by James Laxer
The response to the message in the House of Representatives exposed deep divisions between Madison’s Republicans (the ancestors of today’s Democrats) and the Federalists (the ancestors of today’s Republicans via the Whigs). The more liberal Republicans, in the Jeffersonian tradition, were broadly inclined to identify with the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and even Napoleon, the heir of the Revolution, rather than monarchical Britain. The more conservative Federalists were more sympathetic to Britain than to revolutionary France. At least as important as these ideological inclinations were the major sectional rifts that divided the United States. Federalists who opposed war with Britain tried three times without success to open the session to the public, in the hope that negative popular sentiment would halt the passage of the declaration of war.
On June 4, 1812, the House passed the motion by a vote of 79 to 49. West of the Appalachian Mountains, where the issue was the desire to settle on native land and the conflict was with Tecumseh’s confederacy, Congressmen voted solidly for war. The rest of the country was split. The majority of the delegations from Virginia and Pennsylvania assented to the declaration. The large majority of New York’s congressmen voted against the motion, as did all of Delaware’s members. In New England, where opposition to the war was so strong that it threatened the unity of the nation, the votes in the House were split. Delegations from Connecticut and Rhode Island unanimously voted in opposition to war. Majorities from Vermont and New Hampshire voted yes, as did six Massachusetts congressmen.
The Senate was so deadlocked that it appeared for a time that the declaration would fail. Following a week of deliberations, Senator Alexander Gregg of Pennsylvania moved that the war bill be sent back to a select committee to be amended so that in place of a full declaration of war, the United States would issue letters of marque and reprisal, licensing privateers to attack and seize British vessels.3 The Senate passed Gregg’s motion by a vote of 17 to 13. But three days later, when the limited-conflict proposal emerged out of committee to go before the full Senate, the upper chamber cast a tied vote on the measure, 16 to 16, and thus it went down to defeat.
With the compromise off the table, Madison’s motion again went before the Senate. On June 17, 1812, senators voted 19 to 13 in support of the declaration. It was by far the narrowest vote for war in the history of the United States. The following day, Madison signed the declaration.
On June 27, Brock received the news at Fort George that the United States had declared war against Britain nine days earlier. He immediately dispatched missives to his key subordinates along the Niagara Frontier. By June 30, the news had reached Colonel Thomas Bligh St. George, an experienced British officer who had served in Europe before being transferred to Canada as commander of Fort Malden. And by July 8, Captain Charles Roberts, in command at Fort St. Joseph, had been alerted, which gave him a clear edge against the Americans at Fort Michilimackinac.
Although Brock was urged by Prevost to remain cautious and defensive-minded, he did send two letters to Roberts on June 26 and 27, ordering him to assault Fort Michilimackinac if he felt he could take it. Roberts commanded an outpost on the St. Mary’s River just off the northern shore of Lake Huron, manned by a small contingent of Royal Artillerymen and a single company of the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion. His fort was located eighty kilometres northeast of Michilimackinac, a strategically important island that dominated the strait connecting Lakes Huron and Michigan and sat astride a major fur trade route. The very day that Roberts received his missives from Brock, he also received a letter from Prevost with orders to act with caution, offer aid to the North West Company, and ready himself to retreat “in case of necessity.” Even Brock was not entirely committed to the offensive in the Northwest. On July 15, Roberts received another letter from his commanding officer with orders “to adopt the most prudent methods of offence or defence which circumstances might point out.” But this was not an order to prepare to retreat.4
With these ambiguous instructions from two distant commanders, Roberts was left to decide on his own what course to follow. On July 17, with a force of about 700 native warriors (including Sioux, Winnebagoes, Tallesawains, Chippewas, and Ottawas), 260 Canadian militia, and just under 50 British regulars, Roberts swooped down on Michilimackinac and seized the island from the surprised American garrison. U.S. Lieutenant Porter Hanks, in charge there, only learned on the day he surrendered his post that war had been declared — Roberts informed him. The swift capture of the post, which was held by the British until the end of the conflict, helped open the way for Brock’s attack on Detroit and had long-term consequences for the course of the war in the Northwest.5 Michilimackinac was also strategically crucial to the Canadian fur trade and to winning over native peoples of the region to the British side.
In his roles as the head of the government of Upper Canada and the commander of armed forces in the province, Brock issued a proclamation to steady the nerves of the populace: “Whereas on the seventeenth day of June last the congress of the United States of America declared that war then existed between those States and their territories, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the dependencies thereof: And whereas, in pursuance of such declaration the subjects of the United States have actually committed hostilities against the possessions of his Majesty and the persons and property of his subjects in this province: now therefore by and with the advice of his Majesty’s executive Council for the affairs of the Province, I do hereby strictly enjoin and require all his Majesty’s liege Subjects to be obedient to the lawful authorities, to forbear all Communication with the Enemy or persons residing within the Territory of the United States, and to manifest their Loyalty by a zealous Co-operation with his Majesty’s land Force in Defence of the Province & repulse of the Enemy. And I do further require and command all officers civil and military to be vigilant in the discharge of their Duty, especially to prevent all Communication with the Enemy; and to cause all Persons suspected of traitorous Intercourse to be apprehended & and treated according to Law.”6
On July 3, Brock wrote to Prevost that he had “been anxiously expecting for some days, to receive the honor of Your Excellency’s Commands” to deal with “the present emergency.” He told the commander-in-chief that while he believed the declaration of war against Britain by the Americans “would have justified in my opinion, offensive operations,” he calculated that attacks could later be mounted against a number of American positions, including Fort Niagara, which was across the river from Fort George. Therefore, he “relinquished” any such immediate intentions and “attended only” to defensive measures such as “calling out the flank companies” of the local militia. He informed General Prevost that he believed the Americans had about twelve hundred regulars and militia at Fort Niagara, and added, “I consider myself at this moment perfectly safe against any attempt they can make.”7
A few days later, Prevost replied to Brock in characteristic fashion, telling him, “I am convinced you have acted wisely in abstaining from offensive operations . . .” Still in a cautionary frame of mind, he wrote, “It is highly proper you should secure the services of the Indians but restrain and control them as much as you can.”8 On July 10, again counselling restraint, Prevost advised Brock, “I consider it prudent and politic to avoid any measure which can in its effect have a tendency to unite the People in the American States.”9
While Brock and Prevost attempted to calculate the correct balance between offence and defence, the Americans were acting on a plan of attack that they had conceived months earlier. The Madison administration had one big idea about how to prosecute the war. The idea was to conquer Canada.
Shortly after war was declared, Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York was confident that “one half of the Militia of both provinces [Upper and Lower Canada] would join our standard.”10 And in Washington, Henry Clay told the House of Representatives in the summer of 1812, “We have the Canadas as much
under our command as she (Great Britain) has the ocean; and the way to conquer her on the ocean is to drive her from the land. I am not for stopping at Quebec, or anywhere else; but I would take the whole continent from them, and ask no favors. Her fleets cannot then rendezvous at Halifax as now; and, having no place of resort in the north, cannot infest our coast as they have lately done. It is as easy to conquer them on the land, as their whole navy would conquer ours on the ocean. We must take the continent from them. I wish never to see a peace till we do.”11
A week after the U.S. declared war, Secretary of State James Monroe gave himself over to the rising belligerence where Canada was concerned when he said that public opinion could make it “difficult to relinquish Territory which had been conquered.”12
Also at the beginning of the war, former president Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter that the conquest of Canada must be a goal of the United States. He referred to his hope for “the successful course of our war, and the addition of Canada to our confederacy. The infamous intrigues of Great Britain to destroy our government . . . and with the Indians to tomahawk our women and children, prove that the cession of Canada, their fulcrum for these Machiavellian levers, must be a sine qua non at a treaty of peace.”13 In a further letter he wrote in late 1812, Jefferson said that he believed that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighbourhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and will give us the experience for the attack on Halifax, the next and final expulsion of England from the American continent.”
For the Americans, a successful invasion of Canada would achieve three goals simultaneously: by denying British war aid to the native enemies of the United States, it would ensure U.S. control of the lands the Americans were contesting with Tecumseh’s confederacy; it would lead to the annexation of Canada, which was much desired by the land-hungry War Hawks; and it was the one way the United States could get at the British. Potentially, Canadian soil could be held as a bargaining chip to force the British to end the practice of impressment and interference with U.S. commerce across the seas.
In April 1812, the Americans conceived a strategy that had the endorsement of both President James Madison and U.S. Secretary of War William Eustis. The plan was to attack Canada with simultaneous assaults against Montreal and Kingston and across the Niagara River between Lakes Erie and Ontario. Some of President Madison’s advisors concluded that because Canada’s defences depended on the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence, and other major rivers, the U.S. needed to seize control of the waterways by constructing a fleet of ships as soon as possible. That was a far-sighted idea, but the Americans failed to follow through amid fierce debates about how much the war would cost and who would pay for it.
If American planning was desultory, their selection of senior commanders could hardly have been worse. Henry Dearborn, a sixty-one-year-old veteran of the American Revolutionary War, was put in charge of the first plan to conquer Canada. Dearborn had long since devoted himself to politics, not military affairs. Nonetheless, Madison appointed Dearborn, who was known to his troops as “Granny,” to command the Northern Department with a rank of major general.14 At the same time, the administration picked sixty-three-year-old Thomas Pinckney, another veteran of the American Revolution, to run the Southern Command.
A third key commander whose military experience during the American Revolution had long since passed, was fifty-nine-year-old William Hull. Short and pudgy, more epicurean than Spartan, Hull was the genial governor of the Michigan Territory, the first holder of that office, with an appointment that had begun in 1805. As governor, Hull was the nominal commander of the Michigan militia. Originally from Massachusetts, he displayed few of the martial qualities of a man fit to lead soldiers into battle. Whatever his military prowess decades earlier, Hull was now fearful. Above all, he quavered at the prospect of native warriors gaining the upper hand against his troops and his family, a fear that would have important consequences in coming weeks.15
Shortly after his arrival at Fort Detroit on July 5, General Hull received a packet from William Eustis that contained the text of the American declaration of war and gave Hull written authorization “to commence offensive operations.” While Eustis cautioned Hull to protect his own posts, he urged him to “take possession of Malden and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify.”16
Hull replied with a written message of his own that combined bluster against the British with anxiety about the native population. “Every effort has been and is still making, by the British to collect the Indians under their standard,” he wrote. “The British have established a post, directly opposite this place — I have confidence in dislodging him, and being in possession of the opposite bank . . . I have little time to write: every thing will be done that is possible to do. The British command the water and the savages . . . you therefore must not be too sanguine.”17
On July 12, after collecting boats on the Detroit River for three days, Hull led his troops across the river. Greeted by friendly residents in the settlement of Sandwich, Hull issued a proclamation to Canadians, inviting them to regard the American forces as liberators. “Inhabitants of Canada!” Hull’s proclamation read. “After 30 years of peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities of Great Britain, have once more left them no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country, and the standard of union now waves over the territory of Canada. To the peaceable, unoffending inhabitant, it brings neither danger nor difficulty.”
Asserting that Canadians had no interest in Britain’s wars and had “felt her tyranny,” he pressed, “I tender you the invaluable blessing of civil, political and religious liberty . . . That liberty which has raised us to an elevated rank among the nations of the world, and which afforded us a greater measure of peace and security, of wealth and improvement, than ever fell to the lot of any country.”
The general’s honeyed words were followed by a stern warning: “If, contrary to your own interest and the just expectation of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies, and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk you. If the barbarous and savage policies of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages be let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping knife, will be the signal of one discriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner; instant destruction will be his lot.” And then he added a final admonition: “The United States offer you peace, liberty and security — your choice lies between these and war, slavery and destruction.”18
From the American point of view, the immediate response to Hull’s invasion of Canada and to his proclamation was favourable. Several hundred Canadian residents quickly accepted the entreaty to identify themselves with the American cause, and dozens of militiamen deserted Fort Malden to join Hull’s army. Hull had been expecting this support. He later wrote that “a large portion of the population of that province had emigrated from the United States. They had been educated with the principles of freedom and independence; and some of them, and many of their fathers, had fought and bled in our revolutionary contest. They were situated more than three thousand miles from the country to which they were subjected, and had no participation or interest in the measures it adopted.”19 The positive reception the Americans received from a sizeable number of residents showed that Brock’s concerns about the loyalty of segments of the population were well-founded.
Confident that he was on the way to a major and easily won victory, Hull set himself up in the best-appointed house in Sandwich, the residence of a British colonel who was then away in York, the capital of Upper Canada. The American general sent out parties of troops to commandee
r provisions for his men from the local farmers,20 a practice that over the course of the war convinced most Upper Canadians that the Americans were thieves, not liberators. The demands of the invaders devastated some of the farmers. One farmer had 408 bushels of grain confiscated, and another lost 620 skins and all of his livestock.
On July 16, the first shots in the War of 1812 rang out not far from Fort Malden. Advance units of General Hull’s army, based at Detroit, had crossed the Detroit River onto Canadian soil four days earlier. Under the command of Colonel Lewis Cass, the invading force consisted of one company of the U.S. 4th Regiment, one company of Ohio volunteers, four companies of Ohio riflemen, and some dragoons — in total about three hundred men.21 Leaving a small force to hold a bridge across the Canard River, Cass marched up the river to a ford and crossed. There he surprised a small force of British regulars, Canadian militia, and native warriors, under the command of Lieutenant John Clemow. The outnumbered British fell back to their main position at Amherstburg. During the confused retreat, two British privates, James Hancock and John Dean, were left behind. They defended their position until both were wounded and taken prisoner. Hancock died the same evening, the first soldier to be killed in the defence of Canada.22
Ten days after Hull’s proclamation to the residents of Upper Canada, Brock issued his own counter-proclamation from Fort George. In the words of the head of the military and civil government of the province, Hull had insulted Upper Canadians “with a call to seek voluntarily the protection of his government.” Brock warned that an American conquest of Canada would quickly be followed by the country’s re-annexation by France, which would result in the inhabitants of Canada becoming “willing subjects, or rather slaves, to the despot who rules the nations of continental Europe with a rod of iron.”