To reach the Senate and later achieve a consulship, Arrian had to serve as a junior officer with Rome’s auxiliary forces and legions, the culmination of his military career being the command of a legion. During this early stage of his career he had almost certainly served in Britain, for in one of his written works, he describes the Britons’ chariot horses as if from firsthand knowledge. Of Greek stock, Arrian was a fan of Alexander the Great, writing a biography of the Greek king in seven volumes which was to become one of our key sources on Alexander and his military conquests.
Arrian also wrote a handbook on military matters, which, while hankering back to the Greek-style military of Alexander, who had used armies made up of phalanxes of spearmen, still reveals much about the Roman army of Arrian’s day, and earlier. Arrian was a man who both led from the front and who organized his military campaigns in fine detail, well in advance. A copy of his orders for the AD 135 expedition against the Alans, Aries contra Alanos, has come down to us, and from this we have an excellent idea of how the mission developed.
At his immediate disposal for the campaign, Arrian had the 15th Apollinaris Legion at Satala in Cappadocia. This, Arrian knew, was a vastly experienced legion with a lengthy history; it had a long roll of battle honors in the east and in Europe, including the First Jewish Revolt and the Dacian Wars. The 15th would form the core of Arrian’s army, and the legion’s commander, the legate Marcus Vettius Valens, would be Arrian’s second-in-command.
To the 15th, Arrian added his other locally based legion, the 12th Fulminata, which had been based at Melitene in Cappadocia since taking part in the First Jewish War in AD 66–70. For this campaign, the 12th Fulminata was led by its senior tribune, just as it had been during the Jewish War. The 12th had lost both its eagle and its commander to the Jewish rebels in AD 66, and it is tempting to think that, after that disgrace, the legion was not given a commander of senatorial rank.
One of the auxiliary units in Arrian’s army was the 1st Apamenorum Cohort, an equitata unit of both horse and foot archers raised at Apamea in Syria. For some time prior to this, the unit had been based in Egypt, but more recently, before being sent up to Cappadocia, it had probably taken part in Sextus Severus’ operations in Judea. Two factors indicate that this Alani operation was not a knee-jerk offensive initiated locally, but was an operation planned and directed by the Palatium in Rome. Firstly, for Arrian to lead the legions based in Cappadocia out of his province he required specific permission from the emperor; otherwise, he was breaking the law and could be declared an enemy of the state by the Senate. Arrian, therefore, had been granted special powers by Hadrian for this operation, as Severus had been in Judea.
Secondly, of the auxiliary units tasked with the Alani operation, six were specialist units of foot and horse archers, indicating that they had been very carefully chosen for this mission. This was the single largest concentration of archers in any Roman province at that time. In Britain, for example, there was then not a single unit of archers, while there was just one in Syria. [Hold., DRA, ADRH] Arrian’s planned tactics for the operation against the Alans would depend heavily on archers, indicating that he had specifically asked for the bowmen. Alternatively, knowing that the Alans, like so many Eastern tribes, were themselves strong in archers and were all mounted, the Palatium may have chosen to equip Arrian with a large contingent of bowmen to enable him to fight fire with fire.
Auxiliary units and allied units supplied by Roman allies marched to Armenia Minor either late in the autumn of AD 134, to spend the winter in Cappadocia or Armenia Minor, or made the journey at the beginning of the spring of AD 135. Either way, before the spring of 135 was over, all the elements of Arrian’s army including local troops had come together at the assembly point. From Caesarea Mazaka, capital of Lesser Armenia, Arrian’s army marched east toward the Caucasus, intent on throwing the Alans back across the mountains.
Arrian’s army, in addition to the two legions, comprised four cavalry alae including one of dark-skinned Moors, a force of allied cavalry from the Getae tribe, originally from Thrace, and a large number of horse archers supplied by the king of Armenia. For auxiliary infantry, Arrian had ten cohorts of auxiliary light infantry, as well as mounted infantry and foot and horse archers—not all of them at full strength according the Arrian’s figures—and two groups of fighters of unspecified size, provided by Roman allies. In all, there were over 20,000 men in the Roman force.
It seems that Arrian had personally scouted the territory into which his troops were now marching. Either that, or someone whose judgment he trusted implicitly had scouted for him. For, based on prior knowledge of the locale, Arrian had chosen a particular valley in the foothills of the Caucasus where he intended to fight the Alans after they crossed the mountains—in his orders to his officers he wrote of “the appointed place” for the battle. [Arr., EAA, 11] This was a valley where the infantry could readily form up in its battle lines on the flat, with rising ground on either flank where Arrian planned to post archers and stone-throwers.
Arrian also very carefully dictated the order of march. A stickler for orderly formations, he knew that Roman armies on the march—such as that of Varus in the Teutoburg Forest in Germany in AD 9—had been destroyed while proceeding in disorder, by enemies sometimes inferior in numbers and/or equipment. Arrian’s orderly formation as he led the army east in AD 135 began with cavalry scouts well out in advance, in pairs. The army’s vanguard consisted of auxiliary cavalry, infantry and archers, followed by the two legions, then carts carrying Arrian’s catapults, with horse archers protecting the flanks. More auxiliaries followed, then the main baggage train, with a cavalry rearguard provided by Getae allies.
On Arrian’s orders, his troops marched in silence; the only sounds were those of tramping feet and hoofs, rolling wheels, the tinkling of the bells on the thousands of mules in the baggage train, and the rattle of harness and equipment. Each unit looked much the same as the next, with similar uniforms and equipment. Frequently the only way to tell one from the other was to look at the unit designs on their shields. Only the allied Armenian horse archers stood out, in their loose pants and fish-scale armor, riding horses that also sported armor.
On reaching the chosen valley—the exact location is unknown—mounted scouts were sent by Arrian to clamber up into the surrounding heights to keep watch for the enemy. Meanwhile, the Roman cavalry formed up in a vast square on the flat ground, ready to defend the infantry should the enemy appear unexpectedly. Inside the cavalry screen, and still without uttering a word, the Roman infantry armed themselves with additional ammunition from the baggage train, and then moved to their prearranged battle positions.
Arrian’s army, following the battle plan he had carefully mapped out back in Mazaka, spread across the plain and up on to the rising ground on either side of it. Arrian did not use the standard Roman formation for countering cavalry attack—the wedge. Instead, the majority of his front line was flat and straight. The 15th Apollinaris Legion took the right side of the battlefront, four lines deep. The legion’s commander, Valens, was to command all troops on the right—which included auxiliary light infantry, stone throwers and horse archers from Armenia under their chiefs Vasakes and Artbelos. Here, Arrian introduced a tactic of his own creation—these units on the wing curved around the foothills to project ahead of the straight battlefront, like the horn of a bull.
The 12th Fulminata Legion occupied the left of the battlefront, again four lines deep. Its tribune commanded the left of the line. As on the right, there were light infantry, horse archers and cavalry stationed on the left flank, likewise following the rising ground to form a projecting horn. The cavalry were stationed in front of the infantry on the wings, with orders not to hurl their lances at the enemy but to extend them in front, with each trooper running the rear part of his lance along the flank of his horse for added strength. These projecting lances formed a sharp wall to discourage the enemy from approaching the Roman wings, and prevented the Alans from
reaching the archers stationed behind the cavalry.
Immediately behind these front lines, to the left and right, the artillery was quickly set up, the gunners under orders to fire their missiles over the heads of the legionaries and auxiliaries lined up in front of them. A long line of auxiliaries including the foot archers extended between the catapults, behind the legion lines. Arrian positioned himself to the rear of the lines of archers, with more catapults. Here, from his saddle, the general could see over the archers to the legion lines, and could quickly spot any problems that might develop with the legions—the core of his army—and relay orders to correct those problems. [Arr., EAA, 23]
The commander-in-chief was accompanied by his staff, all mounted, including his personal standard-bearer and trumpeter, and the governor’s bodyguard—his mounted equites singulares, who were detached from various cavalry units for the prestigious task of providing protection for Arrian, plus 200 hand-picked legionaries from the 15th Apollinaris and 100 carriers of light spears.
Arrian’s dispositions meant that the Romans blocked the valley. The Alans’ passage would only be over the dead bodies of Arrian’s men. Whether the planned battle actually took place or not is not recorded, but the outcome of Arrian’s campaign against the Alans suggests that it did. If the battle ran according to Arrian’s plan, it went with Arrian sending cavalry to encourage the Alans to pursue them, and so draw them into the valley where the Romans waited. On the other hand, perhaps the nomadic Alans were simply moving west now that the winter had passed and the snows in the mountain passes had melted, and Arrian stood in their way.
The Alans approached from the northeast. Their exact number is unknown, but they were a large tribe and this force was probably not less than 10,000 strong; it may well have numbered many more men. They were all mounted, with, Arrian noted, both riders and their mounts lightly armored. [Arr., EAA, 31] Confident of their ability to ride down any foot soldiers foolish enough to oppose them, the Alans would have enthusiastically charged the stationary Roman army in their path.
Because the horns of the Roman battle line occupied high ground, the charge of the Alans funneled through the valley to crash into the Roman legions on the flat ground in the center, ignoring the auxiliaries on the wings. On Arrian’s orders, the Roman army was silent as the thousands of barbarian horsemen pounded toward them armed with long lances, swords and battleaxes.
The commander-in-chief’s trumpeter sounded a call. The curved, rectangular shields of the four lines of legionaries of the 12th and 15th came up from the rest position, and the men of the first three lines locked their shields together to create three solid walls. The second and third lines shuffled forward, until they had created a dense mass of men and shields. There they stood, like sardines in a can, with shields raised and left foot forward, ready to take the impact of the charging horsemen. Behind them, the men of the fourth legionary line stood back a little in the throwing stance, with a javelin in their right hand.
On the wings, stone-throwers and javelin-throwers stood ready to release their missiles; they were under orders to concentrate their fire on a particular point in the front ranks of the charging enemy cavalry. Behind them, the catapults had been drawn into the firing position and loaded with long, metal-tipped bolts. On the wings and in a close-packed line stretching along behind the legions, the archers raised their bows to the heavens and drew back their first arrows.
On his horse, Arrian waited, watching the Alani charge bring the mass of enemy horsemen closer and closer. Timing was critical; the general could not afford to give his order too soon, or too late. Around him, men and horses would have been becoming edgy. Arrian was waiting for the precisely the right moment. He had to allow time for his order to be transmitted, first by his trumpeter, then by the trumpeters of the legions, then for the troops to react and for their missiles to fly to the point where Arrian wanted them to land, right at the forefront of the enemy charge.
Now, the general gave the much anticipated order. As Arrian noted in his Tactical Handbook, the noise of battle could sometimes make it difficult for the troops to hear commands. For this reason, the general’s banner would visually show what the latest command was. As the keyed-up troops heard the trumpet call they had been waiting for, the general’s banner also motioned—with the standard-bearer possibly quickly pumping it up and down. Arrian’s pre-battle orders required his men at this moment to “all cry out most grandly and frightfully to [the god] Ares” and let fly with their missiles. [Arr., EAA, 25]
The men of the first three lines of the legions, waiting to receive the enemy charge with their raised shields hard up against their left shoulders, now would have seen and heard thousands of arrows and catapult bolts fly over their heads from behind them. They saw the missiles fall from the sky like rain, right on to the front ranks of the mass of charging horsemen. Dead and dying horses would be going down; others shying in terror. Riders would be toppling from the saddle with multiple wounds. The massive charge had its own momentum, and continued forward, over the top of fallen men and steeds.
Another Roman trumpet call. The bowmen had swiftly reloaded; they fired again. From the flanks, the shorter range missiles now began to fly. Stones, arrows and javelins filled the air, coming in from the “horns” toward the center of the charging mass. At the same time, the legionaries of the fourth line let fly with their javelins, then reached for their next missile. The catapults had reloaded; with a thwack and a whoosh they too let fly, and their missiles again soared over the heads of the infantry. “Altogether,” Arrian wrote in his battle plan, “the shooting should be from all sides, to one dense point, for the confusion of horses and the destruction of the enemy.” [Arr., EAA, 25]
The Alans’ horse charge would have devolved into chaos. Some of the Alans would have made it through the carnage and confusion caused by the missiles, which continued to fall from the sky in their thousands, to press home the attack. The legionary shield line held firm; horses literally bounced off it. As the Alans closed in with lances, swords and axes, the men of the legionary front line pushed javelins out through slender gaps in their shield line, and jabbed into the nearest horses. With shrieks of pain horses reared up, badly injured, or fell dead to the ground, dislodging their riders.
The charge had come to a rude halt. Alan riders further back continued to push forward, crushing comrades against the shield line. With the momentum of the charge gone, using their small shields to try to protect themselves from the hail of missiles, and with their horses going down under them or going mad with fear, panic broke out in the Alani ranks. More and more horsemen withdrew from the fight in wide-eyed terror.
If the enemy were repulsed by his tactics, Arrian had written, his foot soldiers were to advance, in good order, to give pursuit and drive home the advantage. As for the Roman cavalry on the wings, half—those in the frontal formations on the “horns”—were permitted to charge in pursuit, while the remainder were under strict orders to follow in formation and at the trot. If the enemy continued to flee, once the horses of the first division of pursuing Roman cavalry tired, then the second division was permitted to continue the chase and complete the destruction of the enemy. They were under orders not to throw javelins at the Alans but to get in close on their heels and butcher them in the saddle, or on the ground if their horses went down, with sword and ax.
On the other hand, should the enemy regroup and suddenly wheel to stage a counter-attack, a common tactic among the cavalry of eastern peoples, the cavalry that were slowly following up the pursuit could then charge to the attack. To prevent the enemy from wheeling about, Arrian placed the Armenian horse archers with the first cavalry division, and they had orders to keep up a discouraging rate of fire as they took part in the pursuit.
Apparently, Arrian’s battle went precisely to his carefully conceived plan: the Alans were slaughtered in their thousands and the survivors fled back across the mountains. According to Dio, the Alans then not only accepted gifts from th
e king of Armenia and agreed not to invade his country, but they “also stood in dread of Flavius Arrianus.” [Dio, LXIX, 15] For the Alans to be in dread of Arrian, who had not possessed a significant military reputation prior to his Cappadocian appointment, strongly suggests that they had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of his army.
Arrian’s apparently stunning victory had another result, for Dio reported that the Iazyges Germans, who had gone to war with Rome during the reign of Domitian and who would launch a savage new war during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, less than thirty years later, quickly sent envoys to Hadrian in Rome following the withdrawal of the Alans, for they “wished to confirm the peace.” [Ibid.] The Armenians also sent envoys to Hadrian in Rome blaming Pharasmanes, the Iberian king, for encouraging the Alan invasion. Pharasmanes himself would later travel to Rome to vow his allegiance to the Roman emperor.
It would be another 200 years before the Alans pitted themselves against the might of Rome in strength, and then it would be in the West. After their sound defeat by Arrian, the Alans would not again take the road south to the Roman East. As for the men of the two legions who had taken part in the battle, there was the glory of a great victory, and a cheap one at that. And there was booty galore from the dead Alans and their horses—which were famously decorated with gold horse ornaments.
ARRIAN’S ORDER OF BATTLE
This is the most detailed extant order of battle for any Imperial Roman army.
ARMY COMMANDER:
Flavius Arrianus, Propraetor of Cappadocia.
DEPUTY COMMANDER:
Marcus Vettius Valens, legate of the 15th Apollinaris Legion.
LEGIONS:
15th Apollinaris Legion, normally stationed at Satala, Cappadocia. Commanded by the legate Valens (above).
12th Fulminata Legion, normally stationed at Melitene, Cappadocia. Commanded by its senior tribune.
ARTILLERY:
Approximately 110 spear-throwing catapults (55, the standard legion complement, from each of the two legions), operated by men from the legions.
Legions of Rome Page 47