It could be said that for Rand, the notion of rational self-interest was internal to the concept of egoism; the notion of laissez-faire was internal to the concept of a genuinely capitalist social system. She and others explored many of these principles with increasing breadth and depth in such publications as The Objectivist Newsletter (1962–65), The Objectivist (1966–71), and The Ayn Rand Letter (1971–76). Important essays from these periodicals were anthologized in such nonfiction works as The Virtue of Selfishness (1964), Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (1967), The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (1971), The Romantic Manifesto (1971), Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (1979), and Rand’s posthumously published works, Philosophy: Who Needs It (1982) and The Voice of Reason (1989). However, Rand’s first nonfiction work to appear in book form was the lead essay of For the New Intellectual, which presented philosophical passages culled from the body of Rand’s fiction. Rand’s harsh and polemical tone, coupled with her caricaturing of many philosophers, led Sidney Hook to denounce the book for its sloganeering: “This is the way philosophy is written in the Soviet Union. In a free culture there must always be room for vigorous polemic and controversy but civility of mind is integral to the concept of a civilized society.”56
Despite pinpointing a very real lack of civility in Rand’s exposition, Hook did not realize that Rand’s impulse toward synthesis was indeed the way philosophy had been written in Russia for many generations. Rand provoked the wrath of academicians partially because, like her Russian philosophical ancestors, she was an outcast, a social critic writing with a passionately immoderate tone that was far more accessible to the general public and far less considerate of scholarly give-and-take.
As her sales increased, so did her impact. She electrified audiences on television and radio, and in newspapers and magazines. With the establishment of the Nathaniel Branden Institute (N.B.I.), Rand’s philosophy was mass marketed through the rental of taped courses. Rand made personal appearances at Columbia, Princeton, Harvard, Yale, New York University, and other college campuses across the country. On 2 October 1963, she received an honorary degree, Doctor of Humane Letters (L.H.D.), from Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon, in recognition of her growing influence (Gladstein 1984, ii).
But in 1968, the Objectivist movement was torn asunder in a schism between Rand and two of her closest friends and associates, Nathaniel and Barbara Branden. In later years, it became apparent that the schism was inextricably tied to a collapsing love affair between Rand and Nathaniel Branden.57 Even though Rand continued to publish and lecture in the ensuing years, her fractured movement disintegrated under the weight of charges and countercharges. Eventually, Rand’s disillusionment with the state of the world led to her virtual retirement from public life.
Ayn Rand died on 6 March 1982 and was buried in Valhalla, New York.
In the years since her death, Objectivist philosophy has emerged as a veritable tradition of thought.
Flowing almost directly from what remained of Rand’s inner circle are the “orthodox” Objectivists, led by Leonard Peikoff. The orthodox school consists of thinkers such as Harry Binswanger, Edwin Locke, Edith Packer, George Reisman, John Ridpath, and Peter Schwartz, among others.
Leonard Peikoff received his doctorate in philosophy at New York University in 1964 under the direction of Sidney Hook. Peikoff’s dissertation was titled “The Status of the Law of Contradiction in Classic Logical Ontologism.”58 His mentor criticized him as a “monist” and a “Hegelian,” but this did not deter Peikoff from his Objectivist predilections.59 Yet like a genuine Hegelian, Peikoff argues that no philosophic problems can be resolved in a vacuum, since all issues are interconnected.60 Admitting to a tendency toward rationalism, Peikoff never tires of quoting Hegel’s dictum that “The True is the Whole.”61 He repeats this credo in his books, articles, and courses, warning of the danger of “one-sided distortions” (1983T, lecture 7). His presentation has always been more deductive than inductive, more synthetic than analytic.62 But in many ways, the Peikoff-Rand link parallels the relationship between Engels and Marx. Like Engels, Peikoff has continued to publish and edit many of his mentor’s previously unavailable writings. He has also made an important contribution to the formalized presentation of Rand’s philosophy in his 1991 book, which derives from both the written and oral tradition of Objectivism.
In contrast to the Randian orthodoxy, there are those neo-Objectivist thinkers who are generally associated with the Atlas Society (formerly the Institute for Objectivist Studies), an organization headed by David Kelley. Kelley’s Evidence of the Senses is a realist defense of perception in the Objectivist tradition. Other thinkers who have spoken at Atlas forums or written for its periodicals, include Joan and Allan Blumenthal, Stephen Hicks, the late George Walsh, and the late Kay Nolte Smith.
There is also a group of “libertarian” neo-Objectivists, consisting of such theorists as Tibor Machan, Eric Mack, Douglas Den Uyl, and Douglas Rasmussen. This group of thinkers relates Rand’s work to the Aristotelian, classical liberal, and modern libertarian traditions.
Finally, one cannot discount the contributions of Nathaniel Branden and Barbara Branden. Despite leaving Rand’s inner circle in 1968, the Brandens have each moved in the direction of “revisionism.”63 Nathaniel Branden in particular has emerged from his years with Rand as an important theorist and practitioner of “biocentric” psychology. As the so-called father of the self-esteem movement, Branden has emphasized the role of self-esteem in nearly every aspect of human life. His books include The Psychology of Self-Esteem (1969), The Disowned Self (1971), The Psychology of Romantic Love (1980), Honoring the Self (1983), and The Six Pillars of Self-Esteem (1994). Even though he departs from some of Rand’s formulations, he continues to build on the Objectivist approach.64
PART TWO
THE REVOLT AGAINST DUALISM
5
BEING
N. O. Lossky (1951) once wrote: “Philosophy is a science and therefore, like every other science, it seeks to establish truths that have been strictly proved and are therefore binding for every thinking being and not only for a particular people or nation.” Operating at the highest level of generality, the philosopher traces the interconnections between the entities, elements, and aspects of reality. The philosopher must unite “two opposed and not easily combinable faculties: the highest degree of abstract thinking and a high degree of concrete contemplation of reality” (402). In Lossky’s view, however, people have not developed these faculties to the degree required for the truly stupendous tasks of the examined life. That many opposing schools of philosophy exist illustrates that philosophy is at a much more primitive level of development than either mathematics or physics (403). But for Lossky, philosophy was paving the way for a more unified, nondualistic conception of being and knowing.
Though Rand rejected much of the content of Lossky’s philosophy, her own system retained an exhaustive and dialectical form that reflected her Russian roots. Just as significant, however, was Rand’s profound respect for philosophy as essential to human being. Like her teacher, Rand perpetuated a distinctive tradition of philosophizing that stretched back to the days of the ancient Greeks. For Rand, it was the culture of classical antiquity that marked the beginning of humankind’s intellectual maturity. The classical thinkers contributed to humanity the very concept of philosophy as a secular discipline in which the mind strove to achieve “a comprehensive view of existence.” Rand believed that this authentic, nonreligious commitment to the examined life was rarely duplicated in the history of thought: “The grandeur, the reverence, the exalted purity, the austere dedication to the pursuit of truth, which are commonly associated with religion, should properly belong to the field of philosophy. Aristotle lived up to it and, in part, so did Plato, Aquinas, Spinoza—but how many others?”1
Like her teacher, Rand argued that philosophy requires the greatest level of abstraction and concretization, “the integration of factual data, the maint
enance of a full context, the discovery of principles, the establishment of causal connections and thus the implementation of a long-range vision” (108). Every aspect of Rand’s thought—from her social ontology to her politics—concentrates on the specifically conceptual nature and needs of human consciousness.
Like most systematic visions, Rand’s Objectivism cannot be fully appreciated until it is grasped as a totality. No totality, however, can be presented as such. Peikoff argues correctly that the whole can only be examined through the parts. Every part of a philosophical system implies both the whole and every other part.2 Furthermore, Peikoff understands that Objec-tivism is structured as an internally related system, such that any “change in one element redounds throughout the network.” Indeed, for Peikoff, as for Rand, Objectivism mirrors the very interrelationships that are present in existence and knowledge. Peikoff maintains: “Human knowledge on every level is relational. Knowledge is not a juxtaposition of independent items; it is a unity … a total, a sum, a single whole.” The relational character of knowledge is a reflection of the metaphysical fact that “there is only one universe.” In the universe, “everything … is interconnected.” Peikoff writes:
Every entity is related in some way to the others; each somehow affects and is affected by the others. Nothing is a completely isolated fact, without causes or effects; no aspect of the total can exist ultimately apart from the total. Knowledge, therefore, which seeks to grasp reality, must also be a total; its elements must be interconnected to form a unified whole reflecting the whole which is the universe.3
Peikoff stresses also that no mind can disregard the relationships among its contents because the discovery of such relationships is inherent in the identity of consciousness. Thus every tenet of a philosophy, just like every aspect of knowledge, “must be judged in the light of the total picture, i.e., of the full context.” Since every element of knowledge “is potentially relevant to the rest,” a genuinely integrated philosophy must transcend fragmentation and subdivision. Peikoff (1991b, 125) suggests that Rand’s achievement lies partially in her methodical consistency within the context of available knowledge.
Ultimately, then, one cannot analyze any of Rand’s isolated philosophical insights by disconnecting them from the corpus of her thought. Taken together, each part generates and is generated by the totality. Rand’s approach is so thoroughly integrated that her philosophical beginnings seem to presuppose the results of her entire system.4
Yet, as I have demonstrated, Rand’s philosophy was not a mere deduction from first principles. It was a historical product of her revolt against formal dualism. Ironically, Rand has been criticized for the reverse evolution of her thought, for its movement from political to metaphysical themes. William O’Neill ([1971] 1975) suggests, for instance, that Rand’s philosophy really began with ethics and terminated, as an afterthought, with a theory of truth and knowledge: “Her epistemology and her metaphysical assumptions—indeed, the vast bulk of her philosophy—are essentially an a posteriori rationalization for a fervent a priori commitment to the ethics of laissez-faire capitalism” (175).
In a certain sense, of course, O’Neill is correct. Rand’s literary project began with a political dynamic and concluded with ontological and epistemological themes. In We the Living, Rand focused on the central question of the individual against the state. By the time she had written Atlas Shrugged, she was examining the role of the mind in human existence and making explicit connections between epistemic and political themes.
But it is ahistorical for O’Neill to suggest that any thinker could develop a system of thought by merely deducing it from metaphysical principles. It is true that many Objectivists imply that the morality of capitalism flows logically from the law of identity. Rand herself wrote with such a polemical flair that many of her ontological and political insights seem self-evident. The fact is, however, that Rand’s system is less a rationalization of her belief in capitalism than it is an articulation of the underlying, interconnected ontological, epistemological, and ethical premises on which capitalism depends.
Rand could never have begun with metaphysics and merely deduced her political ideas. She did not emerge full-grown from the head of Zeus as a modern goddess of wisdom. Her entire philosophical project was a historical product from its genesis to its formal presentation. Indeed, Rand had to develop her thought quite extensively before she could present it as an organic system of philosophical integration.
She begins with ontology and epistemology, breaking up the world into humanly knowable, relational units. This analytical moment of Rand’s method encapsulates a process of intellectual “chewing,” of breaking down the whole into graspable elements. By tearing these elements apart, Rand makes them intellectually digestible (Peikoff 1983T, lecture 1). Her mode of inquiry traces the interconnections between these units on a social scale, reconstructing the totality as an organic whole. Her ethics and her politics are grounded in her teleological and biological insights. Though Rand is known for her polemics, she was quite adept at theoretical integration, expanding and synthesizing the units of her analysis to encompass the whole of reality.
A central aspect of Rand’s exposition is her ability to trace the dialectical relationships between apparent opposites. Rand was never misled into accepting her opponents’ definition of a specific philosophical or social problem. She aimed to “go to the root of the issue,” claiming that the essential aspects of any question often could not be grasped by relying on the static premises and traditional frames of reference in mainstream thought (N. Branden 1989, 215).
Toward this end, Rand analyzed the antinomic “paradoxes” in modern philosophy. For Rand, a paradox had the appearance of a logical contradiction, which is at root, impossible (Peikoff 1974T, lecture 2). Hence, it was incumbent upon her as a dialectical thinker, to trace the links between apparent opposites, to show that the alternatives offered by contemporary schools of thought were false.5
Though Rand aimed to document the fundamental links uniting such opposites, she also attempted to show that many contemporary thinkers had merely settled for embracing reductionist monism rather than finding a remedy for the various forms of dualism. They emphasized one pole of a duality as a means of reconciling opposition. In Rand’s view, dualism could not be conquered through the absorption of one polar principle by another. Just as Rand’s philosophy attempts to transcend alleged polarities as a means of providing an integrated view of human existence, so her critique of opposing traditions in Western thought seeks to uncover the fundamental errors they share. In most cases, Rand shows that each of the opposing schools of philosophy is half right and half wrong.
Since Rand discovered value in many of the philosophies she analyzed, some critics have attempted to tie Objectivism to such traditions as rationalism, materialism, or existentialism.6 What her critics failed to grasp was that she was working toward a new synthesis, which required that she use established categories in the process of transcending them. She both accepted and rejected significant principles within each of the polar traditions which she analyzed. Consequently, by abstracting particular aspects from the totality of her thought, one can see elements of rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, liberalism and conservatism. Rand explains: “Most men hold mixed premises; most schools of thought are full of contradictions. One may find some elements of value, of truth and of rationality in many people and schools. This does not make them Objectivist.”7
Part 2 examines the distinctiveness of Objectivism, even as it traces significant parallels between Rand’s thought and others in the history of philosophy. But in dissecting the content of Objectivism, much of the following discussion may sometimes obscure the broad fundamentals of Rand’s worldview. Rand herself was once asked to identify the central tenets of her system. Her identification, in each of the major branches of philosophy, is worth recalling:
1. Metaphysics: Objective Reality. 2. Epistemology: Reason. 3. Ethics: Self-interes
t. 4. Politics: Capitalism. If you want this translated into simple language, it would read: 1. “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed” or “Wishing won’t make it so.” 2. “You can’t eat your cake and have it, too.” 3. “Man is an end in himself.” 4. “Give me liberty or give me death.”8
THE REJECTION OF COSMOLOGY
Rand’s revolt against formal dualism first manifested itself in the realm of metaphysics or ontology.9 Metaphysics, for Rand, refers to that branch of philosophy which “deals with the fundamental nature of reality.”10 Metaphysics involves the widest abstractions pertaining to existence as such.11 Whereas the special sciences separate a part of existence and investigate it thoroughly, metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate context of reality and knowledge, that is, “being qua being.”
Rand’s approach to the ontological foundations of philosophy was minimalist. In fact, beyond the general axiomatic proposition of existence, Rand refused—on principle—to commit herself to any a priori judgments about the ultimate constituents of reality. She believed that epistemology was the crux of philosophy because it related to the means of knowledge and was the base of all special sciences. Rand herself considered ontology and epistemology inseparable, and argued that each therefore implied the other (Peikoff 1976T, lecture 4). Thus her axioms serve as the foundation for her theories both of being and of knowing.
Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical Page 17