Grant’s soldiers were in just as bad a condition, most of them having lost all their belongings when the Southerners overran and looted their army camps. Even the colonels and generals wound up with their belongings in possession of patched-pants Confederates. Lieutenant Colonel Adolph Engelmann, Forty-third Illinois, lost his shaving gear, new coat, underwear, extra uniforms, and a fifty dollar saddle. Captain Andrew Hickenlooper found his tent completely looted by the Southerners, and he was forced to remain in his muddy, bloody clothes of Sunday and Monday until supplies arrived and he was able to purchase new uniforms.2 A private in the Twelfth Michigan lost his knapsack, haversack, canteen, overcoat, blanket, and even a letter he had just written to his sweetheart back home.3
If the loss of clothing and personal effects was serious, the army was faced with an even more drastic immediate problem—the shortage of foodstuffs. It was a week after the battle before the army could bring provisions by steamer to replace those carried away or ruined by the Rebels. In the meantime, troops lived on what could be salvaged from the ruined supplies or what they were able to purchase from the helpful army sutlers. Most of the soldiers were able to find a few soda crackers to chew on, but these were not particularly tasty or filling. Even crackers were somewhat scarce, and a dozen thin slices sold for a dime. Eggs were selling at twenty-five cents a piece, while butter varied from thirty to forty cents a pound. Apples cost the previously unheard of price of two for a nickel. Postage stamps ran from five to eight cents each, although one soldier was able to pick up a bargain lot at thirty for one dollar. Writing paper was even more dear; however, many soldiers were able to buy small quantities to drop a few lines to the folks back home.4
Despite the handicaps and discomforts of the post-battle camp, the soldiers were doing some thinking and drawing conclusions. The attitude of the army, or at least a substantial part of it, was that the whole mess was Grant’s fault. The soldiers told each other that Grant should have sent out patrols to avoid being surprised, while others claimed the army camps should have been fortified. If the commanding general was catching criticism at Pittsburg, it was no wonder the folks back home began asking a lot of embarrassing questions.
Although vague rumors of the battle at Pittsburg first reached Washington, D. C. on the night of April 8, the country as a whole got its first concrete news about Shiloh from the April 10 issue of the New York Herald. It was an account by a correspondent, W. C. Carroll, who had served as a volunteer aide on Grant’s staff.5
Carroll completely whitewashed Grant, ignoring any hint that the general had been taken by surprise. The enterprising correspondent went on to say that Grant had personally turned the tide on the second day of the battle by leading a heroic charge, a statement which was untrue. The story made a sensation, and the whole United States went mad with joy.6
The first warm glow of Northern enthusiasm soon wore off as young Whitelaw Reid, correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette under the pen name Agate, fired off his account of the battle at Pittsburg to Cincinnati. The Gazette ran his massive letter, which was picked up by other prominent newspapers. The Gazette account was a revelation to many Americans who had gone overboard on the Herald account. Reid was convinced the army was taken by surprise, that Grant and the other generals were incompetent, and that the army had narrowly averted disaster. He charged the army was surprised in its tents and beds, and that some of the men were bayoneted before they could even put on their clothes. Reid made a number of errors, including the especially erroneous one that Prentiss was captured at 10:00 a.m., but on the whole his account was a remarkably reasonable appraisal of the battle, considering his own inexperience and the hectic conditions under which he worked.
By his article, Reid unleashed a hurricane of criticism of the Union command at Shiloh. Cowards who had run away from the battle and reached safety in Northern cities regaled frightened civilians with stories of terrible command stupidity and incompetence, screaming the whole thing was the fault of Union superior officers.7
Governor David Tod of Ohio howled that the routed Fifty-third and Fifty-seventh Ohio Regiments were innocent, that the disaster that had befallen them was due to “criminal negligence” of Grant, Sherman, and other generals. Ohio editors and politicians castigated Grant as the villain in the picture, and in Congress, Representative James Harlan of Iowa declared that Grant had blundered at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh, and had only been saved at the latter by the arrival of Buell. Lieutenant Governor Benjamin Stanton of Ohio criticized Grant in a newspaper article on April 12, saying he ought to “be court martialed or shot.”8 Ugly rumors began to circulate that Grant was drunk at Shiloh, although the charge was untrue. For years stories of his drinking would recur again and again as his friends and enemies rushed to at tack or to defend him.9 The soldiers of Buell’s army were convinced that Grant was not only incompetent, but also besotted on that fateful Sunday morning.10
If the army and the nation were upset by the accusations and charges arising out of Shiloh, then there was equally widespread jubilation over the news from Island No. 10. After several weeks of confused and almost bloodless fighting, the Confederate bastion surrendered on April 7 to the hero of New Madrid, General John Pope. Actually it was the United States Navy which made possible the capture, but Pope received most of the credit and was soon on his way to becoming the hero of the radical wing of the Republican Party, and many other Americans as well. The capture not only raised Union morale and freed Pope’s army for operations against Corinth, but it also cost the Confederate army seven thousand irreplaceable men captured, besides a large amount of precious war material.11
The rest of Buell’s army, including George Thomas’ division, soon arrived at Shiloh to be followed a few days later by Pope’s command, fresh from its Mississippi River victory. Additional fresh regiments came in from all quarters and the army swelled in fighting strength. The equipment and supplies left behind by the Army of the Ohio finally arrived at Pittsburg a week after the battle, while other supply shortages were quickly rectified. One handicap to Union efficiency was the persistent bad weather. It rained almost every day, and ten days after the battle, a sharp cold spell engulfed the Union army.12
The most significant event at Pittsburg Landing was not the rain, weather, or supplies, but the arrival of a new army commander: Major General Henry Wager Halleck. On April 11, Halleck arrived by steamer and promptly took charge, much to the curiosity and interest of the Union soldiers. Whatever the merits of Halleck as a soldier, his arrival certainly seemed to have been useful from the standpoint of army morale and discipline. Ever since the battle, the army had been at least partially in a state of chaos. Deserters kept wandering off by hitching rides on steamers, while on occasion waves of panic swept through the troops. In one instance, someone yelled or shouted something about a Rebel attack, and hundreds of men started running for the river in wild panic. On Wednesday morning after the battle, the troops from the Twelfth Illinois abruptly lost their heads and raked Sherman’s regimental camp with gunfire, wounding four men in the process. Just two days after this unfortunate experience, another bad panic swept through the army camp as some fool spread a false alarm about attacking Confederates. Fortunately, officers kept their heads and managed to restore order before anyone was hurt.13
Halleck quickly set to work restoring discipline and improving the conditions of the individual soldier. Each corps commander was made responsible for his own organization, discipline, and supply, while an all-out drive was launched to improve the health of the soldiers. These considered actions produced much good and reduced the number of occupied hospital beds.14
Southward at Corinth, General Beauregard similarly worked to prepare his army for action. Work parties were soon busy adding to the existing fortifications, while a steady stream of reinforcements arrived. Van Dorn’s troops, as well as a few scattered regiments, reached camp in mid-April, but the Creole soon worked out a new table of organization allowing for the new units. Confeder
ate morale was-fairly high, and the soldiers much better armed than when they had started the campaign, thanks to their capture of Union weapons. Unfortunately the Southern army suffered terribly from disease. Large numbers of soldiers contracted pneumonia during the marches to and from Shiloh, while the inadequate rations of the campaign worked havoc with the digestive tracts and bowels of the men. The pitifully overworked Confederate medical staff found themselves burdened with a staggering sick list on top of the thousands of wounded to be cared for.15 Typhoid fever soon made its deadly appearance, dropping privates and colonels with equal efficiency. The water supply at Corinth, already in bad shape be fore the battle, was soon almost completely polluted. During the last week in April and in the month of May, tens of thousands of Confederates be came ill from drinking the germ-filled water. Southern reinforcements scarcely kept even with the daily decrease in effectives caused by disease.16
On top of all their other woes, the Southerners suffered greatly from hunger. Rations were scanty both as to quantity and quality. General Beauregard remonstrated with Richmond authorities, pleading for better commissary arrangements, but met with scant success.17
Confederate morale plummeted badly as the news of the fall of New Orleans reached the camp. To the men it seemed as though they were being surrounded by enemy armies on all sides.18 Most of the soldiers would have welcomed a battle as a pleasant relief from the sickness and tedium of life at Corinth, but un fortunately the Union army was not too obliging about giving any kind of fight.
Halleck would not budge from Pittsburg Landing until his army was at maximum strength, fully equipped, well supplied, and at least comparatively competently trained; besides it was useless to take the offensive until the weather cleared and the roads dried up. Northern patrols from Pittsburg occasionally dueled with Confederate picket posts, but there would be no big push until the end of April.
With an eighth of a million men available, Halleck finally gave the order to advance on April 29. The Union army was completely different from the force that fought at Shiloh. The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth divisions of Grant’s old army and the division of Major General George H. Thomas now formed the Union right wing, commanded by the Virginian Thomas. Buell’s Army of the Ohio, reduced to the divisions of Wood, Nelson, and McCook, formed the center, while Pope’s Army of the Mississippi became the Union left wing. McClernand commanded a reserve corps, consisting of his own division and those of Crittenden and Lew Wallace.19
Grant was appointed second in command of this new army, but the title only signified that he was shelved, for Halleck apparently felt that there was substance to the accusations made against Grant after Shiloh. The unhappy former army commander grieved about his new assignment and even considered handing in his resignation; however, fortunately for the Union cause, he was dissuaded by Sherman’s good offices.20
Even with the massive numbers of men available, the Federal advance on Corinth was painfully slow. Halleck was determined to give Beauregard no opening for a vigorous counterattack. The Federals advanced cautiously behind screens of pickets and patrols, frequently halting to fortify the newly occupied ground. It would take four weeks for the army to reach the environs of Corinth, but it would make the short passage without fighting a major battle, and indeed with few battle casualties. The advance literally turned into a gigantic siege. But there was little lack of excitement despite the absence of big heroic clashes. Union and Confederate patrols frequently traded shots, and there was occasionally a brigade or even divisional strength engagement.
While thousands of soldiers labored at building roads, corduroying through the swamps for the heavy artillery and wagons to pass over, General Halleck’s left wing drew first blood on May 3. Confederate skirmishers interfered with Union work parties along the road to Farmington, and Brigadier General James D. Morgan, of the First Division, deployed more than one thousand of his infantry and a battery of artillery to clear them out.
A casual meandering sort of battle developed, with the Southerners making a fighting retreat down the road in the face of vigorous enemy pressure. General Pope’s soldiers finally entered Farmington, Mississippi, where they fought a second engagement with Confederate skirmishers south of the town. The entire affair lasted about three hours, until about 6:00 p.m., when the fighting died down. Probably no more than one hundred and fifty soldiers were killed or wounded on both sides, but it was still a noisy and bloody affair, and it was the biggest since Shiloh.
The Confederates were commanded by Colonel John S. Marmaduke and numbered about two thousand men, cavalry and infantry, and at least three pieces of artillery.21 Sharp picket fighting broke out again on the following day, with Confederate soldiers trading Minie balls at long range. One Rebel scout crept up to a Federal work party and picked off a Union officer. Jumping to his feet, the Southerner made a wild but successful dash back to a Confederate picket post.22
The skies opened up again, raining on the Blue and Gray alike, but work on building fortifications and roads continued. Union and Confederate guns traded a few cautious long range shots to try and determine each other’s positions and strength. Patrol activity flared on the Union right wing, and several Confederate prisoners were brought in to Thomas’ headquarters.23
General Beauregard was eager to strike a blow against Halleck, and Pope’s capture of Farmington seemed to provide the needed opportunity. Farmington was only about four miles from Corinth, and the swamp area around the little town meant that the hero of Island No. 10 was virtually isolated from the rest of the army. Beauregard’s plan was for Bragg to distract Pope’s attention with a frontal assault while Van Dorn attacked the Union left.24
On the morning of May 9, Bragg struck. Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles’ Division actually made the assault, driving in Federal skirmishers and driving off the Second Iowa Cavalry. The Southerners swarmed into Farmington, captured a number of prisoners, grabbed up a newly established telegraph station, and secured a considerable quantity of Federal supplies. Just beyond the town, Ruggles encountered a strong force of Pope’s infantry, which he engaged. Union skirmishers were chased off and several Federal infantry regiments badly mauled and forced to withdraw. The Southerners were finally ordered to halt lest they run into an ambush, but Private Charles Lamb, Thirteenth Louisiana, became so excited that he rushed after Pope’s men until shot through the left leg. Lamb and the other Confederate wounded were picked up, and General Ruggles reluctantly gave the order to withdraw for Van Dorn had failed to make his flanking move. Ruggles’ losses were ninety-nine men killed and wounded as against one hundred and seventy-eight Union casualties. Twelve Confederate regiments, one battalion, and four batteries were involved as compared to eleven Union regiments.25 Pope pulled his troops back several miles so as to co operate better with the rest of the army and to al lay Halleck’s fears about him be coming trapped in the exposed Farmington position. For more than a week operations languished in the Corinth area as both armies cautiously kept their horns in and continued digging.
Beauregard’s situation steadily deteriorated as the Federals grew ever closer. His total effectives were only about fifty thousand men, thanks to the deadly effects of disease. If Halleck continued his siege-like approach, the Confederates would be forced to either fight under almost hopeless conditions or else evacuate Corinth and the surrounding fortifications.
To try and divert some of Halleck’s army away, Beauregard launched raiding parties into Tennessee and Kentucky. The Creole hoped to pull troops away from the Corinth area to oppose these parties, but the plan failed as the raiders were too few in number to make any spectacular inroads on Federal communications.26
While the raiding parties were doing their part, Beauregard’s soldiers skirmished and dug around Corinth. Miles of trenches and breastworks were thrown up, protecting the various approaches to the little Mississippi community. Grumbling soldiers dotted the countryside with a seemingly infinite number of rifle pits.
While thousa
nds dug, hundreds traded shots with the Federals. Here and there a Southerner went down, his flesh torn by an enemy sharpshooter’s round. One Southern private suddenly felt a tremendous blow on his leg, and looking down, he could see a small red mark which rapidly grew into a large whelp. A spent musket ball had hit him. Shaking with relief, the private sat down on the ground, emptying his stomach of his last scanty meal. The Sixth Tennessee was pestered by a Northern sniper who was peppering their picket post. The men finally spotted the Yank about five hundred yards away behind a large oak tree. But the fellow was too agile for their return fire. Finally Captain Ephrain Harbert, Company K, arrived at the post. A noted Tennessee squirrel hunter, Harbert watched the proceedings with a certain amount of disdain. Finally he took an Enfield rifle from one of the soldiers. He waited for the Yank to fire again and then gently squeezed the trigger. The Federal jerked backward behind the tree and did no more shooting that day.
Occasionally some of the Southerners got a little time off to visit the town. Most of the men vainly hunted for some liquor or decent food. One Confederate noticed some Federal soldiers being marched through the town and recorded in his diary that the “blue rascals looked like sheep killing dogs.”27
The daily monotony was finally broken by a sharp fight caused when Sherman assaulted the Russell House on the extreme Confederate left. Morgan L. Smith’s brigade, supported by Bouton’s Illinois Battery, assaulted the house and surrounding works, driving the Confederates out after an hour’s fight. The Southerners were finally forced to give ground, although a Rebel officer made a gallant effort to rally his men. Private R. M. Snyder, Company G, Eighth Missouri, put a rifle ball through the Southern officer’s head, ending his efforts. Federal losses were ten killed and thirty-one wounded, while Sherman reported that his men took one prisoner and found twelve bodies in and around the house.
Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862 Page 33