Washington considered his actions carefully and often did the unexpected with surprisingly good results. Speak little, and when you speak, people will listen more. Decline to discuss your genuine exploits, and people will consider them even greater. Apologize to someone rather than challenge them to a duel that you are expected to win, and people will admire you all the more. The pattern is quite clear, and the behavior, foreign to politicians of our century, was admired in Washington’s day.
I. SUCCESS AT BOSTON
COMPARISON OF WASHINGTON TO MOSES, PAGES 92, 97, 120, 140
Governor Trumbull’s note with the flour comparing Washington to Moses, a note Trumbull really wrote, was not an isolated comparison. The war abounded with biblical references, particularly on the American side, and Josiah’s description of the constant comparisons of the colonists to the ancient Israelites, of King George to the Pharaoh, and of Washington to Moses was, if anything, understated. We have never had an American leader compared to a biblical figure the way Washington in his time was compared to Moses. Many colonists saw themselves as the heirs to the promised land and Washington as the “reincarnation of the faithful Hebrew deliverer” (Barry Schwartz, Washington: The Making of an American Symbol, 176). Hundreds of sermons after Washington’s death compared him to Moses. Reverend Timothy Dwight noted, “Comparison with him [Moses] is become almost proverbial.”
When Washington wasn’t being compared to Moses, he was being compared to the saints. Clergymen wanted to insert Washington’s farewell address into the Bible as an epilogue. (See Ron Chernow, Washington, 813.) No wonder Josiah was worried about the comparisons to Moses affecting Washington’s judgment about taking power that week at Newburgh.
II. DISASTER IN NEW YORK
PUBLIC OPINION TURNS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION, PAGES 103-107
Earlier we learned that those who were neutral or loyal to the king made up a sizable portion of the American population. After the massive defeat in New York in 1776 and the retreat across New Jersey to the Delaware River, one can imagine the impact on American public opinion. The British were not oblivious to this development. Relying on intelligence from General James Robertson and others (in military parlance today, we would call these men “old American hands”), the British believed that the Revolution was the work of a few “hot-headed designing men” and that two-thirds of Americans were loyal to the king. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 160.) Their strategy, therefore, was to pacify, restore order, and encourage a loyalist government in occupied New Jersey. Toward that end, the British offered amnesty, guarantees of life and property, and a chance for advancement to those who took a loyalty oath and pledged allegiance to the king.
The British belief in majority loyalist numbers was naive, but not naive was their claim that thousands of New Jersey residents took the loyalty oath to the king. As one Continental soldier observed, those taking the oath “consisted of the very rich and very poor, while the middling class held their constancy” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 162). One of New Jersey’s richest men and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, Richard Stockton, signed the oath to the king after harsh treatment and imprisonment. (He later renounced the oath, took a new oath to the Congress, and retained his home and property, which today is the official residence of New Jersey governors.)
Unfortunately for the British, the pacification policy went awry. Foraging became compulsory foraging, which turned into plundering, which turned into widespread rape upon the part of the British and especially their Hessian allies. Gang rapes by both British soldiers and officers were documented in diaries of British officers and American investigations. As American civilians responded by taking up arms, the British invoked the European laws of war that a man fighting out of uniform was a bandit or assassin who could be executed at once. To the Americans who believed civilians had the natural right to defend their liberties, such conduct quickly turned friends of the British into fierce foes. With the failure of the British pacification policy, the victories at Trenton and Princeton described by Josiah sparked a wholesale rejection by New Jersey residents of loyalty oaths to the king, the taking of new ones to the Congress, and widespread attacks on British forces. (For those wanting to read more about the war for public opinion in New Jersey in 1776 and 1777, see the chapter “Americans Under Foreign Rule” in David Hackett Fischer’s Washington’s Crossing, 160–81.)
III. TRIUMPH—THE FIRST CROSSING OF THE DELAWARE
THE IMPACT OF THE BATTLE OF TRENTON, PAGE 108-12
No battle in the Revolutionary War receives more attention in our high school history textbooks than the Battle of Trenton. But, if anything, the importance is understated. There were just two American combat deaths (more died of exposure to cold) compared to the enemy’s twenty-two killed, eighty-four wounded, and almost nine hundred Hessian prisoners! It was the first American victory following a string of defeats. Josiah was right in exulting over the triumph. The British historian George Trevelyan wrote: “It may be doubted whether so small a number of men ever employed so short a space of time with greater and more lasting effects upon the history of the world” (Ron Chernow, Washington, 276).
IV. TRIUMPH—THE SECOND CROSSING OF THE DELAWARE
WASHINGTON’S PLEA TO HIS TROOPS, PAGES 113–14
A sergeant present at the plea by Washington to his troops to reenlist before the second crossing of the Delaware recalled the speech in 1832:
My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do, and more than could [be] reasonably expected; but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with the fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty, and to your country, which you probably can never do under any other circumstances. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 272–73.)
Josiah marvels, as can we, that a general would make such an appeal to his troops. Not only was this beyond what a British general at that time would do but, according to Fischer, beyond what any general in the world would have done then.
“An officer asked the general if the men should be enrolled. ‘No,’ said Washington, ‘men who will volunteer in such a case as this, need no enrollment to keep them to their duty’” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 273). In 1776, from the General on down officers in the American army were, to the astonishment of Europeans, addressing privates as gentlemen. Washington made his appeal based not just on rank but on principles of honor and “human dignity and decency.”
That this appeal came from a general who expected and received deference from his troops made the appeal all the more remarkable.
FOREIGNERS’ ESTEEM FOR WASHINGTON’S GENERALSHIP, PAGES 120, 122
While Washington outmaneuvered the plotters in the Conway Cabal, what really solidified both congressional and public opinion behind him was the exalted opinion of Washington’s generalship held by European and British officers and leaders. Congressmen, who, as Lafayette observed, knew nothing about war, may have had occasional doubts about Washington’s generalship, but there were no doubts among either America’s enemies or allies.
In terms of the war, the most crucial opinions came from British officers who came to believe that the war could not be won because Washington was superior to any British general. Josiah refers to the intercepted letters of British officers. Lieutenant Colonel Allan MacLean wrote: “Poor devils as the rebel generals are, they have outgeneraled us more than once, even since I have been here, which is only six weeks . . . Lord Cornwallis is, I believe, a brave man. But he allowed himself to be fairly outgeneraled by Washington, the 4th of January last at Trenton, and missed a glorious opportunity when he let Washington slip away in the night” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 344).
Even British general Clinton recognized Washington’s outgeneraling of Cornwallis: “His Lordsh
ip, thinking that Washington would wait for him till the next day, deceived by his fires . . . into this belief, neglects to patrole to Allentown—over which Washington’s whole army and the last hope of America escaped” (David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 344). The same was true of the Hessian officers who convened a court-martial to find out why they had inferior leadership.
The British government in London tried to suppress the news of the American victories at Trenton and Princeton, which of course just made that news all the more devastating when it came out. Realizing that the British had huge advantages over the Americans in numbers, training, experience, and arms, British writers drew what to them was the obvious conclusion: the only way the Americans could be winning was that Washington was a superior general and that generals such as Clinton just could not match Washington when it came to the “abilities to plan [and] . . . to execute” (John Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 358).
While the British and Hessians may have criticized themselves and each other as well as crediting Washington, other Europeans just hailed Washington’s generalship. Josiah accurately quotes the French general Rochambeau as well as Frederick the Great, who, after the victories at Trenton and Princeton, extolled Washington:
The achievements of Washington and his little band of compatriots between the 25th of December and the 4th of January, a space of ten days, were the most brilliant of any recorded in the annals of military achievements. (See Ron Chernow, George Washington, 283.)
Similarly, Horace Walpole compared Washington’s exploits to those of the Roman general Fabius. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 324.)
Cornwallis himself, who most Americans recognized as Britain’s finest general in the war (and whose talents were later recognized by British kings over decades and many continents), acknowledged the emergence of Washington’s superior generalship not just at Yorktown but earlier, in the Delaware campaigns. Cornwallis did so at a dinner with Washington after he surrendered to Washington at Yorktown in 1781. That generals would gather right after a decisive battle for a drink and dinner may seem quaint today. We can’t imagine Eisenhower exchanging toasts with a German general. Yet that is what happened after Yorktown, when Josiah accurately quotes Cornwallis’s toast to Washington:
When the illustrious part that your Excellency has borne in this long and arduous contest becomes a matter of history, fame will gather your brightest laurels rather from the banks of the Delaware than from those of the Chesapeake. (See David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, 362.)
V. VICTORY AT YORKTOWN
FOREIGNERS’ ESTEEM FOR WASHINGTON’S GENERALSHIP (CONT.), PAGES 125, 127
As happens so often, a hero is recognized sooner by those more distant than by those closer to home. In this case, those at home quickly fell in line with the opinions of those abroad. Benjamin Franklin was surrounded and influenced by French, Dutch, Russian, and Prussian generals. Franklin conveyed their sentiments to the Congress back home. Thus, while some in Congress or a few rival generals may have carped, Franklin felt very confident in expressing to an English friend what he believed to be an accepted European opinion on how five British generals—Gage, Howe, Clinton, Cornwallis, and Carleton—had all fallen victim to Washington:
An American planter was chosen by us to command our troops and continued during the whole war. This man sent home to you, one after another, five of your best generals, baffled, their heads bare of laurels, disgraced even in the opinion of their employers. (See Ron Chernow, George Washington, 458.)
Franklin knew that his opinion was accepted European opinion and that his English friend would not disagree with him.
CHAPTER FIVE: DAY FIVE, FRIDAY—FINAL PREPARATIONS
LADY WASHINGTON’S POPULARITY WITH THE TROOPS, PAGES 134, 135
Lady Washington’s popularity with the troops, which Josiah comments on, is a subject usually ignored. Just as generals did not always lead from the front as Washington did, wives of generals did not always share the suffering of those under their husband’s commands. This was certainly true of British generals’ wives ensconced back in London. Yet by all accounts, this five-foot-tall, plump but attractive lady who loved the good life of a Virginia plantation not only was adept at putting people from all backgrounds at ease but she shared in and tried to alleviate the soldiers’ suffering.
One observer gave this account of Lady Washington, once described as “a one-woman relief agency,” at Valley Forge:
I never in my life knew a woman so busy from early morning until late at night as was Lady Washington, providing comforts for the sick soldiers. Every day, excepting Sunday, the wives of the officers in camp, and sometimes other women, were invited to Mr. Potts’ [house] to assist her in knitting socks, patching garments and making shirts for the poor soldiers when material could be procured. Every few days she might be seen, with basket in hand, and with a single attendant, going among the huts seeking the keenest and most needy sufferers, and giving all the comforts to them in her power. (See Helen Bryan, Martha Washington, 226, 227.)
For the officers’ wives and neighboring ladies, Lady Washington used a log cabin as a sewing center during the day and a pretend drawing room with candles at night. There she conducted singing sessions over meals of potatoes and pieces of salt fish. No wonder regiments competed for her praise and troops greeted her arrival with “God bless Lady Washington.”
When men were later clothed with French aid, Martha loved to listen to fifes and drums parading. Like veterans and their wives of many eras, Lady Washington later looked back with nostalgia on army camp life. (See Helen Bryant, Martha Washington, 222.)
GEORGE WASHINGTON AND RELIGION, PAGES 136-37
There seems to be an industry devoted to proving George Washington’s religiosity, or lack thereof. The most thoughtful effort is the book by theologians Michael and Jana Novak, Washington’s God. Washington was a very private person and did not write of his personal beliefs.
If we mean by “Christian” a twenty-first-century evangelical who writes or speaks of Jesus or Jesus Christ, Washington does not qualify as a religious Christian, for his voluminous letters contain no such references. Yet Washington went way beyond the eighteenth-century Deists who believed that God may have created the world but ignored how the world functioned. Washington was quick to attribute Revolutionary War successes to both human initiative and divine intervention. Unlike Jefferson, Washington not only did not disparage Jesus or organized religion but praised the constructive role that the church could play, as shown in the building of the chapel for worship at Newburgh and his encouragement of religious services in the army. As the Novaks conclude, Washington’s serving as an Anglican church vestryman, while at the same time expressing irritation at the formality of Anglican services, probably showed a typical eighteenth-century Episcopalian who wanted to perform his religious and civic obligations but did not like to wear his religion on his sleeve.
More important than Washington’s personal religious beliefs for the future of his country was his concern about what official attitude the new country should take toward religion and its various organized manifestations. The observation of Josiah and his fellow aides that Washington believed his role as the new country’s leader required him to attend many different church services and reach out to different religious groups has been attested to over and over. (See Ron Chernow, Washington, 132; Barry Schwartz, George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol, 85.)
Today, we look back on this period and, with the benefit of hindsight, assume that slavery was the main obstacle to the stabile growth of the new democracy. Our forefathers, however, may have seen things differently. My own readings convince me that, based on hundreds of years of religious persecution both before and after the new Americans came here, religious fratricide—not slavery or even, after the Revolution, a British reconquest—was seen as the chief threat to the new republic. How Washington conducted himself, including his attendance at various church
services, reflected his desire to meet this threat.
In this regard, the oft-quoted Washington letter to the Hebrew congregation at Newport, Rhode Island, is quite instructive. For years, people of different religious beliefs had, if failing to establish their own church, sought toleration from the established church in their colony. Thus the Baptists sought toleration from the established Anglicans in Virginia, the Anglicans sought toleration from the established Puritans in Massachusetts, the Roman Catholics sought toleration from established churches outside of Maryland, the Jews sought toleration from established churches everywhere, etc. That was the European custom where monarchs ran established churches and tolerated this group and denied toleration to another one. While states still had established churches in the early nineteenth century, Washington was very proud that the federal government officially exercised religious toleration toward every group and, in doing so, went further than any European monarch. As you will notice from his letter to the Newport Hebrew congregation below, however, Washington had given considerable thought to the nature of toleration and concluded that religious toleration was not sufficient but that true religious liberty required that America should go much further:
The citizens of the United States of America have a right to applaud themselves for having given to mankind examples of an enlarged and liberal policy: a policy worthy of imitation. All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights. For happily the government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.
The Man Who Could Be King: A Novel Page 24