Lists of the whereabouts of house or apartment keys were to be kept by the police for easy appropriation thereafter. Children under fifteen or sixteen would be left with UGIF; animals were to be left behind—with the concierge if there was one. One convoy of a thousand Jews would go each week from each camp, thus four trains a week, to be guarded by French police under observation by a German police squad of a lieutenant and eight men.
Could the French camps cope? Drancy had limited capacity, so careful organisation was required—not a Darquier attribute, but the Germans did not yet know this, and moved to help him by issuing regulations on 8 July forbidding Jews to enter any public place, permitting them to shop only between 3 and 4 p.m. They were already forbidden to leave their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. This meant that in addition to the census of Jews already available, and the yellow star which marked them for arrest, German command made sure that the listed Jewish bodies would be at home to be collected. Louis thanked the Germans for their help.
The real worry was still the numbers. Tulard's cards revealed that there were insufficient Jews in every category, so the upper age limit of those to be arrested was raised to fifty-five for women and sixty for men, and they added back Jewish spouses of Aryans and women with children above the age of two, though not pregnant women. All were to be stateless Jews. Four thousand children between the ages of two to sixteen were anticipated, and UGIF could only care for four hundred. Dannecker sent another urgent telex to Eichmann to get his permission to deport the children, using the prevention of promiscuity as one good reason.
The day decided upon, 13 July, was the eve of Bastille Day, still a French public holiday. In the interests of a happy populace the round-ups were deferred until Thursday, 16 July, and the operation was given a pretty name: “Vent printanier ”—Operation Spring Wind—but it is always called the “Rafle du Vel' d'Hiv'.” Supply lists were prepared:
… a) one pair of stout working shoes, 2 pairs of socks, 2 shirts, 2 undershorts, one work overall, 2 wool blankets, 2 sets of bedding (sheets and pillow cases), a bowl, a cup, a water bottle, a spoon and a pullover in addition to the necessary toiletries.
b) Each Jew is to take enough food for 3 days. Only one suitcase or rucksack is allowed per person … 28
As Louis Darquier was in control of UGIF, only he—though again it was Galien who actually dealt with the matter—could ensure that the trains were properly equipped. And so they were not. The CGQ J had to extract such provisions from the French Ministry of Industrial Production; correspondence between them on the matter of shoes and blankets reached unprecedented levels of mutual insult. Whatever was supplied disappeared into other pockets well before any convoy left France. Then money and cooperation had to be culled from the prominent Jews who ran UGIF. Thus it was that Jews paid for their own deportation and death. The amount of effort this required added to Louis' fury with René Bousquet. At the time he could do little to cover his back, nor did he have the temperament to do so. But Laval and Bousquet did. On 15 July Laval wrote Bousquet a protection letter for the file:
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
Direction Générale de la Police Nationale
Paris, 15 July 1942
The Head of Government, Minister and Secretary of State for the
Interior [Laval] to Monsieur le Préfet de Police (Cabinet) [Bousquet]
As you have been informed verbally, the German authorities have decided to transfer to the east those Jews resident in the Paris region and who belong to one of the following categories: Stateless, Germans, Austrians, Czechoslovakians, Polish, Russian, refugees from the Saar…
As the Commissioner for Jewish Affairs [Darquier] has given his agreement for the implementation of this operation by the French police forces, I would be grateful if you would take all practical measures to this end according to the conditions set out during previous meetings to which you were summoned.
I also confirm that the “instructions” you submitted to me have been approved by the Commissioner for Jewish Affairs.
Signed: for The Head of Government29
At four o'clock in the morning of 16 July 1942 the round-ups began, and went on until one o'clock the following day. Nine thousand French policemen and auxiliaries, working in teams, using the index cards, knocked on doors. But Parisians knew what was going on. Some Jews had been warned, and many survivors owe their lives to French policemen who did not do as they were told. In the beginning many were unafraid; it did not occur to them that French police would arrest women and children, so the men fled, and their women and children took their places. Illness made no difference: those who could not walk were taken on stretchers. No children could be left with neighbours. Children born in France of foreign parents were legally French; this made no difference. Pregnant women were taken (some babies were born at the Vel' d'Hiv'). Twenty-four Jews were shot resisting arrest. Some raced across the roofs of Paris to escape, and over a hundred committed suicide, one a woman who threw her two babies from a fifth-floor window first, then jumped herself.
By 5 p.m. on 17 July the total came to 12,884 Jews: 4,051 children, 5,802 women and only 3,031 men. Dannecker, by now reduced to the anticipation of twenty thousand Jews, was over seven thousand Jews short, and, an even greater disaster, almost a third of his tally were children; he had gathered only 8,833 “deportable” Jewish bodies for incineration. Eichmann had not yet reached his decision as to what to do with children. Since they could not work, he was still investigating whether the gas chambers had sufficient capacity to gas them.
On 17 July began the great debate as to what to do with the children. Blood was at the root of this. Though in this instance the children had to be used to make up the numbers, more important, these children had Jewish blood in their veins. They would grow up and re-infect the sacred blood of Aryan France, Aryan Europe. Much of the dithering about the children was circumlocution around this, jiggling with Catholic or other consciences to break a taboo. The murder of children, like the eating of human flesh, is not easily done. Darquier suggested children's homes for the moment, but Leguay, François and Tulard were anxious about the numbers. The compromise over French Jews had already enraged Eichmann, and when the train of 15 July from Bordeaux had to be cancelled, as only 150 stateless Jews could be found for it, he was so angry that this could never be permitted to happen again. They also realised that separating the children from their parents at the Vel' d'Hiv' would be a further public relations disaster after the scenes of hysteria in Paris of the past two days.
Until 1942, the Germans estimated that 80 percent of the French population rejected collaboration. The round-up of the Vel' d'Hiv', during which Parisians openly reproached the French police as they went about their work, increased this percentage. After Bousquet's August round-ups in the Occupied Zone, popular hatred of the intruders became almost the biggest problem faced by the Nazis and by Vichy. So all agreed that the children should be despatched to more distant concentration camps with their parents while awaiting the decision from Eichmann as to what to do next. On 17 July fifty city buses collected the Jews. About six thousand of them, those without children, were taken straight to Drancy, soon bulging at the seams. Jews with children, over seven thousand of them—there were 4,051 children—were interned for up to six days and nights in the blistering heat of the Vel' d'Hiv'.
Nothing had been prepared for them, except policing. It was mid summer, boiling hot. The roof of the sports stadium was glass, painted blue for blackout purposes, and so an eerie blue light filled the arena. There was no water, and the few toilets there broke down almost immediately. The people were crowded together; the corners of the grounds on which they slept were their urinals. The smell was as dreadful as the heat; the thirst and hunger were followed by diarrhoea and dysentery. Some managed to kill themselves, some tried to kill their children, some went crazy and their screaming, all night long, spread panic. The Germans and Galien permitted only two doctors to enter the stadium. When UGIF begged for
more medical help, Galien refused—he found the conditions “perfectly satisfactory.”30
A little girl, aged five then, remembered later “the cries of grief, of horror, of fear… that horrible odour, the tears of children.”31 Some were there for two or three days; some were there for a week. Some died, and the really sick were taken to Drancy. Gradually these thousands were removed to the concentration camps of Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande. They went from the Gare d'Austerlitz, heavily guarded so the public could not get near to help them. When they got to the two camps near Orléans there were no preparations ready for them. Many of the four thousand children died there and are buried in the local cemeteries.
The first trains left Drancy for Auschwitz on 19 July, and four more followed on 22, 24, 27 and 29 July, with over five thousand Jews, mostly those arrested on 16 and 17 July, so that in hundreds of instances Jews taken from the streets of Paris were dead within five days. By 1945 all the rest were dead except for forty-seven survivors. When the Drancy Jews had gone, it was the turn of those with children at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande. Permission to send the children had not arrived, so the French authorities decided that parents and their children over fourteen should go immediately; the younger ones would follow later. French police watched as the little ones saw their distraught parents and older brothers and sisters wrenched from them by “rifle butts, with truncheons, with streams of icy water.”32 Trains left the two camps on 31 July and 3, 5 and 7 August. Four convoys, four thousand people. Of these about two thousand were gassed immediately, and of those remaining, thirty-five survived.
Left behind at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande were about 3,500 children ranging in age from fifteen months to thirteen years old. After their parents were taken, there were only a few nursing mothers and Red Cross workers to look after them. The cabbage soup gave them diarrhoea; they slept on soiled layers of straw, they were filthy, they smelt. Some were too young to know how to wash themselves; some did not even know their names.
Louis Darquier did not go near the Vel' d'Hiv' or Drancy. It was clear to all that Galien was in charge. Dannecker and Galien made a fine team, for Dannecker was “brutal and fond of drink, he was known as ‘the sadist’ and carried out violent assaults against people who had been arrested. He personally selected Jewish internees at Drancy for the firing squad.”33 Darquier later stated that he was in his office on 16 and 17 July, shuffling paper. Actually he, and others, saw Laval, who came to Paris for a report on Operation Spring Wind while Galien and his SEC police were on the rampage: tens of millions of francs' worth of jewels disappeared, according to directors of UGIF. Even the Germans complained that the CGQ J and Galien were “not only highly servile but also capable of showing an over-zealous approach to their work.”34
By August, public and clerical outrage conveyed to Pétain and Laval over Vel' d'Hiv' led to a strong rumour that Darquier was about to be replaced because he had dealt with Jewish internments “in too superficial a manner.”35 Knochen and Dannecker were seriously unhappy about the numerical failure of the round-ups, Bousquet and his police were worried, and Darquier's absence was noted by all: the orchestra of Nazi objections began its crescendo at this time. Darquier had been responsible for the preparations at the Vel' d'Hiv', but left it to Galien, who prepared nothing, and did nothing, except steal. Darquier was never allowed near deportations again. After this the contribution of the CGQ J was confined to the provision—or not—of blankets and shoes.
Darquier took part in no more management meetings after July, and complained of his exclusion, blaming Laval. In future his involvement was reduced to writing and receiving letters. So many letters of his exist dated 16 and 17 July that it almost seems planned as an alibi.36 Even the French consul-general in London received one with a little on account for Anne—£50. Another letter Louis wrote on 16 July was to the Federation of the War Amputees of France, refusing to intercede on behalf of one Victor Fajnzylberg, the father of two children aged six and four, whose wife had been arrested that morning. Fajnzylberg was “a former soldier of the 22nd foreign (Polish) infantry regiment. He is not fully recovered from his amputation and requires specialised, daily care. He can only move with the aid of crutches…he lives on the 5th floor…he is now left alone with two young children.”37 Victor Fajnzylberg died in Auschwitz, sent there on Convoy 68,on 10 February 1944.
After July Darquier also had time to address Vichy, and part of the office work he referred to is to be found in the shoal of letters he poured out to Laval. In the first, on 23 July, he adopted a guarded but threatening tone. Galien, in his mode as spy number J11, ensured that the Germans saw a copy of the letter.
… the Commissioner for Jewish Affairs was put in charge of delivering 32,000 Jews (22,000 from the Occupied zone and 10,000 from the Non Occupied zone) to the German authorities.
These Jews were to be chosen from among stateless persons and nationals from certain foreign countries.
These measures were carried out on 16 and 17 July and gave the following figures:
3,095 men 5,885 women
i.e. a total of 8,980 people from Paris and the suburbs [handwritten note in the margin by Röthke: “and 4,000 children—total of 12,884”].
This number is well short of the planned figure …
It should be noted that although the arrests proceeded without any particular problems on the first day, the percentage of individuals to be arrested who were absent reached 66%. Indiscreet behaviour prior to the arrests allowed a certain number of Jews to pass secretly into the Non Occupied zone.
In my meeting today with the occupying authorities I noted that they were highly dissatisfied with this situation.
The German authorities had planned a sufficient number of trains for the transportation of 32,000 Jews. It is necessary that the arrests correspond to the scheduled departure times for these trains …
I would like to suggest that the following steps be taken:
1) All stateless Jews and those Jewish nationals of foreign countries previously designated … should be arrested and held ready for deportation.
2) … Belgian, Dutch and all foreign Jews not in possession of a recent, valid passport could also be arrested.
3) … it would be advisable to arrest French Jews who were naturalised after 1 January 1927 …
Personally, I am certain that any delay or negligence in the implementation of this evacuation plan will lead to serious consequences … 38
He wrote again a week later, more plangent, more indignant, opening with the words that Laval most hated to hear: “Following our conversation this morning …” A peal of complaints followed about the loss of his police force and the inadequacies of Bousquet's, ending with, “It shall not be said that I did not warn you …”39
Laval received Darquier's views about the French police at the same moment that General Oberg concluded his first accord with René Bousquet. From now on Bousquet's French police force was to be independent, their sovereignty exchanged for French assurances of the militant maintenance of order. In other words, from now on French police would work with German officials to kill French “enemies of the state”— the Resistance. The announcement of the Oberg-Bousquet agreement in the first week of August was the sole response Darquier received, while Laval's only reaction was to make notes about a projected “reorganisation” of the CGQ J. By 13 August, spies were informing the Gestapo that Darquier was about to be replaced.
At the same time a solemn letter of disapproval arrived at Vichy from the Catholic hierarchy. Writing on their behalf, Pétain's most faithful servant, Archbishop Suhard of Paris, protested to the Marshal about the terrible events witnessed on the Paris streets. Cardinal Gerlier wrote too, a letter “of astonishing moderation.” The bishops did not make their protest public, however.40
The round-ups in the north and south coincided with a procession of statues of the Blessed Virgin Mary from all over France to Le Puy-en-Velay, whose Black Virgin was to be celebrated on 15 Aug
ust, Assumption Day. Cardinal Gerlier, Monseigneur Valerio Valerio, the Papal Nuncio, Vichy ministers of state and flocks of bishops and the faithful gathered to begin what was to be a great pilgrimage of four of these Virgins throughout France over the coming years. Such a national Catholic and Vichy event prohibited more than a letter to Pétain about the Jews.
Theodor Dannecker did not trust Bousquet; he visited the Vichy camps in July to ensure that sufficient Jews would be provided, and demanded the delivery of eleven thousand in August. Bousquet promised three thousand by 10 August. All préfets were sent lengthy orders specifying the kinds of Jews to look out for, providing a list of a dozen more exceptions than those permitted by Darquier or the Germans. The age range to be arrested began at eighteen and ended at sixty, but Bousquet “always considered the impact…on the French political situation, the difficulties of execution of them for his services, and the aggravation of the internal situation which might occur and thus automatically augment the number of résistants.”41
At first Bousquet observed the Vichy exemptions, often deciding not to deport Jews who were “near relatives (parents, spouses, descendants) [of arrested Jews], Jewish old soldiers, foreign volunteers and POWs.”42 Louis Darquier, maddened by these exclusions, kept the Germans informed of Bousquet's every move. This led to a crisis which forced Bousquet to remove many of the exempt categories. He had to anyway, to reach the necessary tally.43 Bousquet's instructions were brutal: his police must “crush all resistance.” And he was clever: he thought to investigate hiding places—convents, schools and children's homes; his police waited and watched, surrounded and pounced.
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