by Bill Fawcett
So Nelson had lost sight of Napoleon’s army and protecting ships. But he knew that he had to find them. Everyone was in a panic as to what the already famous French general might do. Nelson got new orders and information from Gibraltar, but they were of no help. The orders made it clear that no one in England or Gibraltar had any better idea where Napoleon was going than Nelson did. The French fleet had vanished, and when it reappeared the cost to the British was likely to be high. Nelson’s orders were for him to search the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, Greek waters, and even the Black Sea as needed. They also warned that the French could be planning to invade Ireland, or maybe grab Gibraltar, or Naples, or Sicily, or Malta. It is interesting that the list in his orders did not include Egypt, a tribute to the disinformation being put out by the French. So basically Admiral Nelson’s orders read “look somewhere” but gave him no idea where to look.
By the time the British were repaired and ready to sail again as a fleet, ten days had passed. That meant the French could be as much as 300 miles away in about any direction. With no hard information on Napoleon’s whereabouts, Nelson chose one of the possible invasion targets. He sailed for the port city of Naples. The Italian city had two advantages. It was a friendly port, one of the few, so supplies and more repairs were available. And there was a good chance that the British ambassador to that kingdom, Lord William Hamilton, might have obtained, from the many merchants who used the port, some idea of where the French fleet was.
Strangely, considering all the disinformation being spread by the French, France’s ambassador in Naples had told the British ambassador that Napoleon’s eventual destination was Egypt. But Lord Hamilton was unable to separate that nugget of truth from the many lies purposely spread by French agents, and so he put no faith in it. Instead he made his own best guess. When they sailed into Naples, Hamilton told Nelson’s captains that he thought Napoleon’s immediate destination was Malta.
On June 20, a month after the French had been lost, while sailing from Naples toward Malta Nelson’s ships were met by the British consul from Messina as the fleet passed through the straits named for that city. The consul carried the news that Napoleon had indeed gone to Malta and the island had surrendered to his overwhelming force on June 9. It was too late to save Malta and probably too late to stop the French from sailing on.
So far, fate had intervened in Napoleon’s favor. He would have approved of his luck, having once stated he always preferred a lucky general to a competent one. But once Horatio Nelson arrived at Malta on June 22, the French general didn’t need luck anymore. From that point on, Nelson’s own actions became the main cause of his own failure. While in Malta, Admiral Nelson was told that Napoleon had sailed away on the fifteenth or sixteenth. This meant the French again had almost a week’s head start and could be hundreds of miles away in any direction. Actually, there was some confusion, likely due to translation, and the French had sailed less than two days earlier. But because of his incorrect assumption that the invasion fleet was at least a six days’ sail away, Nelson ignored a report of four strange ships just to the southeast of Malta. These were actually four frigates that were trailing at the rear of the French fleet. Napoleon was just tens of miles away, not hundreds.
Nelson did not want to wait the few days that it would have taken to check out that report or order the entire fleet after the “strange ships.” If they proved to be nothing, he would be even farther behind Napoleon. Having decided that if Napoleon’s target had been relatively nearby Sicily, he would have heard of its fall by then, he correctly guessed Egypt had to be the target. The British fleet rushed south, making best speed to Alexandria harbor. In fact, Nelson was in so much of a hurry to get to Alexandria, he did not deploy the fleet in a wide line that would sweep the ocean as they sailed. He kept his ships together as this allowed them all to make greater speed.
Had the French actually had a six-day lead, everything Nelson did would have been correct. In fact, he would have probably arrived in Alexandria at just the right time. The problem was that the French fleet had really left Malta on June 19, not the sixteenth. The French fleet was also much slower moving. This is because the slow transports, full of soldiers, were by necessity setting the pace. So the French not only had left for Egypt later than the British thought, but were traveling at a much slower speed as well. Had Nelson made more inquiries, he might have found out the correct date for when the French had sailed. But fearing the worst, he rushed southeast to Alexandria (the main port of Egypt) so quickly, he never knew of the mistake.
Being able to sail toward Egypt much faster than the encumbered French fleet, Nelson actually passed that fleet on the way. He sailed past within a few dozen miles of the French without seeing them and arrived before they did. The British found the harbor at Alexandria empty. Had Nelson guessed wrong? He had to wonder. Napoleon could have landed anywhere and be wreaking real havoc on the few allies remaining in the area or could he have sailed off to Ireland? There could be dispatches on a sloop from London now blaming the admiral for the loss of Ireland or the capture of Gibraltar. Sitting in the empty harbor, Nelson’s anxiety caused him to make the blunder that changed history. If he had just waited three days at the location he had correctly determined to be Napoleon’s target, the British fleet would have been waiting when the highly vulnerable transports and their escorts arrived. The slaughter would have likely been terrible, and even if Napoleon himself survived, his invasion of Egypt would have been stopped before it was started. Without at least the illusion of that conquest, when Napoleon had returned to Paris, he would have come back as a failure and not a conquering hero worshiped by the masses. It is then likely his own coup and takeover of the government would have failed or never have been risked. There would have been no First Consul Napoleon and certainly not an Emperor Napoleon. Without the military genius of Napoleon, there would have been no war to conquer all of Europe. Peace might even have broken out as the French government by necessity moderated and the monarchies learned to live with it.
But Nelson could not sit still. After weeks of scuttling across the Mediterranean, he just kept going. Perhaps he lost confidence in his judgment that Egypt was the French’s target. For whatever reason, on June 30, within hours of arriving, the British left Alexandria to sail up the coast of Syria (which included Palestine at this time). Twenty-five hours later, the French did arrive in Alexandria and instead of facing the Royal Navy, they met no real resistance. This allowed the entire army to be landed near the city. Nelson spent the next month frantically searching port after port for the French fleet. It was not until August first that he returned to Alexandria and found it.
In one of his most brilliant battles, Admiral Horatio Nelson crushed the anchored French defenders in Aboukir Bay. Only two of the French ships of the line and a few smaller vessels escaped destruction or capture. But Napoleon and his army were long gone. Ten days earlier, on July 21, Napoleon’s army had destroyed the Mameluke cavalry army in the Battle of the Pyramids. After that victory, he had effectively conquered Egypt. With no fleet or reinforcements, the French were unable to hold Egypt. But a year later, in July 1799, Napoleon slipped back to France on a single frigate. Having carefully managed the news that reached Paris, he returned as a hero. In the coup d’état on 18 Brumaire (that is, November 9, 1799), Napoleon took control of the French government. It wasn’t until after the Battle of Waterloo, sixteen years later, that Europe again knew any real peace.
Admiral Nelson correctly deduced the target of Napoleon’s invasion and had actually beaten the French to Alexandria. But unable to just sit and wait, he then led the British fleet off on a monthlong search for a French fleet that arrived in the same city just twenty-five hours after Nelson left. It was a mistake that eventually made Napoleon the emperor of France and set the stage for sixteen years of war.
44
TUNNEL VISION
A Battle of
Three Emperors
1805
In military histo
ry, few commanders have played as skillfully as the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, who manipulated both Emperor Francis II of Austria and Czar Alexander I of Russia at the Battle of Austerlitz.
In the months before the three emperors fought, the French had won battle after battle. Napoleon’s army had even occupied the Austrian capital of Vienna. But now, despite the French general’s maneuvering, two large Austrian and Russian armies had managed to unite. Napoleon’s position was less than ideal. He was far from anywhere friendly at the end of long supply lines. His army was too deep into Austria to be able to pull back safely. One defeat, and the entire French army would be lost. Napoleon Bonaparte knew he was in a dangerous position. He was also aware that the two emperors opposing him knew this as well. In fact he was counting on it.
On December 2, Napoleon began a plan that took advantage of the two emperors’ overconfidence. He not only had to win but also needed the battle to start soon. There was a good chance the Prussians would join the coalition against him within days. Only a decisive victory could keep them out of the war. The first step was to send his personal aide, a gentleman with the improbable name of Anne Jean Marie René Savary, to negotiate an armistice. While doing so, this officer carefully let it slip that the French morale was so bad that some of the army was unwilling to attack. This deception was supported by the allies’ being able to see that the French soldiers had begun to build field defenses and were all digging in. Then, just to guarantee that the Russians and Austrians were sure the French soldiers were on their last legs, Napoleon conceded the highest and central position of the battlefield, the Pratzen Heights, to the allies as well. All this just whetted the appetite of his opponents to destroy the seemingly vulnerable invaders.
So far as the allies could see, they had 85,000 soldiers to 65,000 for the French. They held the heights that overlooked the whole battlefield, and they were sure that their enemy’s morale was failing. All of the allied commanders were anxious to get on the attack and finish them off. The Austrian empire had recently been beaten in battle, had their capital captured, and been chased out of Italy. The normally cautious Austrians were more than anxious to even the score.
On the battlefield, Napoleon had set out irresistible bait. He had purposely weakened his right flank. Less than a corps was holding the right side of its position. This was the flank that protected the roads that led back to Vienna and then on to France. The emperors and their generals knew that if they could break through that thin line of defenders facing the left end of their army, it would force the surrender of the entire French army.
What the allies did not know was that Louis-Nicolas Davout, perhaps Napoleon’s best marshal, was fast marching his entire corps toward that flank. But this was not entirely a sucker move: If the allies could smash through Soult’s corps on the French right, then they could win the battle. Even the arrival of Davout would not repair the damage.
The Russian prince Bagration led a valiant attack on the French left in an effort to ensure no one there could go to assist the vulnerable French right. At the same time, massive columns of Austrians attacked on the far side of the battlefield. Badly outnumbered, the men of Legrand’s division held the French right valiantly. Fighting behind barricades, they drove off charge after charge with musket volleys. The sheer number of attacking Austrians pushed them back, but it still did not yet break their line. Many times it appeared that a few more regiments were all that was needed for the allies to break through. Soon all the reserves behind the main attack were used up. But victory seemed so close that the allied commanders began to send in men who had been holding the Pratzen Heights.
As desired, all of the allied commanders had fixed their attention on the weak French flank. None noticed that Bonaparte was feeding just enough new men into the thin, slowly retreating line to maintain it. More and more troops attacked. More and more moved off the central position to join in the attack on their left. In the French center, two corps sat.
On the allied right, Bagration and the French had fought each other to a standstill. On their left, it still appeared that just one more attack, a few more regiments, and the allies would have their victory. So more men were ordered off the central heights and joined the attack. And still the French soldiers in front of the Pratzen Heights just sat and did nothing. This most likely proved to the Russian and Austrian emperors that the French morale had failed. Although that wouldn’t have explained the dogged defense they were facing nearby. But confident there was no threat, more Russian and Austrian regiments moved off the heights. Still, the thin French line barely held on, always barely, but it held. It appeared they were ready to collapse under the weight of just one more assault. Between the fighting on both flanks, virtually all of the remaining allied divisions that had been on the Pratzen Heights since 9:00 AM were then marching up to behind the right side of the French line, where Soult’s corps was still holding on against overwhelming numbers.
Victory for the Austrians and Russians seemed so close and to them everything seemed to be going almost according to their plan. But in reality the battle was going exactly as Napoleon had devised from the beginning. Then it was time. Suddenly Bonaparte unleashed his fresh divisions against the few troops remaining on the Pratzen Heights. They easily smashed the center of the allies’ position. The combined Austrian and Russian army had been split. At the same time, Marshal Murat led the reserve cavalry against Bagration’s horsemen, while the French infantry joined in to force the Russian prince’s entire command away from the rest of the allied army.
The emperors of Russia and Austria and their generals had lost sight of what they were doing. By concentrating on accomplishing their original goal of breaking through the French right, they forgot the reason they wanted to do this was to win the battle. Trying too hard to win that tactical victory, they lost the battle. With virtually all of their men committed to attacking on the one flank, the Austrian and Russian generals had almost no one left to counterattack the French when they cut the joint army in half. The Russians threw what they could find at the French until they finally used their last reserve with no success. Finally, even the Russian Imperial Guard attacked in a glorious but doomed attempt to retake the heights. Then French cavalry rode that noble infantry unit down, and the battle was lost.
More French infantry went up the heights and then turned right. They took the same paths that the allied regiments had used to reinforce their attack. Coming down the heights, Napoleon’s infantry tore into the vulnerable side and rear of the allied regiments that were still attacking the French flank. The entire allied line was “rolled up,” even while the newly arrived Davout attacked through Soult’s exhausted defenders. Within minutes, two-thirds of the allied army was routed. Bagration, seeing all was lost, managed to make a fighting retreat while Napoleon concentrated on the destruction of the thousands of panicky allied soldiers.
French casualties were under 7,000 killed and wounded with few captured. The Austrian and Russian armies had 15,000 killed and wounded and another 12,000 captured. The French also captured 180 cannons. Many of those who did escape were in no condition to fight again anytime soon. The Russian army did not stop its withdrawal until it was all the way back in Russia. The Austrian army was in worse shape and had nowhere to go. Peace, on Napoleon’s terms, followed within weeks.
“Soldiers! I am content with you,” the emperor stated in his Victory Bulletin. To show just how grateful he was, Napoleon personally adopted the children of every French soldier killed at Austerlitz. This included providing them with schools, homes, and the money to support them.
The allied army commanded by the two emperors started the battle with superior numbers and a strong position on the central heights. But they allowed themselves to be duped and led by Napoleon into doing what he wanted. The result of their mistake was a triumphant Napoleon Bonaparte able to rampage through Europe for another decade. The French emperor had taken a great chance. Had he lost this battle while so deep inside Aus
tria, there is no question Napoleon would have become a prisoner and likely been executed. The Grande Armée would have been destroyed. But two emperors, and all of their generals, danced to a French tune at Austerlitz. It took another ten years and hundreds of thousands of deaths before Napoleon did meet his Waterloo.
45 and 46
NOT LEARNING FROM HISTORY
Two Centuries and
Two Mistakes
1812 AND 1941
It is not impossible to successfully invade Russia, just really hard. This was accomplished many times in history. The Vikings did it, and they became the local lords. Later the Mongols invaded and controlled Russia for more than two centuries. It can be done, but in the last two centuries, two of the world’s greatest conquerors have tried and failed. What there is to note here are the many similarities shared by the two invasions set more than a century apart: invasions staged by Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolf Hitler.
Both Napoleon and Hitler had been elected first, taking absolute power once in office.
Both invasions came while also at war with Britain. France had been at war with Britain for more than a decade when the Grande Armée entered Russia. Germany had failed to break the RAF in the summer of 1940 and invaded a year later.