To many soldiers it seemed that the fruits of these victories were wasted by their high command (coincidentally full of ‘German’ officers) and Russian soil was being surrendered to the enemy without a fight. Bagration certainly echoed the opinion of many when he wrote to Barclay de Tolly:
With our armies finally uniting, we accomplished the goal set by our Emperor [Alexander]. With so many experienced troops gathered together, we now enjoy a superiority, which [Napoleon] tried to exploit while we were separated. Now, our goal must be to attack the [French] centre and defeat it while [the French] forces are scattered […] We would seize our destiny with one blow […] The entire Army and all of Russia demand [attack].21
Conceding to public pressure, Barclay de Tolly called a council of war on 6 August. The council agreed to an attack and next day the Russian armies advanced westward in three columns on a 20-mile front. The weather was dry and the advance rapid. Yermolov recalled that the soldiers were in high spirits because: ‘the order to attack was finally given and it [was] impossible to describe the joy of our troops! Smolensk watched in bewilderment at our forces’ eagerness to fight; the Dnieper vociferously flowed, proud of the orderly movement of our troops!’
But the advance also revealed an ongoing disagreement between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly. One day after the offensive began Barclay de Tolly received news, later proved incorrect, that the French were advancing towards Porechye, north of Smolensk. Fearing Napoleon would turn his right lank, Barclay de Tolly ordered his troops to veer to the right to cover the Porechye–Smolensk route. Bagration opposed the change in direction of the 1st Western Army’s advance, since he anticipated Napoleon’s actual attack on the left flank.22
Barclay de Tolly ignored Bagration’s pleas and remained on the Porechye route, awaiting new intelligence. His order to Platov (leader or Ataman of the Don Cossacks) to halt did not reach him in time, and acting under original instructions, Platov continued his march north-west, making a sudden attack on General Sébastiani’s division near Inkovo (Molevo Boloto). Instead of trying to exploit this initial success by mounting a major attack in this direction (as envisaged by the council of war), Barclay de Tolly remained idle on the Porechye route, still believing that the main threat to Smolensk lay from the north. A Russian general complained:
Instead of rapid movement that would have secured our success, the armies were given a useless rest and the enemy gained additional time to concentrate his forces! […] Circumstances still favoured us and had our Commander-in-Chief showed more firmness in his intentions [we would have succeeded]. Of course, the defeat at [Inkovo] awakened the French, but they were about to suffer from further attacks and had no time to avoid them. Yet, the Commander-in-Chief not only evaded executing the adopted plan but completely changed it.23
This was a decisive blow to the Russian counter-offensive. The Russian armies remained inactive for days as Barclay de Tolly dithered, thus alerting Napoleon to Russian intentions and permitting him to prepare his troops accordingly. Finally, on 12 August, Barclay de Tolly learned that his intelligence regarding a French concentration at Porechye was incorrect and that Napoleon had assembled his army at Babinovichi, on the Dnieper, threatening the left lank of the Russian Army, as Bagration had anticipated days before. He responded by withdrawing his troops from the Porechye road to the Rudnya route on 13 August. The Russian troops reacted bitterly: the soldiers were grumbling and, after marching several times through the village of Shelomets, they called Barclay’s manoeuvres ‘oshelomelii’ or ‘dumbfounding’.24
The sudden cancellation of the planned attack, lack of information on Barclay de Tolly’s plans, constant changes in orders and delayed manoeuvres aroused feelings of dismay in many Russian officers, and in Bagration above all. He clearly saw the threat to the Russian left lank but could not convince Barclay de Tolly to believe him. He complained:
I still believe that there are no enemy forces [in the direction of Porechye] […] I would be glad to coordinate my actions with [the 1st Western Army] but [Barclay de Tolly] is making twenty changes in a minute. For God’s sake, please do not change the strategy every minute; [we] must have some kind of system to act upon.25
Russian senior officers who disliked Barclay de Tolly before now openly despised him. Conspiracy theories lourished in this fertile ground: especially after the Russians, searching Sébastiani’s headquarters at Molevo Boloto, found a message from Marshal Murat describing the Russian offensive. Could it be that someone at Barclay de Tolly’s headquarters had notiied the enemy about the counter-offensive? On 12 August, Pavel Pushin of the Semeyonovskii Life Guard Regiment noted in his diary:
A few days ago, General Sébastiani’s personal papers were captured. Notes were found in his portfolio that contained numbers, places and day-by-day movement of our corps. Rumours have it that, as a result, all suspicious persons were removed from headquarters, including Flügel Adjutants and Counts …
Not surprisingly, all of these persons were non-Russians, mostly Poles. It later transpired that the Polish Prince Lubomirski, one of the adjutants, accidentally overheard several generals discussing Russian offensive plans in the street and had sent a message to his mother, urging her to lee the coming bloodshed. Murat – who was billeted at Lubomirski’s family home – had intercepted this letter. Another incident further increased Russian suspicions against the Poles in particular. As the troops marched back and forth between Prikaz Vydra and Shelomets, some soldiers noticed:
a woman following our columns and, when asked, she always replied that she was with General Lavrov. Everyone was satisfied with her answer until one joker decided to flirt with her and, in a moment of passion, tore off her hat, which revealed a male head underneath. It appeared that he was a spy; he was [arrested] and sent to headquarters.26
14–19 August: Napoleon Strikes Back – The Battles of Krasnyi, Smolensk and Lubino
Russian hesitation gave Napoleon enough time to adjust his plans. His first reaction to news of the action at Inkovo had been to suspend preparations for the drive on Smolensk, followed by an order to concentrate the Grand Army around Lyosno, in order to meet the Russians. But by 10 August Barclay de Tolly’s indecision convinced Napoleon that the Russian offensive presented no significant threat. Meanwhile, an opportunity to deal the enemy a decisive blow had presented itself.
Napoleon’s manoeuvre on Smolensk was a masterpiece. He concentrated his corps on a narrow front between Orsha and Rosasna on the northern bank of the Dnieper; then, under cover of a heavy cavalry screen, the Grand Army crossed to the southern bank. Napoleon’s plan was to advance eastwards along the left bank, taking Smolensk while the Russians were preoccupied with the northern approaches.
1. Emperor Alexander I (1777–1825).
2. Mikhail Illarionovich Golenischev-Kutuzov (1745–1813), commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.
3. General Barclay de Tolly (1761–1818), commander of the 1st Western Army.
4. Count Bennigsen (1735–1826), Kutuzov’s Chief of Staff.
5. General Prince Bagration (1765–1812), commander of the 2nd Western Army
6. Lieutenant General Baggovut (1761–1812), commander of Kutuzov’s II Infantry Corps.
7. Lieutenant General Tuchkov (1765–1812), commander of Kutuzov’s III Infantry Corps.
8. Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy (1771–1857), commander of Kutuzov’s IV Infantry Corps.
9. General Dokhturov (1790–1863), commander of Kutuzov’s VI Infantry Corps.
10. Lieutenant General Uvarov (1773–1824), commander of Kutuzov’s I Reserve Cavalry Corps.
11. Major General Korf (1773–1823), commander of Kutuzov’s II & III Reserve Cavalry Corps.
12. General Platov (1753–1818), ‘Ataman’ of Kutuzov’s Cossack Irregular Cavalry
13. General Golitsyn (1771–1844), Cavalry commander of the 2nd Western Army.
14. Lieutenant General Rayevsky (1771–1829), commander of Kutuzov’s VII Infantry Corps.
1
5. Major General Vorontsov (1782–1856), commander of Kutuzov’s 2nd Combined Grenadier Division.
16. Major General Sievers (1772–1856), commander of Kutuzov’s IV Reserve Cavalry Corps.
17. Major General Karpov (1762–1837), commander of the 2nd Western Army’s Irregular Troops.
18. General Löwenstern (1777–1858), Barclay de Tolly’s Adjutant.
19. Emperor Napoleon I (1769–1821).
20. Marshal Berthier (1753–1815), Napoleon’s Chief of Staff.
21. Armand de Caulaincourt (1773–1827), Napoleon’s Grand Equerry.
22. General Auguste de Caulaincourt (1777–1812), killed in the changes against Rayevsky’s Redoubt.
23. General Louis-Pierre Montbrun (1770–1812), commander of Napoleon’s II Cavalry Corps.
24. Marshal Bessières (1768–1813), commander of Napoleon’s Guard Cavalry.
25. Marshal Davout (1770–1823), commander of Napoleon’s I Corps.
26. Marshal Ney (1769–1815), commander of Napoleon’s III Corps.
27. Prince Poniatowski (1763–1813), commander of Napoleon’s V Corps.
28. General Junot (1771–1813), commander of Napoleon’s VIII Corps.
29. Marshal Murat (1767–1815), commander of Napoleon’s Reserve Cavalry Corps.
30. General Nansouty (1768–1815), commander of Napoleon’s I Cavalry Corps.
31. General Grouchy (1766–1847), commander of Napoleon’s III Cavalry Corps.
32. General Latour-Maubourg (1768–1850), commander of Napoleon’s IV Cavalry Corps.
By daylight on 14 August almost the entire Grand Army was across the Dnieper and advancing on Smolensk. However, Napoleon’s plan was thwarted by a small Russian detachment led by General Neverovsky, which Bagration had deployed at Krasnyi to watch for any potential flanking manoeuvres. Neverovsky’s troops made a successful fighting retreat to Smolensk, ‘retreating like lions’ as one French officer described it. Their exploits enthralled the Russian Army, and future guerrilla leader Denis Davidov reflected what many felt at the time: ‘I remember how we looked at this division, as it approached us in midst of smoke and dust. Each bayonet shone with an immortal glory.’
Without Neverovky’s staunch resistance at Krasnyi, the French might well have reached Smolensk by the evening of the 14 August and taken the city, cutting the Russian line of retreat. However, as a result of this action, Napoleon decided to halt his advance for a day in order to regroup his forces, missing his chance of taking Smolensk by surprise.
Hearing of Napoleon’s flanking attack, both Russian armies rushed back to Smolensk. On 15–16 August the Russians repulsed French assaults on Smolensk but were nonetheless forced to abandon the city. Smolensk was almost completely destroyed and of 2,250 buildings only 350 remained intact. Meanwhile, of the city’s 15,000 inhabitants only 1,000 remained in its smoking, smouldering wreck. The Russians lost about 10,000 men in the two-day battle. French losses reached a similar figure, though Russian sources often claim as many as 20,000 French casualties.
As the Russians withdrew to Moscow, Napoleon attempted to cut their line of retreat but at the Battle of Valutina Gora (Lubino) on 19 August Barclay de Tolly’s army succeeded in clearing its way to Dorogobuzh. Once again the fighting proved bloody, this battle claiming over 7,000 French and around 6,000 Russian casualties.
20–29 August: The Retreat Continues
As the retreat continued, Barclay de Tolly concentrated his troops at Soloveyovo, crossing on four bridges to the left bank of the Dnieper. His army was now deployed at Umolye, while Bagration gathered his forces between Mikhailovsky and Novoselok. On the 21st, the 2nd Western Army proceeded to Dorogobuzh while Barclay de Tolly remained at Umolye until late evening, beginning his movement towards Usvyatye around 9pm by crossing the River Uzha. The French tried to cross the river in his wake but the Russians fought a successful rearguard action at Pnevo Boloto, destroying the bridges. This temporarily reduced the pressure on Barclay de Tolly, who realized a battle would have to be fought before moving much closer to Moscow. He instructed several officers, including Quartermaster-General Colonel Toll, to seek advantageous terrain for battle. As a result, two positions were found: one at Usvyatye, on the River Uzha, and the other at Tsarevo-Zaimische, near Vyazma.
On 21 August Barclay de Tolly and Bagration – accompanied by Grand Duke Constantine (Alexander’s brother), Toll, and various aides-de-camp – met at Usvyatye to inspect the site. Barclay de Tolly initially favoured the position but changed his mind when Bagration, among others, found it faulty on several counts: including an unprotected left lank, and the fact that it was overlooked by a range of heights where the enemy might site his batteries. Bagration then suggested another site near Dorogobuzh.27 But Toll arrogantly defended the position he had selected, going so far as to insult Barclay de Tolly, who refrained from an angry reply. Bagration, however, resented Toll’s insolence and defended Barclay de Tolly, censoring the young Quartermaster-General.28
On 24 August the 1st and 2nd Western Armies halted at Dorogobuzh, while their top brass spent the morning surveying positions that also proved to be unacceptable. Returning from a reconnaissance the Commanders discovered that the troops were so poorly deployed by Toll that: ‘the 1st Army’s front, facing the Dnieper, was perpendicular to the enemy’s front and its reserves were arranged with their rear facing the enemy.’ General Yermolov later remarked: ‘This fact was immediately concealed! Bagration insisted on punishing [Toll], who deployed the Army with its rear facing the French […] and he requested reducing him in rank for this unjustifiable blunder.’ Barclay de Tolly quipped that: ‘Toll must be either a traitor or madman for mishandling this task.’ And yet, a favourite of Mikhail Kutuzov (hero of recent Russo-Turkish clashes along the Danube and future Commander-in-Chief), Toll would avoid punishment.
Next morning the Russians left Dorogobuzh and retreated to Vyazma, where they found a strong position at Tsarevo-Zaimische. Although Bagration still was not completely satisfied with the terrain, he agreed with Barclay de Tolly that no better position could be found at a safe distance from Moscow.29
Nevertheless, the failure of the Russian counter-offensive at Smolensk and the subsequent surrender of the city led to a rapid deterioration in relations between the two Russian commanders. Anti-Barclay sentiments also increased among senior officers, who intrigued behind the Commander-in-Chief’s back. These generals not only demanded a change in strategy but also Barclay de Tolly’s dismissal, threatening to disobey orders if they didn’t get their way. This alarming development has been described by one Russian historian as ‘the Mutiny of Generals’.30 Thus, Dokhturov considered Barclay de Tolly a ‘stupid and loathsome person’, while Platov reportedly told Barclay de Tolly: ‘As you see, I wear only a cloak. I will no longer put on a Emperor, requesting that Barclay de Tolly be replaced by Bagration.
Unaware of Yermolov’s initiative, Bagration continued to obey Barclay de Tolly’s orders, much to the Army’s annoyance, as one contemporary recalled: ‘the reconciliation of the commanders infuriated all our generals and officers, who unanimously detested Barclay.’ These misguided officers tried to induce Bagration to oppose Barclay de Tolly publicly and Vistitsky even admitted that ‘[some] senior officers urged Bagration to replace Barclay by force.’31 To his credit, Bagration rejected such treasonous suggestions and refused to publicly oppose Barclay de Tolly, though his passionate temper often burst forth in private correspondence. Yermolov urged Bagration to write directly to the Tsar and boldly suggest that he be named supreme commander of the Russian armies. But while this was undoubtedly Bagration’s ambition, he hesitated to go that far: ‘I will not write to the Tsar asking for the command, because this would be attributed to my ambition and vanity, not my merit and abilities.’32
After the loss of Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly’s position in the Army became tenuous. The British Commissioner to the Russian Army, Sir Robert Wilson, recalled: ‘The spirit of the Army was affected by a sense of mortiication and
all ranks loudly and boldly complained; discontent was general and discipline relaxing. The removal [of Barclay de Tolly] […] had become a universal demand.’33
The withdrawal through Lithuania and Byelorussia, though far from popular, had been reluctantly accepted in view of the enemy’s numerical superiority. But now the war was blighting ancient Russian soil and Smolensk, a holy city for many Russians, lay in ruins. As a senior Russian officer (Benckendorff) described: ‘Drowned in sorrow, we were abandoning our provinces and their generous population to the enemy’s devastation. How many curses the honest and noble General Barclay attracted …’ Fedor Glinka wrote in his memoirs: ‘Soldiers were eager, demanding to fight!’ And another officer complained: ‘We are running away like hares. Panic has seized everyone […] Our courage is crushed. Our march looks like a funeral procession.’34 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Radozhitsky saw many junior officers and soldiers gathering in small groups and talking ‘of the impending destruction of the fatherland’. They wondered, ‘what fate awaited them [since] the arms which they had borne so bravely in defence of their fatherland now seemed useless and cumbersome.’35 Yermolov reflected the opinion of his fellow senior officers when he wrote:
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 4