101. Rand (10 April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in Voice of Reason, 118, 122.
102. Peikoff (July 1992), “Some notes about tomorrow, part one,” in Schwartz 6.4.
103. Rand (17 July 1972), “Representation without authorization,” in Voice of Reason, 235–36.
104. Rand (8 April 1974), “Moral inflation, part three,” in Ayn Rand Letter 3:309.
105. Rand (September 1963), “Racism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 128; (June 1966), “The roots of war,” in Unknown Ideal, 36.
106. Rand (10 April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in Voice of Reason, 127.
107. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 52.
108. Rand (10 April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in Voice of Reason, 128.
109. Rand (September 1963), “Racism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 128–30; (30 September 1962), “The man-haters,” in Unknown Ideal, 136; (10 April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in Voice of Reason, 127–29.
110. Rand (September 1963), “Racism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 128. For Objectivist discussions of South African apartheid, see Rand 1978T, and Schwartz (20 January 1986), “Untangling South Africa,” in Schwartz 4.4.5.
111. Rand (September 1963), “Racism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 130; [1964] 1993dT. The evidence suggests that Rand would have seen contemporary “bias” crimes as one more concession to tribalism. She did not believe that racially motivated crime was worse, morally, than any other crime. For Rand, the smallest minority was the individual. The difference between the murder of a single individual and genocide was quantitative, not moral. Evil ideas, in Rand’s view, were dangerous only because other individuals failed to offer a better alternative. Rand (June 1978), “The first amendment and ‘symbolic speech,’” in Column, 110; Schwartz 1990T.
112. Reisman (27 May 1982), “Capitalism: The cure for racism, part three,” in Schwartz 2.17.6; (21 October 1982), “Capitalism: The cure for racism, part five,” in Schwartz 3.1.3.
113. Rand (14 August 1972), “A preview, part two,” in Ayn Rand Letter 1:100–101.
114. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 166–67. Also see Steele (1990) whose book receives an excellent review in the catalogue of Second Renaissance Books. Steele (1994) provides an analysis of “group entitlements” that is compatible, in many respects, with Rand’s own views.
115. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 52.
116. Reisman (23 August 1982), “Capitalism: The cure for racism, part four,” in Schwartz 2.19.3.
117. Reisman (15 November 1982), “Capitalism: The cure for racism, conclusion,” in Schwartz 3.2.4.
118. Reisman 1990. Reisman criticizes the multiculturalists for attacking the values of Western civilization, values which are not confined to the West or to white Eurocentrists. He argues: “Western civilization is a body of knowledge and values.” See also Hull (November 1993), “A postscript on post-modernism,” in Schwartz 7.6; Schwartz 1994T. In the multiculturalist debate, many non-Objectivists have noted similar tendencies toward ethnic fragmentation in education and politics. Magner (1990, A37) observes that at Berkeley, “Words like ‘balkanization’ and ‘tribalism’ are being used to describe undergraduate life here. Both refer to a tendency among students to segregate themselves into racial and ethnic enclaves.” Krauthammer (1992, 33) argues too that “racial Balkanization [is] so routine” in U.S. politics, that it has become a principle for the gerrymandering of congressional districts.
119. Rand (September 1963), “Racism,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 131.
120. Rand (June 1968), “The presidential candidates, 1968,” in Objectivist 7:468.
121. Rand (7 December 1960), “Conservatism: An obituary,” in Unknown Ideal, 196; [1964] 1993cT.
122. Rand 1981T. This anti-Reagan stance differs significantly from Rand’s initial assessment of the former president when he campaigned for Goldwater and was elected governor of California. Rand (April–May 1967), “The wreckage of the consensus,” in Unknown Ideal, 234–35.
123. Rand (21 November 1981), “The sanction of the victims,” in Voice of Reason, 155–56. For a complementary critique of religious authoritarianism, see N. Branden 1994, 294–97, and Schwartz (14 October 1987), “Secularism and public schools,” in Schwartz 4.13.7.
124. Rand (June 1981), “The age of mediocrity,” in Binswanger 2.3.5.
125. Ibid. On the mutual responsibilities of parent and child, see N. Branden (December 1962), “Intellectual ammunition department,” in Objectivist Newsletter 1:55; Rand 1983T, interview 2; and Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 9.
126. Rand (18 November 1962), “Post-mortem, 1962,” in Column, 86.
127. Rand (24 September 1973), “Thought control, part one,” in Ayn Rand Letter 2:245. Though Rand opposed censorship, it must be emphasized that she saw censorship as an outgrowth of governmental action. It was not censorship, in Rand’s view, in (June 1963), “Man’s rights,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 98–99, for a private individual or group to refuse to fund projects or to provide a forum for the expression of ideas to which they were opposed. Likewise, Rand opposed all government involvement in the arts. The establishment of the National Endowment of the Arts introduced, by necessity, an element of government control over artistic expression. Objectivists endorse the adage: “He who pays the piper, calls the tune.” In recent years, they have argued that the debate over who would receive government art subsidies fails to question the legitimacy of granting any subsidies to any artist. See J. Blumenthal (December 1968), “Art for power’s sake, part two,” in Objectivist 7:563–71; Peikoff (1 August 1981), “The conservative establishment: A report,” in Schwartz 1.19.
128. Rand (13 August–10 September 1973), “Censorship: Local and express,” in Philosophy, 210.
129. Rand (26 March 1961), “The intellectual bankruptcy of our age,” in Voice of Reason, 86.
130. Rand (13 August–10 September 1973), “Censorship: Local and express,” in Philosophy, 228–29.
131. Rand (26 March 1961), “The intellectual bankruptcy of our age,” in Voice of Reason, 88.
CHAPTER 13. HISTORY AND RESOLUTION
1. Rand (December 1969–January 1970), “Apollo and Dionysus,” in New Left, 58.
2. Rand credits Branden for this designation in New Intellectual, 14n. Also see Hollinger (1984), “Ayn Rand’s epistemology in historical perspective,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, in which Hollinger relates the Witch Doctor-Attila distinction to Rand’s critique of Plato, Descartes, Hume, and Kant.
3. Marx and Engels ([1845–46] 1970, 39–68) saw the division of society into businessmen (the “bourgeoisie”) and intellectuals as a by-product of capitalism, a system which thrived on the dualism of material and ideal factors.
4. Rand (November–December 1965), “What is capitalism?” in Unknown Ideal, 30–31.
5. See Peikoff (July 1992), “Some notes about tomorrow, part one,” in Schwartz 6.4. Compare Hayek (in Geddes 1979), who argues too that the movement toward capitalism “requires a very slow and gradual change in national morals and national customs, which takes a few generations.” Without such an evolutionary change, the market economy is “bound to fail.”
6. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 53.
7. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in Philosophy, 94.
8. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in Philosophy, 94; (August–December 1970), “The comprachicos,” in New Left, 238.
9. Rand (August 1964), “Is Atlas shrugging?” in Unknown Ideal, 165. There are some parallels here with Kuhn [1962] 1970. I do not explore these similarities in the current study.
10. Rand (30 April 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Schwartz 6.1.3.
11. Rand (October 1975), “From the horse’s mouth,” in Philosophy, 99.
12. Rand (August 1964), “Is Atlas shrugging?” in Unknown Ideal, 165. The most
dramatic, literary presentation of Rand’s belief in the power of ideas can be found in Atlas Shrugged (605–7) in the description of an inexorable railroad catastrophe.
13. Engels (21–22 September 1890), “Letter to Joseph Bloch,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 396.
14. Engels (5 August 1890), “Letter to Conrad Schmidt,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 393.
15. Engels (27 October 1890), “Letter to Conrad Schmidt,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 397; (25 January 1894), “Letter to W. Borgius,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 441. This is not the place to consider the myriad interpretations of Marxist historiography. My own view of Marx’s dialectical historical methodology is presented briefly in Sciabarra 1988a and 1995b.
16. Rand (April 1977), “Global balkanization,” in Voice of Reason, 115.
17. In this same historical context, Paterson formulated a theory of history that also gave credence to the power of ideas. See especially Cox 2004, passim. Paterson ([1943] 1993, 53) writes; “Ideas precede accomplishment.… Every achievement is foreshadowed in fancy; every major disaster is the result of inadequacy, error, or perversion of intelligence.” Also see Cox (1993), “Introduction to the Transaction edition,” in Paterson [1943] 1993; Rand (October 1964), “Books: The God of the Machine by Isabel Paterson,” in Objectivist Newsletter 3:42–43.
18. Rand (25 February 1974), “Ideas v. goods,” in Ayn Rand Letter 3:296.
19. Rand (August-September 1967), “Requiem for man,” in Unknown Ideal, 299–300.
20. Peikoff 1972T, Lecture 8. See also Peikoff 1985T, Lecture 5, which compares Rand and the conservatives in terms of their respective views on the speed of social change. N. Branden tells a story in his memoirs (1989, 294) that Rand was amused when, in 1957, on the publication of Atlas Shrugged, Peikoff, the youngest member of the inner circle, suggested that Rand’s book would convince America to embrace laissez-faire capitalism within a few years. “‘That’s not how things happen, or can possibly happen,’ she insisted. ‘I will have an influence—Atlas will have an influence—but it will be a very slow process. We won’t begin to see its concrete results in action for many years. I may not fully see them at all.’” Of course, Peikoff no longer adheres to such ahistorical reasoning.
21. This is an instance of reciprocal causation. Peikoff (1974T, Lecture 9) explains, for instance, that low-caliber movies will contribute to the disintegration of a culture, even as they are symptomatic of it. In such circumstances, each factor mutually reinforces the other. It should be noted that Peikoff’s book, The Ominous Parallels (1982), despite its more popularized style of exposition, is the most explicitly developed application of the Objectivist theory of history yet published.
22. Peikoff (October 1985), “Philosophy and psychology in history,” in Binswanger 6.5.8. Peikoff’s essay is, in many ways, a response to Branden who argues that the Objectivist philosophy of history is in great need of revision. N. Branden (1982T) suggests that Rand’s theory of history should incorporate both philosophy and psychology.
23. On the issue of whether or not “good or ill” pertains to an idea or to the practitioners of the idea, there has been a debate within Objectivist circles. The themes discussed in the following sources are wide-ranging and controversial, and symptomatic of a deep division between orthodox and neo-Objectivists, particularly Peikoff and Kelley: Schwartz (27 February 1989), “On sanctioning the sanctioners,” in Schwartz 4.20; Peikoff (18 May 1989), “Fact and value,” in Schwartz 5.1; and 1989T; Bidinotto 1989; Kelley 1990.
24. In the first two-thirds of Atlas Shrugged, Galt does not remove himself entirely from the social order; he works incognito at Dagny Taggart’s railroad, but not in his capacity as an inventor and entrepreneur.
25. Peikoff argues that many Objectivists make a mistake of abstraction. They adopt a quasi-religious perspective, substituting Galt’s Gulch for Heaven, and alienating themselves from the culture-at-large. Like the Christians in days of yore, they view suffering as their destiny. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 12) rejects such “rationalistic” Objectivism.
26. Marx (13 October 1868), “Letter to J. B. Schweitzer,” in Marx and Engels 1982, 201; Capital, 1:17.
27. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in Philosophy, 245–49. On Chernyshevsky and Lenin, see Chapter 1, in this edition.
28. Rand (January 1962), “Check your premises: Choose your issues,” in Objectivist Newsletter 1:1; (October 1966), “A letter from a reader,” in Objectivist 5:156.
29. B. Branden (June 1963), “Intellectual ammunition department: What is the Objectivist stand on ‘right-to-work’ laws?” in Objectivist Newsletter 2:23.
30. Rand (June 1966), “The question of scholarships,” in Voice of Reason, 40.
31. See also Rand in Peikoff 1976T, Lecture 10. Peikoff (1983T, Lecture 4) argues further that under statist conditions, one may be justified to lie about age, national origin, etc., in order to gain employment, shelter, and other amenities of life.
32. Rand (5 June 1972), “‘Fairness doctrine’ for education,” in Philosophy, 231–43.
33. Rand (February 1970), “The left: Old and new,” in New Left, 96.
34. Rand (18 July 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Schwartz 6.1.6; (July–September 1965), “The cashing-in: The student rebellion,” in Unknown Ideal, 256–57.
35. Rand (3 January 1972), “‘What can one do?’” in Philosophy, 245.
36. See Peikoff 1984T, which discusses systematization and comprehensiveness as two important components of previously successful intellectual movements.
37. Rand 1962T; [1964] 1993bT.
38. Rand (7–21 May 1973), “The missing link,” in Philosophy, 45.
39. Packer (February 1984), “The psychological requirements of a free society,” in Binswanger 5.1.2–5.
40. Rand (22 July 1962), “‘The cold civil war,’” in Column, 23–25.
41. Rand (April 1964), “The property status of airwaves,” in Unknown Ideal. A more detailed Objectivist blueprint for deregulation is presented in Reisman 1986T.
42. Rand (February 1964), “Government financing in a free society,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 116; [1964] 1993aT. Prominent Objectivists have debated the morality of taxation in the pages of Full Context. See especially, articles and letters by Peter Saint-Andre, Tibor Machan, Murray Franck, and others, in Reedstrom 1994.
43. Rand (7 December 1960), “Conservatism: An obituary,” in Unknown Ideal, 201.
44. Rand (18 July 1946), “From Ayn Rand’s notes for Atlas Shrugged,” in Schwartz 6.1.3.
45. On this convergence, see N. Branden 1983b, 239.
46. Rand (9 April 1934), “From Ayn Rand’s unpublished writings: Philosophic journal,” in Binswanger 4.4.2.
47. It is no coincidence that Nathaniel Branden (1992, 43–45) projects this same harmonious integration in his description of the fully efficacious individual of self-esteem.
48. Barry 1983, 108–9; 1987, 130.
49. Friedman 1991, 17–18. On the other hand, Rand argued that Friedman was not an advocate of capitalism. She characterized him as a “miserable eclectic,” and repudiated his “amoral” defense of the fact-value dichotomy in economics. Rand (January–February 1976), “A last survey, part two,” in Ayn Rand Letter 4:386; 1976T; Peikoff 1980T, Lecture 1.
50. B. Branden 1986; Rothbard 1987, 1; Kelley 1990, 71–72.
51. Though Foucault is most famous for his opposition to the treatment of those individuals labeled as “mentally ill” by the psychiatric profession, it is Szasz among libertarian psychiatrists who has actually fought the practice. Both Branden and Rand have praised Szasz. Though N. Branden (1971b, 6) opposes Szasz’s belief that mental illness is a “myth,” he applauds the famed psychiatrist’s fight against the victimization of mental patients in state psychiatric hospitals. Rand (1976T) considered Szasz a promising advocate of individual rights in this regard.
52. Machan (1984), “Reason, individualism, and capitalism: The moral vision of Ayn Rand,” in D
en Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 214.
53. Den Uyl 1973, 7. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1993, 126–30) provide a quasi-Aristotelian critique of the “moral dualism” that underlies this dichotomy of individuality and sociality.
54. Flew (1984), “Selfishness and the unintended consequences of intended action,” in Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 191–92.
55. Rand (August 1962), “The ‘conflicts’ of men’s interests,” in Virtue of Selfishness, 55–56.
56. Rand (23 October 1972), “A nation’s unity, part two,” in Ayn Rand Letter 2:127–28.
57. Rand (1971), “Why I like stamp collecting,” in Column, 122.
58. Rand (July–August 1971), “The age of envy,” in New Left, 157–58. Despite his criticism of such doctrines as “natural rights,” MacIntyre’s conception is informed by Aristotelian and Thomistic moral theory. He criticizes “the modern liberal attempt to render our public shared morality independent of conceptions of the human good.” MacIntyre 1990, 1981. An interesting commentary on MacIntyre is provided in Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991, 97–101.
EPILOGUE
1. Lukács (March 1919), “What is orthodox Marxism?” in Lukács 1971, 1–2. More specifically, Lukács identified Marxism with dialectical materialism. Himmelfarb (1994, 52–54) provides an interesting account of the impact of Lukács’s book on Marxist scholarship.
2. Of course, Peikoff (1990–91T, Lecture 8) does not characterize the relational view as “dialectical.” But clearly, Peikoff views Hegel as “the best actual predecessor of Ayn Rand” on the issue of integration, the view “that every item implies every other, that there is nothing by chance and no inexplicable element, and that integration is the key to knowledge.” Peikoff wonders “whether Ayn Rand in her reading of the history of philosophy got any leads from Hegel …” (Peikoff 1997T, Lecture 7). Thanks to David M. Brown for bringing this to my attention.
APPENDIX I: THE RAND TRANSCRIPT (1999)
Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical Page 67