by Mark Zuehlke
Montgomery’s relationship with his third army general had always been more fractious. Harry Crerar had served Montgomery briefly as commander of I Canadian Corps in Italy before assuming command of First Canadian Army. Each man’s personal style and temperament grated on the other. Fifty-six-year-old Crerar was fussy about proper dress, a stickler for detailed and extensively written operational plans, and a prickly Canadian nationalist. He was also shy and retiring. Montgomery dressed casually, preferred terse and often orally delivered operating instructions, and was an outspoken, shameless self-promoter. In Italy, Montgomery had concluded that Crerar had no idea how to fight a corps and appeared to think the same of the man’s handling of an army, even after his most capable performance during the Rhineland Campaign. Eisenhower had taken note, however, extending personal “admiration” for how Crerar “conducted the attack.”17
Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks, who had served under Crerar as commander of the British XXX Corps, thought the Canadian “much underrated, largely because he was the exact opposite to Montgomery. He hated publicity, but was full of common sense and always prepared to listen to the views of his subordinate commanders . . . I grew to like him very much, though, I am afraid I must have been a terrible pain in his neck, for during part of this long-drawn-out battle I was feeling unwell . . . The outward and visible sign was that I became extremely irritable and bad-tempered, yet Crerar bore with me very patiently.”18
Command was taking its toll on Crerar. He had visibly aged during the Rhineland Campaign. Always a heavy smoker, he was now smoking more cigarettes than ever. The resulting hacking cough was so bad his batman moved out of the general’s caravan.19
At least one of his subordinates emerged from the Rhineland Campaign convinced that Crerar should no longer command the army. Major General Dan Spry thought Crerar “too old for it and [that] a lot of his thinking was back in 1917-1918. He didn’t get along with Monty . . . My own feeling was that, although I liked the man and never had any difficulty with him . . . at his age, and compared to Guy [Simonds]—who was really on top of the situation—[we] might have been better served with Guy in command.”20
Spry liked the forty-one-year-old II Canadian Corps commander despite acknowledging that he could be “icy cold.” When angered, Simonds would not shout or become agitated. Instead, his jaw set, his eyes glinted, and his words and manner left “no doubt what he wanted. [He was] very straightforward, determined. He ranked with Monty, way above most.” Although Spry found Crerar an able enough manager, it was Simonds, he thought, who really commanded. “Lots of corps and [divisional] plans were Guy’s. [He then] got Crerar’s okay.”21
Simonds’s meteoric rise from major to lieutenant general in just three and a half years had led many to think he would replace Crerar. Indeed, Crerar’s evacuation to England in September 1944 with jaundice had resulted in Simonds leading the army through the Scheldt Estuary Campaign and raised expectations that he would retain command. Certainly Montgomery had lobbied for this. However, Crerar had returned in November and been promoted to the rank of full general.22
BY THE TIME Montgomery convened his March 9 meeting, the Rhine assault plan was well massaged. The general intention, Montgomery told his three army commanders, was to “cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr and secure a firm bridgehead, with a view to developing operations to isolate the Ruhr and to penetrate deeper into Germany.” Two armies—the Second British and U.S. Ninth—would force the crossing between Rees and Rheinberg. On the left, Second Army would cross with its XXX Corps in the area of Rees, while XII Corps struck near Wesel. Right of Wesel, the Ninth would protect Second Army’s flank with crossings at two points along its six-mile frontage from Wesel to Rheinberg.
The primary thrust would be delivered by Second Army’s XII Corps at Wesel because this town, with a pre-war population of about 24,000, was a vital rail and road communication hub. Once a lodgement here was secure, XXX Corps would expand the bridgehead northward, so the Rhine could be bridged at Emmerich. The Americans would meanwhile widen the bridgehead southward.23
To hasten the expansion, there would be a massive drop by airborne troops. Code-named Operation Varsity, this airborne phase would see XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps—comprising the 6th British and 17th U.S. Airborne Divisions—land about five miles north of Wesel to seize various heights, crossroads, and bridges over the Issel River, a tributary flowing from the east into the IJssel River. These actions by the paratroops would deny the Germans excellent artillery observation points and also block the movement of reinforcements along the main routes running to Wesel from the east.24
This would be the third major airborne operation of the North-west Europe campaign, but it differed greatly from those before it. For D-Day and Market Garden, the paratroops had dropped before the sea landings or ground assault. This time they would jump after the Rhine was crossed. Market Garden, particularly the disaster of Arnhem, had shown that paratroops should not be deployed too far from their objectives or from the ground forces that were to relieve them. Nor should they be landed in packets at widely spaced time intervals. For Varsity, the paratroops and glider-borne troops would land in rapid succession and within close striking distance of their objectives. As it had during the D-Day landings, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion would land as part of the British division’s 3rd Parachute Brigade.
The Canadian paratroops would not, however, be the first Canadians across the Rhine. This honour would go to 3rd Canadian Infantry Division’s 9th Brigade, which was attached to XXX Corps. Due to the narrow frontage for Plunder, rather than to Montgomery’s lack of confidence in Crerar, First Canadian Army would play no immediate role.
Organizationally, Twenty-First Army Group was highly flexible. During the Rhineland Campaign, XXX Corps was under First Canadian Army command. Now, II Canadian Corps shifted to Second Army, with its 3rd Division being directly under XXX Corps command. Moreover, this division’s 9th Brigade was placed under the control of Major General Thomas Rennie’s 51st Highland Division, and its Highland Light Infantry battalion further assigned to go into the attack under command of that unit’s 154th Brigade. The intention was to ensure that 9 CIB would pass quickly over the Rhine and spearhead a “rapid build-up of Canadian forces east of the Rhine, initially under British command.” Once the brigade was all inside the bridgehead, it would thrust towards Emmerich, followed by the rest of 3rd Division and ultimately as much of II Canadian Corps as might be required to clear the area there—particularly the high, overlooking Hoch Elten feature. When this area was secure, First Canadian Army would commence bridging operations in front of Emmerich. Upon completion, II Corps would revert to its command and the Canadians would advance towards the IJssel River, slipping into Holland through the back door, rather than attacking the German defences guarding its southern approaches.
Crerar and his staff remained responsible for holding a long defensive line that stretched from Emmerich to the sea and included a threatened bridgehead over the Waal at Nijmegen.25 They also had a major administrative role in overseeing “the build-up of ammunition and engineer stores . . . for the only way into the area between the rivers was over First [Canadian] Army’s heavily laden and already sagging road system.”26 II Canadian Corps staff was also deeply engaged in teeing up the provision of supporting artillery and engineers to XXX Corps.
Another challenge facing First Canadian Army was to integrate a new corps into its midst. In 1943, in a phased movement that began with 1st Canadian Infantry Division’s attachment to Eighth Army for the Sicily invasion, I Canadian Corps had been transferred from Great Britain to Italy. By early 1944, the corps was complete in Italy with two divisions under command, the 1st Division and 5th Canadian Armoured Division.
There had been a general understanding that the Canadian deployment to Italy was temporary—intended to give the army needed combat experience before its commitment to the Normandy invasion and simultaneously assuage public demands at home that the nation’s s
oldiers should be blooded, as had been its airmen and sailors. But once in Italy, the British high command had been disinclined to bring I Canadian Corps back to Britain. Such a movement would have necessitated replacing the corps with a British one. It would have also required vital shipping at a time when all such resources were required for the buildup to the Normandy invasion and subsequent support of operations on the continent. So the Canadians had been left in place, marching with Eighth Army slowly up the Italian boot.
There they would likely have remained had it not been for a Combined Chiefs of Staff decision at the Malta Conference of January 30-February 2, 1945. Much discussion had focused on strategic priorities, and of key import to the Canadians was the decision that “the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive western front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theatre.” Suddenly, Italy became a backwater from which it was possible to remove “up to five” Canadian and British divisions.
I Canadian Corps received immediate instructions to prepare for a transfer, with 5th Division and corps headquarters shipping out in February from Leghorn to Marseilles and then travelling overland to Belgium. By mid-March, 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade completed the journey. As First Canadian Army readied for its role in Plunder, 1st Division was en route and scheduled for operational deployment on April 3.
Crerar welcomed the new corps at the end of March, citing his farewell address in Italy when he had predicted that “we, Canadians, would all meet again, somewhere in Europe, when the Armies of the United Nations converged, and the job we came over here to do was about to be accomplished. Well, the prophecy has come true—and no soldier in the First Canadian Army can be more elated at this situation than I, myself, am. The I Canadian Corps returns to the Canadian Army, with a magnificent fighting record, first established in Sicily by the 1 Canadian Division and fully maintained by other formations of the Corps as all, later, fought their way through Italy. We are all very proud of what you have accomplished and it is simply great to get together again. And, now that we are all together, let us all speed to the victory in no uncertain manner.”27
AS THE CANADIANS regrouped, the behemoth that was Plunder lumbered towards its launch. Between Emmerich and Wesel, the fast-flowing Rhine stretched to a width of 1,500 feet—a formidable obstacle to bridge even in peacetime. To undertake the task, likely under German observed artillery and mortar fire, XXX Corps alone was assigned 8,000 engineers. These were supplied with 22,000 tons of assault bridging that included 25,000 wooden pontoons, 2,000 assault boats, 650 larger storm boats, and 120 river tugs. Eighty miles of balloon cable and 260 miles of steel wire were trucked to the Rhine’s banks.28
To avoid gridlock on the fragile and limited road system, a complex schedule was developed that ensured that the hundreds of trucks groaning under the weight of bridging supplies “lined up in correct order and plans were all made so that the right material would arrive at the right point at the right time,” observed 6th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, Company Quartermaster Sergeant Samuel Alexander Flatt. “The usual Hollywood words, such as colossal, stupendous and unbelievable, would be of little use in describing the situation as seen here. Nothing had been left to chance and a timetable had been worked out that reminded us of the detailed planning for the ‘D’ Day assault.”29
No less colossal and far more destructive in the lead-up to Plunder was the air support, which a Canadian Army historical officer described as “gigantic.” Bombing operations by the Royal Air Force and U.S. Army Air Force started in early February to gradually isolate the Ruhr by destroying eighteen bridges on the most important routes leading to the area from central Germany. By the time Plunder’s commencement was imminent, only three or four of these bridges still stood, and those that did had suffered damage. In early March, Bomber command had begun “going all out” to cripple the German transportation network to the rear of the battle area with attacks on targets in Germany and Holland.30 Over three weeks, Allied bombers dumped 31,635 tons of explosives into the area.31
A third phase of bombing immediately before Plunder aimed to “reduce the enemy’s will to fight, to hinder his defensive preparations, and to disrupt his communications. To this end, key crossroad towns of Haldern, Isselburg, Anholt, and Praest—each little more than ten miles back of the river from Rees and Wesel—were slated for destruction. Haldern and Praest were targeted on D minus 1, the other two to be struck at first light on D-Day.
The fourth phase of aerial operations aimed to seize and maintain air superiority over the assault area and the airborne force’s drop and landing zones. Allied air commanders worried that the Luftwaffe would challenge Allied mastery of the skies with the new jet-propelled fighter and fighter-bombers the Germans had recently brought into action. Consequently, beginning on D minus 3 and running through to D-Day, Eighth U.S. Army Air Force pounded airfields within range of the assault area with fourteen hundred planes. At the same time, 2nd Tactical Air Force’s Spitfires and Typhoons and planes of the U.S. Eighth Fighter Command cast a thick carpet over the area to interdict any German jets that might sneak in. Inside the assault area, fighter-bombers also struck at known German anti-aircraft gun positions and other identified targets that could threaten the landings. Once Plunder began and Allied forces were across the Rhine, air support was to be constantly available to engage any targets identified by air or artillery forward observation officers operating with the advancing troops.32
Added to all the explosives being dropped on the Germans from the skies would be those hurled by the artillery once Plunder began on March 23. Besides the almost 3,500 guns supporting the Second British Army, Ninth U.S. Army had 2,070 guns ready. Both armies had complex fire plans that “included counter-battery preparation, to prevent the enemy shelling our forming-up areas and crossing places, counter-mortar tasks, a preliminary bombardment to lower the defenders’ morale . . . harassing fire and a smoke screen.” XXX Corps had the direct support of the divisional artillery regiments of the Guards and 11th Armoured Divisions, the 3rd British, 3rd Canadian, 43rd (Wessex), and 51st (Highland) Infantry Divisions, as well as three Army Groups of Royal Artillery (including the 2nd Canadian Group) and the XXX Corps Troops Royal Artillery. All II Canadian Corps artillery not directly supporting the crossing would fire diversionary plans on their flanks to create confusion about whether other assaults might be coming in those sectors.33
The complete assault plan, combining aerial and artillery bombardments, multiple crossings along an extended front, and airborne landings behind the Germans dug into the bank of the Rhine, was—as Chester Wilmot, a thirty-three-year-old Australian correspondent for the BBC, understatedly put it—“elaborate.”34
On the Friday morning of May 23, Montgomery issued a message to all the troops of Twenty-First Army Group. Referring to his earlier message at the beginning of the Rhineland Campaign, he said: “On the 7th February I told you we were going into the ring for the final and last round; there would be no time limit; we would continue fighting until our opponent was knocked out.”
Now, he said, “the enemy has lost the Rhineland, and with it the flower of at least four armies—the Parachute Army, Fifth Panzer Army, Fifteenth Army, and Seventh Army; the First Army, further to the South is now being added to the list. In the Rhineland battles, the enemy has lost about 150,000 prisoners, and there are many more to come: his total casualties amount to about 250,000 since 8th February.
“In the East, the enemy has lost all of Pomerania east of the Oder, an area as large as the Rhineland; and three more German armies have been routed. The Russian armies are within about 35 miles of Berlin.
“Overhead, the Allied Air Forces are pounding Germany day and night. It will be interesting to see how much longer the Germans can stand it.
“The enemy has been driven into a corner, and he cannot escape. Events are moving rapidly. The complete and decisive defeat of the Germans is certain; there is no possibility of doubt on this matter.
“21 ARM
Y GROUP WILL NOW CROSS THE RHINE. The enemy possibly thinks he is safe behind this great river obstacle. We all agree that it is a great obstacle; but we will show the enemy that he is far from safe behind it. This great Allied fighting machine, composed of integrated land and air forces, will deal with the problem in no uncertain manner.
“And having crossed the Rhine, we will crack about in the plains of Northern Germany, chasing the enemy from pillar to post. The swifter and the more energetic our action the sooner the war will be over, and that is what we all desire; to get on with the job and finish off the German war as soon as possible.
“Over the Rhine, then, let us go. And good hunting to you on the other side.
“May ‘the lord mighty in battle’ give us the victory in this our latest undertaking, as he has done in all our battles since we landed in Normandy on D-Day.”35
[2]
Never to Be Forgotten
AS TWENTY-FIRST ARMY Group put the finishing touches on preparations for Plunder, the Germans braced to meet the onslaught. The defenders were General der Fallschirmtruppen Alfred Schlemm’s First Fallschirmjäger (Paratroop) Army—badly mauled during its blood-soaked attempt to deny the opposite bank to First Canadian Army. Schlemm had withdrawn the last of his men on March 10, crossing the river at Wesel on the region’s remaining bridges. When the last soldier passed over, the bridges were blown. Left behind were fifty thousand men captured, along with all the dead included in the final count of about forty thousand killed or wounded. Exhausted and dispirited, Schlemm wondered if Hitler’s insistence on defending the Rhine’s west bank had been madness, the heavy loss in veteran troops impossible to replace.