by Bill Fawcett
Carthage gathered an army and called on its remaining major ally, Syphax, and his army and moved to defeat Scipio. But in a night attack, the smaller Roman army and its ally routed and then slaughtered the camped Carthaginians. There was only one response left for the great merchant city that had been fighting Rome for more than a decade. They recalled Hannibal and the last army they had left from Italy.
Hannibal Barca and about 15,000 of his veterans slipped past the Roman fleet and soon were in Carthage. At this point, Scipio made the city a proposal. He was under pressure from an untrusting and jealous Senate and wanted the war over before they could recall him to Rome. So Scipio made the city a very generous offer that would not only have allowed Carthage to keep its merchant fleet, a major source of the city’s wealth, but would also have left it a large degree of independence and even a small fleet of warships. Carthage would not again be a military threat to Rome, but it could remain an economic powerhouse, wealthy from trade and manufacturing.
The city of Carthage was now at war with a Rome that controlled the entire western Mediterranean. They no longer had their main source of soldiers, their manpower was limited, and one of their key allies had changed sides. Even if they defeated Scipio, they would not, and probably could not, win the war. Rome, which had proven amazingly resilient, would simply send another army and then another until they finally won. But the return of Hannibal and his veterans gave the people of Carthage hope. The city’s leaders flatly refused the Roman commander’s offer.
A few days later Hannibal and Scipio’s armies faced each other near Carthage. Hannibal’s army had elephants and his core of veterans. The Roman army had its flexible and well-trained smaller units and superior cavalry.
The Battle of Zama
Hannibal’s Carthaginians were formed into three lines each behind the other. The legions were in long columns made up of maniples, numbering between 100 to 180 men. They lined up not shoulder to shoulder but behind one another in long columns. This was unusual because the legion normally deployed in a checkerboard formation that allowed for maximum maneuverability or in a line to allow the most soldiers to fight for the frontage.
The battle began when Hannibal ordered a charge by the war elephants that were spread all across the Carthaginian front. It was hoped the large beasts would disrupt the Roman formations and scatter its cavalry. But like most animals, these elephants ran along the line of least resistance. Those that were not frightened or driven away by javelins simply hurried down the open spaces between the columns while their riders were fired at from both sides. Worse for the Carthaginians was that the elephants, charging the Roman right, were actually turned around by the noise and pain. Instead of disrupting the Roman cavalry, they slammed into their own Numidian horsemen, who were protecting the Carthaginian left flank. Observing this happen, Massinissa charged his larger cavalry force and infantry against the disorganized Numidian horsemen. The Numidians broke and ran almost immediately. Seeing this, the Roman horsemen on the other side of the battle charged as well. There was a violent melee and then the Carthaginian cavalry abandoned Hannibal’s right flank as well. The Carthaginian flanks were open to attack, but since both Roman forces followed the enemy horses off the field in pursuit, these flank victories did not determine the battle. For a while, the Roman successes simply left the field to the infantry. This was good news for Carthage because they had 45,000 soldiers to Rome’s 34,000.
Hannibal ordered his front line to charge Scipio’s Romans, who, with the threat of elephants gone, had re-formed into a solid front. That first line consisted of mostly Gauls: individually brave but not skilled at fighting in a unit. They smashed into the Romans, and the fighting degenerated into man-to-man combat. They were doing what Hannibal hoped, breaking up the solid Roman front.
For some reason Hannibal’s second line, made up of newly trained Carthaginians, failed to advance and take advantage of the Gauls’ attack. Seeing they were not being supported but were left to die in front of the Romans, the Gauls turned and fled. But the unmoving line of Carthaginians refused to open to let them pass. Needless to say, the Gauls now were sure they had been betrayed and began attacking Hannibal’s second line. The two Carthaginian formations were still fighting when the front of the Roman army, Scipio’s hastati (a class of infantry), slammed into them both. When the second line of Romans, the principes, joined in the fighting, the surviving Gauls and Carthaginians of the second line were both routed.
The retreating Carthaginian second line then ran directly toward the last of Hannibal’s formations. This was a line formed by the veterans who had come back from Italy with him. They knew that if they broke formation to let the fleeing Carthaginians through, the Romans advancing just behind the fugitives would tear their line apart. So, they too held solid against their own retreating soldiers. For a second time, one of Hannibal’s lines fought against the other as the Romans advanced behind it.
By the time Scipio had re-formed and moved his maniples to attack Hannibal’s veterans, the fugitives who had survived from the broken two-thirds of the Carthaginian army had either died or escaped around the edges of the final line. From having a numerical advantage in infantry of four to three, the odds against Hannibal had now changed to a disadvantage of two to one as his 15,000 veterans attempted to defeat more than 30,000 legionnaires. And for a time they held, fighting off twice their number and not even being pushed back. But then the Romans’ two victorious cavalry forces returned to the battlefield. Both slammed into the back of those Carthaginian veterans. Surrounded and outnumbered, the last and best of Hannibal’s army died. Hannibal himself fled into Carthage and then into permanent exile.
Scipio, soon to be known as Africanus in honor of his victory, approached the walls of Carthage, but lacked siege artillery. He could besiege the city, but that would take months and the Senate was likely to call him back anytime. So again he offered terms, though not as generous as those he had been willing to give a few days before. Now Carthage did not have a single army left. The oligarchy that ruled Carthage had no real choice but to accept. Among these terms was the provision that Carthage could never again wage war without the Roman Senate’s permission. The peace agreement guaranteed that the city survived but also ensured Carthage could not rise again to greatness or be a threat to Rome. They ignored a basic rule of diplomacy that is all too often ignored: If you have everything to lose and winning will not win the war, accept any peace you can get.
Having lost two wars to Rome, the merchant princes of Carthage should have known better. But less than fifty years later, the city hired another army of mercenaries and attacked a Roman ally in Africa—an ally that they felt had betrayed the city. Rome’s reaction was not only to conquer the city but effectively to eliminate it. Although it was one of the most successful merchant cities in history, Carthage never seemed to realize that it had a good deal when it really mattered.
Had Carthage survived as a major economic presence in the Mediterranean, the city might well have slowed or changed the expansion of Rome. Certainly its mercantile philosophy and family-centered social structure would have been more present in today’s Western culture as opposed to the patriotic and state-centered ideal that we have all inherited from Rome.
11
PERSONAL AMBITION
Political Suicide
133 BCE
Tiberius Gracchus was born with just about as noble a pedigree as a Roman could. The Gracchi were an old and wealthy family. His grandfather was Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, the Punic War hero who finally defeated Hannibal Barca. He was married to another blue-blooded noble, Aemilia Pulcher, and the future looked good for young Tiberius Gracchus.
In 137 BCE, the young noble was appointed quaester, chief quartermaster and financial officer, for his brother-in-law, Scipio Aemilianus, in a campaign in Hispania (Spain). The war did not go well, and the entire Roman army was trapped. With his brother-in-law dead, Tiberius took charge and managed to negotiate a peace treat
y with the local tribes that saved the lives of thousands of skilled Roman legionnaires. But rather than praising his efforts, many Senators condemned Gracchus, and the body even voted to nullify the treaty. It was the beginning of a battle between Gracchus and the Roman Senate that changed, and damaged, the empire forever.
Feeling alienated from the nobles who controlled Rome’s Senate, Tiberius Gracchus turned to the common people. What he saw angered him. For years the noble families had been grabbing up all the small farms. Often these were the farms of soldiers who were serving in the empire’s wars of conquest. With no male to work the land, many went into debt or were unable to pay the rising taxes. Then the farms were snatched up by the nobles, many of them Senators, and the people became slave labor to work the estates. This meant that when a soldier returned from the wars he would likely find himself and his family homeless and destitute. These penniless and unemployed former soldiers then flocked into the cities, especially Rome, hoping for work.
So in 133 BCE, a bitter and idealistic Tiberius Gracchus campaigned for and was elected to one of the two positions of tribune of the people. It was his job to represent the needs of the people to the Senate. He immediately began agitating for land reform. He tried to limit the amount of land any one person or family could hold. The attempt failed since there was simply no one to tell the Senators they could not acquire more land for themselves. He then called for all newly captured lands and any confiscated lands to be divided up between the former farmers. This, he explained, would both provide a living for the urban poor and create a pool of landowning farmers who could serve in the legions. It was a good idea, for the farmers and Rome, but not for the rich families controlling the empire.
The Senate refused to act on the proposed laws. On a personal level, the enmity between Gracchus, who constantly harangued for the lower classes in Rome and stirred them up, and the Senators, who benefited from the status quo, became vicious. When the Senators managed to pressure the other people’s tribune, Marcus Octavius, into vetoing the land reforms, Gracchus first forced his fellow tribune out of office, illegally, in most scholars’ opinions. Then he used his power, as the person who officially opened the temples and markets, to shut down the city. With what was effectively a strike supported by the people, Rome ground to a halt. Vital services were not maintained, and the food supply dwindled. Riots threatened, and the masses were angry.
The Senate reluctantly accepted the changes in the land laws and appointed an Agrarian Reform Commission to implement the new laws. Then they gave that commission a budget so low it could not actually do anything. It seemed a beautifully bureaucratic way to kill changes that would cost the Senator’s families a fortune. That ploy worked for a while until one of the client kings, Attalus III of Pergamum, died and left his kingdom and large personal fortune to Rome. Forcing leaders to do this was one of the main ways the empire took direct control of an area without having to conquer it. It was not an unusual bequest, but then Gracchus hijacked it. Against all law and precedent, because he felt the greater good required it, the tribune used Attalus’ fortune to implement his land reforms. The real problem for the Senate was not the loss of land or the illegal actions of the remaining tribune. What frightened them was that Gracchus then had a large and fanatic following among the common people. He had enough of a following to gain more control of the city of Rome than the Senators. Furthermore, he continued ranting against the Senate, declaring that it was acting only in self-interest.
There was a very real chance that Tiberius Gracchus could use the mobs of Rome combined with the reluctance of the legions to intervene against their fellow citizens to make himself dictator. Effectively, he already controlled most of the city through the mobs. Soon rumors were heard of Gracchus being seen wearing purple robes, such as the old kings had worn before the Senate replaced them. But the Senate had found a way to deal with the upstart tribune within the system. He had clearly broken the law in driving out Octavius so he could override the veto of the land reforms. As Gracchus’ one-year term as tribune (yes, just one year; he had been busy) ended, the young populist announced he planned to run for reelection. This was an unusual but not unprecedented event.
Soon, with the election in full swing and Gracchus appearing before large crowds all over Rome, his trial in the Senate began. The tribune began promising the crowds much more radical changes. These included shortening the time men needed to serve in the legions in order to get the free land; allowing common people, not just the Senators, to serve as jurors in major cases; and opening Roman citizenship to allied peoples who served in the legions or otherwise aided Rome. These ideas may not seem radical today, but when combined with the threat to the power of the Senate he already represented, this was truly radical stuff and a direct threat to their power and wealth.
On the day Rome voted, feelings were at a fever pitch as the trial continued. In the street in front of the Senate, a threatening crowd grew. Soldiers were called in. The trial became more of a series of threats and counterthreats, with tempers running high. Finally, dozens of Senators came off their benches and literally beat Tiberius Gracchus to death with the legs of their chairs. The Roman Senate was made up of some very tough men, and you can see they were willing to kill to protect themselves and their power. This was something Julius Caesar should have been aware of a century later when he usurped their power, but that was another mistake and not just his. The tribune’s body was thrown into the Tiber to prevent any embarrassing funeral, and the crowd in front of the Senate Building was violently dispersed by the army.
When word of Gracchus’ murder spread through Rome, many parts of the city rioted. In an ironic attempt to protect themselves, the Senate quickly approved almost all of Gracchus’ reforms. This helped to quell the riots and restore their support among the population. The mistake of murdering the populist leader effectively forced the Roman Senate to concede to everything the tribune had demanded. Because of these changes, power in Rome gradually shifted from the noble families to the masses and the army. The people who lived in Rome began to learn that they were more powerful than the Senators who ran their government, and the army learned that they could control who among different factions controlled the Senate. Because of Gracchus’ willingness to ignore the laws, combined with the Senator’s greed and then fear, Rome did not have a truly stable government for almost a century. And that century ended in the civil wars. In 49 BCE, Gaius Julius Caesar used the support of the mobs and his legions to take complete control of all of Rome, and the power of the Senate was lost forever.
12
PLAYING TO THE ENEMY’S STRENGTHS
Trapped in Alesia
52 BCE
The Battle of Alesia in 52 BCE was the final conflict that determined whether the Roman or the Celtic way of life would dominate northern Europe. It was the culmination of the five-year conquest of Gaul (France, Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg) by Gaius Julius Caesar. The entire war and Julius Caesar’s intelligence and courage were made famous even as it was fought by that brilliant bit of self-serving propaganda, Caesar’s Gallic Wars.
In 60 BCE, three men agreed to share control of Rome. These were Crassus, Pompey, and Julius Caesar. While theoretically equals, each strove to be the first among equals. Crassus was very rich. Yes, the old phrase “rich as Crassus” refers to him. Crassus had also proven himself a competent general by defeating Spartacus and his slave rebellion. Pompey also was a proven general, having won a number of victories in the name of Rome. The younger Julius Caesar had the greatest need to prove himself and the most to gain.
So Crassus went off to Syria, where he managed to get himself killed while losing two entire legions to the Parthians. Pompey mostly stayed in Rome. He was already rich with the spoils of his earlier victories and had a great reputation. Caesar saw where the greatest opportunity was and chose to take over the province known as Transalpine Gaul. This was really the most northern parts of Italy and much of the south coast of France. This p
rovince gave him a base from which he could conquer the rich lands of the Gallic tribes.
From 58 BCE until Alesia, Julius Caesar defeated one Gallic tribe after another. While not happy about the situation, no one tribe or local alliance could stand against his army of more than 50,000 highly trained legionnaires. It wasn’t until Julius Caesar was in northern Italy dealing with Roman politics that all the Gauls found themselves a leader. This was the charismatic and often brilliant Vercingetorix.
Through strong oratory and good politics, Vercingetorix managed to get almost all the tribes in Gaul to swear to follow him into rebellion. That summer, the Gallic leader put tens of thousands of his warriors through a regimen of training. Then in the late fall, he led his army against the Roman garrison at Orleans (then called Cenabum). The city fell, thousands of Romans were killed, and Caesar suddenly had a major problem. His political strength came from being the conqueror of Gaul, and Gaul was looking very unconquered. To make things worse, Vercingetorix was a very good general, and he had chosen Orleans because the city was the main Roman grain storehouse. His army was now living off the Roman army’s supplies, and Caesar’s legions could expect short rations without them. In fact, Vercingetorix used food as a weapon throughout his rebellion, often effectively using scorched earth tactics against Caesar. Ironically, starvation would ultimately cause his surrender.
Caesar rushed back to Gaul and united the legions that had been spread out in winter quarters. For the rest of the winter, Caesar either chased Vercingetorix or captured the cities that were in rebellion. After capturing Loire, today’s Paris, the Roman army turned toward the richest city still controlled by the rebelling tribes, Provence. Vercingetorix correctly guessed Caesar’s intentions, but the mistake he made was in how he reacted, and that reaction was what lost the war.