator of local autonomy necessitates a continual search for new avenues to ensure its continued leverage vis-a-vis local governments. In 1988 Home Affairs engineered and administered the ichioku furusato (one million for hometowns) policy attributed to former Prime Minister Takeshita: the onetime deal provided each municipality in Japan with one million yen, no strings attached, to promote local development. In addition, as the agency charged with promoting regional development and local autonomy, Home Affairs has long promoted a campaign against ikkyoku shucho, or the concentration of resources in Tokyo.
In the 197os and 198os, however, local governments throughout Japan began vigorously pursuing overseas contacts and establishing international exchange programs. Of course, some local governments had formed independent ties with foreign cities much earlier. Prefectures and municipalities along the Japan Sea coast, for example, have a long history of trade relations with Korea and China. But the movement to cultivate links outside a national framework has been driven in recent years by the boom in sister-city relationships. While these were often superficial connections designed to give prefectural and municipal officials an excuse for traveling abroad, they nevertheless represented independent contacts with foreign entities. Some of Japan's bigger cities, such as Yokohama, now have ten or more sister cities all over the world. Moreover, with the increase in the numbers of returnee students, foreign students in Japanese universities, resident foreigners, and participants in various overseas exchange programs, many prefectural governments in the i98os created an entirely new administrative section for the oversight of international issues: the international relations division (kokusai koryuka) within the prefectural office.
Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program Page 5