I feel sure we should never have relinquished our hold over the Transvaal. If we were to have a fight upon the question, how much better it would have been to have had it when the Boers possessed no artillery, were only armed with bad sporting rifles, had very little ammunition and still less money than in 1899.29
This was an erudite assessment that shows prescience of the military-political situation of this period and would weigh heavy upon the British army in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).
Wolseley showed great dedication to army reform, as is reflected in the following extract:
The depth of Wolseley’s commitment to army reform and his recognition of the importance of mobilizing the public are at no point clearer than when considering the proposal he put forward after the government had all but abandoned the idea of making him a peer. On hearing of the postponement of the matter, he indicated to Childers that, if the argument still centred round the inadvisability of having the Quarter-Master General sit in the House of Lords, he was prepared to resign his position and accept a peerage and the position of Governor-General of Gibraltar in succession to Lord Robert Napier. He would then be able to support the government in its programme of [army] reform …30
The government backed down on making Wolseley a peer and offered him the job of Adjutant General. This position had a condition brought down from the Duke of Cambridge by which Wolseley had to promise not to publish publicly anything on military affairs that would oppose the Duke’s views. This was an assurance that Wolseley had no intention of keeping and he showed great resistance to the Duke’s views and, in his position as Adjutant General, pressed his own opinions readily forward, especially in the case of much-needed army reform issues. Wolseley in his new position was appointed president to the Colour Committee, which decided to change the colour of the British Army uniform from red to khaki: ‘After red had proved such a conspicuous target at Majuba Hill in 1881 the Adjutant-General, Garnet Wolseley, threw his weight behind efforts to modernise and improve the army uniform. In 1883 a committee of which he was chairman suggested the adoption of grey for service dress. Yet significant clothing reforms were not brought about much before 1900.’31 This issue would take some time to be concluded but the practicality of the colour change would of course be the deciding factor, even in the face of royal opposition by the Duke of Cambridge and Queen Victoria herself.
Tel-el-Kebir and the Egyptian Campaign, 1882
Unrest in Egypt and the eventual collapse of the Egyptian government led to the military taking over the government in April 1882. Wolseley’s task was purely militaristic and he was to defeat and disperse the forces under Arabi Pasha, which were in rebellion to the Khedive Tewfik. He was then subsequently to restore the prince to the throne in Egypt. Prime Minister Gladstone in a breakfast meeting with Wolseley had told him that the British government is ‘bound to protect Tewfik’.32 Wolseley was appointed Commander in Chief of all land forces in Egypt and was sent with an army of 24,000 men from Malta and Cyprus and a further 7,000 from India. The operation was originally to be a joint venture between France and Great Britain. France had been eager not to allow rebellion to foment across North Africa, especially since they had recently acquired Tunis. The French Chamber of Deputies refused the vote to the Freycinet administration and the ministry fell from power. The Ottoman Turkish government was also content to watch from the sidelines. It was apparent by July 1882 that Britain would be acting alone. It was imperative that the flow of shipping through the Suez Canal to Port Said not be disrupted. This was of vital interest to British trade, especially routes to India and China.33
Wolseley perceived this campaign as a logistical problem rather than tactical or strategic. The problem was the desert and supply of an army in the desert. The most important provision for men and animals was water. Horses require on average 8 gallons of water a day, and since transportation was vital this was an element that had to be well planned in the summer heat of the Sahara. Lieutenant General Wolseley was given the local rank of General and was given command of the full operation. As usual, he managed to bring many of the ‘ring’ with him: Wood was in command of an infantry brigade; Buller was in the intelligence department; Baker Russell commanded the 1st Cavalry Brigade; and Butler and Maurice received appointments on Wolseley’s staff. These selections created a bit of a stir with the Duke of Cambridge and other detractors of Wolseley, but nevertheless he went forward with what he perceived to be the best men for the jobs.34 Wolseley received two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry with full transportation and, since animals would not be available in Egypt, he also asked for mules to be shipped from America and he wanted five steam locomotives to expedite all transportation of men, animals and supplies. He also put in a request for open rail stock to repair anticipated demolition by the enemy. The ready supply of water was paramount in an operation in the Sahara and Wolseley wanted to be prepared for every contingency.35 Wolseley’s concern for transportation is interestingly observed in his earlier diary entry of May 1882 when he was still back in the War Office.
Discussed transport with Adye, Maurice and Reeve. Adye is unsafe on such points & very ignorant of practical war: he thinks because he has mules, carts & a collection of Levantine ruffians whom he calls drivers that he has an effective transport: he might as well imagine he had secured a painter, when he purchased a canvas & a paint box.36
The plan was to have separate forces to attack and secure the Suez Canal and Cairo. Wolseley had another Asante veteran, though one he did not entirely like, Major General Alison, command two battalions of infantry and a company of Naval Engineers from Cyprus. They were prepared to go forward within 24 hours of given notice, a sort of modern-day rapid deployment force. Wolseley planned to move forward on the Canal Zone and Ismailia and then to Tel-el-Kebir and then eventually to Cairo. Secrecy was maintained since there were many foreign correspondents and Egyptian spies and even the French designer of the Suez Canal was considered hostile to British plans. After Wolseley landed and took Alexandria on 21/22 August 1882, his first point of action was to take Tel-el-Mahuta, since there was a large force of infantry there and the dams there were making the water supply at the Sweetwater canal dangerously low. He left behind his main force to repair the railways and to secure logistical supplies from the ships to supply the main body of troops. Wolseley made a bold move to attack and take Tel-el-Mahuta with a small force. This was important to secure the water supply and to catch Arabi Pasha’s men off guard. The move paid off and Wolseley was able to take Tel-el-Mahuta. After this action Wolseley meticulously brought up his dispersed forces. It was important that supply lines be maintained and secured before any forces moved forward. There was pressure in early September from the press and home government for Wolseley to move forward, but he needed to wait for supplies to be concentrated at Kassassin. They had to come up through rail and land transportation via Ismailia, Tel-el-Mahuta to Kassassin. This was essential for a successful campaign to be launched on Tel-el-Kebir. Wolseley had followed the age-old lesson of securing lines of supply before advancing tactically into battle. Since he was in the largest desert in the world this was very prudent.37 Wolseley made his headquarters at Kassassin on 8 September 1882 and began a plan to take Tel-el-Kebir.
Since the advance to Tel-el-Kebir would be across open desert with no cover and the Egyptian forces were armed with modern breech-loading rifles (equal to the British rifles), Wolseley decided on a daring night march with a dawn attack on Tel-el-Kebir. The attack proceeded at 0450 on 13 September when his force was detected by Egyptian sentries, then Wolseley’s whole force moved forward to attack and overwhelmed the Egyptian forces in a short time. The whole of Tel-el-Kebir and the railway station had been taken by 0700. This was a lightning attack that was dominated by artillery support and finally fell to a lot of hand-to-hand combat. Wolseley spoke highly of the fighting men in a telegram to Secretary of State for War, Hugh Childers, and his diary entry read, ‘All rendezvous at 5 AM a
nd heard first shot on Tel-el-Kebir by 6:45 and send off telegram to Childers at 7AM. Our loss not as heavy as I expected.’38 He followed up with a gleaming telegram to Childers, ‘I can say emphatically, that I never wish to have under my orders better Infantry Battalions than those which I am proud to have commanded at Tel-el-Kebir.’39
Wolseley, true to his word, achieved his objective from the beginning until the end of the Egyptian campaign in 1882. His job was simple, to maintain the flow of shipping through the Suez Canal to Port Said without major disruptions and to capture Cairo intact. The campaign needed to be planned quickly and efficiently, since the terrain provided many challenges, and Wolseley did not want this campaign to descend into a battle of attrition in which heat exhaustion and sickness would have taken there toll.40 Wolseley finally went home on 21 October 1882 after all loose ends were tied up. A garrison of 12,000 British soldiers were left behind under the command of Alison, who had come from Cyprus at the beginning of the campaign. Evelyn Wood, a prominent Wolseley ‘ring’ member became Sirdar of the Egypt army in December 1882. Wolseley was awarded his much-deserved peerage and attained the rank of full General for his duties in Egypt.41
Plan of the battles of Tel-el-Kebir and Kassassin, 1882. (From Sir Evelyn Wood, British Battles on Land and Sea, London: Cassell & Co., 1915)
The next question of debate was the Sudan issue (1884–85). Since Egypt controlled the southern province of Sudan, it seemed Egypt and Britain inherited the problems of the region. Since Britain had a considerable military presence in Egypt it seemed to exacerbate the problems in Sudan. There was a Muslim uprising led by Mohammed Ahmed, who was the self-proclaimed Mahdi or ‘Chosen One’, who was to regenerate the faith of Islam and to expel the infidels or convert them into the folds of Islam. The Egyptian government decided to evacuate the Sudan and hopefully contain the spread of Mahdist teachings north. The British government did not want to intervene militarily after the defeat of Colonel Hicks’s forces at El Obeid by the Mahdist forces. It was then decided to send Charles Gordon to the Sudan to expedite the evacuation and ensure the loyalty of the tribes not swayed by the Mahdi. Though Wolseley was instrumental in getting Gordon to go to the Sudan, he was slightly untrusting of Gordon’s methods but he did see much worth in the man as a military leader. He also felt that the convictions Gordon brought with him would be helpful in maintaining the loyalty of the populace in Khartoum and the Sudan. Gordon’s mission had turned into a disaster and the government was begrudgingly forced to send a relief expedition to save Gordon in Khartoum. Wolseley was to be in command of this expedition. There were two factors that dominated this relief expedition and doomed it to ultimate failure: procrastination by Gladstone’s government, which perceived Gordon as disobeying orders, and the flow of events in the Sudan. Wolseley pressed for an immediate relief expedition to be sent in the autumn and wanted to start making logistical plans for this expedition. The Cabinet delayed and did not make any decisions on this mission. It was not until 5 August 1884 that the government allowed a budget and made plans to send a relief expedition to Khartoum. Wolseley was put in command and dispatched to Egypt, arriving in Cairo on 9 September 1884.
There was a large effort made by Wolseley to move from Wadi Halfa, and build up men and supplies and there was also the much-famed battle of Abu Klea, but this was all in vain as on 4 February 1885 Wolseley read the news that Khartoum had fallen and Gordon was dead. The expedition’s failure weighed heavily upon Wolseley’s shoulders. He squared the blame on Gladstone and subsequently Gladstone’s government fell in the aftermath of Gordon’s death. The Gordon relief expedition was the real first failure in Wolseley’s career as a commander in the field. It would prove to be his last field command. It seemed that Wolseley’s career was in the doldrums but this was not the case, as outlined by his most recent biographer, Halik Kochanski,
Wolseley returned from the Sudan chastened, but determined to devote his attention to turning the British army into a professional force capable of meeting and defeating any enemy, colonial or European, on the battlefield. The ingrained conservatism of the Duke of Cambridge meant that his efforts were frequently hampered, and in many areas he could do little more than prepare ground for the time when, he hoped, he would succeed the Duke and create his model of a modern British army.42
Wolseley was a stalwart if not personal commander and many have written on his abilities as a commander. Ian Hamilton said, ‘Wolseley was the most impersonal commander I have ever met … a soldier of quality’,43 and the Queen’s secretary Sir Henry Ponsonby wrote, ‘he does not inspire any love among those who serve under him though I think they have confidence in him. He thoroughly believes in himself and this makes others believe in him. He is hard and very likely unfeeling but this is useful if unpleasant in a general.’44 Wolseley was an intellectual general and perhaps a bit distant to the colloquial club atmosphere of the late Victorian army. He was certainly effective as a commander and successful as an army reformer. He seemed to inspire by example and duty rather than camaraderie.
Wolseley was a keen army reformer and put forth many schemes and ideas in the British army when he returned to the War Office in 1885 as Adjutant General. Wolseley believed that much of the training in the British army was for the benefit of show and parade ground, and that this was of little use in actual battlefield conditions. Wolseley was known for stating that a ‘good battalion’ is one that can shoot well under fire, efficient in outpost colonial duties, capable of night marches and studied in the tactical realities of modern battlefields. This in many ways flew in the face of the notion of army life during this period. The highly personal and fraternal nature of the late Victorian army could be the antithesis to the goals outlined by Wolseley. During his tenure in office as AG (1885–90) Wolseley wanted the British army to have the best possible rifle and he put forth the adoption of the Lee-Metford magazine rifle in 1888.45 This was the precursor to the famous Lee-Enfield rifle, which would serve in two world wars. The Lee-Metford, although it did not use the more-advanced smokeless powder, produced a superior rate of fire and accuracy than the Martini-Henry and Martini-Enfield rifles. Wolseley influenced many upcoming field commanders in both ‘rings’ – his own as well as that of Roberts, such as Kitchener, Hamilton and Smith-Dorrien – on the importance of rifle firepower, musketry accuracy and covered-position field firing.
Wolseley was a deep and strong proponent of the machine-gun. He had employed both the Gardner and Nordenfeld guns on campaign in various situations with a variety of results. The failure of the Gardner gun at Abu Klea did not deter his enthusiasm for this new weapon system. When the Maxim machine-gun was introduced in 1887 it was Wolseley who became a strong proponent of this weapon. He had spoken on the Maxim at a United Service meeting,
the machine gun [Maxim] will take the place of considerable bodies of men … I believe there is a very great future for [it], and that the general of that nation which knows how to develop or make use of it will in the future have a very great opportunity – an opportunity that has never been made use of by anyone before.46
As has been remarked, ‘Garnet Wolseley, who would die one year before World War One began, was surely astounded by the British lack of interest in machine-guns.’47
Since the new Maxim machine-gun was not hand-crank operated like the previous machine-guns (Gatling, Gardner and Nordenfeld), it provided a much higher rate of fire with less likelihood of jamming since it was belt loaded. The tactical implication of this weapon on the burgeoning colonial battlefields was attracting much interest. Wolseley was also enthusiastic about the new weapon: ‘the fire of this small arm, firing from a fixed carriage [or position] at ascertained ranges of 2000 up to 3000 yards and beyond will be most effective’.48 Wolseley also pushed forward the establishment of a Promotion Board in 1890 for the promotion of officers. Two areas that Wolseley failed in were in the establishment of a new modern drill book and regular large-scale manoeuvres, which were prevalent in continental armies. Th
is posed problems in the future since the commanders at Aldershot and Salisbury had little or no experience in handling troops in sizes above brigade levels. Corps and army level manoeuvres were not even considered and divisional manoeuvres were carried out with a very artificial level of organisation and not indicative of a modern battlefield. This of course would prove very detrimental in 1914.49
The Duke of Cambridge finally retired as Commander in Chief in 1895 but the post was first offered to Buller, who was not a boat-rocker and would not implement much or any reform in the army. This is what the outgoing Duke of Cambridge wanted. When the Liberal government that had nominated Buller resigned, however, the incoming Secretary of State for War, Lord Landsowne, put forth Wolseley’s name for the position to the Queen. There was much debate between the Queen and the government but Victoria finally conceded Wolseley’s appointment. It was feared by the Queen that Wolseley would make many changes and was ‘full of fancies’ and had a ‘clique of his own’. Wolseley found that his position as Commander in Chief was a much-watered down version of what the position had been under Cambridge. This of course troubled Wolseley, who wanted to make some much-needed reforms and changes to the British army. Relations between Buller and Wolseley were quite soured, though this did not reflect any plotting against Wolseley. The new organisation of the Army Board and the various departments now reported directly to the Secretary of State for War. This in many ways circumvented the Commander in Chief’s power to command. Wolseley did not like this at all and endeavoured at every chance to get the departments to report through him. Wolseley also did not allow the various heads to overrule his decision as was originally intended. Wolseley observed the Salisbury manoeuvres in 1898 and made some very poignant commentary on the officers and their errors. As outlined by Wolseley, they employed formations that exposed the men to artillery fire, open order was adopted too early in an engagement and the use of ground was poor. Furthermore the use of machine-guns was lacking since they were employed en masse rather than defensively. Machine-guns were employed like artillery rather than infantry support weapon systems. These shortcomings were proved to be eerie predictions of problems that surfaced a year later in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).50 The men suffered greatly from these errors by regimental officers on the battlefields of Magersfontein and Colenso. Some of the men appointed to command positions in South Africa by Wolseley were dismal failures, such as Sir George White and even Buller did not perform that admirably as commander of forces in South Africa.
Victoria's Generals Page 4