To counter this strategy we need a theater nuclear force deployment doctrine that will make absolutely clear the new relationship of theater forces to U.S.-based strategic nuclear forces at one end of the spectrum of deterrence, and to the alliance’s conventional military forces deployed in Europe at the other.
At the central strategic end of the spectrum U.S. forces together with longer-range theater systems must neutralize the threat of such Soviet forces. Only the President of the United States can spell out the doctrine of limited and selective use that is needed to ensure the vital connection necessary to such neutralization.
At the battlefield end of the spectrum a modernized theater nuclear force will provide the main deterrent to massive Soviet conventional or tactical nuclear attacks. This will be so even if NATO’s conventional forces are greatly improved. NATO cannot realistically expect to contain such attacks with conventional forces alone. But to be effective, the theater deterrent must be clearly able to halt a large-scale attack by the forces of the Warsaw Pact, and to prevent the loss of territory. It will require an ability to locate and destroy military targets in the field, and their support in the rear.
This requires modernization of our posture across the board: nuclear weapons and other critical military assets in the theater must be made more survivable against surprise attack; nuclear weapons must be modernized to enhance their defense capability and reduce the collateral damage from their use (battlefield variations of the neutron bomb are essential for this purpose), theater-range systems might be introduced to meet the threat of the Backfire and SS-20, but not at the expense of modernizing battlefield nuclear weapons; conventional forces need to be modernized, taking advantage of new technologies; deployment plans for combined nuclear and conventional arms must be fashioned to make credible a deterrent based more strongly on the ability to deny an aggressor his objectives. Above all, a doctrine to guide modernization and to preclude piecemeal force decisions must be devised.
All of this will be extremely difficult; more alliance cooperation than we have recently seen will be necessary. The United States will have to lead, but to do so wisely it will first have to organize its own approach. This does not mean a repetition of the mistakes of the 1960s, when our tendency was to force a strategy on our allies; the solutions must be worked out together with our allies. But wise leadership is impossible without a sense of direction, and one of the major reasons for NATO’s strategic confusion today is that the United States lacks a firm sense of direction. Our tendency in recent years has been to approach alliance military decisions piecemeal. This must stop. A cooperative effort to renew and restore the reality and credibility of deterrence in Europe can help build allied unity as well as military and political strength.
• • •
The accession of Spain to NATO is vitally important. If Spain’s rapidly modernizing forces and key strategic location were combined with France’s growing cooperation within the alliance, NATO would have the military depth it now lacks. The United States has advocated Spanish membership since the early days of the Eisenhower administration. With the passing of the Franco regime and the evolution of democracy in Spain, the West Europeans should now be prepared to incorporate Spain into NATO. The Spanish people are hardworking, courageous, and able. The United States and the West need them as friends and allies, especially since it is NATO’s political unity even more than its military posture that discourages Soviet tests and adventures.
Turkey is a time bomb that, if allowed to explode, could have a more devastating impact on NATO than even the upheaval in Iran. Turkey has no oil but it shares borders with Iran, Syria, Iraq, and the Soviet Union. It controls the entrance to the Black Sea and the eastern entrance to the Mediterranean. It provides one third of NATO’s sixty-six divisions. Its 500,000-man armed forces are second in size in NATO only to those of the United States. For centuries it has been a target of Russian aggression.
Turkey’s economic problems are staggering. It faces what Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel calls “the gravest economic crisis in Turkey since we set up the republic” in 1923. It is torn by religious strife and imperiled by radical political groups. Riots and assassinations are rife. Its government has long been weak and unstable. For purely political reasons, the U.S. Congress has been niggardly in providing military and economic aid. If Turkey collapses, the south hinge of NATO will be torn away and the effect on its oil-producing neighbors will be incalculable. The NATO countries, including the United States, must urgently develop a program for military and economic assistance to ensure that this does not happen.
NATO and the Oil Lifeline
Sixty percent of Europe’s oil moves by sea from the Persian Gulf. Europe, like Japan, is far more dependent on oil from Arab countries than we are. It was this consideration as much as any other that led most of our NATO allies to see the rights and wrongs of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 differently from us. Except for the Dutch, who were hit by an oil embargo for opposing the Arabs, and the Portuguese, who at that time had African colonies with oil, they were reluctant to help us help the Israelis, for fear the Arabs would punish them by withholding vital oil supplies. Thus most NATO countries denied landing and overflight rights to our air transports carrying supplies to Israel, and resisted the diversion of military equipment from central Europe.
The situation facing our Western European allies with regard to their oil supply was admittedly difficult, and their concern over diversion of NATO military stocks had legitimacy. However, in retrospect, neither consideration justified their lack of support of the United States. It is not only that their reluctance to support us in 1973 has gained them no appreciable or permanent advantage with the Arab states. Nor is it that their policies were shortsighted concerning the strategic relationship of Israel to Western European security. Their failure to support the United States when it was acting in accordance with what it believed to be a major national interest—and one common to its allies—has ominous implications for the health of the alliance. How viable is NATO if we cannot have a concerted policy to deal with major security problems beyond Europe? Economic and geopolitical considerations, particularly in the Persian Gulf, are raising problems that, while beyond the normal confines of NATO, without question concern NATO as an alliance. And so far NATO has shown itself incapable of responding as an alliance to such problems. It is urgent that we develop coordinated, effective means of dealing with such problems.
The key challenge here is not procedural or technical: it is political. The Europeans’ vital and legitimate interests in the Middle East and the Gulf are more immediate to them than American interests in the region are to the United States. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan will remain heavily dependent on oil imported from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf for the remainder of this century, and the Soviets know it. Soviet oil reserves are running low and they too will soon need Mideast oil. They have an avid interest in the region for these and other reasons. As James R. Schlesinger, who was my Defense Secretary, said in his farewell address as President Carter’s Energy Secretary, NATO is “insufficient” today because “it offers no protection for the energy resources on which our collective security depends.” The threat is “stark,” he said. “Soviet control of the oil tap in the Middle East would mean the end of the world as we have known it since 1945 and of the association of free nations.”
Sooner than we would wish or might expect, it may be necessary for European nations to be ready and willing to use military force, in cooperation with the United States, in defense of the West’s vital and legitimate interests in the Middle East or Persian Gulf. If so challenged, we have no choice but to do what is necessary to prevent our oil lifeline from being severed.
A Western military presence in the Middle East or Persian Gulf area need not and probably should not be a NATO presence, nor should it be under a NATO command. But there will probably be a need in the future to devise ways in which a few cooperating states could increas
e the readiness of their forces, after alliance consultation, without requiring the cooperation or even the assent of all.
The strategic position of the entire Western alliance hinges today, and will for years to come, on the reliability of access by Western Europe, North America, and Japan to crude oil from the Persian Gulf; on the continued credibility of United States protection and support for the key states in the area; on limiting Soviet influence in the region; and on the avoidance of war if at all possible. But these interests are not self-executing even though they are, to some extent, self-evident. It is necessary to be prepared, and to be seen to be prepared, to join together to defend them.
The United States should also have the ability to intervene unilaterally in this vital area of the world if the need arises. Strategically located bases to counter the Soviet bases in the area and a rapid deployment force would show the Soviets we are serious about countering a threat by them to our oil lifeline.
The rapid deployment idea is useful for other volatile and sensitive parts of the world as well. Senator John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee has pointed out why in a colorful way. “We have more problems than just strategic threats,” Stennis said, so “we’ve got to be prepared for more uncertainties” and have forces “that can go into the bayous” of the Third World. Rapid deployment forces, if used intelligently, would provide the United States with the necessary flexibility to respond to the needs of allies around the world.
It should be noted, however, that the capability of a rapid deployment force would depend on bases and prepositioned equipment and supplies on land or at sea. Airlift could not transport the amount of equipment needed. Above all, rapid deployment force would depend on bases and prepositioned we will lose at present levels of the naval budget.
Japan
The Japanese are in a position that is strategically quite similar to Europe’s. The threats that alarm the Japanese are essentially from the Soviet Union: nuclear coercion, interruption of sea-lanes between Japan and the Persian Gulf, and harassment or attack from the air. In response to these threats the Japanese can choose from three options. They could rearm, both conventionally and with nuclear weapons. They could seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union, offering to trade their technical know-how for nonaggression. Or they could continue to rely on the United States. For a few more years at least they will pursue the last course. At the same time, they can be expected to modestly increase their defense expenditures and maintain communication with the Soviet Union because our questionable stability as an ally has forced them to keep their options open.
In June 1979 during the seven-nation summit meeting in Tokyo, Japan was shocked by the arrival off Tokyo Bay of the Minsk, the U.S.S.R.’s new aircraft carrier scheduled for permanent Pacific stationing. This provocative gesture stole banner headlines throughout Japan from the first international summit held in Tokyo since World War II, an event that symbolized for the Japanese their readmission to the circle of global powers. Yet the presence of the Minsk underscored the delicacy of Japan’s position. Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told me in 1970 that Japan was engaged in “a completely new experiment in world history,” by which he meant his country was bent on taking her place as a major world power without significant military strength.
Japan allocates has allocated less than 1 percent of its GNP for defense as compared with 5 percent for the United States and at least 11 to 13 percent for the U.S.S.R.—a smaller percentage than any major nation on earth except Mexico. This free ride on defense helped spur its meteoric economic rise. Economists have estimated that if Japan had spent 6 percent of its GNP on defense over the past couple of decades, its GNP would be some 30 percent lower than its current $1 trillion—which will soon be the second highest in the world, as Japan overtakes the Soviet Union.
That same free ride has also made Japan very vulnerable militarily. Its 155,000-man army is one-fourth the size of North Korea’s, its 44,000-man air force is inadequately protected, and its 42,000-man navy is vulnerable to air attack and incapable of defending the sea-lanes on which Japan depends.
Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore’s Prime Minister, put his finger on the Japanese dilemma when he told me in 1965, “The Japanese are a great people. They cannot and should not be satisfied with a world role which limits them to making better transistor radios and sewing machines, and teaching other Asians how to grow rice.”
The Japanese government, however, currently defines its role as forging a wide consensus among key political actors, rather than leading them toward a clear objective. At present there is general agreement that Japan’s security is slipping, but while the Japanese have made encouraging progress in strengthening their military forces, they have not yet made the very difficult but necessary decision to exceed the self-imposed 1 percent limitation on military spending. Unless there is some jolt to the international system—such as a second Korean conflict or a Sino-Soviet war—Japan’s force improvements will probably be in limited areas rather than across the board.
Japan needs more defense, and it can afford it. The present constraints on defense spending are political and psychological, not economic. It may be unrealistic to expect a Japanese government in the immediate future to break through the traditional 1 percent of GNP barrier on defense expenditures. But even within that limit expenditures can and should be raised, and Japan’s leaders will have to work at preparing their people for a greater military effort. Meanwhile, Japan should compensate for its virtually free ride on defense by shouldering a greater share of the free world’s economic burden—in foreign aid, for example.
The cornerstone of Japan’s defense, however, will continue to be its alliance with the United States. U.S.–Japanese military cooperation needs to be strengthened; this is in the interests of both countries. A close partnership between the strongest military and economic power in the free world and the strongest economic power in Asia could provide the basis for American political and military flexibility in the region and act as a restraint on Soviet adventuring.
By means of more intimate naval cooperation, the U.S. and Japanese fleets could greatly improve their coverage of the sea lines of communication south of Japan toward the Persian Gulf area. If such cooperation were matched by similar NATO cooperation in the Mediterranean, it would be feasible to deploy a U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean. This could be done without involving the Japanese in international political problems for which they may be unprepared, and without lessening the essential naval presence in East Asia.
Even assuming that Japanese air-defense, sea-lane protection, and early-warning needs are met, there remains the nuclear threat from Russia. Nearly half of Russia’s new SS-20 missiles are based in the Soviet Far East and cover Japan; the operational radius of the Backfire bombers based east of the Urals easily includes Japan. Although the problem in Northeast Asia is fundamentally the same as in Western Europe—a rapidly rising Soviet nuclear force buildup targeted on U.S. allies—the solution for Japan cannot be the same as for NATO, because Japan cannot yet accept the basing of theater nuclear forces on its soil. The United States could provide longer-range theater coverage of Northeast Asia by submarine-based and land-based cruise missiles deployed from bases on our own soil. One of the major deficiencies of SALT II is that the protocol would limit the range of such missiles to 600 kilometers. The United States will have to deploy long-range land-based and sea-based missiles in the Western Pacific as part of a modernized theater nuclear force.
The defense of Korea is also indispensable to the security of Japan. I vividly recall a conversation I had with Whittaker Chambers when North Korea invaded South Korea. He strongly supported the U.S.–U.N. action. He said, “What we must realize is that for the communists the war is not about Korea but about Japan.” A Korea overrun by the communists would be like a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. In view of present world developments the United States should strengthen rather than weaken its own forces in South Korea. It also
should avoid the mistake we made in Iran of undermining a friendly government because it does not make progress toward American-style democracy as fast as we would like.
Finally, for East Asia as for Western Europe, it is absolutely essential that the United States clarify its strategic nuclear doctrine in ways that bolster the nuclear umbrella rather than collapse it. This strategic initiative would serve our own direct national interest, as well as the interest of our friends and allies—and at absolutely no cost to us.
If we fail to renovate and strengthen our alliance with the Japanese, we will force them either to go it alone or to seek an accommodation with the Soviets. The Japanese do not want to turn to the Soviet Union. Japan is part of the free world. The United States is an enormously larger customer for her products than is the Soviet Union. And while the United States returned Okinawa to Japan in 1970, the Soviet Union adamantly refuses even to discuss the return of Japan’s northern islands, which it seized after World War II, and is even defiantly increasing its military presence on them. But above all, Japan does not want to be on the losing side again. If the Japanese lose confidence in the credibility of the American deterrent, they will be sorely tempted to make the best deal they can with the Soviets. The geopolitical impact of such a development would be catastrophic for the West.
Real War Page 22