Against the enormous weight of evidence, he clearly did not at first properly appreciate the situation. He still kept 21st Panzer and the Ariete Divisions down in the south and the only action he took on the morning after his arrival was to dance smartly to Montgomery’s tune.
Chapter Fourteen: The Day Of Crisis
(26 October)
COUNTER-ATTACK
The success of the Australian exploit against Point 29, small though it was in extent, but occurring on the very night of Rommel’s return to the desert, touched him on the raw. He reacted violently, just as Montgomery wanted him to do.
Apprehending that our purpose, apart from cutting off the Axis forces in the coastal sector, was to drive in behind the main minefields, and expecting us to make a farther thrust northwards to the coast road, Rommel resolved to restore the situation in that sector immediately and to regain Point 29. To do so, he ordered a massive counter-attack, employing 164th Light Division, the Italian 20th Corps and everything that was left of 15 PZ Division. To support this powerful blow against a small sector, he added a strong force of aircraft, comprised of fighter-bombers, Stuka dive-bombers and protective fighters.
The hit-back was a complete failure. Our own watchful eyes in the air soon spotted the great assembly of tanks, guns, infantry and vehicles marshalling itself for the onslaught, with their protective fighters circling overhead. The Allied air squadrons and the soldiers on the ground made immediate counter-preparations and as the enemy strove to move forward he was met by a storm of shelling and by a violent bombardment from the waves of Baltimores and Mitchells that flew eagerly in upon so spectacular a target.
There followed a great battle of air and ground, with roars of bombs that shook the desert floor, their tremors felt beneath the feet of our own troops, and with great clouds of smoke and dust obscuring friend and foe alike. Fierce conflagrations from stricken tanks and aircraft added to the scene and the sky became reticulated with a pattern of darting tracers. The German and Italian fighters fought hard to protect their own troops, and their Stukas and fighter-bombers launched attack after attack on our soldiers on the ground, but in the face of the dash and vigour of our own fighters they were unable to press home their assaults.
Rommel himself watched the attempt against what was to him Hill 28, recording afterwards, with that somewhat plaintive exaggeration that marks his Papers, how ‘rivers of blood’ were ‘poured out’, how ‘tremendous British artillery fire pounded the area’ and how the bofors fire directed against his aircraft, the densest he had ever seen in Africa, was such that ‘the air became an inferno of fire’.
Thus Rommel’s first big counter-attack was broken up in ruins as soon as it began. He had failed to appreciate the situation with which he was confronted. He was opposed now not only by superior numbers but also by an army better equipped, better trained, better led than of old and one that fought as an integrated machine under a very firm control from the top. The relatively easy successes he had had against the ill-co-ordinated British forces in June and July were over. He and Von Thoma between them, now, by bad tactics, lost far more tanks than they could afford.
REAPPRAISAL
In consequence of Rommel’s counter-attack on Point 29 there were no German tanks facing 1st Armoured Division in the Kidney sector that day, though they were seen in the distance moving away to take part in that operation. Our own tanks, however, whenever trying to move forward, were immediately destroyed by anti-tank guns that could only rarely be located.
Thus on 26 October the advance of Eighth Army towards its purpose appeared to have come to a dead stop. The armour could no more break through the barrier of unseen guns than the enemy armour could break in against ours. Eager enough to join battle with each other, the tanks were as helpless against the anti-tank gun as the horsed cavalry of their fathers’ days had been against machine guns and field artillery.
Our own tank losses, of course, much exceeded the enemy’s. They amounted so far to about 300, but many had not been destroyed and were being recovered and repaired. We had some 800 more. Rommel still had some 400, still a formidable force if properly employed. In officers and men we had lost 6,140, of which one-third were in 51st Division.
Thus in tanks our battle casualties were, as far as we can judge, rather more than twice as many as the enemy’s and in officers and men nearly twice as many. This was approximately the ratio to be expected in an assault against prepared defences, though the casualties in personnel on both sides were unexpectedly light in a battle of this ferocity, because of the wide dispersion that the spaces of the desert permitted. The tally was to be very different before the end.
An appraisal of losses at that time, however, meant little. The tactical prospects were what mattered and they were not promising to the British outlook. We had not yet punctured the enemy’s hide, not yet broken into the inner bailey of his fortress. We had won a marked tactical success, but not a decisive one. Montgomery, who had been ‘well content’ the day before, was anything but content today. Indeed on that Monday, in the words of Oliver Leese, we were ‘within an ace of losing our grip of the battle’. Likewise Freyberg: ‘Although the Battle of Alamein never looked like failing, it had its critical moments.’
Montgomery went forward to see Freyberg and found the old warrior still convinced that one more strong infantry attack on a broad front with a powerful artillery barrage would succeed in breaking through the hard crust of the enemy’s front. He did not like attacks on a narrow front and was always, right up to the end of the war, a firm believer in the creeping barrage. Speaking to Leese, Freyberg again pressed for an ‘attack on a three-division front without being tied to a firm base, for which we did not have the troops’.[52]
However, though eager to attack again, Freyberg had serious misgivings about the physical ability of his own infantry to carry out any further ‘major attack’. His rifle companies had already been reduced to half-strength or less (50 to 60 men) and no further New Zealand reinforcements were to be had. One more assault would so cripple his infantry that they would not have the numerical strength to take part in the exploitation and pursuit for which the Army Commander intended them. This situation Freyberg put into writing in a letter to Leese that day.
For the time being, while he considered the situation, Montgomery’s orders to Leese were that 30th Corps should secure their front against counter-attack, patrol actively and withdraw from the line any troops that could be spared, in preparation for a new major attack, to which he now set his mind.
Throughout that day, anxious though it was, Montgomery was assessing the position dispassionately as he visited the divisions. He was a realistic but always positive thinker, and he did not himself entertain the slightest anxiety, nor concern himself with any fear of a possible breakdown of his plan. Such things never entered his head. His way of thinking was directed only towards resolving the best course for driving his purpose forward. He was the soul of confidence. He had won the battle of the break-in; what now remained was simply to determine the best method of winning the break-out. No ‘new plan’ was necessary; the plan resolved upon stood. Wimberley recalls how, standing up in his tank, Montgomery called at the ‘elephant’ shelter[53] dug into the sand which was Highland Division’s headquarters, as he often did, and how he ‘radiated complete confidence’.
Sitting afterwards in his caravan on the dazzling white beach, Montgomery spent much of the day balancing the courses open to him. Two factors that he had to provide for were the lack of New Zealand and South African replacements and the fatigue of those divisions of 30th and 10th Corps that had been doing most of the fighting. He was impressed by the success of the Australians, however, and was now thinking in terms of diverting his main thrust along the axis of the coast road, instead of from the present bulge — just as Rommel thought he was doing. What was first intended as a diversion took shape in his mind as a new avenue to the main break-out. That design assumed precedence in his mind for the next thre
e days.[54]
By the evening of that day he had made up his mind.
THE LAST OF MITEIRIYA
Before his new thoughts had been disclosed, however, other operations in pursuit of the basic plan had been loosed. The larger of these, by 1st Armoured Division in the Kidney sector, was to be ennobled by one of the battle’s most golden exploits and on that account deserves a chapter to itself. The other was a night attack by Gentry’s 6th New Zealand Brigade and the South Africans to complete their conquest of the middle and southerly parts of Miteiriya Ridge.
An advance of about 1,000 yards was involved and the fight was a sharp one. The enemy was, of course, well prepared. Notwithstanding a violent defensive fire, the rifle companies of both brigades thrust through to their final objectives on the far slope of the ridge, the New Zealanders taking ninety prisoners. The newly-won objective then came under severe fire from the enemy and the gaps through the mines were enfiladed by heavy machine guns so acutely that it was impossible to push forward the supporting weapons. New gaps had therefore to be made by the sappers and before daylight the situation was firm.
The fiery ridge, strewn with the blackened hulks of burnt-out tanks, the remnants of shattered vehicles and all the detritus of a fierce battle, its rocky surface littered with the bodies of the still unburied dead, vanishes now from our story, as Montgomery prepared a new blow.
THE CRITICAL CONFERENCE
While the attacks of the New Zealanders and South Africans were in full career, the infantry divisional commanders themselves were summoned to a 30th Corps conference and thither they made their way in the moonlight — Freyberg, Wimberley, Morshead, Tuker and Pienaar. It was held in a small elephant shelter down by the sea under the fizzing glare of a Tilly lamp. They found Oliver Leese, who had recently come from a conference with Montgomery, in a serious mood.
In Leese’s own words afterwards,[55] ‘the atmosphere among this group of dynamic men in the tiny corrugated-iron hut was tense, almost electric’. Looking round in the harsh light at the little group of generals, mostly commanders of Dominion troops, Leese apprehended the difficulty of the task before him. He could not command their unquestioning obedience as he could those of the British army. He had to secure their co-operation by conviction. In what he had to put before them there was no room for compromise. Each of them, he knew, had had victory snatched from him at the last moment in the previous desert fighting, and he had to secure their trust that they would not now be exposed to the likelihood of a similar fate again.
He began by telling them that the situation was now critical and that the offensive would collapse unless its momentum could be maintained and the initiative continually pursued. The threatened stalemate must be broken. He repeated to them what Montgomery had been saying to him an hour or two earlier: ‘As long as you can make a German commander dance to your tune, you have nothing to fear; but once you allow the initiative to pass into his hands you are liable to have plenty of trouble.’
Therefore, Leese told his generals, the Army Commander had decided to follow up the Australians’ initial success by a further thrust to the north, where Rommel had already betrayed his sensitiveness. The Australians must ‘draw everything they could on to themselves for a few days, by the twin threats of cutting off the enemy troops in the coastal pocket and of opening up the coast road behind the minefields.’
He glanced at Morshead and saw no flicker of hesitancy disturb that swarthy face.
While the Australians were thus drawing fire upon themselves, Leese continued, the divisions of 30th and 10th Corps were to be regrouped at once in order to form a fresh surprise striking force for a break-out to the Rahman Track. This striking force, as originally intended, would consist of the armour of 10th Corps and the New Zealanders, accompanied by 9th Armoured Brigade.[56] These formations were now to be withdrawn into reserve to reform and recruit their strength for the new endeavour. The headquarters of the New Zealand division, however, together with their artillery, would remain in the line in charge of a sector and would be given the temporary loan of 151st Brigade (the Durham Brigade) from 50th Division.
Meantime — and here Leese knew that he was coming to what was perhaps the trickiest point for one of his audience — there would be a redistribution of 30th Corps divisions. This was necessary to fill the gap made by the withdrawal of the New Zealand infantry and to assist the Australians by abbreviating their frontage. The Highland Division was therefore to take over the sector of 20th Australian Brigade and there was to be a consequential side-step all along the bulge; the attenuated New Zealand division would shift into the Highland sector, the South Africans would take over from the New Zealanders on the northern part of Miteiriya Ridge and 4th Indian Division would move into the South African sector and would pass to the command of 13th Corps. The movements were to be complete by dawn on the 28th and the Australian attack was to be mounted that night.
This reshuffle, Leese was well aware, was quite a difficult tactical operation in the best of circumstances, and doubly difficult to carry out in forty-eight hours. But he was conscious that what was likely to provoke even more uneasiness, especially on the part of Pienaar, was the withdrawal of the armour into reserve. The South Africans were touchy and had to be handled with care. Like other infantry divisions, they were very ‘overrun conscious’, that is to say, apprehensive of being overrun by tanks, and the surrender of their 2nd Division at Tobruk was still for them a fresh and poignant memory. Leese was therefore careful to emphasize that as long as the enemy was kept on the defensive, by being hit hard on one sector or another, there was no fear of anyone being overrun. The great thing was to reorganize the front as quickly as possible and get the right people out and the right people in.
His uneasiness about the reaction of the South Africans, whose front would be extended somewhat, was not unwarranted, for at this juncture Pienaar made an interjection. He did not think, he said, that he would be in a position to do what was wanted, for he had not enough transport for the move.
This was exceedingly awkward, for it would have vitiated the whole operation. Freyberg, however, knew his man and his racial foible. In an undertone, he ascertained from Ray Queree, his GSO 1, what his own transport position was and said to him: ‘Good! Then I’ll spike his guns; he doesn’t like accepting help.’
Aloud to Pienaar, Freyberg said:
‘Is it only transport that’s worrying you, Dan? No other difficulty?’
‘No, just not enough transport.’
‘Can we help you, then? I’ll give you any transport you need.’
Pienaar’s objection at once vanished at this shrewd and gentle challenge; he did not need help. He would manage somehow. Thereafter, as Leese knew he would, he played up splendidly. Indeed, all began to vie with each other to make the plan a complete and memorable success.
Such, in brief, were Montgomery’s intentions for the renewed pursuit of his plan. There were those in high office, both in England and in Africa, who, when they heard that the armour was to be ‘withdrawn into reserve’, were startled into the gloomiest reactions, apprehending that this meant that the attack had been a failure and was being called off. There was considerable uneasiness in the Cabinet at home. It was, however, a typical Monty manoeuvre and he has said that whenever a commander is seen to withdraw troops at a critical moment in a battle one may surmise that he is about to win a victory.
However that may be, it is certain that, like the first decision to swing the attack to the north, this reorientation of forces at a critical moment was a brilliant conception. But on the already strained staff officers of Corps and divisions the task imposed yet more anxious hours and sleepless nights. Thus through the rolling clouds of dust, lashed by the occasional burst of shell fire, some 60,000 men, with fleets of vehicles, guns and tanks, jolted and crawled into their new positions in the next thirty-six hours, guided by the steadfast and devoted Military Police. The scenery was being shifted ready for the next dramatic act.
/> ROMMEL’S COUNTER-PLAN
Rommel also was making plans. In pursuance of his resolve to drive the British back whence they had started, all along the bulge, he was preparing to mount a major onslaught with all the force he could assemble. Curiously, it was to be directed at two points — against the Australians at Point 29 again, and against 1st Armoured Division in the Kidney sector. The attack was to be made the next afternoon (the 27th) and to take part in it he brought forward from reserve his most seasoned infantry, 90th Light Division, replacing them with the Trieste Division from Fuka and, after a great deal of hesitation, he at last ordered up 21st Panzer Division from the southern front, together with 50 per cent of the artillery that was in that sector.
This formidable blow was, therefore, to be struck by 21st and the remains of 15th PZ Divisions, the Littorio Armoured Division, 90th Light and 164th Light, the Bersaglieri and elements of the Trento Division. Thus the whole of Rommel’s German divisions (but not the Ramcke Brigade) were to be thrown in and, as before, the attack was to be supported by the full weight of the Axis air forces. On the face of it, it was a tremendously serious challenge.
That night 21st PZ Division and the artillery reinforcements moved north in accordance with orders and were heartily bombed on the way.
Chapter Fifteen: The Riflemen And The Gunners
(Night 26/27th and Day 27th)
ATTEMPTS TO PUSH ON
First Armoured Division was not among those who were to be withdrawn into reserve immediately. In the next two days they were plunged into some of the stiffest fighting of the battle and, for one of their infantry regiments and the anti-tank gunners who accompanied them, the most glorious. The operation upon which they embarked on the night of D plus 3, 26 October, ran head-on to Rommel’s massive counter-attack the next day, and the division, in repelling it, administered to the enemy tanks the same astringent medicine that our own tanks had so far been compelled to swallow. They proved again that the stoutly manned anti-tank gun on the ground could see off the enemy armour with heavy loss; they proved it, moreover, in a hastily occupied position devoid of natural advantage.
Alamein (Major Battles of World War Two) Page 26