Cultural historians can easily identify a plethora of mean-spirited pronouncements, whereas those embracing tolerance—or at least toleration—appear to be solitary, lonely voices. Nevertheless, they prove to be extremely important for our own discourse on this issue because tolerance represents a profound ethical challenge, and already the earliest and faintest reflections of this humanistic value weigh considerably in the larger schema of historical developments affecting whole societies. Even though the majority of people today would certainly claim—at least in Western societies—to be tolerant and welcoming to foreigners, refugees, or asylum seekers, in reality, this open-minded attitude can easily flip to its opposite. To be tolerant represents the result of long and intensive training, education, and cultural awareness and sensitivity. But people have always tended to be rather selfish, egotistical, and hostile. Hence, considering voices from the past, even if isolated and faint, arguing for a tolerant attitude allows us to participate in an ancient and ongoing discourse. If some medieval thinkers or poets were able to adopt toleration or even tolerance, what would then hold us back today from following their model? In other words, the intensive examination of the central issue concerning us here allows us to contextualize and historicize it appropriately.
Both religious and chronicle authors might not be the best witnesses of this discourse since they normally arrived at the table with their own agendas. Literary narratives promise to yield much more flexible positions because of their fictional nature. Poets have always enjoyed considerable freedom and could express their own opinion more freely than their contemporaries; thereby they were able both to influence and mirror widespread attitudes and ideas. At the same time, literary texts are not absolutely reliable; but which text would be so? Poets have the relative freedom to express their own opinions and can, thus, explore taboos, conflictual conditions, controversies, and then are also in a position to project utopias or dystopias.111 I will examine these issues in a separate chapter further below and only want to underscore here the deep importance of the literary discourse where the individual writer enjoyed considerable freedom to formulate ideas and concepts not subject to the opinions of the Church and other authorities.
We always have to take into consideration tendentiousness, experimentation, exploration, innovation, and attempts to pursue specific ideological purposes. But if we observe narratives of great popularity in which at least some indications of a tolerant mindset can be identified, we might be on the trail of a stronger substratum of the general mentality that would defy many of the modern stereotypes of the past. In other words, I would be rather doubtful about the absolute value of those comments by medieval theologians or chroniclers who formulated strict opinions and rejected any potential deviation. Those have to be taken into consideration as well, but only as additional remarks about individuals of different races or religions. Ultimately, literary, but also philosophical and religious, analysis makes it possible to identify significant levels of opinion that sustained the history of mentality. This does not make literary works more valuable than historical documents, but they represent a less controlled mode of expression. Human existence is seminally predicated on the experience of self and other, and culture results through the balancing act of both aspects.
Hence, the search for the discourse on toleration and tolerance in the Middle Ages constitutes a fundamental quest for the human individual in the pre-modern world.112 After all, if medieval societies succeeded, or failed, to integrate members of other religious or racial communities, why are we more, or rather less, successful in that effort? Probing the issue of toleration and tolerance also in the pre-modern world, hence, amounts to a critical investigation of human anthropology. Pursuing tolerance implies to observe and respect human dignity:
Wo immer jedoch Toleranz als soziale Tugend und daher als Verpflichtung ernstgenommen wird, orientiert sie sich an der Überzeugung von der Würde des Menschen. In diesem zentralen Bezugspunkt berührt sich die Toleranzdiskussion nicht nur mit der Diskussion um die Freiheit, sondern auch mit derjenigen um die Grundrechtung…. Ein Mensch übt Toleranz, wenn er einen anderen Menschen duldet und gelten läßt, der sich in seinen Meinungen und Anschauungen und vielleicht auch in seinem Handeln von ihm unterscheidet.113
[Wherever tolerance as a social virtue and hence as an obligation is taken seriously, it is oriented toward the conviction of critical importance of human dignity. In this central reference point, the discussion on tolerance does not only interlink with the discussion on freedom, but also with the one on the fundamental human rights…. An individual practices tolerance when s/he tolerates another person and acknowledges him/her even though s/he differs in his/her opinions and concepts, and maybe even in his/her actions.]
The Middle Ages and the early modern age were certainly not ripe with ideas about tolerance, but the concept of toleration was well in place already then. The countless discussions about faith, truth, wisdom, ethics, and other related topics within a religious and philosophical context confirm this observation, some of which we will revisit in the following chapters. As Nederman rightly emphasizes, reflecting on the various sources that he had studied in his book,
from the twelfth century through to the sixteenth, these writers sought to articulate an overarching “moral” principle capable of providing for “peaceful coexistence” and thus for “basic human rights,” to borrow Michael Walzer’s terminology. Such moral principles were, as we have seen, derived from an account of human nature, but they tended not to posit an abstract and universalized human essence, such as “natural” rights or “personal autonomy.” Medieval notions of human nature that promoted tolerance instead tended to give primacy to the features of the species that made its members and communities different rather than identical. Thus, the very contextualization of tolerant attitudes and practices had the effect of generating a powerful rationale for extending toleration to differing (even repugnant) teachings and forms of worship.114
Other scholars do not see it that way at all, of course, but much depends on the text selection, the terminology, the methodological approach, and the critical perspectives. For Jerold C. Frakes, all the documents that have been cited as confirming elements of tolerance—he does not know, or at least does not use, the term ‘toleration’—represent nothing but bigotry and thinly veiled hegemonic statements supporting the supremacy of Christianity over all other religions—it seems very difficult, if not anachronistic, to talk about bigotry in the pre-modern world vis-à-vis religion, mutual acceptance, religious debates, and literary projections. It is virtually impossible and really beside the point to probe what the individual writers of literary, theological, and philosophical texts really intended. We have many texts available that allow us to examine important ideas concerning other religions, cultures, ethnicities, and languages and to uncover refreshingly innovative positions.
For Frakes, however, Hrotsvit of Gandersheim, the Ludus de Antichristo, or Wolfram von Eschenbach would have to be judged by modern criteria and would hence fall under the category of racism and Islamophobia. He wonders whether Wolfram could not have had a working knowledge of the Qu’ran (ca. 1200!) and, hence, could not have changed his views about Muslims at large. Frakes does not blame Wolfram, or any other writer from that time, individually, but charges the entire medieval society for its bigotry: “we must view Wolfram’s bigotry not as his own invention but rather, in its cultural context, as a single reiteration of a recurring mode of Euro-Christian responses to the Other, in this case the Muslim Other.”115 Consequently, Frakes reaches conclusions that a more careful analysis would simply not maintain, such as that all ‘good Muslims’ must convert to Christianity, that all black people presented in medieval texts are viewed negatively, and that all speech by Muslim characters represents nothing but “a series of discursive tropes divorced from any but a most remote and refracted origin in reality.”116 Little wonder that he closes his investigations with the global perception that medieval writers—som
e, many, all?—were determined by a fundamental cliché regarding the Muslim Other, propagated from the early Middle Ages to the modern age, without deviation, exclusively, and all-encompassing.
Such remarks might ultimately fall, unfortunately, into the same category of virtually racist perceptions, only from the opposite end. Frakes is too smart, of course, not to become a victim of such a danger, but most of his readings confirm his explicitly postmodern interpretations, which do not do a good service to the historical-literary texts or to postmodern theory either. The debate is ongoing, but I think it is high time to stem the flood of overly theory-driven arguments that refrain from reading our texts carefully enough and to return to our sources, after having been theoretically energized.117 Although most pre-modern documents seem to indicate the predominance of intolerant and dogmatic thinking, a close analysis will reveal that here we deal with a much more poly-vocal world with many more religious perspectives than has been previously assumed.118
Notes
1 See the contributions to Grenzen der Toleranz, ed. Detlef Pollack et al. (2014); Bernhard Casper, Grundfragen des Humanen (2014); for global perspectives, see Toleranz im Weltkontext, ed. Hamid Reza Yousef and Harald Seubert (2013). I have been extensively influenced by the numerous studies in the volume Kulturthema Toleranz, ed. Alois Wierlacher (1996). The topics discussed here pertain, for instance, to active tolerance, tolerance versus cultural violence, human rights, tolerance and culture, tolerance within the world of human languages, tolerance in historical terms, and tolerance in various cultural contexts. Most provocatively and constructively at the same time proves to be the philosophical and social-cultural investigations by Alexander Thomas, “Ist Toleranz ein Kulturstandard?” (1996), 181–204.
2 See the excellent anthology with religious texts, Religiöse Toleranz: Dokumente zur Geschichte einer Forderung, intro, commentary, and ed. Hans R. Guggisberg (1984).
3 See the contributions to Toleration in Conflict, ed. Rainer Forst and Ciaran Cronin (2016).
4 This issue is currently discussed internationally and in many different academic, political, and social settings; see, for instance, Owen Anderson, The Declaration of Independence and God (2015); Liberté religieuse et cohésion sociale, ed. Florence Faberon. (2015); An Inquiry into the Existence of Global Values, ed. Dennis Davis, Alan Richter, and Cheryl Saunders (2015); Modernity – Unity in Diversity?:, ed. Kjartan Koch Mikalsen, Erling Skjei, Audun Øfsti (2016).
5 I could not have imagined how relevant and topical this issue would be while writing this book. Racism and intolerance have raised their ugly head in the United States once again, as documented by the demonstrations and various forms of violence in Charlottesville, VA, August 12, 2017. I also am very mindful of the suffering of Black-Americans and the movement, “Black Lives Matter,” among many others. It seems as if this book on toleration and tolerance in the Middle Ages and the early modern age does not only reflect a historical-philosophical interest, but also addresses the current situation in America, and in other parts of the world, just as much. We are hence called upon once again to remember the lessons from the past and to apply them to our own time, alas.
6 Henryk M. Broder, Kritik der reinen Toleranz (2008). His provocative theses alert us to the problem that even a tolerant society needs to be on the guard against most intolerant enemies who cannot be protected on the grounds of limitless tolerance. Laws, courts, police, and other institutions must have the authority, as Broder argues, to carry out justice and hence also apply penalties and not reward criminals. Terrorists are not, for instance, worthy resistance or freedom fighters, when they blow up innocent civilians. See also Kelly James Clark, Abraham’s Children (2012). As to children and tolerance, see Sophie Minette, “Freedom of Expression and Promoting Tolerance,” (2014): 181–91; Rachel Dean-Ruzicka, Tolerance Discourse and Young Adult Holocaust Literature (2016). One of the most fundamental studies continues to be the monograph by W. Paul Vogt, Tolerance and Education (1997).
7 Paradoxes of Religious Toleration in Early Modern Political Thought, ed. John Christian Laursen and María José Villaverde (2012).
8 Peter Dinzelbacher, “Die ostgotischen Könige, die Religionen und das Recht nach Cassiodors ‘Variae’” (2013): 1–27; Theoderich der Große, ed. Manfred Clauss (2015); Monika Ozóg, Inter duas potestates: The Religious Policy of Theoderic the Great, trans. Marcin Fijak. (2016).
9 Eckehart Stöve, “Toleranz: I. Kirchengeschichtlich” (2002), 646.
10 See also Hartmut Rosenau, “Toleranz: II. Ethisch” (2002), 664–68; Peter Gerlitz, “Toleranz: III. Religionsgeschichtlich” (2002) 668–76. In particular, he discusses the concept of tolerance as developed by famous Gustav Mensching (1901–1978), who had differentiated between formal and substantive tolerance, the latter meaning the positive recognition of other religions. Gerlitz differentiates this binary pair into ten different concepts of tolerance, such as eclectic, dialogic, rational, temporal tolerance, ethical, and quasi tolerance.
11 See Werner Heinz, “Toleranz – Akzeptanz – Versöhnung (forthcoming). Peter Dinzelbacher, “Toleranz bei Bernhard von Clairvaux?” (2002): 9–29.
12 Arold Angenendt, Toleranz und Gewalt: das Christentum zwischen Bibel und Schwert (2007/2009; 2014); Schwierige Toleranz: der Umgang mit Andersdenkenden und Andersgläubigen in der Christentumgeschichte, ed. Mariano Delgado, Volker Leppin und David Neuhold (2012).
13 For an excellent overview of the endemic conflicts within Christianity since late antiquity and the centuries-long in-fighting among the various Christian churches and groups well into the seventeenth century, see Ernst Benz, Beschreibung des Christentums (1975), 158–62.
14 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles (2000); see also the excellent, very detailed, and thoroughly researched article online at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Troubles (last accessed on December 29, 2017).
15 Igino Cardinale, Religious Tolerance, Freedom and Inter-Group Relations in the Light of Vatican Council II (1966); for the text itself, in English translation, see online at: www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html (last accessed on December 29, 2017). See also Catholic Engagement with World Religions, ed. Karl J. Becker and Ilaria Morali (2010); Religionsfreiheit – gegenwärtige Herausforderungen aus christlicher Sicht, ed. Daniel Legutke (2009). Currently, there are many efforts to foster inter-religious communications; see, for example, The Transformation of the Christian Churches in Western, ed. Leo Kenis (2004); Paul Hedges, Contemporary Muslim-Christian Encounters (2015).
16 Here the authors refer to a long list of Church Fathers and other religious authorities from late antiquity and the early Middle Ages supporting their new, or rather very old, position: “Cf. Lactantius ‘Divinarum Institutionum’, Book V, 19: CSEL 19, pp. 463–64, 465: PL 6, 614 and 616 (ch. 20); St. Ambrose, ‘Epistola ad Valentianum Imp.’, Letter 21: PL 16, 1005; St. Augustine, ‘Contra Litteras Petiliani’, Book II, ch. 83: CSEL 52 p. 112: PL 43, 315; cf. C. 23, q. 5, c. 33, (ed. Friedberg, col. 939); idem, Letter 23: PL 33, 98, idem, Letter 34: PL 33, 132; idem, Letter 35: PL 33, 135; St. Gregory the Great, ‘Epistola ad Virgilium et Theodorum Episcopos Massiliae Galliarum[’], Register of Letters I, 45: MGH Ep. 1, p. 72: PL 77, 510–511 (Book I, ep. 47); idem, ‘Epistola ad Johannem Episcopum Constantinopolitanum’, Register of Letters, III, 52: MGH Letter 1, p. 210: PL 77, 649 (Book III, Letter 53); cf. D. 45, c. 1 (ed. Friedberg, col 160); Council of Toledo IV, c. 57: Mansi 10, 633; cf. D. 45, c. 5 (ed. Friedberg, col. 161–162); Clement III: X., V, 6, 9: ed. Friedberg, col. 774; Innocent III, ‘Epistola ad Arelatensem Archiepiscopum’, X., III, 42, 3: Friedberg, col. 646.
17 Alyssa Gabbay, Islamic Tolerance (2010); Arabic and Islamic Textual Interpretations on Religious Tolerance, ed. Badmas O. Yusuf (2015); see also Aaron Tyler, Islam, the West, and Tolerance (2008); Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam (2003); Henning Wrogemann, Muslime und Christen in der (2016); see also Kai Hafez,
Islam in “Liberal” Europe, trans. Alex Skinner (2014).
18 Gudrun Krämer, “Toleranz im Islam (2010), 39–52; Thomas Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität: eine andere Geschichte des Islams (2011).
19 Antti Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols in the Middle of the Thirteenth Century (2001); Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ed. William W. Fitzhugh, Morris Rossabi, and William Honeychurch (2009); The History of Mongolia, ed. by David Sneath. Vol. 2 (2010); Bat-Ochir Bold, Mongolian Nomadic Society (2013); Denise Aigle, The Mongol Empire Between Myth and Reality (2014); Kim M. Phillips, Before Orientalism (2014); The Mongol Empire: A Historical Encyclopedia, ed. Timothy May (2017).
20 Norbert Winkler, “Toleranz im Mittelalter?” (1991): 853–67. He draws from famous Goethe’s Maximen und Reflexionen, no. 877, and then offers the concept of “selbstreflexive Systemkorrektur” (854–55; self-reflective correction of the system), which is predicated on open dialogues and a basic willingness to adapt and to modify the own world view.
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