7. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 12 December, 14 December
8. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 7 February 1937
9. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 6 March 1937
10. Duke of Windsor to Mrs Simpson, 2 April
11. NA MEPO 35/10, Channing (?) to Game, 19 December
12. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 12 December
13. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 6 March 1937
14. Information from Mrs Jackie Holland
15. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 6 February 1937, Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, n.d. c. 25 February 1937; Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 7 February 1937
16. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 6 February 1937
17. Mrs Simpson to Bessie Merryman, 21 February 1937
18. Mrs Simpson to Bessie Merryman, 6 March 1937
19. Allen to Mrs Simpson, 8 March 1937
20. Mrs Simpson to Bessie Merryman, 11 March 1937
21. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 7 April 1937
22. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 3 January 1937
23. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 3 January 1937
24. Ziegler, Edward VIII, pp 353–9
25. Stanley Baldwin papers, George VI to Baldwin, 4 May 1937
26. Ziegler, Edward VIII, pp 358
27. Thornton, Royal Feud, p. 147, citing Lady Hardinge, p. 165
28. Churchill papers, Churchill memorandum, 25 April 1937
29. Ziegler, Edward VIII, pp 357–60; Stanley Baldwin papers, George VI to Baldwin, 4 May 1937
30. Chamberlain diary, 26 May 1937
31. Baldwin to Selwyn Lloyd, 20 October 1947, quoted in Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 67
32. Monckton narrative
33. Chamberlain diary, 30 May 1937
34. Bryan & Murphy, The Windsor Story, p. 341
35. Quoted in Jones, A Diary with Letters, p. 299
36. Frances Stevenson diary, 17 March 1937
37. Spencer Churchill papers, Churchill to Clementine, 25 January 1937, reproduced in The Churchill Documents, pp 549f; Churchill to Chamberlain, 24 March 1937
38. Churchill papers, 2/300, Churchill to Chamberlain, 24 March 1937; Churchill to Lloyd George, 25 March 1937, reproduced in The Churchill Documents, pp 634–6
39. Chamberlain to Hilda, 10 April; Chamberlain diary, 12 April 1937
40. NA PREM 1/463, Wigram to Chamberlain, 11 April
41. Chamberlain to Hilda, 10 April; Chamberlain diary, 12 April 1937
42. NA PREM 1/463, Wigram to Chamberlain, 11 April and 26 April 1937
43. Reith diaries, 16 April 1937
44. Windham Baldwin papers, 11/1/1, Monica Baldwin, ‘An Unpublished Page of English History’
45. Mrs Simpson to Duke of Windsor, 7 March 1937
46. Sarasota Herald Tribune, 3 February 1941
47. Monckton narrative
48. Windham Baldwin papers, 11/3/13, note of conversation with Monckton
AFTERWORD
* * *
WILSON’S EFFORTS TO produce a narrative of the crisis that concealed matters that would have embarrassed the government had they come to light, turned out to have been almost entirely unnecessary. The waters of oblivion closed rapidly over the heads of the former King and his new wife. After a flurry of coverage of their wedding, they attracted no more than two or three newspaper stories per month.
Their affairs were still a matter of agonised discussion in the closed worlds of Downing Street and Buckingham Palace, but there was no follow-through for even the muted public controversy at the height of the crisis and its immediate aftermath. The tentative efforts of Churchill and Lloyd George to obtain a Civil List grant were the last hurrah of the King’s Party in its largest sense. Stanley Baldwin had succeeded in drawing a line under the whole sorry business, and there was no appetite to look closely at what anyone had done or how.
Discussions between George VI and the government under the new Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on one side and the Duke of Windsor on the other focused on the two topics that soon became intertwined: the uncompleted agreement with the royal brothers over money and the Duke’s desire to return soon to Britain. The Duke also sought some form of recognition by the government and the Court for the Duchess. He displayed the same tactical ineptitude that had marked his handling of the crisis. His attempt to rebuild a public position through a visit to Nazi Germany together with the Duchess in the autumn of 1937 turned out to be an embarrassment at best, and, at worst, glaring proof of his complete lack of judgement. Chamberlain and Wilson, whose nebulous but enormously powerful role survived into the new premiership and became even stronger, successfully led the fight against the Duke’s return.
The disappearance of the Duke and Duchess to the margins of public and political attention was hastened by the worsening diplomatic situation in Europe. After relative calm through 1937, Germany’s Anschluß with Austria in March 1938 set the continent on track for the Second World War a year and a half later. Contemporaries and later historians were naturally far more interested in how Britain’s statesmen had performed when confronted with these tests than on the spectacular, but short-lived and parochial drama of the abdication. Compared to the intense and bitter debate over the parts that Baldwin, Chamberlain and Wilson had played in the appeasement policy towards Hitler and Mussolini, the abdication barely counted. The British government’s long-standing reluctance to release any official documents relating to the royal family was further deterrent to discussion.
Perhaps perversely, the fact that the historical verdict on Chamberlain – who died in 1940 – depends so hugely on the verdict on appeasement meant that otherwise well-disposed writers allowed the faintest and most coded of criticism of his performance during the abdication to creep in. This began in 1946 with his first, and de facto, official biographer, Keith Feiling, who hinted at the tension between Chamberlain’s pressure for ‘some terminus’ and Baldwin as the ‘Crown’s principal and, in this case, best adviser’.1 Chamberlain’s parliamentary private secretary and, eventually, successor as Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, praised Baldwin’s sure-footedness, ‘discretion, sensitivity and patience’ in contrast to Chamberlain’s ‘restive[ness] with what he judged to be the fumbling indecision by the Prime Minister’.2 Home was even more forthright to a friendly biographer and labelled Chamberlain’s private criticism of aspects of Baldwin’s handling of the crisis as simply wrong.3
By the time that the Duke of Windsor, egged on by Lord Beaverbrook, set out to present his side of the story, culminating in his memoir A King’s Story in 1951, the abdication had receded far into the past. The Duke’s three principal targets, Baldwin, Archbishop Lang and Geoffrey Dawson of The Times, were all dead. Moreover, the actual role of the latter two had been minor, if not downright peripheral, and his version of Baldwin’s role was ludicrously garbled, reflecting Beaverbrook’s yearning to humiliate posthumously a man who had soundly beaten him in all their political encounters.
Baldwin had savoured the moment of his triumph in the House of Commons on 10 December 1936, but thereafter placed his feet firmly on the ground and minded the fickleness of political opinion. A few days later he was talking to MP Blanche Dugdale, ‘quite unmoved by his personal prestige. He says he was on a personal pinnacle before (at the time of the General Strike) and within six weeks all were damning him.’4 Baldwin never left a written record of the crisis, but he set out what he saw as the key points of the affair to another MP a few weeks later. His own role barely featured. What mattered was that:
Edward VIII had not the vital gifts which make a King – patience and devotion to duty. It was fortunate for the country that he went when he did; the downfall would have been more catastrophic in later years.5
NOTES
1. Feiling, Neville Chamberlain, p. 289
2. Home, The Way the Wind Blows, p. 51
3. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home, p. 67
4. Blanche Dugdale diary, 13 December
5. Windham Bal
dwin papers, 3/3/14, Extracts from Lord Hinchingbrooke’s diary, 26 February 1937
APPENDICES
* * *
A. DRAFT OF LETTER OF FORMAL ADVICE TO THE KING
Mr. Baldwin with his humble duty to Your Majesty.
It was with great regret that Mr. Baldwin found it necessary on Tuesday, the 20th October, to communicate to Your Majesty his very real concern at the widespread feelings aroused in all sections of Your Majesty’s subjects by Your Majesty’s association with Mrs. Ernest Simpson. As an illustration of this attitude Mr. Baldwin left with Your Majesty a number of letters received by him and others and since then many more letters of a similar character have come in. Moreover the legal proceedings instituted on the 27th October by Mrs. Simpson for the divorce of her husband have concentrated the public attention upon the subject and aroused public apprehension to such a degree that Mr. Baldwin feels it necessary to repeat more formally and more emphatically the warning he has already addressed to Your Majesty but to which Your Majesty has hitherto paid but little heed. He feels it his duty as Prime Minister to point out to Your Majesty that the continuance of Your Majesty’s association with Mrs. Simpson after these legal proceedings is likely to affect in a manner which cannot be ignored the already very disturbing movement of public opinion. This opinion is now moving rapidly to the conclusion that the dignity and self-respect of the people of this country and of the sister nations are being symbolically affronted and that the conduct of Your Majesty is inconsistent with the whole conception of Kingship and its great tradition. The high expectations which accompanied Your Majesty’s succession to the Throne are giving way to doubts as to whether they can conceivably be fulfilled. Unless steps are taken promptly to allay the widespread and growing misgivings among the people, the feelings of respect, esteem and affection which Your Majesty has evoked among them will disappear in a revulsion of so grave and perilous a character as possibly to threaten the stability of the nation and of the Empire. The dangers to the people of this country of such a shock, the disunity and loss of confidence which would ensue at a time when so much of the world is looking to the United Kingdom for guidance and leadership through a sea of troubles cannot but be obvious to Your Majesty.
In Mr. Baldwin’s opinion there is but one course which he can advise Your Majesty to take, namely to put an end to Your Majesty’s association with Mrs. Simpson. In order to prevent any possible misunderstanding he must add that he would not regard marriage with Mrs. Simpson as a possible solution of Your Majesty’s difficulties.1
B. DRAFT OF LETTER OF INFORMAL ADVICE TO KING
FISHER’S DRAFT
When Your Majesty was pleased to receive me on October 20th I intimated that the manner of Your Majesty’s domestic life was causing me and other Ministers much concern by reason of the feeling to which it was giving rise in the country. Subsequently the divorce proceedings which, in spite of my representations, Your Majesty did not feel disposed to make any attempt to stop, have brought about a situation which threatens not only Your Majesty’s own position, but the constitutional stability of the nation.
Your Majesty’s Government have information which leaves no doubt that there is throughout the country a growing feeling of discontent and resentment at the example which Your Majesty is setting. They are also aware that, since the divorce proceedings, the ordinary restraint imposed on Your Majesty’s subjects has been disregarded, and that Your Majesty’s association with the lady in question has continued as before. They think it their duty to inform Your Majesty that already two affidavits have been put in by outside parties requiring the intervention of the King’s Proctor.
In these circumstances I have consulted with Ministers and have before me an official communication in which the advice of Your Majesty’s Government is formally tendered to the effect that, in view of the grave injury which in their opinion is being inflicted on the people of this country, Your Majesty’s association with Mrs. Simpson should be terminated forthwith.
It is hardly necessary for me to point out that the refusal of Your Majesty to follow the requirements of constitutional monarchy and accept this advice can have but one result, namely the resignation of myself and the National Government.
Although in the last resort I have no alternative but to transmit this formal advice to Your Majesty, I have no doubt that, in the event of your giving an undertaking that Mrs. Simpson shall leave the country forthwith, this distasteful matter can be settled in a less formal manner.
I shall be glad to receive Your Majesty’s reply as soon as conveniently possible and in the event of Your wishing to discuss the matter I would propose to bring with me the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Halifax (representing the Lord Chancellor), the Lord President of the Council and the Speaker of the House of Commons.2
AMENDED BY CHAMBERLAIN
When Your Majesty was pleased to receive me on October 20th I intimated that the manner of Your Majesty’s domestic life was causing me and other Ministers much concern by reason of the feeling to which it was giving rise in the country. Subsequently the divorce proceedings which, in reply to my representations, Your Majesty declared yourself unable or indisposed to stop, have brought about a situation which threatens not only Your Majesty’s own position, but the constitutional stability of the nation.
Your Majesty’s Government have information which leaves no doubt that there is throughout the country a growing feeling of discontent and resentment at the example which Your Majesty is setting. They are also aware that since the divorce proceedings, this feeling has been intensified and fresh apprehensions aroused by the continuance of Your Majesty’s association with the lady in question. Further publicity is likely to be involved if, as Your Majesty’s Government has been informed, two affidavits by outside parties are being prepared for submission to the Registrar in the proceedings instituted by Mrs. Simpson at Ipswich.
In these circumstances I have consulted with Ministers and have before me an official communication in which the advice of Your Majesty’s Government is formally tendered to the effect that, in view of the grave danger to which in their opinion the country is being exposed, Your Majesty’s association with Mrs. Simpson should be terminated forthwith.
It is hardly necessary for me to point out that should this advice be tendered and refused by Your Majesty, only one result could follow in accordance with the requirements of constitutional monarchy, namely the resignation of myself and the National Government.
Although in the last resort I should have no alternative but to transmit this formal advice to Your Majesty, I have no doubt that, in the event of my receiving satisfactory assurances of Mrs. Simpson’s intention to leave the country forthwith, this distasteful matter could be settled in a less formal manner.
I shall be glad to receive Your Majesty’s reply as soon as conveniently possible since I am convinced that there is really no time to be lost if the danger of an explosion is to be averted.3
C. HARDINGE’S LETTER TO THE KING, 13 NOVEMBER 1936
SIR,
With my humble duty.
As Your Majesty’s Private Secretary, I feel it my duty to bring to your notice the following facts which have come to my knowledge, and which I know to be accurate:
(1) The silence of the British Press on the subject of Your Majesty’s friendship with Mrs. Simpson is not going to be maintained. It is probably only a matter of days before the outburst begins. Judging by the letters from British subjects living in foreign countries where the Press has been outspoken, the effect will be calamitous.
(2) The Prime Minister and senior members of the Government are meeting to-day to discuss what action should be taken to deal with the serious situation which is developing. As Your Majesty no doubt knows, the resignation of the Government – an eventuality which can by no means be excluded – would result in Your Majesty having to find someone else capable of forming a government which would receive the support of the present House of Commons. I have reason to know that,
in view of the feeling prevalent among members of the House of Commons of all parties, this is hardly within the bounds of possibility. The only alternative remaining is a dissolution and a General Election, in which Your Majesty’s personal affairs would be the chief issue – and I cannot help feeling that even those who would sympathise with Your Majesty as an individual would deeply resent the damage which would inevitably be done to the Crown, the corner-stone on which the whole Empire rests.
If Your Majesty will permit me to say so, there is only one step which holds out any prospect of avoiding this dangerous situation, and that is for Mrs. Simpson to go abroad without further delay, and I would beg Your Majesty to give this proposal your earnest consideration before the position has become irretrievable. Owing to the changing attitude of the Press, the matter has become one of great urgency.
I have the honour, etc., etc.,
ALEXANDER HARDINGE.
P.S. – I am by way of going after dinner to-night to High Wycombe to shoot there to-morrow, but the Post Office will have my telephone number, and I am of course entirely at Your Majesty’s disposal if there is anything at all that you want.
NOTES
1. NA PREM 1/463
2. NA PREM 1/463
3. NA PREM 1/463
BIBLIOGRAPHY
* * *
PRIVATE OR UNPUBLISHED ACCOUNTS OF THE ABDICATION BY PARTICIPANTS
Beaverbrook, Lord, drafts of narrative, House of Lords Record Office, Beaverbrook papers, BBK 6/G/19
Chamberlain, Neville, diary*, University of Birmingham Special Collections, Neville Chamberlain papers NC 2/23–24
The King Who Had to Go Page 41