Early American proposals designed to stabilize the strategic situation—to freeze the central strategic offensive systems, to establish equal ceilings on them, and to reduce them—were rejected by the Soviet Union. At the same time, Soviet strategic force levels continued to rise. By 1971 our more ambitious SALT goals had to be abandoned, replaced by the simple objective of securing Soviet agreement to offensive limitations that would halt the continuing buildup of Soviet launchers. The Soviet objective was clearly to continue that launcher construction until planned programs were completed and to limit the U.S. ABM to as low levels as possible. The Soviets were interested in curtailing the U.S. ABM, for the general reason that this was an area in which we had technological superiority, and for the specific reason that the ABM would interfere with their counterforce doctrine, since its primary purpose was defense of Minuteman.
The United States took the position that our ABM requirements were determined by the extent of the offensive threat to Minuteman; if that threat could be reduced, so could our defensive requirements. That was the principle of defense-offense linkage. In a broader sense, we were more concerned about the continued growth of Soviet offensive capabilities. Therefore, we could not agree to limit ABM without offensive force limitations. The Soviets insisted on ABM limitations only. Because of the Soviet buildup, we were unable to achieve offensive limitations consistent with the levels of defense established. But we did eventually succeed in getting an interim five-year agreement limiting offensive arms coupled with the ABM treaty.
We were not completely satisfied with that offensive force agreement. It allowed the Soviets higher levels than previously deemed acceptable, and higher than those permitted the United States. But this simply reflected the realities of the situation at that time, and we intended that the offensive agreement would last no more than five years. To emphasize this, the United States added to the treaty a formal declaration that stated, “If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.”
During that five years we believed that Soviet advantages would be offset by U.S. advantages, particularly in technology, and that vigorous U.S. research and development and force modernization programs would both preserve that situation and induce the Soviets to be receptive to an equitable follow-on agreement. We hoped that the SALT I agreement would thereby promote a better SALT II agreement, and also buy us time. We also hoped that it would have some moderating effect on the Soviet buildup.
SALT I itself did not freeze us into an inferior position. On the contrary, my administration welcomed and endorsed the Jackson Amendment, which required a reinvigorated American strategic effort, with aggressive modernization programs, as a condition for ratification of SALT I. It also stipulated that any future agreement should be based strictly on equality.
We moved to redress the strategic imbalance by pushing programs in all areas of the strategic triad—the MX on land, the Trident on the sea, and the B-1 in the air. None of these programs was inhibited by the agreement.
The B-1 bomber was slated to complement our aging B-52 bombers, which were designed and deployed in the 1950s and whose projected service life was to last until the 1980s. The B-1 was intended to be able to penetrate the most sophisticated Soviet air defenses of the 1970s, and would have forced the Soviets to divert tens of billions of dollars to radically new air defense systems for the 1980s and 1990s, a diversion that could only have come out of money now programmed for more threatening offensive strategic systems aimed at the United States. The Carter administration’s cancellation of the B-1 in the summer of 1977 may have been one of the greatest strategic blunders this nation has ever made.
The Trident submarine was designed to complement our Poseidon/Polaris submarine force of forty-one vessels, and eventually to replace many of the older boats. A Trident will carry twenty-four long-range missiles loaded with ten warheads each. SALT II, incidentally, would limit Trident I to seven war-heads. The Trident’s missiles will exceed in range, payload, and accuracy any of our present submarine-launched weapons and represent an increase to a new order of magnitude in deterrent effectiveness and invulnerability.
Similarly, the new proposed MX land-based intercontinental ballistic missile, when deployed, would provide a substantial improvement in overall power, weight, and accuracy compared with our present force of Minuteman missiles. In addition, the MX was intended to be deployed in a relatively invulnerable way, by being moved around from point to point. This would complicate the Soviets’ strike plans, greatly strengthening the invulnerability of America’s deterrent forces.
We also began to fund the development of cruise missile weapons, to be deployed from air, sea, or ground launchers. While it is a valuable weapon, the cruise missile is not a panacea for all our defense needs. If optimistic projections prove correct, we may have a very large technological lead over the Soviets in this form of weaponry, but advocates of the cruise missile as a substitute for heavier, more effective, and much swifter weapons should ponder the rapid deterioration of the lead we once held in MIRVing capabilities—that is, the ability to put several independently targeted warheads on the tip of a single missile. Also, while we still have no cruise missiles, the Soviets already have thousands of them deployed.
Now the B-l bomber has been canceled, deployment of the MX missile has been delayed by at least three years, the Trident production rate has been slowed (the first boat will not put to sea until 1981), and cruise missile development has encountered unforeseen problems. The backbone of our strategic deterrent force is still the land-based Minuteman III. By comparison, the warheads on the Soviet SS-17 are four to eight times as powerful, those on the SS-19 six to twelve times as powerful, and those on the SS-18—the Soviets’ supermissile—sixteen to forty times as powerful as those on the Minuteman III.
Soviet development of MIRVing technology, together with the tremendous lifting power of their huge missiles compared to the smaller size and weight of ours, means that they can mount many more warheads of much more power on each of their missiles than we can on each of ours. The SALT agreements do not limit warheads; they only limit missile launchers or airplanes. We must therefore face the grim reality that these developments have fundamentally altered the strategic equation in favor of the Soviets.
When the SALT II negotiations began early in 1973, our objective was to redress the inequalities that had been accepted by necessity in SALT I, and particularly to obtain reductions in the massive 4-1 throw weight advantage that had been permitted the Soviets. Our concern was that the Soviets would be able to convert their throw weight by the middle 1980s into a disarming first-strike option against our land-based ICBMs, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground. In such a situation the United States would have no response available except for the completely illogical and suicidal response of attacking Soviet cities with our small remaining force, inviting a massive, certain Soviet retaliation upon our own cities.
The Soviet leadership stonewalled us in Moscow in June of 1974. They refused to consider limitations on missile throw weight or reasonable levels of ICBM warheads. It was clear they put much political value on a first-strike capability against our land-based ICBM force. In Vladivostok in November 1974 President Ford encountered the same resistance, for the same reasons, and shifted to the less ambitious goal of negotiating equal aggregate numbers of strategic launchers, with sublimits on multiple-warhead-armed launchers. The only way in which SALT II could have meaningfully stemmed the arms race—by limiting throw weights—was dashed by Soviet intransigence and the lack of American bargaining muscle. We simply did not have the programs to offer as counters to bargain against the massive Soviet buildup. We still do not.
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By the time of the Vladivostok negotiations, the strategic situation was rapidly changing, and so were
American SALT expectations. Soviet momentum was increasing rather than moderating. In some cases, such as the substitution of the heavy SS-17 and SS-19 ICBMs for the light SS-11s, Soviet force modernization exploited loopholes in the SALT I agreement contrary to our understanding of that agreement. Increasingly, their overall strategic capabilities were reflecting a drive for superiority and a determination to achieve a strategic nuclear war-fighting capability that contrasted sharply with American views of deterrence. It was clear that a dangerous strategic balance was evolving and that SALT would not change that trend. The United States had to take more effective unilateral steps if it intended to avert a major imbalance in the early-to-mid-1980s. The Vladivostok limits were acceptable because they did not limit our ability to deal with the threat and because the United States then intended to go through with the programs that would do so. If arms control cannot limit and reduce the threat, it must not limit our ability to deal with it, directly or indirectly. By the time of Vladivostok the United States was determined that SALT, if it failed to do the first, at least would not do the latter.
The Carter administration tried to revive SALT with a new comprehensive proposal of March 1977, which, if successful, would have achieved some of the limits on Soviet throw weight that we had sought in 1974. The Soviets rejected the Carter proposal out of hand, and the administration quickly abandoned the effort and turned back to the Vladivostok guidelines. Unwisely, however, the administration allowed the Vladivostok framework to be expanded in ways favorable to the Soviet Union. As SALT II congressional testimony has shown, during the next two years the Carter administration gave in to the Soviet position on nearly every important point. It also abandoned or delayed those programs that would have made the strategic environment of the early-to-mid-1980s safer for the United States and more conducive to SALT agreements. Abandoned were the B-l bomber, Minuteman III production, early deployment of the MX missile as well as the most promising rebasing mode for ICBMs, on-schedule deployment of Trident, timely and unrestricted deployment of cruise missiles, and the neutron warhead. Ironically, had the administration not abandoned or delayed those programs, it would not have encountered the opposition to SALT II that it did, despite the major flaws in the agreement.
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On the basis of the record it is clear that the United States and the U.S.S.R. have diametrically opposed goals in strategic nuclear arms control negotiations. The United States seeks to reduce the danger of war, or of defeat without war; the damage to be done should war actually come; and the cost of armaments. Negotiating balanced limitations on strategic nuclear arms is a means toward these ends.
The Soviets do not seek equality. They believe strategic nuclear war might come, though they do not seek it, and they are perfectly willing to spend enormous sums of money year after year to prepare to win it. They favor arms control that will limit the United States where we are ahead, but which will not limit the Soviets either where they are ahead or where they are behind and need to catch up.
The U.S. goal during the Nixon and Ford administrations was to attempt to build a structure of peace with a negotiated equivalency in strategic nuclear arms as its cornerstone, and with sufficient strength in the other areas of national power as a part of its foundation. America has abandoned that goal, and with or without further SALT agreements the United States faces Soviet superiority by 1985, possibly sooner. This is dangerously destabilizing to the superpower relationship. One of the original premises of the SALT process was that the two sides would establish and codify strategic stability. This we have failed to do because we have not kept up with the Soviets by doing what we were allowed to do under SALT I.
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Strategic nuclear arms control agreements are not an end in themselves. Just as arms are required for a purpose, so must arms control be pursued for a purpose. The Soviets arm to expand; we arm to thwart that ambition. Arms control will serve our purposes only if it achieves what some have called “crisis stability” between the two superpowers, while holding down the levels of strategic nuclear arms.
Paul Nitze has described crisis stability as “a situation where, in a crisis threatening war, there would be no significant advantage to the side striking first, preempting, or launching from under indications of attack.” In effect, this means that our strategic forces must have no vulnerabilities that the Soviets could exploit by a first strike; our forces must always be able to ride out even a massive surprise attack and retaliate in a variety of ways, and still have enough left to strike again if necessary, or to preclude any Soviet postexchange advantage.
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Six indispensable conditions must be met before we make any further strategic arms agreements.
1. We must establish a strong position to negotiate from, and we must bear in mind that it is better to have no agreement than to have a bad agreement. The way to avoid a bad agreement is to assure that the strategic situation is favorable to the United States during negotiation, at the time of agreement, and throughout the duration of the agreement. Arms control agreements tend to reflect the reality of the two sides’ respective strength. If we want good agreements, we must establish the reality from which they can emerge. Agreements against a background of Soviet strategic advantage will only reflect that advantage; they will not change it.
2. Any agreement we make with the Soviet Union must not inhibit us from assisting our NATO allies to develop the strength they need to help us deter Soviet use of theater nuclear weapons.
3. Our dedication to strategic arms limitations must not leave the United States, in case of attack or threat of attack on one of our allies or friends—or on our strategic defense system—with the sole option of killing millions of Russian civilians. This position would be clear inferiority.
President Carter has stated that one Poseidon submarine has the capability of taking out most of the Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet preemptive strike that destroyed most of our land-based missiles. This claim is not only wrong factually; it is incredible. Since the Soviets would then have the capacity to retaliate by obliterating every city in the United States, it is like the threat of a man who says, “Do as I say or I’ll blow out my brains all over your new suit.”
We must maintain sufficient land-based and accurate forces to ensure an effective second strike, not merely against the cities and population of the U.S.S.R., but also against its military targets, particularly its ICBM silos with “reload” capacity. Only through this capacity can deterrence be preserved.
4. Any SALT agreement must be strictly verifiable by national means without the cooperation of the Soviet Union.
5. Arms control must never be pursued as an end in itself, in isolation from other goals. There must be linkage between arms control and Soviet behavior in areas where they are engaging in activities that are antagonistic to our interests. Control of arms cannot be separated from the threats that require us to maintain arms. If war comes, it will be primarily because of failure to resolve political differences, combined with failure of the United States to maintain forces to dissuade aggressors from challenging our interests.
6. The SALT process must not inhibit the United States from going forward with strategic programs that are (a) allowed under the terms of an agreement, and (b) important for the achievement of a responsible American strategic posture. We can be sure the Soviets will do everything allowed that they consider will give them superiority. We cannot deploy, use, or employ for political effect or as bargaining chips missiles we were allowed to build but did not. If the United States unilaterally makes a concession in the hope of inducing concessions on their side, the Soviets take full advantage of this stupidity and push ahead with their programs. Paul Nitze reports:
Senator Tower asked [Soviet] academician Shchukin . . . what the Soviet side would do to reciprocate for our cancellation of the B-1. Mr. Shchukin replied, “You misunderstand us. We are not pacifists nor are we philanthropists.” I am sure Mr. Shchukin had
in mind a third point but was too polite to make it. “Nor are we fools.”
We have been engaged in SALT for a decade and have practiced strategic arms restraint longer than we have had SALT agreements. The benefits originally expected have not materialized. In fact, our strategic situation has steadily deteriorated. Clearly, our attention now should not be on SALT, but on identifying and remedying the weaknesses in our strategic posture as rapidly as possible.
The demonstration of American will and capability to deny the Soviet leaders the strategic superiority they seek will have a more restraining influence on those leaders in the long run than a SALT agreement or anything else. It could convince them to reduce their ambitious strategic aims because the costs and uncertainties of pursuing them would be prohibitive. Consequently, taking resolute action to deny superiority to the Soviets is not only necessary to our own future security, it may also in the long run be the best means to meaningful mutual arms limitation agreements.
The question confronting us now is: What can the United States do to prevent strategic vulnerability and inferiority in the immediate future? We now have few strategic programs that will have any effect before the late 1980s.
There are some things we can do that would at least ease the situation until longer-range solutions are possible. There also are several strategic force options available for the mid-range, including accelerating some of the present long-range programs. Many of these options have been studied and presented over the past two years by a group of defense scientists and specialists, the Strategic Alternatives Team chaired by Dr. William Van Cleave of the University of Southern California. The vulnerability facing our ICBMs by the mid-1980s could be avoided by rapidly rebasing Minuteman III in the multiple vertical shelter mode, originally recommended by the air force, without waiting for development of the MX missile. The severe vulnerabilities of our bomber force could be reduced by increasing the alert rate, rebasing the force inland, and re-engining the B-52 Gs and Hs. The submarine force could be improved by fixes to its communications and by accelerating and increasing the Trident I program. Cruise missile production could be accelerated and expanded. In civil defense, studies show that inexpensive actions could be taken to improve that capability substantially within three years. I would add that in the medium term the B-1 program should be reactivated both as a penetrating supersonic bomber and as a subsonic cruise missile carrier.
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