The rest of the army was rewarded handsomely as well. Sixty-three officers received promotions. Two senior officers received the prestigious Order of St George (3rd class) while sixty-six (including twenty-seven colonels) earned the St George of the 4th class. Thirty-two officers received the Order of St Vladimir (3rd class), twenty-two – St Vladimir (4th class), and 554 – St Vladimir (4th class with ribbon). Seventeen officers were given the Order of St Anna (3rd class), twenty-seven – St Anna (2nd class with diamonds), while 159 officers received St Anna (2nd class), and 767 – St Anna (4th class). Over 340 officers were awarded with golden swords for courage, while six were commended with citations of the ‘imperial goodwill’.
In Moscow, Governor Rostopchin, who had been publishing overly positive and patriotic proclamations for the past few weeks, issued more bulletins proclaiming that ‘the accursed one [Napoleon] and his accomplices will perish through famine, fire and sword’. A Te Deum service was held at the Uspensky Cathedral and the air over the city was shaking from constant pealing of church bells. Yet, after receiving Kutuzov’s new dispatches, Rostopchin found himself in a very awkward position. The Russian Commander informed Rostopchin that he had retreated behind Mozhaisk and desperately needed supplies and transports to evacuate the wounded to Moscow. As thousands of wounded troops and terrified peasants began arriving at the capital, rumours of a French victory rapidly spread and the mood of the populace dramatically changed.
The Russian Army, meantime, spent 8 September taking new positions behind Mozhaisk. The French remained idle until afternoon, when Murat’s advance guard moved close to the town and fought minor skirmishes with the Russians. The Imperial Guard, Davout and Ney were following in Murat’s wake, while Junot, as notes above, was ordered to remain on the battlefield. Prince Eugène, reinforced by the approaching 15th Division of General Pino, prepared to cross the Moscow river and proceed towards Ruza, while Poniatowski marched to Borisov. That evening Kutuzov reconnoitred the French positions and decided to continue his retreat. Murat’s cavalry made several attacks on the Russian rearguard but failed to break through into Mozhaisk; Murat’s chief of staff, Belliard, was wounded early in this combat. Late in the evening the French light infantry (four voltigeur companies from the 2nd Division) did manage to enter one of suburbs of Mozhaisk but the Russians were clinging on stubbornly. As Ségur noted, ‘Murat fancied himself already in possession of it, and sent to inform the Emperor that he might sleep there.’ As Napoleon and his entourage moved forward to Mozhaisk, they were warned that the town was still in the Russian possession. So the Emperor spent the night at Kukarino, about a mile from Mozhaisk.
The very fact the Mozhaisk was not seized that day revealed and Murat’s advance was checked showed that the Russian Army was far from being routed. Furthermore, the successful advance guard action allowed Kutuzov to claim further feats of Russian arms. But his army still had to retreat …
On 9 September, the Russian Army, in two columns, proceeded to Zhukovo and then Zemlino. Mozhaisk was occupied after a brief combat and, as Dedem informs us, French troops seized a large magazine with ‘eau-de-vie’ (i.e. vodka). Staff officers tried to confiscate the liquor from Dedem’s soldiers, in order to distribute it among the Imperial Guard, but they were quickly overruled and it was given to regular units. Napoleon moved his headquarters to Mozhaisk later that day and remained for the next three days.
Murat’s cavalry, meantime, continued to harass the Russian rearguard on 10–11 September and at one moment the Russian movement was jeopardized when Platov withdrew his rearguard too soon, allowing Murat to close on the main Russian Army.549 Kutuzov, already dissatisfied with Platov’s performance at Borodino, was furious at this latest slip-up and replaced him at once with Miloradovich.
Publicly, Kutuzov still considered fighting another battle. Many Russian historians claimed that he genuinely wanted to make a second battle before Moscow, but others argued convincingly that Kutuzov simply played to popular sentiments while rationally weighing his options. On 9 September, Kutuzov issued an order thanking his troops for their courage at Borodino and promising ‘with the Lord’s help we will inflict a crushing defeat on our enemy’.550 Three days later, he reiterated, ‘Every commander knows that the Russian Army must have another decisive battle under the walls of Moscow.’ The search for a suitable battlefield finally produced a site near the Poklonnaya Gora, a few miles from the capital. The new battlefield proved to be too expansive for Kutuzov’s weakened force, which still had not received necessary reinforcements. Senior officers voiced their objections to the position, which as Barclay de Tolly noted, presented a cobweb of ravines and gullies. According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, ‘If such a position were found several marches, even one march, from Moscow, it would have been abandoned at the very first glance but now, with Moscow itself in sight, generals deliberated and mulled over their decision, seeking at least some other means to give a battle.’551 It was finally agreed to summon a council of war at the nearby village of Fili.
The council met in a small peasant hut on 13 September and was attended by the Commander-in-Chief and ten senior officers. In a heated debate, Barclay de Tolly, Rayevsky, Osterman-Tolstoy and Toll called for retreat, while Bennigsen, Konovnitsyn, Uvarov, Dokhturov, and Yermolov suggested fighting another battle. Kutuzov, shrewdly allowing everyone to express an opinion, in order to avoid being the first to advocate the abandonment of Moscow, had the last word: declaring his support for those proposing retreat, he stated that ‘the loss of Moscow does not mean the loss of Russia’.
Over the next day and half the Russian Army passed through the capital, which was hastily being evacuated. ‘The march of the Army, while being executed with admirable order considering the circumstances, resembled a funeral procession more than a military progress …’ noted Buturlin, adding that ‘Officers and men wept with rage’. Meanwhile, Dokhturov voiced his indignation at Kutuzov’s the decision ‘to abandon one’s cradle without a single shot and without a fight! I am in a fury …’ And many shared his views. Even more outspoken was Governor Rostopchin, who had spent the previous weeks convincing the people of Moscow that the Russians were winning the war: ‘The blood is boiling in my veins,’ he wrote to his wife, ‘I think that I shall die of the pain.’
On 14 September Napoleon’s troops entered Moscow. The previous day Miloradovich and Murat struck an impromptu armistice to allow the Russian rearguard to withdraw and, as Perovsky recalled, some were stunned to witness French troops allowing the Russians to march through their ranks.552 But the majority in the French Army believed that, to all intents and purposes, the war was now over, and there was no reason to spill more blood. There was hardly any doubt that Tsar Alexander would have to make peace with Napoleon.
For the Russians, however, the war was far from finished. The French hardly occupied the capital when fires began throughout the city and continued to burn for the next three days, destroying two-thirds of the city. The fires were started on the orders of Rostopchin, who preferred to see the capital destroyed rather than in the hands of the triumphant enemy. ‘It was the most grand, the most sublime and the most terrific sight the world ever beheld!’ Napoleon reminisced in exile on St Helena. Yet the great fire had a tremendous impact on the French Army, which descended into chaos and disorder. Pion des Loches recalled that
The army had dissolved completely; everywhere one could see drunken soldiers and officers loaded with booty and provisions seized from houses which had fallen prey to the flames. The streets were strewn with books, porcelain, furniture and clothing of every kind.
While the French remained in Moscow, the Russian Army manoeuvred from the Ryazan Road to the Kaluga Road, where Kutuzov established the Tarutino Camp. Through this manoeuvre, Kutuzov covered the southern provinces with abundant supplies and manufacturing enterprises. The Russians also threatened Napoleon’s rear and lines of communication. At Tarutino, Kutuzov began intensive preparations for future operations and increased his army to 1
10,000–120,000 men, with additional militia forces to come. Kutuzov also encouraged guerrilla operations against the invaders and organized several regular cavalry detachments to harass French communications and supply lines. Napoleon made several peace proposals to Alexander, but they were all rejected.
On 18 October, Marshal Murat’s advance guard suffered a sudden defeat on the Chernishnya river, north of Tarutino. Hearing this news, Napoleon realized it was time to abandon the devastated Russian capital before he was surrounded, especially as the Russian winter, with its notorious frost and snow, was due. The retreat commenced on 19 October, when remnants of the Grand Army left Moscow, accompanied by thousands of non-combatants and an enormous train loaded with loot. The route from Moscow to Smolensk, via Gzhatsk, was devastated during the fighting of August-September, so Napoleon intended to move his forces via the southwestern provinces, which were unharmed by the war and retained large supply stores.
The start seemed promising, as Napoleon successfully deceived Kutuzov as to his intentions, quietly moving his troops onto the Kaluga route. But heavy rains made the roads almost impassable and considerably delayed French progress on 21–22 October. During the night of the 23rd, Russian scouts finally realized that Napoleon was moving southward and Kutuzov immediately marched to Maloyaroslavets, the only point where he could strike the new Kaluga Road and block the French advance. In a battle on 23–24 October, the French captured the town but failed to break through the Russian lines. After a council of war on the evening of 25 October, Napoleon ordered the withdrawal to Smolensk, by the way of Borodino and Gzhatsk. The Battle of Maloyaroslavets had a crucial impact on the Russian campaign, as it prevented Napoleon from reaching the rich provinces in south-eastern Russia and forced him to return to the devastated route of his summer advance. The marching and fighting at Maloyaroslavets consumed seven crucial days and, a week after the battle, the snow began to fall.
In early November the Grand Army finally reached Smolensk, where huge supply depots had previously been established. But discipline broke down and looting became rampant. Napoleon hoped to rally his forces at Smolensk but Kutuzov’s advance toward Krasnyi threatened to cut his route. On 3 November, Miloradovich and Platov attacked Davout near Vyazma and captured the town. Napoleon soon abandoned Smolensk and as the French withdrew, superior Russian forces attacked the French corps as they marched from Smolensk to Krasnyi. Each corps was temporarily cut off and Ney’s corps even surrounded, but none of them was forced to lay down their arms and Ney made a heroic retreat across the Dnieper, earning the nickname ‘the bravest of the brave’. Nevertheless, French losses were horrendous due to constant skirmishes, cold weather and lack of supplies. The poorly dressed French soldiers began to freeze and thousands of stragglers were killed or captured. The Russian Army also suffered severely in the harsh winter conditions.
As Napoleon retreated westwards, the Russians had a unique chance of trapping him on the Berezina river. Admiral Chichagov merged his forces with Tormasov’s army and containing Schwarzenberg’s corps in Volhynia, moved north to intercept Napoleon, taking Minsk on 16 November and Borisov on the 22nd. The main Russian Army under Kutuzov closely pursued Napoleon’s forces from the east, while Wittgenstein’s corps converged from the north-east and Chichagov’s army from the south-west. But Napoleon demonstrated his dazzling military talents by diverting Russian attention to Uchlodi, while his forces crossed the river at Studienka. In desperate fighting, Napoleon extricated part of his army, but lost some 25,000 troops and up to 30,000 non-combatants. Although Chichagov was held responsible for the Berezina failure, Wittgenstein and Kutuzov also acted indecisively. Kutuzov’s faltering actions at Krasnyi and Berezina served as a basis for the so-called ‘golden bridge’ or ‘parallel march’ thesis, which argued that Kutuzov had refrained from attacking the French in order to preserve his armies and let the winter and hunger do its business. On 5 December, Napoleon appointed Murat Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Army and left for Paris. Five days later, the Russian Army captured Vilna and halted its pursuit. By 25 December, the last remnants of the Grand Army recrossed the Nieman and quit Russian soil.
Thus the Russian campaign had disastrous consequences for Napoleon and his empire. His military might was shattered following the loss of up to half a million men in Russia. The loss of so many veterans and the influx of inexperienced recruits had a major impact on the quality of the French Army. Although there is hardly a doubt about the élan of the troops Napoleon led in 1813–14, they were never as good as the veterans of the earlier campaigns. The French cavalry was virtually wiped out and never fully recovered during the subsequent campaigns.
In the spring of 1813, the Battles of Lützen and Bautzen – remarkable victories in themselves – could have been of greater consequence had Napoleon had enough cavalry to mount an effective pursuit of the Allies. In the political dimension, Napoleon’s reluctant allies, Austria and Prussia, exploited the French setback in Russia to break their alliances and joined their efforts against Napoleon. By 1815 French dominance of the Continent was over and a new political equilibrium established in Europe.
The Battle of Borodino is interesting for a number of reasons. Both armies demonstrated remarkable tenacity and gallantry. The Allied troops made repeated charges on fortified positions, while the Russians endured an artillery bombardment of unprecedented intensity. Napoleon used his cavalry in a surprising fashion. The battlefield itself was hardly suitable for cavalry actions and Napoleon’s troopers were forced to endure heavy enemy fire for hours, before being finally thrown into direct assault on Rayevsky’s Redoubt. The French artillery performed well, maintaining a devastating bombardment that decimated Kutuzov’s forces. But most importantly, Napoleon himself was unrecognizable and his lethargy may have been the most decisive factor in the battle, as he rejected proposals that could have delivered victory.
The Russian troops fought with their usual resilience, fervent devotion and gallantry. Individual corps and regimental commanders gave outstanding performances and more Russian officers were killed and wounded at Borodino than any prior battle of this period. Yet Kutuzov’s actions were less than satisfactory – although for years afterwards Russian historians sang his praises. Kutuzov’s battle deployment was flawed, his tight formations presenting easy targets for Napoleon’s gunners. Kutuzov’s inactivity was akin to Napoleon’s but it was balanced by the vigour of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, who, in many respects, fought the battle independent of Kutuzov.
Borodino remains an example of how winning a major battle does not necessarily mean winning the campaign. The French gained a victory – albeit a narrow one – and triumphantly entered Moscow a week later, only to abandon it after a month. The Grand Army then suffered perhaps the most devastating retreat in history. In political terms, Napoleon’s hopes of exploiting his success at Borodino (which, after all, had led to the capture of Moscow) proved futile, as the Russians continued to reject proposals for a negotiated peace. The battle, in fact, may be considered a key event in the downfall of the French First Empire, since Napoleon’s failure to destroy the Russian Army and gain peace with Alexander led to ignominious retreat and the ultimate loss of his own, awesome, Grand Army. This, in turn, prompted the collapse of the Emperor’s power base, facilitating a strong anti-French coalition in 1813. Meanwhile, the Russian Army carried the war from the walls of Moscow to the heart of Paris, where it triumphantly paraded on the Champs-Elysées in the spring of 1814.
The battle had a tremendous effect on the social and cultural landscape of the Russian empire. It was hardly ever acknowledged as a defeat, but rather lauded as a crucial moral victory, especially in view of the subsequent rout of Napoleon’s forces. It helped mobilize the nation and provided a powerful morale boost. The subsequent defeat of an opponent previously deemed unstoppable left a permanent imprint on the Russian national psyche, and helped revive Messianic sentiments in the nation and its rulers. By 1815, Emperor Alexander would be enthralled by these m
ystical ideas, as revealed in his famous proposal for the creation of a ‘Holy Alliance’ to maintain conservative order and encourage monarchs to rule according to Christian principles. Under his successor, Nicholas I, Russia would be labelled the ‘gendarme of Europe’ for its role in protecting the existing status quo on the Continent. The origins of the Decembrist movement, which had a lasting effect on Russian upper society, can be traced to officers, who, following Borodino and the French defeat in Russia, had served in Western Europe and shared their experiences and impressions with other officers.
Finally, the Battle of Borodino influenced artistic and literary fields for the rest of the century and inspired such luminaries of Russian literature as Alexander Pushkin, Peter Vyazemsky, Vasili Zhukovsky, Mikhail Lermontov, Alexander Griboyedov and, above all, Leo Tolstoy, whose War and Peace, with its detailed discussion of the Battle of Borodino, remains one of the greatest literary accomplishments of the 19th century. The themes of 1812 were also woven into the musical masterpieces of Mikhail Glinka, Peter Tchaikovsky and Sergei Prokofiev.
Appendices
ORDER OF BATTLE
[Note: A more detailed order of battle is available at the www.napoleon-series.org.]
THE RUSSIAN ARMY AT BORODINO
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF: General of Infantry Mikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov
1ST WESTERN ARMY: General of Infantry Mikhail Barclay de Tolly
II INFANTRY CORPS: Lieutenant General Karl Gustav Baggovut 4TH DIVISION: Major General Eugène von Württemberg
The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov Page 36