The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  heard, with a singular mixture of raillery and humour, the account of the Battle of Salamanca given by Fabvier, who had just arrived. When Fabvier had concluded his account, Napoleon dismissed him, saying that he would repair on the banks of the Moskowa [river] the faults committed at Arapilles.

  Ségur tells us that Napoleon ‘received graciously the aide-de-camp of the vanquished general [because] on the eve of a battle, the fate of which was so uncertain, he felt disposed to be indulgent to a defeat’. In his response to Ségur, Gourgaud rejected this account as ‘wholly incorrect’ and claimed that the Emperor:

  testified the most violent disappointment, when he learnt that Marshal Marmont had compromised the French Army to satisfy a personal ambition, in giving a battle without waiting and in the face of the orders he had received for the arrival of Soult, which would have insured him the victory.

  Hearing the Emperor’s criticism, Fabvier, who was wounded at Salamanca and was ‘imbued with the most noble and elevated feelings’, considered it as a slight to his honour and during the battle the next day, ‘fought on foot, as a volunteer, in the most perilous situations, as if to prove, that the soldiers of the Army of Spain did not yield in courage to those of the Army of Russia’.144

  News of the French defeat in Spain was suppressed to avoid demoralization in the army on the eve of the battle and, as Brandt noted, ‘many officers, even of high rank, would know nothing of it until they got back from the campaign’.

  In the afternoon, Napoleon decided to make his second reconnaissance of the day. The morning mist was long gone by now and the Emperor could better examine the enemy positions across the field.145 Accompanied by his staff, Napoleon first travelled along the Voina stream to reconnoitre the Russian right lank, before proceeding southwards. In the process, he was noticed and fired upon by some Russian batteries and Muravyev could hear ‘occasional artillery ire here and there and, according to some, these were directed against Napoleon, who was reviewing his troops and reconnoitring our positions’.146 Despite this ‘nuisance’ Napoleon still could notice ‘numerous redoubts that covered the Russian positions’.147 According to Lejeune: ‘The enemy’s line was protected by well-chosen and formidable positions, supplemented by redoubts and redans, the firing from which would cross each other.’ As Saxon Dragoon officer von Leissnig described:

  As far as my inquisitive eye could see the whole ground to the left and right and straight ahead was covered with a growth of hazel bushes, junipers and other brushwood which rose to at least a man’s height. To the left centre […] stood a village [Borodino] and a nice Byzantine church which rose from a gentle tree covered slope and had a pretty tower plated in green copper […] To the right, a ridge was covered along almost all its length with masses of Russian infantry and artillery. As I could clearly see through my telescope, the Russians had thrown up earthworks on some of the highest points of the ridge. These fortiications were cut into notches, which seemed to be embrasures for the artillery. Obliquely to the right of our regiment and beyond the ridge there rose the towers of the churches of Mozhaisk and the nearby monastery. They were an hour’s march away, but they succeeded in lending a touch of beauty to the brooding gloom of the wild and barren neighbourhood.148

  Travelling south, Napoleon observed Russians constructing a large and imposing redoubt (Rayevsky’s Battery) on a hill north of Semeyonovskoye, which could sweep the entire plain in front of it. Slightly south-west of it, he observed two fortifications resembling shallow redans. As Rapp indicates, seeing these fortifications convinced Napoleon that the enemy would not retreat and he immediately returned to headquarters.

  As a result of his reconnaissances, Napoleon realized that the Russian right flank was difficult to assail, as it was located on the steep banks of the Kolocha river and was further reinforced by newly built batteries and earthworks. On the other hand, the left flank was much more exposed and provided an opportunity to launch a massive assault, and, if necessary, a flanking manoeuvre. However, Napoleon’s observations were not complete, since Russian jägers plus thick forest and brushwood barred him from gaining a full understanding of Kutuzov’s position. He thus confused the Kamenka stream with the headwaters of the Semeyonovskii stream, believing that the Bagration Flèches and Rayevsky’s Redoubt were located on the same ridge and could be assaulted at the same time. A similar error was made by Labaume and other French officers who prepared maps for the Emperor. Furthermore, Napoleon and his staff officers failed to notice that there was a third flèche behind the two forward ones, and this slip-up would play an important role in the subsequent fighting.

  Based on his observations, Napoleon made arrangements for the battle. By late afternoon, Poniatowski’s V Corps was lined up between Shevardino and the old road to Utitsa on the French right flank. To the right-centre, east of Shevardino, stood Davout’s I Corps, with the cavalry corps of Nansouty, Montbrun and Latour-Maubourg behind it. Ney’s III Corps was on Davout’s immediate left, with Junot’s VIII Corps and the Imperial Guard behind it. Eugène’s IV Corps, reinforced by two divisions from I Corps, formed the left wing of the Grand Army, across the Kolocha river near Borodino, while General Ornano’s cavalry covered the extreme left. Many troops remained in their bivouacs during daylight on 6 September, assuming their attack positions under cover of night, in order to prevent the Russians from determining the direction of the coming assault. Still, some corps made minor adjustments in their positions during the day and the cavalry was moved closer to the corps of Ney and Davout. Most importantly, Napoleon moved his headquarters from Valuyevo to the Shevardino Redoubt, and was followed by some units of the Imperial Guard, while the rest of the Guard crossed the Kolocha during the night.149

  Napoleon’s plan of attack was hardly inspiring, and Kutuzov himself was somewhat startled by this, writing to his wife: ‘It is difficult to recognize [Napoleon] because he is unusually cautious, everywhere entrenching up to his ears [“zakapyvaetsia po ushi”].’150 The plan called for a heavy bombardment of enemy positions followed by a frontal attack with minor diversions on the lanks. Eugène was to seize Borodino and then swing right across the Kolocha, while Poniatowski was to advance along the Old Smolensk Road and threaten the Russian left lank. Eugène’s attack on Borodino had the twofold purpose of attracting Kutuzov’s attention to his right wing and centre, thus preventing him from diverting forces to other sectors. Napoleon’s main assault was directed against the Russian left lank, where Davout would launch the initial assault. According to Gourgaud, while planning Davout’s attack, the Emperor sent for Compans ‘to inform him that he destined him to attack [Bagration’s southward lèche]’. Ney was present at this meeting and when Compans proposed to lead his division through the wood to avoid the enemy’s fire, Ney argued it would delay the attack. However, Compans, who had reconnoitred the spot, declared that it was ‘a passable copse and the Emperor approved of his plan’. Compans then noted that he was more concerned that his right flank would be exposed to the Russians attacking the gap between him and Poniatowski.151 Once Davout’s attack was under way, Ney was to advance to Semeyonovskoye, with Junot’s VIII Corps and Murat’s Reserve Cavalry providing support. As usual, the Imperial Guard was kept in the reserve.152

  Much has been said about Napoleon’s plan. Some argued that it lacked the ingenuity of the younger Napoleon, especially in light of his refusal to accept a more adventurous scheme touted by Marshal Davout. Given the shortness of the Russian line and manifest weakness of its left wing, Davout proposed to launch his own corps – supported by that of Poniatowski – in a powerful encircling movement through the Utitsa woods, while Ney’s corps pinned down the Russians at Semeyonovskoye. If it succeeded, the Russians would be cornered between the Kolocha and Moscow rivers and could be hammered into submission. But Napoleon was unusually cautious and told the Marshal: ‘No! The movement is altogether too great! It would lead me away from my objective and make me lose too much time.’153 When Davout tried to argue his point, Napoleon a
bruptly silenced him: ‘Ah, you are always for turning the enemy; this is too dangerous a manoeuvre!’

  Napoleon has frequently been criticized for turning down Davout’s suggestion. It certainly promised a much more decisive outcome than a direct attack against fortified positions. So what made him reject it? Davout’s idea called for detaching two entire corps (I and V) – some 40,000 men – and Napoleon was naturally reluctant to commit half his infantry to this manoeuvre, since it would have weakened his position. In addition, the manoeuvre would have been performed during the night and, as Gourgaud observed, ‘it is well known how hazardous such marches are made through a wooded and unknown tract of country, and almost without a guide’. For example, one need only recall Russian troops wandering off-road at night during their retreat from Smolensk. Russian historian Bogdanovich shared this sentiment:

  Considering that Marshal Davout’s proposal required [a] nocturnal march in the forested and unfamiliar terrain, one cannot but doubt the success of such enterprise, which promised to be much harder to execute than the failed flanking manoeuvre of Junot at the Battle of Valutina Gora.154

  Besides, it was probable the Russians would have patrols deployed to detect any such lanking manoeuvre. One historian has also stressed the poor condition of the French cavalry (already giving Napoleon cause for anxiety), which could have limited the extent of the manoeuvre.155 More importantly, Napoleon was concerned that a flanking movement would induce Kutuzov to retreat. Having pursued the Russians since late June, he was willing to sacrifice some tactical advantage to have the enemy finally accept battle.156 Although he rejected Davout’s manoeuvre sur les derrières, Napoleon still planned to utilize a tactical flanking manoeuvre by Poniatowski’s Corps.157

  The French battle plan reveals that Napoleon had concentrated up to 80,000 men – some 60,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry – on his right wing, and about 40,000 men on the left flank under Prince Eugène. Poniatowski had about 10,000 men, including 8,500 infantry, on the extreme right flank. The French artillery consisted of 587 guns, of which some 22 per cent were ‘heavy’ 12-pounders and 8-inch howitzers.158 Guns played a particularly important role at Borodino and many participants would later attest the ferocious nature of the artillery bombardment in this battle. Indeed, the concentration and incidence of artillery at Borodino would not be eclipsed until the carnage of the First World War. Lariboissière, the Inspector-General of the French artillery, would later calculate that the French alone fired 60,000 cannon-balls (Fain claimed as many as 91,000) and 1,400,000 musket shots during the ten-hour battle, which gives 100 artillery rounds and over 2,330 musket shots per minute. If one believes Larionov, that the Russians ired at least as many rounds, the combined average rate of ire would be a staggering 3.4 cannon and 77.6 musket rounds per second.159

  Napoleon’s artillery deployment began late in the evening of the 6th, and Planat de la Faye recalled that:

  the Emperor wanted to know exactly how many musket rounds there were and what munitions in the reserve packs. To get all this information one had to run after units on the march and turn to officers loath to give them, having other things to see to. However, in the name of the Emperor everything became possible. By the end of the day Lariboissière gave him an exact report on the Army’s supplies of artillery rounds and infantry cartridges.160

  During the night two large batteries – those of Generals Foucher du Careil and Sorbier – were set up against the Russian left, while the remaining cannon were arranged in mobile batteries that operated in support of corps. The artillery of the III and VIII Corps was deployed next to Foucher’s battery, while General Pernetty (of the I Corps) led a battery organized from sixteen guns from Davout’s corps artillery, fourteen from Compans’ divisional artillery and eight from the divisions of Friant and Dessaix. Pernetty’s orders called for him to coordinate his actions with Sorbier and provide close support for Davout. Thus, Napoleon had about 100-105 guns arranged in the first line, though some scholars estimate their number as high as 120. In total, the French had concentrated up to 382 guns (including the Guard artillery) against the Russian left lank and some 297 of them could engage the Russian positions between Rayevsky’s Redoubt and Utitsa. Of the remaining 200 guns, fifty were with the Poles of V Corps, while 152 pieces were spread in the centre and the right wing.

  But the artillery deployment had some defects. The officers made a mistake in reconnoitring the terrain at night and placed batteries too far from the enemy positions. Deployment was further confused as units began marching to their positions in the dark. Around midnight, Pion des Loches’ reserve battery was ordered forward and was en route when Napoleon himself came across it and inquired what it was doing. Pion des Loches explained that one of ordnance officers gave him the order to move, to which Napoleon responded:

  ‘He is a bloody fool, I have already got too much artillery here. Return to your corps.’ That was an order doubtless easily given but where is this army corps I had left at midnight? No point in asking […] My battery formed in column to retire.

  After marching for half an hour seeking his unit, Pion des Loches met Marshal Mortier and explained that the Emperor sent him back. ‘Who gave you the order to move?’ inquired the Marshal. ‘An ordnance officer, speaking in the Emperor’s name’ – ‘Those f****** fools are always speaking in the Emperor’s name. Has anyone ever heard of a corps being deprived of its reserve artillery on the eve of the battle?’ Mortier instructed Pion des Loches to return to his place and obey no one but him; even if orders came from Napoleon himself, he was to await the Marshal’s confirmation.161

  While there were no major confrontations on the 6th, the day was not as peaceful as it is usually described in books, being full of skirmishes along the entire line.162 That day, Fedor Glinka, sitting in the bell tower near the village of Borodino, could see as the French ‘bands [of tirailleurs] skirmished with our jägers for almost [the] entire day since our troops did not allow them to get drinking water from the Kolocha’. At one moment, a heated fight began between the tirailleurs of Morand’s division and the Russian jägers near Borodino. Hearing the musket ire, Davout ordered General Dedem, commanding a brigade in Friant’s division, ‘to ride flat out and stop the firing all down the line’.163 Still, occasional fire could be heard for the rest of the day and Captain François recalled hearing it as late as 11pm. The 30th Line lost sixty-seven killed that day and François’ Company alone had twenty-three casualties, over half of them killed. More important, however, was intensive skirmishing on the right lank, where Polish skirmishers tried to drive back the Russian jägers and reconnoitre the environs of Utitsa. Later that night, Colonel Kaisarov, who served as Kutuzov’s duty general, wrote that ‘the enemy occupied us with skirmishes on the left lank’, and Kutuzov responded by ordering one of the corps to proceed to the extreme left lank.164 This was an important development and we will discuss it later in this section.

  It is difficult to determine the prevailing sentiment among Allied troops on the eve of the battle. Memoirs, written many years, if not decades, after the event, tend to misrepresent the true emotions felt that autumn day. Ségur tells us that ‘there was general rejoicing’ at seeing the Russian Army in place:

  This incoherent, sluggish, shifting war in which our best efforts had been fruitless and in which we seemed to be hopelessly, endlessly sinking, was at last cantered in one spot. Here we touched bottom, here was the end, here everything would be decided!165

  Bourgogne watched as ‘some cleaned muskets and other weapons, others made bandages for the wounded, some made their wills, and others, again, sang or slept in perfect indifference. The whole of the Imperial Guard received orders to appear in full uniform.’166

  For Raymond de Fezensac

  there was something sombre and imposing in the sight of these two armies preparing to slaughter each other. All the regiments had received the order to put on parade uniforms as if for a holiday. The Imperial Guard, in particular, seemed to be waiting for a p
rocession rather than a battle. Nothing is more striking than the sangfroid of these old soldiers; on their faces were neither anxiety nor exhilaration. A new battle was to them but one victory more, and to share this noble confidence one had only to look at them.167

  Lieutenant Vossler was among those troops who rejoined the army in time for the battle. Entering the camp he found troops in

  good and sanguine spirits. We were congratulated on all sides upon our timely arrival. If one discounted our men’s pale worn faces, the whole army seemed alive with a cheerful bristle. Most of the troops were busy polishing and preparing weapons for the morrow …

  Meanwhile, Griois found it

  difficult to describe what was happening in our camp that night. A raucous joy, inspired by the thought of the battle, reigned here and there was no doubt in the outcome of the fighting. From every direction one could hear cries of soldiers calling each other, the bursts of laughter caused by their merry tales or grotesquely philosophical thoughts on the chances each one of them would face the following day. Innumerable fires, rather disorganized on our side and symmetrically lit along the fortifications on the Russian, lighted up the horizon and gave the idea of a splendid illumination and a true festival. 168

  Captain Girod de l’Ain was among those Bourgogne saw showing ‘perfect indifference’. As he recalled:

  after a long walk to reconnoitre the respective positions of the armies, I returned to our bivouac and spent the time in having my first lesson in how to play chess from Major Fanfette [one of General Dessaix’s aides-de-camp] who adored the game and always carried with him a little cardboard chess set which folded into eight pieces and which he had himself constructed with great ingenuity.

  Their game would be interrupted after Girod de l’Ain was called up later that evening, but Fanfette would record all their moves and, after surviving the horrors of the retreat, they would finish it in Berlin!169