Besides the infantry brigades, the division had three regiments of field artillery, totalling seventy-two 25-pdr guns when at full establishment, an anti-tank regiment Royal Artillery, and a light anti-aircraft regiment of bofors guns. All the artillery was under the direction of the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA), who was a brigadier and who could, at extremely short notice, concentrate the fire of all his field guns on one point if need be.
Until shortly before Alamein the army had no anti-tank guns, either in the artillery or the infantry, heavier than the little pre-war 2-pdr, but by the time of the main battle most of the 2-pdrs had been replaced by the new 6-pdr, a fine little gun that, at close quarters, could account for most enemy tanks then in the field, but which required steady nerves and stout hearts.
The division’s fighting components were completed by its three field companies and one field park company of Royal Engineers, whose gallantry and steadiness in the dangerous minefields of Alamein were to open the gates to victory.
On the administrative side, the division had three field ambulances of the Royal Army Medical Corps, a unit of the Royal Corps of Signals, supply and transport companies of the Royal Army Service Corps (who in the fluid desert war often had to fight as well as to deliver ammunition, rations, petrol and stores), repair workshops of the newly-formed Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, a red-capped unit of the Corps of Military Police, recruited largely from road scouts of the Royal Automobile Club and the Automobile Association, who in the minefields of Alamein behaved with exemplary courage, and other non-combatant elements.
The headquarters staff of a division consisted of a few General Staff Officers under a GSO 1, dealing with operations, and an administrative staff under an Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, both lieutenant-colonels.
An armoured division differed from an infantry division mainly in the fact that it consisted, normally, of one armoured brigade and one motorised infantry brigade. The armoured brigade comprised three ‘armoured regiments’ and one motorised infantry battalion. The infantry battalion went into action with the tanks, either on foot or in bren-carriers. The armoured regiments were drawn from the Royal Armoured Corps and might be either battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment or else cavalry or yeomanry regiments.[4] There was a subtle difference between the two. The number of tanks in each armoured regiment at the time of Alamein under the Middle East establishment, when at full strength, was fifty-two. The regiment (or battalion), in addition to its headquarters, was organised in three squadrons of four troops, with normally three tanks in each troop.
Until Alamein, when the first Sherman tanks had arrived from America, the British tanks were at a large disadvantage in battle with the Germans’, though much superior to the Italian M13’s. The Crusader was mechanically unreliable, the old Matilda 1’ tank was too slow for desert warfare, the American Stuart (or ‘Honey’) was designed merely as a very fast ‘light cavalry’ tank. All were under-gunned, the British-made tanks mounting only a 2-pdr. Their armour-plating (except for the old Matilda) was somewhat inferior to that of the Germans in resistance and their guns could fire only solid shot. Thus our tanks had to close to about 600 yards before they could hope to kill, whereas the Germans could stand off at 2,000 yards or more and knock out our tanks as they approached. Only in the American Grant, some of which we received in time for Gazala, were we able to compete on nearly equal gun terms with the Germans, but the Grant suffered from the disadvantage that its 75 mm gun was mounted in a side sponson and so could not fire all round.
A very important element of the armoured division, paradoxical though it may appear, was its infantry brigade. This took two forms. One was the ‘lorried infantry’ brigade, who were ordinary infantry transported by lorries; The Queen’s and the Royal Sussex were so equipped for 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions. The other was exemplified in 1st Armoured Division by 7th Motor Brigade; like the motor infantry battalions in each armoured brigade, they were specialised, highly mobile troops, who will be seen at closer quarters on several occasions.
Another special feature of the armoured division was its armoured-car regiment. It had no part in a pitched battle, but was for reconnaissance, exploitation in the pursuit, covering a withdrawal and so on. Otherwise, the armoured division was constructed much the same as an infantry division, with its own artillery, engineers and service elements, though there were slight variations in strengths and in equipment. They tended to adopt a cavalry terminology, so that, for example, the ‘field company’ of Royal Engineers became a ‘field squadron’ and a ‘platoon commander’ became a ‘troop leader’.
These are the formations with which we need to be most familiar for an understanding of events. There were, however, many variations of the official establishments, either caused by battle or duly authorised. Thus the New Zealanders and 50th Division each had only two brigades, due to heavy casualties before Alamein, but, on the other hand, 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions each (at Alamein) had two armoured brigades and 7th had three armoured car regiments; several divisions had more than their official element of artillery, in which Eighth Army was particularly strong.
Above the division was the Corps, commanded by a lieutenant-general. Except for its headquarter staff, it had no prescribed establishment of troops and might consist of any number of divisions or unattached brigades and various ‘corps troops’. At Alamein there were three corps — 10th, 13th and 30th. An important element of the corps troops were the Medium Regiments, Royal Artillery, equipped with 4.5-inch or 5.5-inch guns with fairly long ranges and firing projectiles of 55 lb and 100 lb respectively. They were worked very hard and did brilliant service.
The corps commander, once Eighth Army was properly reorganised by General Montgomery, had great resources for concentration and reinforcement of effort. Thus, with the remarkable flexibility of the British artillery, the Corps CRA could concentrate all the field and medium guns on one task, the Chief Engineer could similarly group all the RE resources, and the supply and transport columns could be pooled for one major operation (as happened on a large scale on one occasion).
Above the corps was the Army, which in turn had its own heads of arms and services and its own ‘army troops’ (as for example, the heavy anti-aircraft regiments), and various specialist units, such as 1st Camouflage Company, RE. The chief staff officer at both the Army and the Corps headquarters was a Brigadier General Staff (BGS) and a brigadier was also responsible for the administrative ‘A’ and ‘Q’ services.
THE AIR ARM
For their support in the air Eighth Army had immediately at hand, and virtually part of itself, the Western Desert Air Force under ‘Mary’ Coningham. By the time of Alamein the Desert Air Force, as it was more usually called, had been considerably augmented and it included seven American squadrons — four of Mitchell medium bombers and three of Warhawk fighters. Its Order of Battle is given in Appendix B. The main fighter airfields were in the Amiriya region, near Alexandria.
In glaring contrast to the acid relations between Rommel and Major-General Hans Seidemann, the Fliegerführer Afrika, a close and intimate partnership was enjoyed between Eighth Army and the Desert Air Force — a partnership that became a brotherhood. The Army Commander said what the programme was and what he required in air support. Coningham resolved these requirements into tactical air terms according to his resources.
This close partnership between the Army and the DAF, however, must not obscure the contributions to the joint effort made by the other Air Forces under the command of Arthur Tedder as AOC-in-C. The Desert Air Force under Coningham, Air Headquarters Egypt under Air Vice-Marshal W. A. McClaughrey, the British and American heavy bombers of No. 205 Group under Air Commodore A. P. Ritchie and No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group under Air Vice-Marshal H. P. Lloyd all existed for different purposes, but when need arose Tedder applied them all to the common purpose. Thus No. 205 Group was frequently at Coningham’s service; Coningham did not have operational command of it, but it
was he who set the target pattern for Ritchie’s Wellingtons. Similarly, he was able to enlist the invaluable flare-dropping Alba-cores of the Fleet Air Arm as lamplighters to illuminate the targets of our night bombers.
Tedder’s forces had for some time been equipped with some American as well as British aircraft, manned by British or Dominion air crews, but American-manned squadrons began to arrive at the end of June. At the end of July, 57 Fighter Group arrived with their Warhawks (P.40’s). Next month came the Liberators (B.24’s) of 98 (Heavy) Bombardment Group and the Mitchells (B.25’s) of 12 (Medium) Bombardment Group. In command of the Americans was Major-General Lewis Brereton, who was as keen a disciple of co-operation as Tedder.
The application of air power to the needs of the battle were constantly under Tedder’s own eye and he relied upon team work among all his forces to achieve concentration of effort. He was a brilliant innovator in the functional handling of air forces, as Coning-ham was of their tactical use. From this, in spite of the mixed nationalities and equipments that made up his command, there derived the impression of a single cohesive force which was our greatest strength against an enemy who, in the Mediterranean as a whole, far outnumbered the Allies.
Behind the fighting formations of Eighth Army there gradually developed an impressive array of administrative and service establishments, both Army and RAF — workshops of all sorts, great supply depots, casualty clearing stations, General Hospitals in Cairo or its neighbourhood, dockyard services, reinforcements camps, training schools of every description. The greater part of these impressive base installations, which supplied Eighth Army with all its gear and tackle for victory, was the kingdom of Lieutenant-General Sir Wilfred Lindsell, one of the greatest of administrative generals.
THE ASPECT OF THE ENEMY
We must now look cursorily on ‘the other side of the hill’ and see the outlines of the enemy as they were at the time of Alamein, remembering that, basically, their organisation in divisions was similar to our own.
We have seen already with how little difficulty the small British army under O’Connor had defeated an Italian army that outnumbered them enormously. Later on, however, the quality of the Italian troops improved and the fashion of deriding them all is by no means a true indication of their qualities. Some of the divisions fought well on occasions. The best of their troops generally were their artillery: it was no fun being shelled by them. The Folgore Parachute Division was as good as the average German division and better at night work, at which the Germans, unlike the British, did not excel. The Bersaglieri had fought extremely well at Sidi Rezegh, and Trento could give a good account of themselves also.
Of the two armoured divisions — Ariete and Littorio — Ariete were the better and were well thought of by the Germans. These armoured divisions, if unable to stand up to British tanks for long in pitched battle with their inferior M13’s, fulfilled many valuable tasks, took some of the burden off the Germans and, with their three machine guns and one 47 mm gun firing high explosive, were a serious threat to infantry. Although some of the Italian troops were undoubtedly of poor quality, it may be said in general that they could fight well at a distance, repelling British attacks more than once, but collapsed if their opponents got to close quarters.
There were three Italian army corps — 10th, 20th and 21st. The 20th, under Lieutenant-General De Stephanis, comprised the two armoured divisions and the Trieste, which was their motorised infantry division. There were eight Italian divisions in all, but they were of a lower establishment than a British division and usually below strength. An outline Order of Battle of the Italians is in Appendix D and of the Germans in Appendix C.
The heart of the enemy strength, of course, from early 1941 onwards, was the German element — the Panzerarmee. Above all, it lay in the tanks of the German Africa Corps (Deutsche Afrika Korps, or DAK), composed of 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. These Divisions were armed with first-class tanks that had very resistant armour and guns that fired high explosive as well as solid shot, the latter often having a steel cap or a tungsten-carbide core for extra penetration. Their chief tanks were the Panzerkampfwagen Mark III and the Pzkw Mark IV, both very formidable fighting vehicles, to which various improvements were made as the war progressed. The emblem of the DAK was a palm tree and, of course, all German tanks and vehicles were sprinkled with the crooked cross of the reversed swastika.
For its infantry element, the Panzerarmee had the famous 90th Light Division, fine fighting troops composed largely of Panzer Grenadiers. Just before Alamein these were augmented by 164 Light Division (identified by the crossed swords that are the mark of Meissen porcelain), and by the tough Ramcke Parachute Brigade, who were composed of German air-force ground troops under Major-General Bernhard Ramcke. The Ramcke were not popular with German army units, as they were always demanding favoured treatment. The German infantry were equipped with a particularly vicious machine gun in the Spandau, the intimidating bursts of which resembled the fast revving-up of a racing car. It will crackle frequently through these pages. All the German formations, thanks to the Royal Navy and the RAF, were much below strength at most material times.
Tanks were not the Germans’ only armoured fighting vehicles. As the war progressed they were equipped with an increasing number of guns of all sorts — field, medium and anti-tank — mounted on tank or other tracked chassis. These were the ‘self-propelled’ guns. The Italians had similar equipment. They were of great value for bringing quick artillery support to any point where it is needed.
Rommel’s artillery, wheeled and tracked, by the time of Alamein included 109 guns of ‘medium’ calibre, against the British 52; and 26 pieces of heavy artillery (above 6-inch) to the British none. The British, however, had a superiority in field artillery. In the tactical handling of this artillery the Germans and Italians were very much inferior to the British, who in this department had attained a standard not known before.
The most formidable of all the enemy artillery was the famous 88 mm, manned by Flak Batteries of the Luftwaffe — the German air force. Originally designed as an anti-aircraft gun, the famous 88 proved also a devastating anti-tank gun, especially when it became equipped with its half-tracked tractor, which enabled it to come into action extremely quickly. Its 21-lb armour-piercing shot, faster than sound, could kill a tank at 3,000 yards (nearly three times farther than any British gun) and its air-burst high explosive, bursting a few feet above ground, was terribly lethal to men. On one occasion (witnessed by the author) a single 88 held up a whole armoured squadron for a time, picking off our tanks at long range as they topped a crest, and its flashless propellant made it impossible to locate. At the beginning of the Battle of Alamein the Germans had eighty-six of these 88s.
Almost equally formidable was the very similar 76.2 mm captured Russian gun, of which, on 23 October, the Germans had ninety-five, including thirty self-propelled models on Czech tank chassis. The British had an even better weapon than either of these in their 3.7-inch anti-aircraft gun, but never employed it in an anti-tank role.
These two German and Russian guns were the most formidable tank-killers in the world, but even the standard German 50-mm anti-tank gun had a performance some 40 per cent better than our little standard 2-pdr, though perhaps not quite as good as our 6-pdr when it at last arrived. The general (but not complete) superiority of German war material at that time was well exemplified by the petrol — or water — container that was subsequently to become world-famous and copied everywhere — the container which the British troops christened the ‘Jerrycan’. It made a glaring contrast with our civilian-type petrol tin, which was made of flimsy, paper-thin metal; so wasteful was it that staff calculations allowed for 25 per cent loss by breakage and evaporation on a desert journey of 250 miles.
In the air there was less technical disparity, but neither the British nor the American aircraft had so high a performance as the Messerschmitt 109 F & G, which could overhaul anything we had. Nor had we a counterpart of the Ju
nkers 87, the famous ‘Stuka’ dive-bomber, which dived straight down upon its victim with a fiendish scream; but the Stuka was largely an instrument of terror or of purely local and isolated destruction, less effective tactically against resolute troops than the allied bombers.
It will be seen from this cursory survey, therefore, that, although in the later phases of the campaign the British sometimes had a slight superiority in numbers (not very marked before Alamein), they were at some disadvantage with the Germans in certain particulars of equipment. Our inferiority in tanks was a reproach to the nation that had invented them and, indeed, it was not until the end of the war that, in the Centurion, we produced a tank that was probably better than any other in the world. But the Germans, we may remember, had been preparing for a long time.
What the British were always superior in was in supplies, particularly petrol, as our sea and air forces (to which in due time were added American aircraft) took their weekly toll of the Axis transports at sea. Both armies freely used the transport guns and stores that they won at various times from each other.
THE ‘ALAMEIN LINE’
These were the armies that became locked together after the long withdrawal and pursuit from Gazala begun on 26 May. Both sides were very tired after the long running fight, but there was to be no let-up, for Rommel, sanguine and full of drive, was determined to maintain the momentum. The Battle of Gazala continued without any interruption in the fighting, its waves beating swiftly upon the rock and sandy wastes of the strip of desert to become famous as the ‘Alamein Line’.
Long before the war this ‘line’ had been recognised in appreciations by the British General Staff in Egypt as peculiarly fitted for defence. It was the obvious last-ditch position for the protection of the Nile. On the instructions of General Wavell, who had inherited these reports, it had been reconnoitred by Lieutenant-General J. R. Marshall-Cornwall as early as 1940. In the next year General Auchinleck had entrusted its lay-out to Lieutenant-General W. G. Holmes. Its special feature was that it represented the shortest distance in the whole desert between two impassable features: on the north the sea and on the south the vast, untraversable Qattara Depression. Thus it had no flanks. The typical desert operation of a right or left hook round an open flank to take an enemy by surprise would be ruled out if the whole thirty-eight miles were occupied.
Alamein (Major Battles of World War Two) Page 4