Though Rand developed her notion of the “sanction of the victim” and of the reciprocity between master and slave in her own unique style, these concepts were not entirely new to intellectual history. As far back as 1577, Étienne de la Boetie wrote A Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, which argued that political tyranny ultimately rested on popular consent. La Boetie believed that most citizens obeyed authority out of sheer habit and custom, duped by the tyrant who promoted a benevolent view of his rule.9 But even before La Boetie, hints of the master-slave duality could be found in Aristotle, who recognized that each term is “reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined.” For Aristotle, such “correlatives” as “master” and “slave” must “come into existence simultaneously.”10
In the history of philosophy, however, it was Hegel who dealt most explicitly with the codependency of master and slave. As Heilbroner explains, this definition of the master and slave each in terms of its “contradiction” or “negation” is not a violation of Aristotelian logic: “The logical contradiction (or ‘opposite’ or ‘negation’) of a Master is not a Slave, but a ‘non-Master,’ which may or may not be a slave. But the relational opposite of a Master is indeed a Slave, for it is only by reference to this second ‘excluded’ term that the first is defined.”11
For Hegel, the emergence of master and slave (Hegel uses the terms “lord” and “bondsman”) is a component of the evolution of consciousness. Hegel sketches the development of selfhood from the first confrontational moments between one self and another. In this initial encounter, the Self seeks to assert its own existence by annihilating the Other. Ultimately, however, each Self manifests a form of dependency. The master and slave use each other in their attempts to achieve self-consciousness. The master sees in the slave an instrument for the achievement of his or her own goals, while the slave sees the master as someone who will care for his or her needs. Masters need slaves to maintain their status as masters, whereas the servant requires the master to perpetuate his slavery. Each is in “reciprocal self-surrender” to the other. In their self-alienation, each fails to achieve genuine independence (Hegel [1807] 1977, 134).
At first, masters appear to be independent. They seem to live only for themselves, whereas slaves appear to live only for their masters. But in reality, the conditions of each consciousness interpenetrate the other. The master’s self is “mediated” through the slave’s consciousness. The master appropriates the material products of the slave’s labor and depends on the slave for survival. As such, masters fail to recognize slaves as legitimate persons, and deprive themselves of the mutual recognition that their consciousnesses require.
By contrast, the slave seems to be an abject dependent. And yet, as slaves master their crafts, they objectify themselves through material production. It is they who most adequately anticipate “the truth of the independent consciousness.” By consummating their purposes in the production of material goods, they become conscious of what they truly are. Even as the master reaps the benefits, and alienates the product of the slave, it is the slave who moves gradually toward the full integration of a genuinely human consciousness (115–19).
For Hegel, the slave does not achieve independence by merely negating the existence of the master. The reciprocal relationship of authority and obedience cannot be broken by reproducing the structure of codependency. It is only in the final phase of Universal Self-Consciousness that slaves stop tying their will to the authority of the Other. They attain full independence, appropriating the products of their own efforts and seeing in others a full, mutual recognition of Self.12
Hegel’s insights served as the model for Marxian theory. In Marx’s view, the worker is the slave for the capitalist master. Capitalists expropriate the worker’s products for their own use, as workers are forced to sell their alienated labor-power on the market. For Marx, communism replaces Hegel’s Universal Self-Consciousness. The communist society is one in which workers realize their potential as producers, emerging as fully integrated, self-conscious, social beings in mutual, benevolent interrelations with others.
There is currently no available evidence to suggest that Rand absorbed any of Hegel’s or Marx’s explicit contributions to this area of social thought. Rand was probably exposed to the Marxian thesis while at Petrograd University. In her intellectual evolution, it would seem that she switched the focus from capitalism to statism. For Rand, the market economy was an outgrowth of voluntary association and trade. Modern statism had introduced an element of coercion into the system of exchange, reproducing, in many insidious forms, the relationships of obedience and authority. But even if Rand did not consciously use Hegelian or Marxian categories in her analysis of the codependency relationship, her dialectical approach would have led her toward a similar assessment of the nature of power.
In Rand’s view, there is no legitimate choice between the self-sacrifice of the slave or the domination of the master. Each is the other side of the same dualism. As Roark argues, there is only the choice between independence or dependence. The independent man “is the man who stands above the need of using others in any manner. He does not function through them.… He does not exist for any other man—and he asks no other man to exist for him.” Independence is the only basis for relationships among equals, “the only pattern for proper cooperation,” and “the only form of brotherhood and mutual respect possible between men.”13
In contrast to both Hegel and Marx, Rand focused greater attention on the psychology of power. Her notion of the second-hander, and her acceptance of several key Brandenian concepts, was an attempt to explain the psycho-epistemological roots of codependency relationships. Ultimately, Rand tied this psychological dimension to a broader systemic context, emerging with a full-bodied critique of contemporary statism.
During his association with Rand, Branden provided a psychological counterpart to Rand’s own view of the “second-hander.” In his concepts of “pseudo-self-esteem” and “social metaphysics,” Branden sought to synthesize Rand’s understanding of the codependency relationship with a psychological dynamic. It was an exposition that Rand fully endorsed.
Central to Objectivism is a vision of human efficacy that entails the full integration of mind and body, reason and emotion, the conscious and subconscious, the articulate and tacit. Rand’s ethos is essentially epistemic. It emphasizes the achievement of reason, purpose, and self-esteem as the basis for and reflection of human efficacy. Rand writes: “The relationship of reason and morality is reciprocal: the man who accepts the role of a sacrificial animal, will not achieve the self-confidence necessary to uphold the validity of his mind—and the man who doubts the validity of his mind, will not achieve the self-esteem necessary to uphold the value of his person and to discover the moral premises that make man’s value possible” (New Intellectual, 37–38).
Branden accepted Rand’s formulation and argued further that since every person must have confidence in his mind in order to act efficaciously, some self-doubting individuals will develop a pretense at self-efficacy and self-worth. Such a pretense is a necessary survival technique for those who fail to achieve genuine epistemological self-confidence. Branden defines “pseudo-self-esteem” as “a non-rational, self-protective device to diminish anxiety and to provide a spurious sense of security—to assuage a need of authentic self-esteem while allowing the real causes of its lack to be evaded.”14
Branden explains that pseudo-self-esteem is maintained by the evasion, repression, or rationalization of those ideas and feelings which may adversely affect an individual’s self-appraisal. In such instances, the individual seeks to derive his self-efficacy from experiences that are less demanding of his ability. Persons of pseudo-self-esteem are motivated by fear. They adopt a host of defense mechanisms as anti-anxiety devices. They may seek solace in religious faith or in the manipulation of others.
Branden extends his analysis by developing a second crucial concept: “social metaphysics.”15 Branden (19
83b, 50) recognizes that as social beings, persons seek visibility in their interactions with others. But individuals who attempt to tie their self-assessment to the opinions of others place themselves in a humiliating subordinate position. Such individuals are parasites on human consciousness. Their frame of reference is not reality, but their own fantasies about the ideas inside the minds of others (Branden 1989, 128). They live not in a universe of facts, but in “a universe of people.” People mediate reality and become the prime tool of their survival. Branden ([1969] 1979) writes: “Social metaphysics is the psychological syndrome that characterizes a person who holds the minds of other men, not objective reality, as his ultimate psycho-epistemological frame of reference” (179–80).
Branden maintains that social metaphysicians lack a firm sense of objective existence distinct from “the judgments, beliefs, opinions, feelings of others.” They experience a metaphysical inefficacy, a basic helplessness, and a malevolent sense of life. Their pseudo-self-esteem is dependent upon the responses of significant others whom they fundamentally fear (185). Social metaphysicians organize their lives “around the desire to please, to be taken care of, or, alternatively, to control and dominate, to manipulate and coerce” others. They seek “completion and fulfillment through domination or submission, through controlling or being controlled, through ordering or obeying.” But ultimately, they experience a “fundamental sense of emptiness” and a lack of authenticity. Their individuation process stunted, they fail to assimilate the basic fact of their aloneness (N. Branden 1980, 111).
Branden ([1969] 1979, 185–95) identifies certain dominant trends among social metaphysicians. He creates typological classifications that in reality, often coexist within a single consciousness:
• Conventional types are pure conformists. They fear independent value judgment and action and are unquestioning in their loyalty to the social “mainstream.”
• Spiritual types seek social position in a culture or subculture of mysticism. As religious fanatics, they claim to possess an ineffable, superior soul visible only to God. Their faith in God and adherence to ascetic rituals serve to bolster an illusory sense of personal worth. They seek the protection and blessing of God because God is, allegedly, the only Other of any significance in their lives.
• Independent types reject the status quo, not on principle, but in an attempt to project a defiant rebelliousness. Such “counterfeit” individualists define themselves not in terms of their conformity to others, but in terms of their opposition to others.16
• Ambivalent types exhibit “a significant degree of intellectual sovereignty,” even as they conform tacitly or indifferently to the values of society.
Of greatest relevance to the current discussion, however, is the Power-seeking social metaphysician. Branden accepts Rand’s view that “power-lust” is “a manifestation of helplessness, of self-loathing and of the desire for the unearned.”17 For Rand, as for Branden, “power-lust is a psycho-epistemological matter.”18 Power-seekers have a basic fear and hatred of both themselves and other people. They attempt to quell their anxiety and to promote a sense of pseudo-efficacy by attempting to control others, especially those who are genuinely efficacious (N. Branden [1969] 1979, 189). Their deep sense of inferiority leads them to deceive, manipulate, and coerce other people, even as they struggle to command their respect, obedience and love. Such types may be found in all professions, but they are attracted principally to politics and the military. In a statist social order, they reproduce “in startling numbers.” Their desire to manipulate others is at root a desire to make their whims efficacious (188–90).
Branden (1980, 172–73) maintains further that a high proportion of such Power-seekers experience peaks of sexual intensity in sadomasochism. The ability to inflict and/or endure pain is internal to their psychology. Branden (1983b, 128) argues, however, that symbiotic dependency is not an adequate model for human relationships. He agrees with Rand that the moral life is not a choice between sadism or masochism.19
There is a period style in Rand’s and Branden’s interest in such issues, which was influenced significantly by the popular, contemporaneous writings of the leftist intellectual, Erich Fromm.20 Fromm similarly opposed the duality of sadism and masochism as an outgrowth of the master-slave relationship. Fromm argued that in striving toward domination and submission, the sadist and the masochist seek to escape from their “unbearable aloneness.” Masochists exhibit inferiority, powerlessness, and insignificance. They belittle themselves in the company of their oppressors. Alternatively, sadists seek to exploit, humiliate, embarrass, and use their partners. They seek to inflict mental and physical harm. But just as the masochist is dependent upon the sexual dominance of the sadist, so too, the sadist is dependent upon “the object of his sadism.” Each derives a sense of fulfillment from the other. Each seeks to escape from the burdens of independence, responsibility, and freedom. In their “symbiosis,” there is a mutual loss of integrity and authenticity.21
Despite this parallel between Fromm’s portrait and the Objectivist conception, there are significant differences between them: Rand and Branden endorse capitalism; Fromm does not. Fromm argues that the perpetuation of sadism and masochism in human relationships is a reflection of the unbearable freedom engendered by the emergence of capitalism. Capitalism destroys the human spirit because it constitutes and is constituted by a spontaneous order that is beyond the control of any human actor. It maximizes material wealth and political freedom even as it undermines the individual’s sense of efficacy. Its institutions are impersonal and not amenable to social control. In essence, it is the cause of modern man’s alienation.
It was largely in response to Fromm’s theories, that Branden wrote his essay “Alienation.” Branden saw alienation as the problem of “the disowned self.”22 Individuals who had failed to develop self-sufficient egos were incapable of experiencing themselves as responsible for their own actions. Branden argues in dialectical fashion: “The problem of alienation and the problem of personal identity are inseparable. The man who lacks a firm sense of personal identity feels alienated; the man who feels alienated lacks a firm sense of personal identity.”23
Branden agrees with Fromm that alienated individuals achieve “a splintered sense of self, a self broken into unintegratable fragments” (291). They engage in flights from reality and from their selves. Most important, they attempt to flee “from the responsibility of a volitional (i.e., self-directing) consciousness” (294). But they cannot escape from the necessity to choose in the cognitive and evaluative realms. Those who default on the responsibility to think and judge inevitably fracture the integrated requirements of their own survival. They achieve crippling guilt and anxiety in their day-to-day lives.
Both Rand and Branden saw capitalism as the only social system that can provide the existential context for the transcendence of alienation. Capitalism is based upon the primacy of existence, the efficacy of reason, and the necessity of freedom. Freedom is not sufficient in itself for human fulfillment, but it is a necessary social requirement. Although self-doubting individuals cannot escape from the cognitive freedom that is inherent in their species-identity, they can escape from freedom on “the existential or social level.” Political freedom can be rejected by those social metaphysicians who seek to escape the responsibility of directing their own lives. Branden declares: “The psychological root of the revolt against freedom in one’s existence, is the revolt against freedom in one’s consciousness. The root of the revolt against self-responsibility in action is the revolt against self-direction in thought. The man who does not want to think, does not want to bear responsibility for the consequences of his actions nor for his own life” (295).
Branden ([1971] 1978) later remarked: “A concentration camp guard is the ultimate example of alienated man” (139). No thinker in the Objectivist tradition has written more about the tragedy of the concentration camps than Leonard Peikoff. Peikoff’s discussion sheds further light on th
e Objectivist contention that the use of force necessarily invalidates self-responsibility and self-direction. But it is not Peikoff’s particular analysis that is pivotal here. What is most significant is the utility of the Objectivist framework for analyzing certain kinds of human experience.
Peikoff’s book The Ominous Parallels explores some of the similarities between the rise of Nazism in Germany and contemporary U.S. culture. Mirroring the efforts of the early Frankfurt school theorists such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse, Peikoff expends considerable energy trying to make sense out of the madness of Auschwitz.24 Drawing from the works of Bruno Bettelheim and Hannah Arendt, Peikoff (1982, 255) argues that the camps were created to inculcate unconditional obedience. Their goal was “psychological destruction,” the obliteration of the human “capacity to function independently” (258).
The relations of power were reproduced on every scale within the concentration camp structure. The camps aimed to control both victims and killers. “The victims had to become robots, slavishly obedient to the guards; the guards had to become robots, slavishly obedient to the Führer” (259).
The camps destroyed their victims’ self-efficacy and self-worth. As their faculty of volition was assaulted, the degraded prisoners were denied their essential personhood. Their ability to grasp existence was slowly eradicated. Their focal choices were made irrelevant to their survival. If they attempted to raise the level of their focal awareness, their minds could not make sense of the reality of mass extermination. If they attempted to shrink the level of their focal awareness in an effort to insulate themselves from existential terror, their minds were invalidated as tools of survival. Living in a nightmare universe, the prisoners learned ultimately “to suppress any outward signs of perceptiveness.” They were forced to “implicate [themselves] in evil” regardless of the choices they made. The prisoners were made accessories to their own destruction as the camps blurred the distinction between victim and executioner (267–68). Peikoff (1980T, lecture 6) emphasizes that under such conditions, the question of the sanction of the victim was beside the point. The victims were spiritually destroyed before they were physically exterminated.
Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical Page 40