by Cicero
[43] Now authority is another factor of prime importance in the management of warfare and the command of armies; and I am sure no one doubts that the commander we are considering is preeminent in this too. Who is not aware how vitally important it is to the management of a war what our enemies and our allies think of our generals—because we know that in such critical situations people are made to experience fear, contempt, hatred, and devotion just as much by talk and rumour as by rational calculation? What name, then, has ever been more famous throughout the world than his? Whose achievements have equalled his? On whom else have you bestowed such great and conspicuous marks of esteem—which more than anything else establish authority? [44] Do you imagine there is any region anywhere that is so remote that word has never reached it of that great day on which the entire Roman people packed the forum, together with all the temples which afford a view of this place, in order to insist that Gnaeus Pompeius, and he alone, be appointed commander in a war that affected all peoples?* I do not intend to say any more, or use other commanders to demonstrate the importance of authority in war: Gnaeus Pompeius himself can be taken as the perfect example of every good quality.
On the very day on which you appointed him commander of the war against the pirates, grain, which had been extremely scarce and expensive, suddenly dropped in price and became as cheap as could hardly have happened in a time of prolonged peace and exceptional harvests—all as a result of one man’s reputation and the hopes he inspired. [45] And now, after the catastrophic defeat in Pontus which I reluctantly referred to a short while ago,* when our allies were in a state of panic, the enemy’s resources and morale had recovered, and the province* was left without adequate defences, you would have lost Asia, citizens, had not the good fortune of the Roman people so providentially brought Gnaeus Pompeius into the area at the critical moment. His arrival checked Mithridates, elated by his unaccustomed victory, and slowed the progress of Tigranes, who was threatening Asia with large forces. So who will doubt what his action will accomplish, when his authority has already produced such results? Who will doubt that with an official command and an army he will easily save our allies and revenues, when he has already protected them merely by his name and reputation?
[46] But look what it tells us about the authority of Gnaeus Pompeius amongst the enemies of the Roman people,* when in so short a space of time they have all surrendered to him, and to him alone, from places so far away and so far apart; and when envoys from the assembly of Cretan states, when there was already a commander of ours with an army in their island, travelled almost to the ends of the earth to find Gnaeus Pompeius and tell him that it was to him that all the states of Crete wished to surrender!* And did not Mithridates himself send an envoy all the way to Spain, again to Gnaeus Pompeius?* (Pompeius always considered the man an envoy, although those who resented that he had been sent expressly to Pompeius* preferred to consider him a spy.) So you are now in a position to decide, citizens, what effect you think this authority will have on those kings,* and on foreign peoples, heightened as it has been by his subsequent achievements and by the great marks of esteem which you have conferred upon him.
[47] It remains for me to speak about the quality of luck—something that no one can guarantee in his own case, but which we may nevertheless call to mind and take note of in the case of another. As is appropriate for a man speaking about something that is under the control of the gods, I will speak briefly and diffidently. In my judgement, it was not only because of their ability, but very often because of their good fortune that Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius,* and the other great generals were granted armies and commands. For it is certainly the case that some men of distinction were helped towards their attainment of honour, glory, and great achievements by a kind of heaven-sent good fortune. But with respect to the luck of the man about whom I am now speaking, I am going to be careful not to claim too much. I shall avoid saying that good fortune was within his control, but instead will make it look as if I am doing no more than noting what has happened in the past, and expressing the hope that things will continue in the same way in the future. If I do that, the immortal gods will not view what I say as offensive or ungrateful. [48] I am therefore not going to proclaim his great achievements at home and on campaign, on land and at sea, and point out the luck that has accompanied them—how it is not just the case that his fellow-citizens have always agreed with his wishes, our allies always complied with them, and our enemies always obeyed them, but even the winds and the weather have always fallen in with them. This, though, I will say, very briefly, that no one has ever had the presumption to dare to ask the immortal gods, even privately in his own heart, for favours as numerous and substantial as those which the immortal gods have showered upon Gnaeus Pompeius. And not only for the sake of our common security and our empire, but for the sake of the man himself, you ought to hope and pray, citizens, as indeed you do,* that the luck that he enjoys should remain associated with him for ever.
[49] Therefore since this war is so important that it cannot be ignored, and so large in scale that it must be managed with especial care, and since it is open to you to put in command of it a man who possesses unrivalled knowledge of warfare, exceptional ability, outstanding authority, and extraordinary good fortune, can you hesitate, citizens, to accept this great blessing, which the immortal gods have offered and granted to you, and use it to protect and enhance our country? [50] Suppose that Gnaeus Pompeius were at this moment a private citizen at Rome: he would still have to be selected for a war of this importance, and sent out. But as it is, in addition to all his other qualifications, he has the further advantage that he is already in the area where he is needed, has an army, and can immediately take over the other armies from those currently in command of them. So what are we waiting for? What is to stop us following the guidance of the immortal gods and entrusting this war against Mithridates to the same man to whom we have, to the greatest benefit of the state, entrusted everything else?
[51] However, the illustrious and patriotic Quintus Catulus, a man to whom you have awarded the highest honours that are in your power to bestow, and Quintus Hortensius,* who possesses supreme gifts of position, fortune, merit, and talent, hold a different view. For my part, I admit that their authority has influenced you strongly on many occasions in the past, as indeed it should. But in this particular case, although, as you know, the authority of these valiant and illustrious gentlemen stands against me, we can still set that authority to one side and arrive at the truth by a logical consideration of the facts. And it will be all the more easy to do this because my opponents admit the truth of everything I have said so far—that the war is an important one and large in scale, and that Gnaeus Pompeius alone possesses all the necessary qualities in the fullest measure.
[52] What, then, is Hortensius’ position? It is that if everything is to be put in the hands of one man, then Pompeius is the most appropriate person; but that everything should not be handed over to one man. This argument is now out of date: it has been refuted much more by the course of events than by words. For it was you yourself, Quintus Hortensius, who with your matchless fluency and unrivalled eloquence made a long, impressive, and highly wrought speech in the senate opposing the valiant Aulus Gabinius,* when he had published his bill to appoint a single commander against the pirates; and from this place too you spoke at length against the bill. [53] So, by the immortal gods, if the Roman people had chosen at that time to pay more heed to your authority than to their own welfare and their true interests, would we still be in possession today of our present glory and our world empire? Or do you imagine that we actually had an empire at a time when envoys, quaestors, and praetors of the Roman people were regularly kidnapped, when communication both official and non-official with any province was out of the question, and when all the seas were so closed to us that it was in fact impossible for us to transact any public or private business at all?
[54] Was there ever any state in the past—I
do not mean Athens, which is said at one time to have had a fairly extensive command of the seas, nor Carthage, with its navy and considerable maritime strength, nor Rhodes, whose naval discipline and success has never been forgotten—was there any state in the past, I repeat, so weak and insignificant that it was unable by itself to defend its own harbours and fields and some portion of its territory and coast? And yet—by Hercules!—for a number of years prior to the passing of the Gabinian law, the great Roman people, who have preserved their reputation for invincibility in naval warfare right down to our own times, were deprived of a large—in fact the largest—part not just of their own resources, but of their prestige and their empire. [55] Our ancestors overcame King Antiochus and King Perseus* at sea, and defeated the Carthaginians,* the most experienced and best-equipped seafarers, in every naval engagement they fought with them; but we, by contrast, were nowhere a match for the pirates. In earlier times not only did we keep Italy safe, but we were able to guarantee the safety of all our allies, however far off, simply through the prestige of our empire. The island of Delos,* for example, far away from us in the Aegean Sea, was a place to which people used to come from all over with their cargoes of merchandise. It was crammed with riches, and it was small, with no city wall; but despite all this its inhabitants were never afraid. We, on the other hand, were deprived of access not just to our provinces and the coasts of Italy and our ports, but even to the Appian Way!* At that period the magistrates of the Roman people must surely have felt ashamed to mount this very platform,* given that our ancestors had handed it down to us decorated with naval trophies and spoils taken from enemy ships!
[56] The Roman people recognized that you, Quintus Hortensius, and the others who put forward the same view, were speaking with the best of intentions in expressing that view. Nevertheless, when our country’s security was at stake, the Roman people preferred to pay heed to the wrong done to them rather than to your authority. The result was that a single law, a single man, and a single year not only released you* from the grievous and humiliating situation you were in, but also brought about one in which you seemed at last genuinely to be master of all other peoples and nations on land and sea.
[57] This, in my opinion, makes it all the more unbecoming that there should have been opposition to the request, the most urgent request, of Gnaeus Pompeius that Aulus Gabinius should be appointed as his legate*—whether this opposition was instigated in order to attack Gabinius or Pompeius, or most likely both of them. Is the man who is requesting a legate of his own choice for a war of this importance an unsuitable person to be granted what he asks for, when other commanders going off to rob our allies and plunder our provinces have taken with them whatever legates they chose? Or should the man who carried the law which brought security and honour to the Roman people and all other peoples be permitted no connection with the commander and army which were appointed as a result of his advice and his willingness to put himself at risk? [58] Or take Gaius Falcidius, Quintus Metellus, Quintus Coelius Latiniensis, and Gnaeus Lentulus,* whose names I mention with the greatest respect: after they had been tribunes of the plebs, they were allowed to serve as legates the following year. So are people going to insist on the letter of the law only in the case of Gabinius—someone who was surely entitled to special consideration? After all, the war was being conducted under a ‘Gabinian law’, and it was Gabinius himself who, through your vote, was responsible for the appointment of the commander and the army. I hope that the consuls will bring the question of his appointment to a legateship before the senate. If they drag their feet or refuse, I undertake to raise it there myself. I will allow no one’s hostility to deter me from relying on your support and defending your right to appoint whomsoever you choose to office, nor will I pay attention to any obstruction short of a tribunician veto—and anyone who threatens to interpose a veto will have to think long and hard, I believe, about how far they may go. In my opinion, citizens, Aulus Gabinius has a unique right to be treated as the partner of Gnaeus Pompeius in the war against the pirates and in his other achievements, seeing that one of these men, through your votes, entrusted the conduct of that war to a single person, whereas the other one took on what had been entrusted to him and carried it out.
[59] It remains, I think, for me to say something about the authoritative view held by Quintus Catulus. When he asked you on whom you would place your hopes if you put everything into Gnaeus Pompeius’ hands and something then happened to him, it was a great tribute to his merit and position that you answered, almost to a man, that you would place them on him. His ability is, it is true, so outstanding that, no matter how large or difficult the undertaking, his intelligence could master it, his integrity safeguard it, and his merit accomplish it. But on the present question, I disagree with him most emphatically, because I believe that the more short and uncertain human life is, the more the state ought to take advantage of the life and qualities of someone who is truly great—for as long, indeed, as the immortal gods will allow.
[60] ‘But no departure should be made from the precedents and principles of our ancestors.’ I shall not point out here that our ancestors invariably followed custom in time of peace, but expediency in war, and that they invariably responded to emergencies with new ways of doing things. I shall not point out that two very serious wars, the Punic war and the Spanish war, were terminated by one and the same commander, and that the two powerful cities which above all others threatened our empire, Carthage and Numantia, were both destroyed by the same man, Scipio.* I shall not remind you that not so long ago it seemed appropriate to you and your fathers to rest all the hopes of the Roman empire in Gaius Marius alone, appointing him to conduct a war against Jugurtha, and another against the Cimbri, and another against the Teutoni.*
In the case of Gnaeus Pompeius—in which Quintus Catulus opposes any departure from precedent being made—just think how many departures from precedent have already been made with Quintus Catulus’ full support! [61] Was anything so unprecedented as for a mere youth, holding no public office, to raise an army at a time of national crisis?* Yet that is what he did. For him to command it? He did command it. To succeed brilliantly in that command? He did succeed. Was anything such a departure from custom as for a man who was barely grown up and much too young to qualify for senatorial rank* to be given a command and an army, and to be put in charge of Sicily and Africa and entrusted with the management of a war there? In these duties he displayed exceptional ability, responsibility, and integrity; in Africa he terminated a war of the greatest importance, and brought his army home victorious. Was anything so unheard of as for a Roman equestrian to hold a triumph? Yet the Roman people did not merely witness that triumph: they thought that everyone ought to go and see it and celebrate it together with enthusiasm. [62] Was anything so unusual as for a Roman equestrian, even though there were two illustrious and valiant consuls* available, to be sent to a great and terrible war with a consul’s authority? He was indeed sent. There were at the time one or two in the senate who argued that it was wrong to send with the authority of a consul someone who was only a private citizen; but then Lucius Philippus is said to have replied that as far as he was concerned, he was voting not to send him with a consul’s authority, but with that of both the consuls!* Indeed, such was the general confidence that he would serve the country well that a task that would normally be assigned to two consuls was entrusted to the abilities of a single youth. Was anything so unparalleled as for him to be exempted from the laws by senatorial decree and made consul at an age when he was not yet legally qualified to hold any curule office?* Was anything so incredible as for a Roman equestrian to be awarded a second triumph by senatorial decree?* In fact if you count up all the departures from precedent that have been allowed to everyone in history, there are fewer of them than we have witnessed in the case of this one man. [63] And all these numerous instances, so significant and so unparalleled, were approved, to the benefit of this same person, with the full endorsement of
Quintus Catulus and other eminent men of equal standing.*
Let them therefore make sure that we do not have a situation in which you have always approved their decisions about the standing of Gnaeus Pompeius, but they reject your own judgements, and the decisions of the Roman people, about him. This would be seen as unjust and intolerable—particularly given that the Roman people are now in a strong position to defend their own decision about him in the face of all who disagree. Indeed, you have every right to defend that decision, seeing that when you chose him, and him alone, out of many possible contenders, to appoint to the war against the pirates, a chorus of protest was heard from precisely the same people who are protesting now. [64] If you appointed him to that command for frivolous reasons or without considering the national interest, then those men are right to try to use their wisdom to temper your enthusiasm. But if it was in fact you who had a clearer view of the national interest than they did at that time, if it was you who, by yourselves and in the face of their opposition, brought self-respect to our empire and safety to the world, then these leading men should finally admit that they and everyone else have now no option but to defer to the unanimous authority of the Roman people.