Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical

by Sciabarra, Chris

  14. N. Branden [1969] 1979, 144–45. Branden (1992, 36) still employs this concept, which he has recently described as “the illusion of self-efficacy and self-respect without the reality.” Orthodox Objectivists also continue to use this concept. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 9; Packer, in Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 11; Locke (April 1984), “Review of Stanton E. Samenow’s Inside the Criminal Mind,” in Binswanger 5.2.12.

  15. Branden’s first discussion of “social metaphysics” appeared in print in the November 1962 issue of the Objectivist Newsletter. I cite The Psychology of Self-Esteem, which reproduces these early entries almost in their entirety. According to both Barbara Branden and Nathaniel Branden, Rand saw “social metaphysics” as an embellishment of and advance over her own concept of the second-hander. B. Branden 1986, 269; N. Branden 1989, 128. In Rand (July 1964), “The argument from intimidation,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 141, she used the Brandenian concept freely, especially in her pre-schism writings. Barbara Branden argues, however, that the concept of “social metaphysics” was only “a valuable description of an aspect of inner behavior … not a fundamental motivational principle; it names how some people behave, but it does not name the underlying sources and base of such behavior.” In her view, the concept of “social metaphysics” became an instrument of psychological control within Rand’s inner circle.

  16. Rand saw many of the protesting students of the New Left as Dionysian, “Independent” social metaphysicians and “counterfeit” individualists.

  17. Rand (December 1962), “The monument builders,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 88.

  18. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 227.

  19. Rand (9 February 1961), “The Objectivist ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 30; N. Branden (1962), “The moral revolution in Atlas Shrugged,” in Branden and Branden 1962, 34–35.

  20. For the recognition of a unique “period style,” thanks to Cox (18 October 1993C).

  21. Fromm [1941] 1969, 163–80. Interestingly, Barnes (1967, 133) notes that Rand’s portrait of the “second-hander” bears some resemblance to Fromm’s “Market Personality.”

  22. Branden’s essay appears in Unknown Ideal, but it also appears in abridged and revised form in N. Branden [1971] 1978. See also N. Branden 1983b, 253.

  23. N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in Unknown Ideal, 289.

  24. See Adorno 1950.

  25. N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in Unknown Ideal, 295.

  26. Addendum to N. Branden (July–September 1965), “Alienation,” in N. Branden [1971] 1978,237.

  27. The phrase “linguistic left” was coined by Hughes (1993).

  28. McCarthy 1978, 86, 133; Habermas [1968] 1971; 1970; [1971] 1973; and [1976] 1979. McCarthy presents a very comprehensible summary of Habermas’s views.

  29. Habermas, “A reply to my critics,” in Thompson and Held 1982, 264.

  30. McCarthy 1978, 200; Habermas [1968] 1971, 217–36.

  31. Habermas [1971] 1973, 18–19; McCarthy 1978, 305, 312.

  32. Peikoff 1983T, Lecture 3. To say that honesty is a relationship between the mind and reality is not to say that Rand’s theory is solipsistic. Rand seeks to objectify the virtue of honesty.

  33. Rand (February 1963), “The ethics of emergencies,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 52.

  34. Rand did not develop the issue of communicative interaction in art, but it is clear that there is a kind of raw, subconscious honesty involved in the “sense of life” relationship between the artist’s creation and the responder’s experience.

  35. N. Branden (March 1963), “Mental health versus mysticism and self-sacrifice,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 36.

  36. N. Branden 1983a, 100, 127, 131; 1986, 21; 1983b, 178–79; 1987; 1994.

  37. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:1. Rand’s identification of anti-concepts should be distinguished from the “anti-conceptual mentality” discussed in Chapter 8. An anti-concept is not simply the linguistic creation of an anti-conceptual mentality. It is at root an illegitimate concept with no clear existential referent. The anti-conceptual mentality, by contrast, is an illegitimate method of cognitive functioning. Thanks to Kelley (20 August 1989C) and Johnson (18 June 1990C) for emphasizing this point. In addition, it should be noted that Objectivists distinguish between an “anti-concept” and a “floating abstraction.” An anti-concept is illegitimate, whereas a floating abstraction may be a legitimate concept in need of concretization. Peikoff 1990–91T, Lecture 9.

  38. There are some obvious Hegelian overtones in Rand’s study of systemic negation. But this parallel should be noted with a caveat: while Rand sees the statist system as a negation of everything rational, her future Objectivist society is not the inexorable product of a historical Aufhebung.

  39. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:1.

  40. Rand (September 1964), “‘Extremism,’ or the art of smearing,” in Unknown Ideal, 176–77.

  41. Rand (25 September 1972), “How to read (and not to write),” in Voice of Reason, 131. Rand argues that “atomism” is one such “anti-euphemism,” a term which makes offensive the concept of a free, independent, individual.

  42. Rand violently opposed the draft on moral grounds, even when a compelling national interest is at stake; she favored instead the all-volunteer army. Rand (April–May 1967), “The wreckage of the consensus,” in Unknown Ideal.

  43. Rand (September 1962), “The pull peddlers,” in Unknown Ideal, 170; (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in Unknown Ideal, 20–21; (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in New Left, 61. Rand discusses a host of “anti-concepts” throughout her writings, including “fairness doctrine,” “isolationism,” “meritocracy,” “mixed economy,” “xenophobia,” and concepts of mysticism, among others. For brief explanations of each of these anti-concepts, see the corresponding entries in Binswanger 1986.

  44. Rand (July 1970), “Causality versus duty,” in Philosophy, 114.

  45. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:3.

  46. Rand (May–June 1965), “The new fascism: Rule by consensus,” in Unknown Ideal, 203–4.

  47. Rand (April–May 1967), “The wreckage of the consensus,” in Unknown Ideal, 222. Rand viewed “anti-ideology” as a species of philosophical pragmatism. In Rand (9–23 April 1973), “Brothers, you asked for it!” in Ayn Rand Letter 2:191, she defined pragmatism as “power without purpose.” In this context, Rand used a generic definition of the concept “ideology,” which should not be confused with the Marxian construct. In “The Wreckage of the Consensus,” she defined “ideology” as “a set of principles aimed at establishing or maintaining a certain social system; it is a program of long-range action, with the principles serving to unify and integrate particular steps into a consistent course.” However, in a clearly defined alternative context, Rand attached an opposite meaning to “ideology,” For instance, in Rand (3 January 1972), “What can one do?” in Philosophy, 248, she denigrated certain groups and movements (such as conservatives and libertarians) as “ideological,” because they proclaim “some vaguely generalized, undefined (and, usually, contradictory) political goals.” She argued that these groups attempt “to reverse the philosophical hierarchy and to sell out fundamental principles.” In this context, the “ideological” is an anti-concept. It is not long-range and integrative; it is vague, undefined, and noncontextual. Such contrasting meanings in Rand’s thought caused me some expositional problems in Sciabarra 1989. Though I have modified some of the formulations from this earlier article, I still believe that Rand’s critique of anti-conceptualism serves a function in her system that is similar to the Marxian critique of ideology. Both notions are intimately connected to the legitimation of power relations. I do not explore these specific parallels here because it requires a more detailed exposition of the Marxia
n concept. A good, brief discussion of Marx’s theory is provided in Ollman [1971] 1976, 227–33.

  48. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:3.

  49. Rand (5 June 1972), “‘Fairness Doctrine’ for education,” in Philosophy, 231.

  50. Rand (6 November 1972), “A nation’s unity, part three,” in Ayn Rand Letter 2:131.

  51. Rand (11 October 1971), “Credibility and polarization,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:3.

  52. Habermas (1994, 26) remains critical of state socialism, while adhering fundamentally to the Marxist critique of capitalism. He identifies “radical democracy” as a political ideal, which “includes using welfare state measures to tame capitalism to some point where it becomes unrecognizable as such.”

  53. Rand (January 1966), “Altruism as appeasement,” in Voice of Reason, 33.

  54. Rand (20 November 1972), “The American spirit,” in Ayn Rand Letter 2:134.

  55. Rand (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 250. Apparently aware of its vague and slang usage, Rand places the phrase “life-style” in quotation marks.

  56. Rand (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 250.

  57. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 152; (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 252.

  58. Rand (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 251.

  59. N. Branden 1994, 288. Branden places the phrase “cultural unconscious” in quotation marks. It is similar in form to Jameson’s “political unconscious,” and highlights the tacit dimensions of culture.

  60. Rand (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 250.

  61. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 165.

  62. Rand (13 March 1972), “Tax credits for education,” in Voice of Reason, 247.

  63. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 153.

  64. Rand (August–September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in Unknown Ideal, 306.

  65. Rand (1 January 1973), “To dream the noncommercial dream,” in Voice of Reason, 245.

  66. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 162–63, 165. Aspects of Rand’s critique in (January 1963), “Collectivized ethics,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 81, have a psychologistic tone since she attempts to identify the implicit motivations and intentions of the egalitarian-humanitarian: “The more neurotic [the egalitarian-humanitarian] is or the more conscientious in the practice of altruism (and these two aspects of his psychology will act reciprocally to reinforce each other), the more he will tend to devise schemes ‘for the good of mankind’ or of ‘society’ or of ‘future generations’—or of anything except actual human beings.”

  67. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 153; (22 November–6 December 1971), “Don’t let it go,” in Philosophy, 252.

  68. Sciabarra (1989) provides additional Marx-Rand comparisons.

  69. Gramsci 1971, 432; Bobbio 1979, 41.

  70. Rand (July–August 1968), “Basic principles of literature,” in Romantic Manifesto, 97.

  71. Blumenthal and Blumenthal ([1974] 1987T) present an Objectivist view of music theory, history, and performance.

  72. Rand (April–June 1971), “Art and cognition,” in Romantic Manifesto, 76. Tolstoy had also criticized “modern artists” for their “counterfeit art.” At the end of the nineteenth century, he argued: “Art, in our society, has been so perverted that not only has bad art come to be considered good, but even the very perception of what art really is has been lost.” Tolstoi [1899] 1913, 87, 132.

  73. Rand (April 1966), “Our cultural value-deprivation,” in Voice of Reason, 102, 104.

  74. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 162.

  75. Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 12. Rand’s hostility toward religion did not blind her to the specifically nonreligious achievements of one of the most important saints of the Catholic Church: Thomas Aquinas. In Rand (August–September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in Unknown Ideal, 315–16, she writes that Aquinas “brought an Aristotelian view of reason (an Aristotelian epistemology) back into European culture, and lighted the way to the Renaissance.” In Rand’s view, “the grandeur of his thought almost lifted the Church close to the realm of reason (though at the price of a basic contradiction).” Interestingly, in her first outlines of Atlas Shrugged, Rand included a priest named Father Amadeus, who was to be a positive character. Peikoff (1991a, xiii) remarks that Rand later eliminated the character because she could not make him convincing.

  76. N. Branden 1967T, Lecture 4; Rand (April 1966), “Our cultural value-deprivation,” in Voice of Reason, 106.

  77. N. Branden (March 1963), “Mental health versus mysticism and self-sacrifice,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 38; [1971] 1978, 165; 1983b, 88. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 12) recognizes that certain religions foster respect for the individual, but this is often undercut by their deeper commitment to faith and sacrifice. Walsh (1988T, Lectures 1 and 3) maintains that people will frequently turn to religion in order to deal with their anxiety over a lack of efficacy. For Walsh, religion will be with us as long as any real or illusory needs can be met by an appeal to the supernatural. Rothbard (1989, 29) argues that the antipathy to religion in Objectivism suggests that “the Randians were fanatically anti-religious” and “that Rand hated God far more than she ever hated the State.” However, Rand maintained that her atheism derived from her belief in the centrality of reason, not from her antipathy to religion.

  78. Rand (December 1962), “The monument builders,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 91.

  79. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 190, 210, 213. Also Rand 1966T. Rand argued that both the content and the structure of education should be changed. Though she proposed an alternative system of private education, she recognized the prime importance of changing the approach to learning. There are a number of Objectivist sources that deal with the nature of a proper education: N. Branden (June 1963), “Common fallacies about capitalism: Public education,” in Unknown Ideal, 89–92, which advocates the abolition of the public schools; B. Hessen (May–June 1970), “The Montessori method,” in Objectivist 9, which defends the value of Montessori education; Peikoff (15 April 1984), “The American school: Why Johnny can’t think,” in Voice of Reason, which criticizes the American educational system; and Peikoff 1985T, which offers six lectures that are an Objectivist primer for “rational” education.

  80. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 204.

  81. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 50.

  82. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 228.

  83. Both Marxists and Objectivists oppose this tendency toward fragmentation in the social sciences. Ollman (1979, 136) notes: “Formal education in America is in large part training in how to think undialectically.”

  84. Rand (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 228.

  85. In keeping with the Randian tradition of using negative phrases to describe contemporary institutions, Reisman (1990T) characterizes universities as “anti-universities.”

  86. Rand (21 November 1981), “The sanction of the victims,” in Voice of Reason, 153.

  87. Rand (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in Unknown Ideal, 250.

  88. On the organic link between anti-conceptualism and statism, see Peikoff 1985T, Lecture 5.

  89. Rand (22 April 1974), “Ideas v. men,” in Ayn Rand Letter 3:319.

  90. Rand (August 1962), “The ‘conflicts’ of men’s interests,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 54.

  91. Rand (August 1962), “Let us alone!” in Unknown Ideal, 141.

  92. Rand (September 1964), “‘Extremism,’ or the art of smearing,” in Unknown Ideal
, 182.

  93. Rand (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in Unknown Ideal, 266. Interestingly, Riggenbach (1982) has reported that in a nationwide survey of the radical, sixties generation, published in 1979, one in six respondents mentioned Rand as a person whom they admired, or whom they had been influenced by. Rand ranked twenty-ninth out of eighty-one individuals mentioned. The survey indicates that among authors, Rand was tied for sixth place with Greer, behind Vonnegut, Gibran, Wolfe, Sartre, Camus, and Ginsberg, but ahead of McKuen, Hesse, Goodman, de Beauvoir, Mailer, and Jones.

  94. Rand (22 October 1973), “Thought control, part three,” in Ayn Rand Letter 3:258; (17 May 1970), “From a symposium,” in New Left, 97, which repudiates both the New Leftists and their conservative-racist critics, including George Wallace.

  95. Rand (February 1970), “The left: Old and new,” in New Left, 82–95; (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in Unknown Ideal, 241.

  96. Rand (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in Unknown Ideal, 249; (17 May 1970), “From a symposium,” in New Left, 97; 1969T. Rand was certainly not the only thinker to condemn New Left counterculture. Even established scholars of the left academy, such as Habermas, criticized the student movement for its infantile, compulsive action, and short-term narcissistic gratification. See Heydebrand and Burris (1982) for a discussion of Habermas’s attitudes.

  97. Rand (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in New Left, 80; (August-December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 236. As a political libertarian, Rand (1969T) favored the legalization of drugs. In her view, drug prohibition profited organized crime. She believed that drug prohibition was a vestige of moral puritanism, since the government sought to control substances that gave some people pleasure. She (1976T) also recognized that the use of drugs in some circumstances, was not a moral, but a medical question.

  98. Rand (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in New Left, 77.

  CHAPTER 12. THE PREDATORY STATE