Joe was not troubled by the objective of lowering the morale of Germany’s workforce by night bombing. The argument in favour of dispersal of effort was to keep as much of Germany’s civilian workforce sleepless, if not actually homeless, as possible, by setting off air raid alarms in many different locations, with no predictable pattern. It was an argument that made a virtue out of necessity, so long as there were neither sufficient aircraft to launch a concentrated attack, nor the technical means to ensure their concentration in time and space at the desired location. The bomber stream – dozens or hundreds of aircraft travelling together in overwhelming force and arriving in precise sequence and time – was a tactic not yet developed.
In the meantime, the problem that had become apparent to crews from their own experience in the autumn of 1941 was that, whether or not they were successfully disrupting civilian life, they were not doing sufficient damage to industrial or military objectives. The problem, Joe continued, was that
the indecisive bombing policy has caused further effects. The trips are merely sorties and it matters little whether you drop your bombs smack on the railway station or some quiet country home – the results are about the same and since the German defences are good you are glad to get rid of your bombs regardless of where they fall & you often have to since the majority of fellows are sensible, intelligent & practical that is what is done. (JJN undated [October] 1941)
In short, the revelations of the Butt Report, and the absence of any immediate prospect of improving navigation and bomb-aiming techniques by more than a margin, seem to have persuaded flying crews that since they were not capable of precision bombing of key military and industrial targets, then dropping their bombs on any built-up area was good enough, and indeed as good as could be expected. Under the circumstances, only heavy concentrations of aircraft sent in sequence – first to mark the target, then raise fires with incendiaries, and then blast it with heavy explosives – could inflict serious physical damage on key targets, as opposed to morale. These tactics had been under active consideration at senior levels in Bomber Command for some time, but Joe’s notebook suggests that the issue was also well understood by those on the front line.
Engaging in what amounted to no more than nuisance raids was detrimental to aircrew morale, Joe asserted, and he set out the tactics and incentives he believed would correct the situation:
Individual squadrons and planes must be given definite tasks so that they will be willing to take greater risks to accomplish a definite task and responsibility and see definite results – there is too much haphazard bombing going on – too many senseless trips being made which breaks down the spirit and fight of even the best men.
No sense taking foolhardy risks when nothing is achieved or gained worth taking risks for. Now the majority of fellows are cool, brave, courageous, daring & ingenious. We all have fighting spirit and a burning desire to achieve concrete results, to sell our lives dearly – to put the Germans where they belong. The way to utilize the qualities of our airmen is to give them something to aim at. A definite important target with our full powers used would achieve miracles. If each group – each squadron, each individual was made to feel that their collective & personal reputations were at stake – then results would follow – if the whole available air force co-operated on one target at one time – then the bombing results would prove positive. …
… squadrons should be run like football teams. Each man competes against the other to prove their superiority – yet all co-operate together to show their collective superiority – with individuals, squadrons & groups competing against one another for the best results yet working together to obtain them must be the keystone for successful and decisive results with the type of fellow in our air force …
(JJN undated [October] 1941)
He singled out the tour system, “the stupid rule that you do 200 hours or 35 trips on operations,” as a perverse incentive because “after a certain number of trips – that objective – that aim – that hope is prevalent during your operational trips.” Everyone, he claimed,
is obsessed with (1) Finishing 200 operational hr. (2) Winning a DFM or DFC (3) Getting a commission. The first point dominates – instead of concentrating on blasting the target – of socking the Germans – of winning the war by these means – we continuously count our hours and trips and forget why we are making them. This attitude is encouraged by our strategic policy – since many raids are half hearted, conducted in bad weather and on fiercely defended targets, some fellows feel as long as they drop their bombs they are doing their stuff – our whole plan must be more definite and better executed.
We must get away from our 200 hrs and get a policy based on achievement and give definite responsibilities to those who succeed – sending everyone to O.T.U. on a rest cure is stupid – it is also criminal – everyone dreads going to those wasteful death traps – give the men who show their capabilities something worthwhile instead of a dangerous, depressing so called rest. We are young we can stand work and danger and responsibilities. (JJN undated [October] 1941)
Of decorations and commissions, Joe observed:
Most fellows want some badge of recognition to show they have done their 200 hours which feat is well worth being proud of. Sensible distribution & awarding of awards greatly improves the morale of the squadron.
… no more commissions should be awarded until a minimum number of operational trips have been made – say ten. New classes of men are being given responsibilities before they have proved themselves, whilst true, tried, dependable and brave men remain NCOs – thus the greatest use is not being made of their ability as leaders – a fairer and more sensible system also improves the spirit of the men.
(JJN undated [October] 1941)
The existing system was, for Joe, one more example of the hidebound nature of the upper echelons of command, and was in urgent need of correction.
It is this senseless organization – this stupid adherence to a so called plan or policy that is our undoing – wake up lads and take advantage of the materials at hand – make use of our great young youths –
I have seen many a good enthusiastic fellow ruined and unnerved by our system – also many a capable man rot in liquor & women –
… We are not worried for the most part about our lives – the Dominion boys especially – but the English fellows are not far behind – arrive in England chock full of enthusiasm – they want to do heroic deeds and justify the confidence & responsibility placed in them – but what happens over here. By the time they have finished being tossed around, kept inactive and stepped on their enthusiasm has been dampened, their initiative submerged, their talent left unutilized.
(JJN undated [October] 1941)
Joe cannot have been alone in his views. These matters would have been the regular topic of discussion among flying crews based on their recent experience. His notebook provides substantial evidence that, three months into Bomber Command’s all-out strategic offensive against Germany, its flyers were well aware of its limitations and the reasons for them, even if they were not privy to the 9 July directive itself, or to the full details of the Butt Report. Bomber Command crews knew perfectly well that they were engaged in area bombing, and why. They were also aware that it was directed more against Germany’s “morale” than its actual military and industrial capacities. And they knew that precision bombing would not and could not be achieved by more attentive dead reckoning and astro-navigation, more meticulous paperwork, and more intensive intelligence debriefings.
Even the most confident aircrews had begun to realize that they could not prevail on fighting spirit alone. That was a lesson that airmen of all the combatant countries would learn the hard way in the coming years. Allied victory would rely on technical superiority and the application of modern management techniques, as Joe had already perceived. And Joe was coming around to the view that achieving those ends was not simply a military issue but a political one.
The most c
onsistent concern in discussion of both Dave & myself is the rut we are in and the absolute inability of the present leaders in Engl. to cope with the ideas & problems – economic, social, military etc. today – we cannot win the war until courageous, imaginative efficient men cast aside old prejudices & fifth columnists and take steps to win this war. (JJD 19 October 1941)
Looking thru “The Aeroplane” list of awards & casualties today one of our basic injustices was clearly demonstrated – most of the awards for bravery were to officers – especially the high ranking ones who fly seldom & whose bravery is often open to question – an odd sergeant is condescendingly given an award – but the casualty lists are mostly sergeants with comparatively few officers – right thru our whole system is found that striking inequality – that injustice – the ones who do the work – take the risks – suffer the most – receive the least credit – return or consideration. (JJD 1 November 1941)
None of these concerns deterred Joe from the job at hand, and a good sortie reinvigorated him.
Did a mine laying job in Kiel Harbour again, bombed & machine gunned a ship – had a pleasant time. … (JJD 4 November 1941)
We had a lot of fun flying at 2000' all the way. The weather was mucky all over but after persistent searching around the Baltic we found a pin point on the desired island – dodged a few flak ships and made a perfect run over the desired spot from 700' and dropped the mine. We then bombed a schooner which I missed and made four attacks firing our machine guns at it from about 50' – the bloody ship ignored our aggressiveness entirely – I guess they were all asleep.
I fell asleep coming home and was too lazy to take any loop bearings or star shots – subsequently we landed around London with warships flashing challenges at us. We were a mere 150 miles off track and proceeded home. Upon arrival we were given a warm reception. Firstly because we had been given up as lost – secondly because we were one of the few crews to actually drop the vegetable in the required spot.
We have a pleasant time on trips. Robby and I usually have an argument about where we are – Hodge chides me good naturedly and all congratulate Robby vociferously when he smartly fools the searchlight and aak battery. I really enjoy our little jaunts with my crew. Robby is a top notch pilot. (JJOD 4 November 1941)
Joe added, in a note to Monty, “We have the only crew in captivity that smokes cigars as they machine gun the Hun.”
Joe’s performance on the return trip from the Baltic did not gain him a place on the list of outstanding navigation errors in the monthly Navigation Bulletin, although similar lapses by other navigators often did. Joe’s squadron leader would later characterize him as a brilliant navigator, who conducted his duties with skill and courage. He may not always have been a meticulous one, or consistently used his tools and training to best advantage, as he occasionally criticized himself for in his diary. The Navigation Bulletin repeatedly exhorted navigators to be alert on the return journey, and navigate home as carefully as they had to the target. Perhaps on this occasion Joe thought that having completed his primary task successfully, he could provide his captain with a homeward course, and relax. Joe was not alone in succumbing to cold, noise, oxygen deficiency, and fatigue on long trips, drained of adrenalin after completing the attack. Star shots involved disconnecting his oxygen supply, crawling up from underneath the cockpit to the dome behind the pilot each time.
Perhaps Joe and many others had absorbed the lesson that regardless of how many star shots they took, or how neatly they kept their logs, finding the aiming point was the exception, not the rule, and that any destruction in a built-up area would suffice if they could not. Perhaps all that many airmen, like Joe it would appear, wanted at this point was to get through this difficult period and live to see the day when they would be better equipped for the task. The higher-ups could nag them about their performance, but not much would or could change until the promised radio-navigation aids arrived.
Joe summed up his situation in his operational diary.
After three months on operations … I can better review life on a bomber squadron.
Firstly: I have definitely settled down. I know the dangers, the chances we take, the chance we have of getting thru the first batch – having accepted the situation calmly and logically I have settled down to an orderly life.
Secondly: I still get a kick out of my operational trips because
1. I am with an experienced crew. We all know the score – that cancels off plenty of the risk.
2. I love action. Unfortunately, this is all negative destruction action. Nevertheless it is activity that calls for skill, cooperation, courage amongst other qualities.
3. most important – it is concrete, tangible and effective way of fighting the Germans. Since their ideas and actions should and are being fought, I as a fighter willing to stand by mine and my country’s form of living against Germany’s get satisfaction while others & me get the benefit out of my small part as an individual.
Thirdly: I am making use of some of my spare time by
1. keeping physically fit
2. keeping mentally fit
To enable me to fight the next battle – the battle for a better life with the required assets (which I have) and the required ammunition which I have not as yet.
Physical fitness – Dave, Roger & I ride about 15 miles per day on our bikes and manage to do the odd bit of boxing and gymnastics in our gym. I also do setting up exercises.
Mental fitness. I have been delving into social problems, our society, problems and solutions – I have read “Let My People Go” by Cedric Belfrage – mostly concerned with religion how it does and does not function in the U.S. in particular. Also “The Socialist Sixth of the World” by the Dean of Canterbury concerning Russia & comparing their life, problems & solutions to ours – we have come out poorly in both books and I intend reading the Bible, Marx, Lenin, etc. I also have a book on public speaking to study.
At this stage the operational trips serve a useful purpose outside of the military effects. Before and during every trip, unimportant petty worries and difficulties fade away – you soon get out of the habit of letting them enter your life – you are concerned with only two big problems – destroying Germans and preserving yourself. (JJOD 6 November 1941)
Twenty-Five
Winding Down
On 7 November, while most 106 Squadron crews were engaged in sea-mining operations in Oslo Fiord, two were sent to the Ruhr, and in support, two others, including Joe’s, were sent as “intruders” to the Kammhuber line. Carrying eight 250-pound bombs, their purpose was to disrupt searchlight operations in the Bocholt section by low-level bombing and machine gunning, which they did for an hour from between five hundred and two thousand feet.
Had to bomb and shoot out searchlights in the searchlight belt so that the boys could get thru to Essen more easily. Stooged back and forth for an hour, dropping bombs, shooting them up and generally scaring the ground crews. We had a singing contest over the intercom – every time we sang a song Robby did not like he would stick the nose of the plane down and stand us on our heads. (JJOD 8 November 1941)
The main action of the air offensive that night had been elsewhere. Bomber Command dispatched nearly four hundred aircraft, virtually all of its serviceable force, and nearly half of them to Berlin, despite adverse weather forecasts. It was one of the largest raids on Berlin so far in the war, and it was a disaster.1
37 planes missing last night 20 in the sea – including McIver – I guess they will start worrying back home – Roger back after a rough trip to Norway from Scotland …2 (JJD 8 November 1941)
The Berlin raid was big news, and it did cause worry at home. Percy recorded, the next day:
The worst air disaster of this war last night over Berlin. Thirty five of our airships lost. Main reason not anti aircraft guns but poor visibility. Airmen started out in the moonlight but ran into terrible weather conditions. Joe almost sure to have taken part in the raid. He has been in every major ra
id so far. After this war is over we will well wonder how we lived through these times. We cannot imagine anything happening to Joe, this is the feeling that all parents have so we carry on as normally as possible. I have just finished a letter to Joe. My sense tells me that it is just as likely as not that he may have been one of the unfortunate ones but my instinct refuses to accept such a possibility. In other words we refuse to accept any idea of disaster until disaster is upon us. And so tonight we go to see Target for Tonight a movie recommended by Joe. A movie by the way which is a document of what happens when a bomber goes over Germany. Not fiction. We don’t want to get away from the war, we want to keep as close as possible to it, we want to talk the same language as Joe when he returns to us. So we read Tally Ho and Bomber Command and everything else about aerial warfare that we can get hold of. (PJD 8 November 1941)
The Berlin disaster broke the War Cabinet’s patience with Bomber Command. Churchill demanded an explanation from its Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. Peirse blamed the unreliability of weather forecasting for the unanticipated extreme icing conditions and high winds encountered on the return trip from Germany. That so many crews ran out of fuel in these conditions, he claimed, was due to their insufficient knowledge of long-range flying. The fault lay, he implied, with his men. The Cabinet and the Air Ministry were less than satisfied. Peirse’s days at Bomber Command were now numbered. Aloof and never popular with flying crew, he was removed to the Pacific theatre less than two months later.
Joey Jacobson's War Page 29