Deal With the Devil: The FBI's Secret Thirty-Year Relationship With a Mafia Killer

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Deal With the Devil: The FBI's Secret Thirty-Year Relationship With a Mafia Killer Page 39

by Peter Lance


  “I did what any other judge would do, I am sure,” Weinstein added as Caproni moved to dismiss any other government counts.

  In the end, having failed with his “AIDS dementia” argument, hoping to put off sentencing via an extended psychiatric evaluation, Scarpa, the master strategist, played the “death card” and won. Although Greg himself was facing his own “life sentence,” there was an enormous disparity between his relatively light punishment and the multiple life terms, plus sixty years, plus the $2 million fine, that Weinstein had imposed on Carmine Sessa’s brother Michael. All of that underscored the special treatment “34” continued to get from the Feds. The younger Sessa was a junior capo convicted of a single homicide. Scarpa had spent more than four decades in a career of murder, mayhem, and racketeering and left enough bodies in his wake to put him in the ranks of the world’s top serial killers.

  “It’s beyond belief,” says defense attorney Flora Edwards. “AIDS virus or not, Scarpa was given the federal equivalent of a love tap at this late stage, and by the same judge who showed absolutely no mercy to Vic Orena Sr.”54

  As for Scarpa’s imminent death, he would continue to defy all the medical predictions.

  Chapter 33

  THE OPR

  If any of the special agents who worked under Lin DeVecchio doubted whether he’d passed FBI intel to “34,” those reservations must have ended in early January 1994, when Larry Mazza finally flipped and Chris Favo started debriefing him. The FBI 302 memorializing that interrogation, which began on January 7, later became known as the “Girlfriend 302,” after the name Mazza said that Scarpa used to refer to his source. Most of the alleged leaks Mazza described were later disclosed by the Feds, and Lin DeVecchio was suspected of being that source.1 The potential security breaches were so serious that, coupled with the allegations of Favo and fellow agents Tomlinson and Leadbetter, they prompted DeVecchio’s internal affairs investigation by the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). The entire “Girlfriend 302” is reproduced in Appendix E, but some of its key revelations are below:

  One of the sources that supplied information on a regular basis was referred to as “THE GIRLFRIEND.” The source would call him at home, as well as beep him. . . . SCARPA SR.’s wife, LINDA . . . referred to the source as “THE GIRLFRIEND” when giving messages to SCARPA SR. regarding phone calls. On occasions when the source beeped SCARPA SR., he would stop whatever he was doing in order to return the call. When in his own home, SCARPA SR. always returned the calls to the “GIRLFRIEND” using the telephone in the basement. . . .

  The information that SCARPA SR. received through his source(s) included, but was not limited to, the address of VICTOR ORENA’s girlfriend’s home in Queens, New York, including descriptive information that it was a white, two family home with aluminum siding. Shortly after SCARPA SR. is shot at, he learns that the panel truck used in the murder attempt was rented from Queens, New York . . . as well as SALVATORE MICIOTTA and JOSEPH SCOPO’s addresses. He also received information regarding the scheduled drug arrest of GREGORY SCARPA JR. and his crew, and the scheduled Credit Card arrest of SCARPA SR. He received a copy of the Complaint issued against himself, and was told that his problems with the Law might disappear if he stayed out of trouble.

  On one occasion, MAZZA was in SCARPA SR.’s house when he received a telephone call from “THE GIRLFRIEND” on the basement telephone. After the call, he told MAZZA that the “GIRLFRIEND” said that the members of the ORENA faction were very close to killing him.2

  In another debriefing, Mazza told Favo and his colleague Special Agent Maryann Walker-Goldman:

  One or two days after the arrest of CARMINE IMBRIALE . . . GREG SCARPA SR. told MAZZA that IMBRIALE . . . was cooperating. . . . SCARPA SR. also talked about killing IMBRIALE some time in the future.3

  Mazza’s revelations only corroborated what Favo and the other agents already knew. But they were potentially very damaging—particularly the intel on Joe Scopo. The fact that Scopo had been killed outside his home three and a half months earlier raised the prospect that Scarpa had learned of Scopo’s address from his source in law enforcement. If that source was Lin DeVecchio—if he was the “Girlfriend”—that could make Lin a possible co-conspirator to homicide.

  Further, the notion that Scarpa had learned the whereabouts of the rented panel truck used in the Eighty-Second Street shootout—which Favo himself had uncovered—must have sent a chill through Favo. In his book, Lin DeVecchio effectively blames Favo for “start[ing]” the Colombo war by “stirring up Billy Cutolo.”4 In fact the Feds had attributed the attack outside Scarpa’s house on November 18, 1991, to “Wild Bill.” Now, with Mazza’s revelations, the opposite could be said: If the Girlfriend had tipped off Scarpa that “the Orena faction” had plotted to kill him, that revelation might have prompted his killing spree.

  Finally, Mazza’s assertion that Scarpa had learned about Imbriale’s cooperation had surely come from DeVecchio—because Favo had overheard DeVecchio telling “34” as much over the “Hello” phone in C-10. That was evidence in and of itself that Lin DeVecchio was the Girlfriend. At that point, Favo and his fellow agents could no longer look away from the growing Scarpa-DeVecchio scandal.

  “Getting SSA DeVecchio in Trouble”

  On Sunday, January 17, 1994, the day before the Martin Luther King holiday, Favo, Tomlinson, and Leadbetter went to DeVecchio’s boss, ASAC Donald North. What happened next was recounted by Favo in a sworn statement made to OPR Supervisory Special Agents Robert J. O’Brien and Timothy T. Arney. Because that statement, in Favo’s own words, provides so many details on the events that occurred after he and the other agents blew the whistle, we’re reproducing sections of it here.

  FAVO: For a long time I have had a concern that SSA DeVecchio may have divulged information to his former source Gregory Scarpa Sr. . . .

  We were about to begin one of several trials with respect to the “Colombo LCN Family War” and were concerned about information from the Confidential Witnesses (CWs) indicating that Scarpa, Sr., had a law enforcement source, specifically in the FBI New York Office.

  ASAC North met with us in the New York field office. We were not interested in getting SSA DeVecchio in trouble, we only wanted to see if he could be transferred to another squad and replaced by another supervisor so we would be able to continue our investigations and prosecutions in the “Colombo LCN Family War” matters, without a concern that he might . . . disclose information regarding certain of our cases.5

  According to Favo, North told him that he would “switch” DeVecchio with another supervisor in the C-6 squad—presumably to remove Lin from the loop. But later Favo said North told him that the agent swap wouldn’t happen, “because it would disrupt both C-10 and C-6 and it made no sense to disrupt both squads.” Favo said another proposal was made a few days later to have DeVecchio trade places with Chris Mattiace, the former C-10 supervisor, who was then working out of the New Rochelle office.

  In order to bring Mattiace up to speed, Favo prepared a detailed seven-page 302 memo recounting a number of incidents during the war when information developed in C-10 somehow found its way to Scarpa. Among his revelations:

  Over the length of the war I began to withhold information concerning Gregory Scarpa or what could not be leaked to the media because I believed SSA DeVecchio was leaking information to both Scarpa Sr. and Jerry Capeci.6

  In that 302, Favo also revealed that DeVecchio had asked him to use the FBI’s Fast Track system for linking telephone numbers to addresses. After running down two area code 516 (Long Island) numbers, which Favo said Lin told him were tied to the safe houses of Jo Jo and Chuckie Russo, Favo wrote that he personally checked the locations—one of which turned out to be a pay phone at a Waldbaum’s supermarket. When he questioned his boss about it, DeVecchio told him that “the numbers were for one of Scarpa’s loan shark victims.”7

  As it turned out, after Favo filed that 302, North didn’t transfer DeVecchio.
The previous fall, during a meeting at the EDNY, Lin DeVecchio had threatened to have Favo’s “ass” if he triggered an OPR investigation.8 Now, ten days after Favo first went to North, DeVecchio called him into his office. Clearly word had gotten back to him that his number two was the primary source of the accusations. In his sworn statement, Favo revealed what happened next:

  SSA DeVecchio . . . asked me who had been saying things about him. I told SSA DeVecchio that I could not discuss the matter with him. SSA DeVecchio told me to get out of his office. 15 minutes or so later, SSA DeVecchio called me back into his office and told me that SSA Thomas Fuentes of the Organized crime section, criminal Investigative Division, FBIHQ, was going to come up to New York and clear him.

  I believe SSA DeVecchio had spoken to ASAC North and learned that SSA Fuentes was going to be in charge of the OPR inquiry. SSA DeVecchio asked me who was in charge of handling a CW by the name of Billy Meli. Meli is a very important CW in our prosecutions and had identified Scarpa’s source as an FBI agent. I told DeVecchio that Meli is being handled by SSA Leadbetter. . . . I told SSA DeVecchio that I was not going to answer his questions about what Meli had said or about this matter.9

  The disclosures by Meli were troubling. A longtime member of Scarpa’s Wimpy Boys crew, Meli confirmed for Leadbetter the allegation that Scarpa had received one of the 1987 DEA arrest lists and the fact that Cosmo Catanzano, a crew member on that list, might cooperate with authorities. That was the revelation that had caused Scarpa to order Meli and others to dig Cosmo’s grave in anticipation of his murder.10

  Continuing in his sworn statement, Chris Favo then described DeVecchio’s reaction to the charges.

  SSA DeVecchio reiterated that he would be cleared and then would return to the squad. SSA DeVecchio was angry about being accused of releasing information. DeVecchio told me that despite what had happened, he would deal with me professionally.11

  According to Favo, though, that never happened. Worse, as Favo saw it, North had already decided to back DeVecchio, and Lin’s response to the accusations was that cooperating witnesses like Mazza and Meli were “liars.”12

  Favo then found out that SSA Fuentes and SSA Jack Barrett, tasked to run the OPR, “were now, or had been in DeVecchio’s chain of command, were close friends of North’s [and] could not be viewed as independent.”13 At the time, Fuentes was supervisor of the Organized Crime Section of the Criminal Investigative Division at Bureau Headquarters in Washington.14 In Chris Favo’s mind, the foxes had been assigned to investigate the chicken coop. He was so worried, he wrote, that he went to AUSA Valerie Caproni and warned that “SSA Fuentes monitors New York’s OC program and . . . DeVecchio indicated Fuentes would clear him.”

  According to Favo, word quickly spread through the squad that it was he and the other agents who had informed on DeVecchio:

  We felt our request for confidentiality had not been taken seriously. On one occasion . . . ASAC North came out to Howard Leadbetter and me in the squad room and in front of other agents asked whether we had the 302s ready. When we asked what 302s he meant, ASAC North indicated they were the 302s from the CWs concerning Scarpa. I believe it is possible that and may have heard ASAC North make the comment to us. It was unprofessional for ASAC North to ask that question in the squad room.15

  Then, wrote Favo, the OPR investigation seemed to be abruptly terminated:

  Mattiace did not want to transfer to New York City from New Rochelle. Later I heard that De Vecchio had been cleared of wrongdoing and would not be transferred. . . .

  ASAC North told me that SSAs Fuentes and Barrett had conducted an inquiry and found that SSA De Vecchio could not have given the “DEA list” information to Scarpa, Sr. ASAC North told me that the inquiry had been terminated.16

  According to Favo, Lin made that clear to the other squad members at an open meeting.

  Three days later DeVecchio called a squad meeting attended by everyone except Andjich who was at a neutral site meeting. DeVecchio said he had been cleared but the case could be reopened later. DeVecchio declared his innocence and was critical of anyone who believed a CW over him.

  DeVecchio added that the whole situation was handled incorrectly by the agents who went to the EDNY and in the future anyone with a problem should bring it to him. It was speculated that SSA DeVecchio may decide to retire and that would solve problem with SSA DeVecchio’s presence as supervisor of C-10.17

  Favo then wrote, “Some of us on C-10 were still in a rather untenable position since we felt uncomfortable about not being able to discuss certain elements of our investigation of Scarpa’s crew with SSA DeVecchio.”18

  Caproni’s solution, according to Favo, was for them to pass on any new information to the DEA and let Drug Enforcement agents conduct the war investigation from there on. But Favo wrote, “We had worked very hard to put these cases together and preferred that the FBI handle its problems properly rather than rely on the DEA to solve our problems.”19

  “Understand the position that Favo, Leadbetter, Tomlinson, and Andjich were in,” says defense lawyer Flora Edwards.20 “They had taken a shot at the king and missed. Lin was the most powerful organized crime agent in New York. He had a direct pipeline to the Director and the DC officials, like Agent Fuentes. Favo and the others were effectively accusing him of a possible murder conspiracy for which he might not just lose his job but get indicted, and now they realized that they weren’t being taken seriously by Donald North.”

  So Favo, whose wife was pregnant, put in an application for six weeks’ annual leave to begin on March 16, two months after he’d first gone to North.21 But at that point, when an official whose name was redacted from Favo’s statement heard that he’d put in for the leave, it was suggested that Favo meet with another official he “trusted.”22

  After a three-hour discussion, this person, whose name was also redacted, relayed Favo’s allegations to Bill Gavin, then the deputy assistant director in charge (ADIC) of the FBI’s New York Office.23

  Apparently sensing that he would now be taken seriously by the FBI leadership, Favo then recommended that OPR interviews be conducted with a dozen agents in the NYO; four assistant U.S. attorneys including Caproni, Stamboulidis, Andrew Weissmann, and Ellen Corcella; and half a dozen cooperating witnesses: Carmine Sessa, Larry Mazza, Joseph Ambrosino, Jimmy Del Masto, Billy Meli, and Mario Parlagreco, all members of Scarpa’s Wimpy Boys crew who had not only committed dozens of crimes with “34” but had also been a party to the special attention he seemed to get from his law enforcement source.24

  Further emboldened at that point, Favo even recommended that the OPR investigators talk to the three EDNY judges who had presided over various Scarpa-related cases, including I. Leo Glasser, who brokered Scarpa’s deal in the credit card case; Magistrate John L. Caden, who’d arraigned Scarpa after the gun-toss bust; and Judge Jack B. Weinstein.25

  In his affidavit, Favo argued, “The sentencing of [Scarpa] was lighter than expected, and it is possible that SSA DeVecchio might have contacted the judges prior to sentencing.”26 Favo used a kind of formal “FBI-speak” in that affidavit, but in a diary he kept that became part of the OPR record, he revealed more of the distress he was feeling.

  Chris Favo’s Diary

  The entries below track the trajectory of Favo’s emotions, beginning with his hope that coming forward would produce some results, and ending with the sense that he and the other agents had made a huge strategic mistake in challenging DeVecchio:

  January 21 North commends us for taking action. North says everything will be confidential. North supports us.

  January 26 Lin calls me into office . . . throws me out. Says he will be cleared. “That’s fine, I don’t care.” I call North. North says he believes Lin. I complain that investigation is not confidential. . . . Lin has been telling people he will be cleared & return. North says there is nothing we can do about that. North says we can still call him if there is any new evidence but we will have to live with the problems.
r />   January 31 In full view of squad, Don North approached me & Howard and told us to write the 302s on the OPR matter and turn them in to him. (There is no longer any doubt who will be held responsible for Lin’s problems.)

  February 4 Lin holds squad meeting . . . denies any wrongdoing. But critical of anyone who believes CW over him . . . I was reminded that when Lin was declaring his innocence he said that anyone that did not believe him could go F— themselves.27

  But Favo and the other agents had already gone on the record with their accusations, and the Office of Professional Responsibility was duty-bound to investigate. That put Valerie Caproni, who was supervising the war prosecutions, in a difficult position, since the leaks Lin DeVecchio appeared to have made to “34” could seriously damage her cases.

  Caproni Asks for a Delay in the OPR

  In February 1994, Caproni was preparing to go to trial against Anthony “Chuckie” Russo and a series of codefendants in a major war prosecution before Judge Charles P. Sifton.

  “So what Valerie did,” says defense lawyer Alan Futerfas, “was to push the Justice Department to delay the OPR. But worse than that, when Judge Sifton later demanded that the prosecutors turn over all documents relating to the DeVecchio-Scarpa investigation, she failed to turn over a key 302 involving a confession by Scarpa Sr.’s underling Larry Mazza.”28

  It was the “Girlfriend 302,” in which Larry Mazza had confessed that there were so many potential leaks to Greg Scarpa.

  “Understand the significance of this,” says Ellen Resnick, Futerfas’s partner. “The production of that 302 to defense attorneys at a critical time would have been devastating.” So where was it? According to a later sworn affirmation by Caproni, it remained in the drawer of her desk.29 In a subsequent pleading to Judge Sifton, Futerfas noted:

  The undisclosed “Girlfriend 302” was created on February 7th, 1994 and given to AUSA Valerie Caproni on February 23rd, 1994 . . . the “Girlfriend 302” is a bombshell providing potent corroborating evidence of an SSA’s misdeeds. Prosecutors receiving this document had to know that it was an extraordinary piece of paper, one which, if disclosed, would open the flood gates resulting in agents and others being subpoenaed, demands for additional discovery and probably requests for continuances or mistrials by trial counsel. The fact that this document was received by the USAO just seven (7) days after this Court’s direct order, and not disclosed to the Court is not explained.30

 

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