by Brian Vale
It was now August, and preparations for the invasion were at last reaching their climax. Valparaiso Bay was alive with launches, water hoys and supply boats. On the ships the final touches were put to paintwork, rigging and sails, while tons of supplies and munitions in kegs, barrels and casks were rowed to the side, swayed on board and stowed away in the hold. Finally, San Martin's troops marched down to the dockside with their bands and equipment to be ferried across to the hired transports. A special landing stage was built to speed their embarkation. Physically, the squadron itself was in good shape. The appearance of pay and prize money had done wonders for the remaining officers and men and recruitment had gone well. Aided by a hot press, a wave of patriotic fervour and proclamations from San Martin promising bonuses to the men on the liberation of Lima, Cochrane's warships were almost completely manned. The only difference was that now, three-quarters of the sailors were Chilean - many of the foreign seamen having packed their bags and left.25
Chapter 8
INVASION AND BLOCKADE
On 20 August 1820, amid noisy celebration, the great expedition against Peru sailed from Valparaiso. In command as Captain General was José de San Martin at the head of 4500 troops, with the Argentine General Las Heras, who had forced the western route during the crossing of the Andes three years before, as his chief-of-staff. It was a multinational army with units from Chile and the Argentine and volunteers from various other South American and European countries. It was also multiracial, with white, mulatto and black troops. The men, with their supplies, artillery and 800 horses, were packed into troop transports under the supervision of Paul Delano, the American captain who had delivered the Curiato to Chile the year before. There were 13 ships altogether - Potrillo carrying powder and munitions, and Argentina, Maguena, Gadiana, Empenadora, Santa Rosa, Perla, Galandrina, Aguila, Dolores, Begonia, Peruvana and Jerezina with troops. The last five were prizes that Cochrane's agent had freighted to the transport company. The escort was provided by Lord Cochrane's squadron and comprised the flagship O'Higgins (Captain Thomas Sackville Crosbie), the frigates San Martin (Captain William Wilkinson), and Lautaro (Captain Martin Guise), the corvette Independencia (Captain Robert Forster), the brigs Galvarino (Captain John Tooker Spry), Araucano (Captain Thomas Carter) and Pueyrredon (Lieutenant William Prunier) and the schooner Montezuma (Lieutenant George Young) for San Martin's personal use. For the first three days the wind blew foul, making the task of assembling the convoy difficult; but after that it blew from the southeast bringing the invasion force to within striking distance of Peru in a fortnight.
As well as his military commanders, San Martin's staff included the civilian aides who were to assist in the political task of liberation. There was the sinister Bernardo Monteagudo, a talented but ruthless Argentine radical in the fanatical mould of the French Revolution. The difference was that in South America, opponents were shot not guillotined. O'Higgins's rivals, the Carrera brothers, had been two victims of Monteagudo's policy: there were to be many more. At the other extreme was the diplomat Juan Garcia del Rio. Born in Cartagena in New Granada, but educated in Europe and England where he had absorbed the principles of the Enlightenment, Garcia del Rio was a minor philosopher and the pioneer of a free press in both Chile, where he founded El Telegrafo and El Sol de Chile, and in Peru. At a less influential level were two other staff figures - the self effacing and tactful Tomas Guido, who was San Martin's devoted follower and acted as principal aide de camp; and the Englishman James Paroissien, whose journal and correspondence recorded the events of the invasion.1 The accuracy of this journal has been questioned, and Paroissien's criticisms of Cochrane have been discounted by at least one biographer as reflecting little more than the envy of the son of a Barking schoolmaster towards an aristocrat.2 But the document gives an invaluable insight into San Martin's reactions to the antics of the brilliant but wayward Vice Admiral and is given credibility by the fact that Paroissien - rather than being a distant detractor - was a friend of both Cochrane and his wife.
Some biographers have suggested that the command of the expeditionary force was divided - with San Martin being in charge of the military campaign, and Cochrane responsible for what happened at sea. This was not the case. Cochrane's instructions made it clear from the beginning that San Martin was in command, and that he was under the Captain General's orders. They began:
The object of the present expedition is to free Peru from her odious vassalage to Spain and to elevate her to the rank of a free and sovereign nation. ... The Captain General of the army, D José de San Martin, is the Chief to whom the Government and the Republic have confided the exclusive direction of the operations of this great enterprise. ... I have consequently the satisfaction to advise Your Lordship that ... you should act precisely according to the Plans that General San Martin shall order in regard to both the point of disembarkation, and the succeeding movements which Your Lordship may have to make with the squadron; and that Your Lordship should not act on your own account with either the whole or any part of the vessels of war which you command.3
The Chilean Government knew that Cochrane would find this subordinate position uncongenial. Indeed, they had already had a taste of his preference for independent action and of the insubordinate streak in his character. In an attempt to mollify him and head off trouble, O'Higgins concluded Cochrane's orders with the pious hope that,
It is unnecessary to recommend most earnestly to Your Lordship the most exact observance of my resolution in all your areas of responsibility. Your Lordship has given sufficient proofs that your military conduct has followed no other course than that indicated by the Government, and I flatter myself that Your Lordship, conforming to this, and to your own principles, will present yourself to the gratitude of America as the hero of its liberty.4
The purpose of the liberating expedition had been decided early. Peru was not seen as enemy territory but as a sister South American country whose independence had been prevented by the presence of occupying Spanish military forces. In addition to tactical flare, San Martin had the ability to think at a high strategic level and fully understood that Peru could not be liberated without the active support of the population. He did not therefore see himself as launching a simple invasion of the country. His purpose was to neutralise the Spanish army so that the Peruvians could liberate themselves. He made this strategy clear on many occasions. San Martin was optimistic of his chances of success, and his confidence had been reinforced when news arrived that the Great Expedition assembling at Cadiz to impose Ferdinand VII'S rule on the Americas was no more. In January 1820, a mutiny led by Major Raphael Riego, had spread like wildfire through the ranks and had destroyed it as a military force.
And there was more. The mutiny had triggered a series of events that resulted in the overthrow of Ferdinand's government of reactionaries and the re-adoption of the liberal Constitution of 1812. Led by the well-meaning Augustin Arguelles, the new ministers believed that the patriot struggle in South America - like their own - had been stimulated by opposition to despotic rule from Madrid, rather than rule from Madrid as such, and they naively assumed that with the coming of constitutionalism the problem would go away. They therefore became preoccupied with the task of enacting a series of progressive laws for an Empire which, in fact, no longer existed. Spanish generals were ordered to talk rather than to fight, and commissioners were sent to the four corners of South America to negotiate the terms on which, it was confidently expected, the revolutionaries would return to their allegiance. Unfortunately, this policy was based upon a totally false premise and got nowhere. The commissioners met no one - except San Martin - and achieved nothing. All it did was to deny Viceroy Pezuela in Peru any hope of reinforcement, to lower the morale of the Spanish armies in the field, and to cause splits and dissension. San Martin knew all this, and was convinced that the position of the Viceroy and his generals would get worse once they were faced with a liberating army on the ground. He was therefore in no hurry, and be
lieved that, even without spectacular victories, it was only a matter of time before Peru fell into his hands like a ripe plum.
As military preparations gathered momentum during the first half of 1820, the royalists in Peru knew exactly what was going on in Chile. Sympathisers in Valparaiso and Santiago and the captains of visiting merchant ships kept them fully informed. The only details that were unknown were the exact date and place of the invasion. The failure of Cochrane's attacks by rockets on Callao had, however, been presented as a great victory by the Spanish authorities who had showered medals on the defenders. Cochrane's efforts were mocked in the press, and Lima was treated to a theatrical performance called Drama Naval sobre el ataque del Callao, which starred San Martin and Cochrane, and portrayed a lecherous O'Higgins entering into a pact with the Devil to gain Kitty's favours.5
With the disappearance of Cochrane at the end of 1819 and the lifting of the Chilean blockade, ships of the Spanish navy were at sea once more, searching for enemy privateers and transferring men, powder and arms to the more vulnerable outposts. In February the frigates Esmeralda and Venganza sailed to visit the northern ports and collect the Prueba, which was completing her refit in Guayaquil.6 On 2
April - a week after she had arrived from the north -Prueba herself sailed with the brig Manipur and the armed ship Javeria carrying reinforcements back to Guayaquil. The flotilla returned to Callao on 8 August having sighted and driven aground the patriot privateer Rosa de los Andes commanded by Captain John Illingworth on the way. It was Illingworth and this ship, then named Rose, that had delivered Cochrane to Chile 18 months before in November 1818. Meanwhile, Venganza and Esmeralda waited in idleness in Callao. It was not until June that there were sufficient stores and money to prepare the two frigates for sea, and even then - to Pezuela's annoyance -their captains seemed defeatist and unwilling to take active measures against the enemy.7 In such circumstances, there was little the Viceroy could do but wait for the patriots to strike.
He did not have to wait long. On 8 September, San Martin's liberating army disembarked at Pisco, 100 miles southeast of Callao and Lima. The town was secured and enough rum and provisions were seized to keep the army and the squadron supplied for months. San Martin then slowly began to occupy the surrounding lowlands while a force of 1000 men under Colonel Juan Antonio Alvares de Arenales pushed northwards to threaten Lima from the east and raise rebellion in the interior.
Relations between the Captain General and the Vice Admiral were strained from the beginning. Routine naval work like escorting a convoy made Cochrane bored. It also made him careless, so that on the voyage from Valparaiso he managed to lose two transports, the Aguila carrying the 4th Infantry Regiment and the Santa Rosa loaded with artillery.8 Paroissien's journal reflected San Martin's concern when he complained 'the ships-of-war are spread about in all directions but to no purpose. Everybody who pretends to know about naval affairs on board the San Martin says that the business of the convoy is conducted in a very unsailorlike manner.'9 As a result, when San Martin arrived at Pisco he found himself without any artillery and lacking a fifth of his infantry.10 He was not pleased. Neither was the atmosphere improved by the knowledge that the slow sailing Aguila had been one of the five prizes supplied by Hoseason as a business speculation on Cochrane's behalf at a charge of $8 a ton! The missing Aguila appeared the following day, but the Santa Rosa did not arrive until 16 September.
Meanwhile Cochrane, whose instincts were totally aggressive, was scathing about San Martin's choice of a landing place, and argued that he should have disembarked nearer to Lima and launched an immediate attack on the city.11 He had even had a good natured bet with Paroissien, wagering a crate of champagne that Lima would be taken quickly and with ease.12 Other military observers took the opposite view. Captain Basil Hall, who had recently arrived on the scene in HMS Conway, thought that the landing at Pisco was a masterstroke.13 The town lay to the southeast of the capital and, with the wind blowing constantly northwards in this latitude, a reembarkation and landing further along the coast could be made at any time. The possibility that the final attack might fall somewhere else, and the distraction caused by Colonel Arenales and his troops, threw the Viceroy into a state of uncertainty about San Martin's intentions and left him undecided as to whether to march against Pisco, or against Arenales, or to remain in position to defend Lima. This confusion, plus the impact of the new orders from Madrid, was enough to make the Viceroy offer an armistice in the middle of September. Guido and Garcia del Rio hastened to Miraflores near Lima to discuss terms, but the Viceroy had no authority to discuss any kind of autonomy and the talks broke down after a week. Nevertheless, with his strategy apparently working, San Martin re-embarked his army on 28 October and headed for Ancon to begin operations north of Callao.
During all this time, the Chilean ships had patrolled the adjacent coastline, their commander-in-chief fretting at what he saw as enforced inactivity. The transfer of the army and squadron further north was a welcome move. As before, Cochrane's handling of the squadron and convoy at sea was worrying. On only the first day of the voyage, Paroissien confided to his journal:
The Admiral has as usual left them (the warships) to run a great distance ahead and it was in vain that the General made signals to order the headmost ships to lay to and await the convoy. ... Not a day passes but brings some proof of (Lord Cochrane's) unfortunate selfish disposition and there is not a man in the fleet who does not lament his carelessness in not keeping the convoy together, although we are within a few miles of the enemy's port. He has not given the least order about the actions of the transports in case of action, nor do the ships of war know what they should do. The Admiral cheerfully neglects this and seems to suppose that his only duty is taking prizes.14
The convoy was off Lima on 29 October. Leaving San Martin and Galvarino to escort the transports carrying the army the remaining 25 miles north to the scruffy little port of Ancon, Cochrane turned aside with the rest of the squadron and began to enforce the blockade that the Chilean Government had declared on 20 August. Unfortunately the blockade was to create more problems for the Chileans than it solved. At the end of 1818, Viceroy Pezuela had decided to increase the flow of supplies and expand his revenues by allowing foreign ships and goods to enter
Peru. It took time for neutrals to respond, but by 1820, dozens of British and American ships were arriving in Peruvian waters. As far as Cochrane was concerned, all those carrying contraband of war or Spanish cargoes were liable to seizure. Indeed, immediately on arrival he took the British Rebecca and the American Canton in the harbour of Pisco. Cochrane's actions came as an unpleasant surprise to British merchants. Only a month before, they had written to Captain Shirreff of Andromache expressing satisfaction at the way Cochrane had gone out of his way to avoid interfering with their trade.15 Now he began to round up British as well as Spanish merchant vessels.
Official Protests from foreign naval commanders in the area quickly followed. No one disputed the fact that Chile had the right to declare a blockade and arrest any vessels that broke it. Indeed, the decrees that laid down the conduct of the blockade closely followed international practice. But for a blockade to be legitimate, there was a basic rule that the number of warships enforcing it had to be adequate to the task. The problem was that the Chileans had declared the Peruvian coast under blockade from 21° 48' to 2° 12' south - a distance of 2000 miles! Sir Thomas Hardy - Nelson's old flag captain at Trafalgar who had now replaced Bowles as British commander-in-chief -protested, pointing out that Cochrane's force was too small to be able to control such a vast area, and that the Chilean blockade could not therefore be accepted as legitimate.16 The Americans took the same view. Hyperion, Conway and the USS Macedonian had been providing escorts for merchantmen for some time. Now the maritime powers began to increase their presence in the area. Sir Thomas Hardy rounded the Horn in the frigate Creole to be on hand personally and ordered the 74-gun Superb to follow. The American consul made it known that th
e 74-gun ship Franklin was on its way. Then, in January 1821, a French squadron comprising the 74-gun Colosse, the Galathée and L'Echo appeared. This caused some alarm until Rear Admiral Julien innocently assured the Chileans that his ships were only on a training and fact-finding cruise.
In theory, the British commander-in-chief, Sir Thomas Hardy, robustly rejected the legality of the Chilean blockade of Peru. But in practice, his orders to treat the Chilean authorities with kid gloves and to avoid any kind of provocation stopped him taking decisive action. The unfortunate Captain Searle of Hyperion fell a victim to this policy after a furious confrontation with Cochrane over the seizure of the Rebecca at Pisco - the second time Searle had found himself in conflict with the Chilean Vice Admiral.17 The first occasion had been in May 1820, when Searle had arrived at Valparaiso to find Cochrane detaining a number of British ships on the grounds that their departures had been embargoed. He had immediately taken the post road up to Santiago and had received reassurance from O'Higgins personally that no embargo existed and that the ships were free to leave. Returning to Valparaiso with the news, Searle had been astonished when Cochrane still refused to allow the ships to sail. After a frustrating week in which all his overtures were rejected, the British captain took matters into his own hands and escorted the Inspector out with Hyperion cleared for action.18 On that occasion, Searle had received a rap over the knuckles from the Admiralty for his undiplomatic conduct. After the second, he and his frigate were recalled to England. From the perspective of the British captain, however, even this cloud had a silver lining. According to Thomas Collings, the crippled clerk of HMS Owen Glendower, when Hyperion returned round Cape Horn she carried remittances of 'freight' from British merchants worth $3 million (or £600,000) in coin and bullion, half of which had been loaded at Callao.19